Russia-China CD Working Paper on New Space Treaty, June 27
I. Russian Statement
'Statement by Ambassador Leonid A. Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament, at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, June 27, 2002', Russian Foreign Ministry Document 1324-28-06-2002, June 28.
Today we and the delegation of the People's Republic of China together submit, for attention of the participants of the CD, a draft document containing possible elements of an international legal agreement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects. We put on record our gratitude to the delegations of Belarus, Indonesia, Syria, Vietnam and Zimbabwe, which expressed their willingness to cosponsor it. The relevant request to distribute it as an official document of the Conference has already been forwarded to the CD Secretariat. The response given by our partners during an unofficial presentation of the paper in the Chinese mission on 28 May, as well as the consultations held on the topic in the capitals further strengthened our conviction that this step was both correct and timely. We are grateful to all those delegations which extended their support to the basic ideas of our initiative, as well as those which suggested specific directions to improve it.
In proposing basic parameters of a possible new agreement in the area of outer space, we have taken into account the experience of nearly a nine-year work of the CD Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS. We consider that our predecessors have already done a lot in this direction by having prepared the issue for negotiation. The developments in the world during the last years have only increased the urgency of resolving the issue of PAROS. That is why we support the urgent adoption today of all measures possible in order to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, rather than waste subsequently huge efforts and resources to have it "de-weaponized".
When we were preparing the paper which is being submitted to your attention we had sought to take into account the basic approaches by our partners towards the problem. While recognizing the value of all the judgements and observations made during the briefing in the Chinese mission, we have decided, however, to refrain from amending the paper at this stage. We believe that these ideas should be subject to a careful elaboration within an appropriate Ad Hoc Committee. I will stress that our principal aim today is to stimulate the early start of substantive discussions in the CD on the issue of PAROS. We do not envisage any tracks parallel to the CD in order to discuss these issues.
While elaborating with the People's Republic of China the basic elements of a future agreement, we were taking into account the fact that the existing international legal regime regulating outer space activities contains a serious gap - the absence of a prohibition to deploy in outer space weapons other than weapons of mass destruction. In 1972 Moscow and Washington decided to partially fill it in bilaterally: the Parties included in the ABM Treaty the commitment "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are ... space-based..." Unfortunately, this rule, which significance extended far beyond the framework of the Russian-US relations and which had a global strategic dimension, also ceased to exist a few days ago, concurrently with the ABM Treaty. It is also worth mentioning the absence today of any legal impediments to deploying around the Earth, for instance, of anti-satellite weapons.
In these conditions, we propose to jointly give a thought to establishing international legal restrictions on the deployment of strike weapons in outer space. I wish to emphasize that it is not a matter of making any prejudice to outer space activities which are defense-related and which are based on the UN Charter. More than that, in accordance with the UN Charter, in particular with its provisions on the non-use of force in international relations, we propose that additional international legal protection be provided to outer space objects.
In so doing, we are not at all seeking to detract from the significance of Article 51 of the UN Charter concerning the right to self-defense. Application of this Article as practice shows is quite compatible with the processes of arms control and disarmament.
We naturally take into account the fact that the achievements in outer space technology are actively used for such "auxiliary" military purposes as communication, navigation, global positioning systems etc. They are also applied to maintain strategic stability in the world, namely to ensure that disarmament arrangements are complied with. We believe that in future the use of outer space-based means will make it possible to resolve a broader range of issues of international security, such as, for example, nuclear and missile technologies proliferation control, conventional and strategic arms build-up in potential conflict areas etc. But this does not mean, not at all, that military activities in outer space should be used to obtain the superiority in force.
Thus, the Russian delegation is proceeding from the assumption that the future agreement would not hinder outer space activities in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interests of maintaining international peace and security, and promoting international cooperation.
We are looking forward to a constructive dialogue and we are prepared to take into account considerations of all the participants in the CD in order to give a specific substance to the document and achieve a mutually acceptable compromise on its language.
II. Working Paper
'Working Paper Presented by the Delegations of China, the Russian Federation, Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Syria: Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects', paper submitted at the Conference on Disarmament, June 27; text contained in Russian Foreign Ministry Document 1324-28-06-2002, June 28.
Possible Name of Such Agreement
Treaty on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects
Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and plays an ever-increasing role in its future development.
There exists a potential danger of an armed confrontation and combatant activities being extended to outer space.
The prevention of the deployment of weapons and an arms race in outer space becomes a pressing task facing the international community.
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions on peaceful use of outer space and prevention of an arms race in outer space, which have provided a prerequisite and basis for the prevention of the deployment of weapons and an arms race in outer space.
The existing agreements on arms control and disarmament relevant to outer space, including those bilateral ones, and the existing legal regimes concerning outer space have played a positive role in the peaceful use of outer space and in regulating outer space activities. These agreements and legal regimes should be strictly complied with. However, they are unable to effectively prevent the deployment of weapons and an arms race in outer space.
For the benefit of mankind, outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and it shall never be allowed to become a sphere of military confrontation.
Only a treaty-based prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects can eliminate the emerging threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure the security for outer space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world peace.
Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects.
Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.
National Measures for the Implementation of the Treaty
Each State Party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional process, take any measures necessary to prevent or prohibit any activity contrary to this Treaty on its territory, or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
The Use of Outer Space for Peaceful and Other Military Purposes
This Treaty shall not be construed as impeding the research and use of outer space for peaceful purposes or other military uses not prohibited by this Treaty.
Each State Party to the Treaty shall carry out activities in outer space in accordance with the general principles of international law and shall not violate the sovereignty and security of other States.
Confidence Building Measures
To enhance mutual trust, each State Party to the Treaty shall promulgate its space programme, declare the locations and scopes of its space launch sites, the property and parameters of objects being launched into outer space, and notify the launching activities.
Settlement of Disputes
If a suspicion arises against any State Party to the Treaty that it is violating the Treaty, the suspecting State Party, or a group of the suspecting State Parties to this Treaty shall conduct consultations and cooperate with the suspected State Party to this Treaty in order to settle down the aroused suspicion. Each suspecting State Party to this Treaty shall have the right to request clarification from the suspected State Party to this Treaty, whereas the suspected State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to provide requested clarifications.
If consultations or clarification fail to settle down the dispute, the suspicion that has aroused shall be referred to the executive organization of the Treaty for consideration together with relevant arguments.
Each State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to cooperate in the settlement of the suspicion that has aroused by the executive organization of the Treaty.
The Executive Organization of the Treaty
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall hereby establish the executive organization of the Treaty, which shall:
(a) receive for consideration inquires by any State Party or a group of States Parties to the Treaty related to the suspicion, which has aroused by the violation of this Treaty by any State Party to the Treaty;
(b) consider matters concerning the compliance with the obligations taken by the States Parties to this Treaty;
(c) organize and conduct consultations with the States Parties to the Treaty with a view to settling down the suspicion that has aroused against any State Party to the Treaty concerning its violation of this Treaty;
(d) take necessary measures to end violation of this Treaty by any State Party to the Treaty.
Amendments to the Treaty
Any State Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment to this Treaty shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments who shall promptly circulate it to all the States Parties to the Treaty. Upon the request of at least one third of the States Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference to which all the States Parties shall be invited to consider the proposed amendment.
Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all the States Parties to the Treaty in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.
Duration of the Treaty and Withdrawal from the Treaty
The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each State Party to the Treaty shall, in exercising its state sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice to the Depository Governments of the decision adopted six months in advance of the withdrawal from the Treaty. Such a notification shall include a statement of the extraordinary events, which the notifying State Party to the Treaty regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Signature and Ratification of the Treaty
This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State, which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force, may accede to it at any time.
The Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their constitutional process. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary Governments.
This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Entry into Force of the Treaty
This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty States, including all Permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council.
For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
Authentic Texts of the Treaty
This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.