Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 86, Autumn 2007
Building Blocks for a WMD Disarmament Regime in the Middle
East
Merav Datan
The goal of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) has been repeatedly affirmed by all states in the
region, as well as the international community at the highest
political levels. Yet instead of movement towards this goal, the
actual potential trend continues to be towards proliferation of WMD
in the Middle East.
Israel's nuclear arsenal, calculated by sources originating
outside of Israel to be some 70-200 nuclear weapons, is castigated
in annual United Nations (UN) General Assembly and International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions and provides a focus for
dissent and criticism by various states parties to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Israel has never joined.
Iran, which has been an NPT party since 1970, is now the focus of
international headlines because of concerns that its uranium
enrichment programme could lay the foundation for development of
nuclear weapons. Recently, several Arab countries have announced
plans to explore and develop nuclear energy programmes for peaceful
purposes, but many analysts outside the region and in Israel
suspect that these announcements are linked to security concerns
related to perceptions of nuclear proliferation in the region.
In addition, the Middle East remains the region with the
greatest concentration of states that are not party to one or more
of the international treaties dealing with WMD: the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and the NPT, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT).[1] The
overwhelming majority of countries in the region have some form of
WMD-related research, development or weaponization programme.[2] Moreover and more ominously,
WMD, specifically chemical weapons, have in the past been used in
the Middle East. [3] Having
already crossed the WMD taboo threshold, and in light of
deep-rooted political tensions and a frequent resort to the use of
force, the potential for nuclear conflict in the Middle East is all
too real.
Elsewhere in the world, nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) have
been successfully negotiated and adopted, and additional such zones
are still being pursued. But in the Middle East the goal of a NWFZ
came to be linked with a WMD free zone (WMDFZ) in the NPT Review
Process and relevant Security Council resolutions, for example.
This is because of the de facto link that states in the
region have made among WMD,[4]
notwithstanding the significant difference in scale of mass
destruction between nuclear weapons and biological or chemical
weapons.
Rhetoric vs. Reality
The goal of a WMD free zone in the Middle East has been affirmed
by the Security Council,[5]
member states of the NPT,[6]
and by Israel.[7] It has been
a topic of discussion at countless conferences and seminars. But
such rhetoric is far from the reality.
While acknowledging that this goal has been used as a "political
football"[8] with each side
holding the others responsible for the lack of meaningful progress
towards the objective, it should also be assumed that each side
sees this goal as consistent with its long-term security interests
and that if any one of the sides indicates a willingness to relax
its current entrenched position and explore practical steps towards
achieving the goal, others will relax their current positions as
well. If so, then a show of flexibility on the part of one or more
sides would create a real political opening for exploration of
steps towards a WMDFZ and would also serve to increase external
political pressure on other sides.
The reality of WMD programmes in the Middle East and the number
of states outside of WMD-related treaties pose an enormous
challenge. The risks associated with these programmes are the main
reason why the Middle East receives the most international
attention as a region that needs to work towards a WMDFZ.
The current deadlock on progress towards the stated goal of a
WMD free zone in the Middle East and the huge gap between rhetoric
and reality reflect how key states in the region have vastly
different, even incompatible starting points. These in turn reflect
different perceptions of the tensions, as well as the causes and
effects of conflict, in the region.
The Arab states' position is essentially that addressing
security concerns in the region requires dealing with Israel's
nuclear weapons first. This view, that Israel's nuclear
capabilities are destabilizing and must be addressed as a
precondition to peace and security in the region, is reflected in
NPT review process documents and the annual General Assembly
resolution "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East"
(sponsored by a number of Arab States), as well as annual requests
for inclusion of an item on "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and
Threat" in the IAEA's General Conference agenda.
Israel's position is that peace and stability must prevail in
the region before nuclear issues can be addressed: "the
establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual
recognition and good neighbourliness, and complemented by
conventional and non-conventional arms control measures"[9] is a precondition for achieving
the vision of a WMDFZ or establishing a NWFZ in the Middle
East.
These diametrically opposed starting positions are at the heart
of the impasse, and were also the basis of the breakdown within the
Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that had
been established in 1991-2 as part of the Middle East peace
process. In order to reverse the current trend towards
proliferation and to make concrete progress towards disarmament,
the prevailing concerns of each of the relevant players must be
addressed. Once the parties involved are confident that their
security concerns can be addressed through the political process,
negotiations on the concrete building blocks of a WMD disarmament
regime can have some prospect of moving forward constructively.
Conditions for Progress
The only way to address and overcome these contradictory
starting positions - nuclear weapons first vs. normalisation first
- is to tackle them in parallel. As discussed by Rebecca Johnson in
this issue, building the prerequisites for progress will require
the leadership of the key countries in the region to change their
perceptions of what is in their real security interests.[10] Here, I will focus on some
disarmament building blocks that could be negotiated and agreed as
the political changes necessary to break the deadlock are being
constructed. In turn, the exploration of such building blocks could
feed into the process of establishing the conditions for progress
by illustrating the feasibility and value of a WMD disarmament
regime in the Middle East.
At the same time, it is essential that the process of
establishing the conditions for a disarmament regime address "soft
security" issues such as development and human rights throughout
the region and within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as these
are a frequent and recurring source of insecurity and conflict.
Addressing these issues would entail not only identifying
mechanisms for the promotion of sustainable development and human
rights, but also agreeing on a forum for the airing of past
injustices along the lines of - but not necessarily following the
form of - truth and reconciliation commissions.
Such a process will be necessary because of the important role
that history and historical identity play in the current conflict
and because of the enormous significance that all Middle Easterners
ascribe to their intertwined histories. Recent attempts to address
the present and the future have repeatedly broken down over
disagreements regarding the past, including whose version of
history is "right" and who was the cause of whose suffering.
Without a mechanism for airing grievances about the past, attempts
to establish a security dialogue and explore arms control and
disarmament options are destined to fail (and have failed). As with
truth and reconciliation commissions, the process of giving voice
to past injustices, the opportunity to be heard, and the
requirement that the other side listen are in reality a form of
redress, and often more important than material redress or physical
compensation (which might not always be feasible).
Assuming, therefore, that the need for parallel or prior fora
for addressing human and historical as well as security concerns is
recognized, and that these have facilitated in principle agreement
to negotiate, the following analysis explores the building blocks
of a WMD disarmament regime for the Middle East.
Even assuming a breakthrough in the current deadlock and a
willingness to explore and negotiate the elements of a Middle East
WMD disarmament regime, the process of political negotiation and
implementation will need to be constantly checked against
underlying security concerns and threat perceptions in order to
prevent a breakdown, as has so often occurred in the past.
The trust required to place the WMD free zone on the agenda in
the first place will likely be fragile and can be strengthened or
broken depending on whether the developing process is able to
reinforce and build on this trust or not. Therefore, the concrete
and quantitatively measurable elements proposed here for pursuing a
WMD disarmament regime must be part of an iterative process,
supplemented by an ongoing qualitative assessment of the underlying
security perspectives and concerns that would emerge from a truth
and reconciliation type process. This assessment must constantly
take into account each state's threat perceptions and seek to
develop confidence and security building measures tailored to those
specific perceptions.
In addition, energy security for the region is an essential
underlying factor with a direct bearing on the feasibility of
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts because of both the
involvement of outside players (and their interest in regional
energy sources) and the needs of the region itself, particularly
the proliferation risks associated with any nuclear programme
whether designated for peaceful purposes (energy) or not. Thus a
WMD disarmament regime can only succeed if it accommodates energy
needs and related security concerns.
Elements of a Middle East WMD Disarmament Regime
The initial elements of a WMD disarmament regime for the Middle
East need to include the following:
- Ratification of the CTBT by Egypt, Iran and Israel;
- Consideration of a Middle East No First Use of WMD agreement as
a step towards a WMD Free Zone;
- Freezing and prohibiting "sensitive" nuclear fuel cycle
activities; and
- An informed public debate within each of the states of the
region that has or is considering a nuclear programme, addressing
the full range of implications, including national and regional
security, environmental and health impact, and alternatives,
particularly renewable, sustainable energy.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The significance of CTBT ratification by all states in the
Middle East has been recognized by international authorities and
identified as an interim measure in pursuit of a zone free of WMD.
Of the 44 states whose signature and ratification are needed for
entry into force of the CTBT, four are in the Middle East: Algeria,
Egypt, Iran and Israel. Of these, all have signed the CTBT but to
date only Algeria has ratified it. The other three have repeatedly
expressed their support for the CTBT but continue to voice concerns
about its value as a real security and disarmament measure and to
link it with the policies and behaviour of other states in the
region. As the Report of the International WMD Commission, chaired
by Hans Blix, made clear in 2006, "Egypt, Iran and Israel should
join the other states in the Middle East in ratifying the CTBT."[11] What, then are the reasons
why these three states continue to hold out against ratifying the
treaty?
In its statements in various international fora, such as the UN
General Assembly and meetings of the NPT and CTBT, Egypt frequently
links its ratification to the nuclear policies of Israel, making
clear that it sees the CTBT in a regional context in which all
aspects of non-proliferation must be addressed. At the 2005
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, for
example, Egypt reaffirmed this view: "[W]hile Egypt supports the
principles and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, we cannot regard the treaty as a secluded legal instrument
apart from our common objectives to achieve nuclear disarmament and
the universality of non-proliferation. Hence Egypt calls for the
achievement of the universality of both the NPT and the CTBT
together."[12]
This position was underlined by Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul
Gheit, who, according to the Egyptian state news agency MENA,
explicitly said "that Egyptian ratification of the treaty was
linked to the extent of developments that may occur in regional and
international circumstances, including the possibility that Israel
may join the NPT."[13] Such
concerns are consistent with Egypt's overall position on nuclear
issues in the region and Israeli policy. The "all or nothing"
approach implicit in this position - that Israel must join both the
CTBT and the NPT before Egypt ratifies the CTBT - could be relaxed
if Egypt is reassured that regional non-proliferation concerns and
disarmament objectives are being pursued in a context that involves
Israel and is geared towards disarmament. In this context, it is
therefore important for Israel to take the first step of ratifying
the CTBT.
Israel participates fully in CTBT activities, particularly in
relation to verification of the treaty, and has constructed two
auxiliary seismic stations as part of the International Monitoring
System of the CTBT. On the matter of ratification, however, Israel
continues to express reservations. As expressed in its statement to
the 2007 CTBT Conference, for example, "Israel's ratification of
the CTBT will be influenced by ... the readiness of the
verification regime of the Treaty, especially that of the [on-site
inspections] and its immunity to abuse; Israel's sovereign equality
status in the Policy Making Organs of the Treaty, including those
related to the geographical region of the Middle East and South
Asia (MESA) and in the Executive Council of the future CTBTO, and
the adherence to and compliance with the ???? by states in the
Middle East."[14]
Israel's position as expressed here is consistent with its
general security concerns and reflects its mistrust of other
states. Concerns over the readiness of the verification regime
suggest a belief that a completely foolproof verification system is
a precondition for joining the treaty, a position that is
impossible to satisfy and ignores the reality that even a
less-than-perfect verification system can be a better guarantor of
security than no verification system at all. The "sovereign
equality" concern reflects Israel's strong interest, apparent in
other fora as well, in being recognized and treated as a legitimate
and equal state. In the context of the CTBT, this has practical
implications, particularly for a country that actively contributes
to and participates in the treaty's verification. Questions about
compliance with the treaty again reflect Israel's mistrust of other
states, specifically in the regional nuclear context.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the fact is that Israel has more
to gain and risks little or nothing by ratifying the CTBT.
Ratification could enhance Israel's security situation and standing
as a responsible state worthy of "sovereign equality"; it would put
pressure on Egypt and Iran to ratify the treaty, and would reassure
its neighbours and the international community that Israel is
willing to engage in multilateral nuclear disarmament.
Moreover, Israel's expressed concerns about the abuse of on-site
inspection provisions ring hollow if one considers the requirements
that trigger such inspections. Unless Israel actually plans to test
nuclear weapons, it need not fear challenge inspections, which are
a tool designed to address suspected violations of the treaty.
As the only country in the region and one of the very few in the
world not party to the NPT, Israel is in a unique position with
respect to the value of CTBT ratification and the message such a
positive act would send to the region and the world. Given its
unique and deliberately vague policy of "ambiguity" regarding its
nuclear capability, Israel has more to gain than anyone by
ratifying the CTBT. Ratification of the CTBT would signal a legally
binding commitment to the goals of non-proliferation and
disarmament, as expressed in the preamble of the Treaty. Unlike
Israel, most other states have made such a commitment through NPT
membership. Though important, Israel's active participation in the
CTBT Organization and its verification system does not have the
same symbolic and political value that CTBT ratification would
have. In addition, ratifying the CTBT would lay to rest the
widespread rumours that Israel has delayed ratifying the treaty
because the Bush Administration, with its own reasons for opposing
the CTBT, does not want it to do so. Sovereign equality, after all,
presupposes sovereign independence.
If Israel were to ratify the CTBT it would become much harder
for Egypt to resist ratification, and if Egypt were to follow suit,
the pressure for Iran to ratify would intensify. Like the others,
Iran expresses support for the CTBT and also participates in its
activities, including the hosting of five monitoring stations. Iran
implicitly justifies its non-ratification by pointing to the
policies of the nuclear weapon states (especially the United
States) and Israel, and saying that "states cannot decide in
isolation".[15] Iran has also
castigated what it calls the "selective approach" used in
establishing the verification system.[16] Most recently, Iran listed as one of the negative
developments that have jeopardized CTBT entry into force and
elimination of nuclear weapons: "Acknowledgment of the possession
of nuclear weapons by Israeli regime as a clear violation of the
spirit and letter of the CTBT, which faced with the condemnation by
a majority of the countries which are Non-Aligned Movement
[sic], and regretfully, the silence of the western
countries. This is again a clear example of the double standard
policy by the West towards nuclear disarmament and non
proliferation regime."[17]
For Iran, as for Israel, there is much to gain through the
symbolic and political value of ratification. Iran needs to
recognize the value of CTBT ratification as a way of demonstrating
the peaceful intentions of its controversial nuclear programme. In
addition, the policies of the United States and other nuclear
weapon states could be more effectively challenged by non nuclear
weapon states if these demonstrate their own commitment to
disarmament measures such as the CTBT. Ratification of the CTBT
sends a signal that the stated position of a country is reflected
in its actual policies and actions. Non-ratification undermines the
credibility of a stated policy of support for multilateral treaties
and measures. Iran, as the focus of international suspicion
surrounding its nuclear programme, could claim the moral high
ground and counter some of the suspicions by ratifying the
CTBT.
Middle East No-First-Use of WMD Agreement
The policy of "No First Use" (NFU) of nuclear weapons refers to
the renunciation of any use of nuclear weapons by a state
possessing such weapons except in response to the use of
nuclear weapons by another state. Over the course of recent
decades, NFU policies have been issued by some of the nuclear
weapons states (although in some cases these were undermined by
actual security policy), while others, including the NATO nuclear
states, refused on grounds that NFU would undermine their postures
of deterrence. Meanwhile, non-nuclear weapon states have persisted
with their calls for the universal adoption of legally binding NFU
commitments. Since in the Middle East, nuclear weapons have been
linked de facto with the other two categories of WMD, a
no-first-use of WMD in the Middle East could be a more feasible
confidence and security building measure than the nuclear no first
use proposal that has been a long-standing demand made of the other
nuclear weapon possessors.[18]
A no-first-use of WMD agreement in the Middle East would be an
important practical and substantive step towards WMD disarmament in
the region. Given the high level of mistrust among regional players
and the relative lack of commitment to WMD-related treaties,
combined with the existence of WMD-related programmes, a formal NFU
treaty may be unrealistic as a first step. Lack of progress towards
any kind of multilateral, legally binding agreement on NFU in the
international arena, despite persistent calls from the Movement of
Nonaligned States (NAM) reinforces this conclusion. However,
individual but parallel NFU commitments by states in the region
could pave the way for a legally binding regional commitment,
avoiding the problems that insisting on a formal agreement at the
outset would undoubtedly provoke. The process of making unilateral
but coordinated pledges (and later, if necessary, negotiating a
treaty) would be a useful and important confidence and security
building measure that would help to devalue all WMD in the
region.
In order to assess the feasibility of achieving such NFU pledges
within the Middle East, it is necessary to consider the positions
of the relevant states. None of the Arab states currently has a
nuclear weapons programme and all are members of the NPT, where
their standing is not in question. For them, a nuclear NFU pledge
would be a practical formality, which would be accomplished through
confirmation of their non-nuclear weapon status and their
commitment (as affirmed in the NPT) not to acquire nuclear
weapons.
With respect to biological weapons, the BWC prohibits the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of
these weapons. It does not explicitly prohibit their use (and
therefore first use) but "there is no doubt among the [states
parties] that any use of biological or toxin weapons in armed
conflict or for hostile purposes would be a breach of the
convention".[19] The Arab
states that are not party to the BWC are Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt
(signed but not ratified), Mauritania, Somalia (signed but not
ratified), Syria (signed but not ratified), and the United Arab
Emirates (signed but not ratified).
According to international law, states that have signed but not
yet ratified a treaty are legally prohibited from taking action
that would violate the affirmative provisions of the treaty. Thus
states that have signed but not yet ratified the BWC would be
legally prohibited from using biological weapons according to the
prevailing interpretations of both the treaty and of international
law. A no-first-use pledge would be consistent with their current
legal obligations even if they have not ratified the BWC. Those
Arab states that have neither signed nor ratified the BWC do not
actually have biological weapons programmes and are not directly
involved in the WMD tensions in the Middle East. They could
probably be persuaded to join no-first-use pledges by their fellow
Arab League members if the states that play a leading role with
respect to WMD issues decide to do so and emphasize the political
and symbolic importance of these pledges for regional objectives
and security.
The CWC explicitly prohibits any use of chemical weapons. The
Arab states not party to this treaty are Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,
Somalia, and Syria. These states - and the Arab League as a group -
are on the record as linking refusal to join the CWC with Israel's
refusal to join the NPT.[20]
Egypt has explicitly stated that it would not sign the CWC "because
a country in the region has a nuclear programme that is not subject
to international guarantees and this country rejects the
international efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear free
region."[21]
Iran is party to the NPT, the BWC and the CWC and has argued
before the International Court of Justice that the existing body of
international law indicates a prohibition on the use of nuclear
weapons[22] and, more
generally, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal.[23] Its legal commitments are
already consistent with a no-first- use pledge. It appears
therefore that any reservations Iran would have to such regional
pledges covering all WMD would be linked with the CWC reservations
of several Arab states and the nuclear policy of Israel, which are
inter-related.
Taken at face value, Israel's stated position that it "will not
be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East" is
essentially a no-first-use policy. Israel is not party to either
the BWC or the CWC, although it has signed the latter. If all
states in the region were to make no first use pledges relating to
all WMD in parallel, their arguments and counter-arguments
regarding one another's WMD capabilities would be cast in a
different light.
Even without a strategic and security environment that would
allow all the parties to negotiate and verify a collective
agreement, no-first-use pledges would have political value as
confidence and security building measures. They would raise the
threshold of potential WMD use and provide an important political
deterrent against any state using such weapons or maintaining
policies based on potential WMD use. If the political environment
were to improve in conjunction with such pledges as well as prior
or parallel security and disarmament oriented efforts discussed
here and elsewhere, a collective legally binding commitment could
be considered and negotiated.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities
The main sources of proliferation concerns in the Middle East
are nuclear materials and technology and the suspicions they
generate. Recommendation 12 of the WMD Commission identified the
importance of addressing nuclear fuel cycle activities in the
context of pursuit of a WMD free zone in the Middle East: "All
states should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the
overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a
confidence-building measure, all states in the region, including
Iran and Israel, should for a prolonged period of time commit
themselves to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment,
reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their
territories."[24]
Such a commitment would need to be coupled with reliable
assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear
activities.[25] Nuclear
technology was originally developed for weapons purposes, making
nuclear programmes of any sort inherently capable of being
diverted to weapons purposes and therefore capable of rousing
proliferation concerns. The case of Iran illustrates this point,
and the reactions to Egypt's announcement in September 2006
regarding the revival of its nuclear energy further support it.[26] Several Arab countries later
announced their intention to pursue nuclear energy, including
Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Some of these states
have turned to the IAEA for assistance in developing their nuclear
energy programmes.
Their stated interest is for peaceful purposes, but observers
challenge this claim: "The Middle Eastern states say they only want
atomic power. Some probably do. But US government and private
analysts say they believe that the rush of activity is also
intended to counter the threat of a nuclear Iran. By nature, the
underlying technologies of nuclear power can make electricity or,
with more effort, warheads, as nations have demonstrated over the
decades by turning ostensibly civilian programmes into sources of
bomb fuel. The uneasy neighbours of Iran, analysts say, may be
positioning themselves to do the same."[27]
Although many analysts link the Arab states' recent interest in
nuclear programmes more to Iran's nuclear capability than Israel's,
the frequent references to Israel's nuclear policy and capability
in a range of international fora cannot be ignored.
The military potential inherent in all nuclear programmes must
be addressed, and the key to allaying such suspicions lies in
addressing the concerns over nuclear materials and technology.
Discussions leading to a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are
a step in the right direction but they do not go far enough because
the current proposals would not address existing stocks or the
capability to produce weapons-usable material in the future. For
this reason, Greenpeace has recently proposed a model Comprehensive
Fissile Materials Treaty (CFMT), which it is circulating among
members of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.[28]
The proposed CFMT would prohibit the separation or processing of
weapons-usable plutonium as well as the production or processing of
highly enriched uranium, and would therefore go farther towards
addressing proliferation concerns than any of the official
proposals currently circulating. Pursuing this more comprehensive
approach internationally could cut across the current deadlock on
WMDFZ negotiations in the Middle East, since in principle each
state in the region could independently engage with this proposal.
This kind of comprehensive approach to fissile materials recognizes
that achieving a secure, sustainable zone free of WMD in the Middle
East will depend on developing better energy options and renewable
energy sources, thereby contributing to the vision of a Nuclear
Free Middle East.
Energy and Security
National security concerns, including threat perceptions, and
domestic energy needs are important drivers underlying the nuclear
and WMD policies of Middle Eastern states. There needs to be a
deeper understanding of how external energy and security interests
affect the Middle East and fuel instability and conflict. This will
require an informed debate at the domestic level on how best to
address energy needs and options, including renewable energy. In
particular, demonstrating the attractiveness and feasibility of
energy alternatives would relieve some of the pressure on states to
pursue nuclear programmes. Exploring such alternatives may need to
be independent of WMDFZ initiatives, but if pursued in parallel it
could help pave the way for progress on negotiations.
Besides the specific measures suggested above, it will also be
necessary to consider the seemingly entrenched starting points of
each of the representative positions characterized by the positions
of the Arab states, Iran, and Israel. In each case, internal or
domestic factors are inseparable from the national security and
foreign policy positions that dictate stated positions in global
fora such as the NPT and the IAEA. Threats may or may not originate
outside of the states involved, but the perceptions of regional
threats are a direct contributing factor - probably the key factor
- in each of the representative positions considered here.
How these threat perceptions translate into foreign and security
policy is highly subjective and the factors and processes of policy
determination are inevitably internal, with high levels of secrecy.
There is no "one size fits all" solution to national security
concerns, particularly not in the Middle East, which does not offer
a level playing field from any political perspective. Therefore one
of the conditions for a WMDFZ in the Middle East is a domestic
shift, at least within the key states. However it happens (and
outsiders might never fully know), some kind of shift is necessary
to foster greater openness and flexibility and influence threat
perceptions at both the public and decision-making levels. The
actual process for bringing about the policy (and perceptual)
shifts will of course depend also on political culture and how
democratic national security decision-making processes are.
What this means for international and regional efforts to
promote a WMDFZ is that the most persuasive arguments and relevant
information might differ in the case of each representative
position. Within Israel, for example, there is a great deal of
attention given to regional nuclear issues but little or no
attention to disarmament as a solution or even as a conceptual
approach that could reduce regional tensions. In fact there is no
word in Hebrew for "disarmament" as such. Rather the term used is
closer to "dismantlement", indicating a focus on the physical
aspects of the weapons rather than a shift in policy relating to
their value or use. The argument that disarmament is a relevant and
practical approach to regional security has yet to be seriously
entertained in Israel. Domestically, Israel appears almost immune
to the enormous amount of international attention given to the
issue of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, and many citizens
would probably be surprised to learn that this goal is consistent
with Israel's official position.
A shift in domestic dialogues surrounding energy needs and
options is also essential. The belief of many states in the region
that nuclear energy is a sustainable and viable way to meet
domestic energy needs is only possible because of ignorance
surrounding the realities of nuclear power generation. These
include environmental and health[29] as well as economic factors. The true costs of
nuclear power are often masked by subsidies and hidden expenses.[30]
Renewable energy alternatives such as solar or wind have not
been given anywhere near the attention that nuclear and fossil fuel
energy sources have received, globally or in the Middle East. Nor
have they received anything like the level of subsidies or
investment in research and development routinely pumped into
nuclear energy. This is unfortunate given the strong potential for
renewable energy - particularly solar and wind technologies - to
meet energy needs in the Middle East. From an environmental and
economic point of view, renewable energy sources are an option well
worth exploring, and from a non-proliferation point of view they
would make a decidedly positive contribution to security in the
region. Greenpeace and others have already provided research into a
renewable energy scenario for the Middle East that could serve to
inform domestic dialogues.[31]
Conclusions
The current deadlock over a zone free of WMD in the Middle East
is the result of a 'chicken and egg' circularity of logic, in which
each side considers action by other(s) as a necessary precondition
for making concessions itself. It can be overcome by addressing the
core issues in parallel and ensuring that underlying security
concerns and threat perceptions are continuously assessed and
addressed.
Before the practical building blocks for a disarmament regime
can be negotiated, it will be necessary for the states in the
region to make far greater progress towards addressing the past,
present and future concerns that create and fuel the tensions that
lead to the use of armed force and the pursuit of security policies
based on possession of weapons of mass destruction (or the
potential to develop and use them). Because the mistrust that fuels
tension and often sparks conflict in the Middle East is rooted in
the past, any attempt to promote security, arms control and
disarmament initiatives will only succeed if there is a prior or
parallel process for addressing matters of human rights, justice,
and history.
A "soft security" process that addresses past grievances is not
only an essential pressure valve for the expression of human
concerns that would otherwise interfere with diplomatic security
negotiations. It can also feed directly into the
confidence-building process that is essential for meaningful
disarmament. Once such a process has been developed and
implemented, the elements of a WMD disarmament regime, including
but not limited to those explored above, will be seen as more
realistic and feasible.
Notes
[1] Building a Weapons
of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global
Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences,
UNIDIR/2004/24, pp. 25, 29. See also Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (updated
September 29, 2006) http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/index.htm
[2] Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Capabilities in the Middle East, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/capable.htm
[3] Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Reported Use of Chemical Weapons,
Ballistic Missiles, and Cruise Missiles in the Middle East, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/timeline.htm
[4] Alan Dowty, "Making
'No First Use' Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent," The
Non-proliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001): 79-85.
[5] Security Council
Resolution 687 (April 3,1991).
[6] NPT 1995 Resolution on
the Middle East.
[7] State of Israel,
Explanation of Vote on the Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle
East, UN General Assembly First Committee, October 9, 2007. This is
the most recent statement of Israel's position: "Israel remains
committed to a vision of the Middle East developing into a zone
free of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weapons as well as
ballistic missiles. Yet we are also realistic enough to know that
in the current realities of the Middle East, this noble vision is
not going to materialize any time soon.." Available at:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com07/EOV/L1israel.pdf
[8] Rebecca Johnson,
"Rethinking Security Interests for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in
the Middle East", Disarmament Diplomacy 86
(this issue), Autumn 2007.
[9] Israel, Explanation of
Vote on the Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, UN General
Assembly First Committee, October 9 2007, above.
[10] Rebecca Johnson,
"Rethinking Security Interests for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in
the Middle East", op. cit.
[11] Recommendation 12,
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Arms, Report of the WMD Commission, 2006, p 81. www.wmdcommission.org
[12] Statement by Egypt at
the Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, New York, September 23,
2005
[13] "Egypt links
ratifying CTBT to Israel's nuclear stance", Pakistan Daily Times
Sunday, 28 August 2005,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_28-8-2005_pg4_7
[14] Statement by Israel
at the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Vienna, September 18,
2007
[15] Statement by Iran at
the Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, New York, 11 November
2001.
[16] Statement by Iran at
the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Vienna, 3 September
2003.
[17] Statement by Iran at
the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Vienna, September 18,
2007.
[18] This proposal and the
analysis that follow build on the presentation of Eitan Barak,
"Regional No First Use Treaty: First Step in the Right Direction?"
at the seminar "Nuclear Future in the Middle East? Options for
De-escalation" hosted by Greenpeace, Tel Aviv, Israel, 15 February
2007, and on a forthcoming paper by Eitan Barak and Merav Datan on
this topic.
[19] Jez Littlewood,
"Strengthening the Role of the BTWC and CWC" in Building a
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global
Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences (United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and League of Arab
States, Geneva 2004) p. 26.
[20] "Arab League
Reiterates Rejection of Chemical Arms Ban Treaty," The Xinhua
General Overseas News Service, March 8, 1993, cited in Nuclear
Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Chemical/3664.html
[21] "Egypt: Diplomatic
Source Says Egypt Not to Sign Chemical Weapons Treaty" Middle East
News Agency, 15 August 1996, cited in Alan Dowty, "Making 'No First
Use' Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent" The Nonproliferation
Review, Spring 2001
[22] Written Statement of
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the International
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 19 June 1995, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8678.pdf
[23] Oral Statement of the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the International
Court of Justice, Verbatim Record in the case Legality of the
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 6 November 1995, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5933.pdf
[24] Recommendation 12,
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Arms, Report of the WMD Commission, 2006, www.wmdcommission.org
[25] Weapons of Terror:
Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, op.
cit.
[26] See "Egypt goes
nuclear amid regional tensions" International Relations and
Security Network http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16724
[27] William J. Broad and
David E. Sanger, "Fearing Iran, Arab states seek nuclear power"
International Herald Tribune, April 15, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/15/news/nuke.php
[28] Comprehensive Fissile
Materials Treaty, 21 February 2006
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/
comprehensive-fissile-material
[29] An Overview of
Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and Turkey, Greenpeace,
2007,
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/
nuclear-facilities-iran-israel-turkey
[30] The Economics of
Nuclear Power, Greenpeace, 2007,
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/
the-economics-of-nuclear-power
[31] Energy
[R]evolution - A pathway to a sustainable clean energy future for
the Middle East, Greenpeace 2007,
http://www.greenpeace.org/mediterranean/reports/energy-r-evolution-a-pathwa.
See also Egypt and the Great Energy Debate, Greenpeace,
2007,
http://www.greenpeace.org/mediterranean/reports/egypt-and-the-great-energy-deb
Merav Datan is the Middle East Political
Advisor for Greenpeace International and is currently based in Tel
Aviv. She is an international lawyer and a former adjunct professor
at Rutgers Law School. She has previously worked for the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom, International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy, and as a consultant to the United
Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. Portions of this paper
appeared in the Greenpeace Briefing "Conditions for a Nuclear Free
Middle East" distributed at the International Seminar on "Steps
towards a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone", co-hosted by the
Institute for Peace Studies and Greenpeace International,
Bibliotheca Alexandrina, March 21, 2007.
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