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Disarmament Diplomacy No. 77, Cover design by Paul Aston

Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 77, May/June 2004

Report on the 2004 NPT PrepCom

Rebecca Johnson

The Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT closed in confusion and disarray around 8 pm Friday May 7, 2004, with adoption of only parts of its final report containing the most minimal agreements to enable the 2005 Review Conference to take place. At issue was whether the review and discussions in 2005 should be framed in terms of the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, the final document of which had contained some groundbreaking agreements, including the 13-step plan of action on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The PrepCom was chaired by Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia, with attendance, if not necessarily participation, by 123 states parties. The representatives of 69 NGOs were also recorded. Like much else that transpired, this does not give the true picture.

As the final PrepCom before the 2005 Review Conference, the meeting was supposed to produce recommendations and finalise arrangements for the 2005 Conference, such as the rules of procedure, documentation and agenda. By and large it failed, and the decisions it did manage to take are mired in confusion. Breaching its own rules and normal practice, the PrepCom, which carried on without translation some hours after it was officially supposed to have ended, did not even resume in open session to adopt its decisions formally and close the session. Unsurprising then that even a month later, there are differences of opinion about what was actually agreed, and at time of writing the DDA website appears still unable to provide a text of the PrepCom's final report.

This much is certain: the PrepCom failed to agree any substantive recommendations and refused to annex the Chair's summary of the meeting. Issued late in the final week, Sudjadnan's paper - as with the chair's summaries from Ambassadors Salander and Mólnár in 2002 and 2003 - was challenged by several states who wanted to defend themselves or who felt their positions had not been adequately represented. Unlike with the adoption of previous chair's summaries, Sudjadnan's was not agreed, and some argued that there should not have been a chair's summary at all, since the third PrepCom was intended to negotiate its recommendations.

As before, the PrepCom had heard over 40 general statements from states or groups of states such as the non-aligned, the European Union, the New Agenda Coalition and the League of Arab States. Significant differences emerged from the very beginning between those who saw the treaty's obligations primarily in terms of articles I and II and wanted to focus on the noncompliance of a handful of states such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya, and those for whom the nuclear weapons states' failure to make sufficient progress towards complying with article VI was at least, if not more, important. There seemed to be a worse problem than usual of repetition and duplication, as statements were first given in the general debate, then the appropriate parts were repeated for the cluster debates on disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, and often again, the same points were gone over - with perhaps a little more detail - in special time debates.

The United States, for example, wanted to point the finger at Iran and take credit for Libya's deproliferation. (Iraq was conspicuous by its absence from most interventions.) John Bolton, the obvious architect of the US delegation's tactics at the PrepCom, explicitly argued: "We cannot divert attention from the violations we face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist". By contrast, the majority of other states, including many western allies, tried to be more even-handed, raising concerns about any states that undermined the nonproliferation regime by not taking seriously their commitments under the treaty.

Apart from the United States, which despite its refrain about Iran, did manage to give one detailed statement on its own record with regard to nuclear arms control and article VI, considerable attention from other states parties was devoted to the 13 Steps, especially the CTBT, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear doctrine and policy, and verification. Other significant issues to be raised included: proposals for addressing the NPT's lack of institutional decisionmaking powers; reporting and accountability; negative security assurances - an issue likely to be at the forefront in 2005; the need to make the IAEA additional protocol into the mandatory safeguards requirement under article III (or at least as a mandatory condition of supply); nuclear safety and security; disarmament education; civil society participation and access for NGOs; and the relationship between the NPT-based nonproliferation regime and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and those contained in UNSC resolution 1540, which the Security Council adopted while the PrepCom was in session.

Instead of taking up space with the Acronym Institute's summary of the positions and arguments at the PrepCom, the Chair's summary is appended below. Although it was hardly discussed and certainly not agreed, Sudjadnan's summary gives a useful, if incomplete, view of the range of issues discussed during the two weeks. Key substantive issues will then be discussed more fully in Disarmament Diplomacy in the months leading up to the 2005 Review Conference.

Controversial though it may have been, the Chair's summary turned out to be little more than a sideshow on the final day, paling into insignificance as states parties realised they were in danger of not being able to take the necessary decisions to enable the 2005 Conference to be held.

Following considerable wrangling, especially concerning Rule 44 on participation by NGOs and by international organisations like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and nuclear weapons free zone organisations, such as OPANAL, rules of procedure based on the rules for the 2000 Review Conference were eventually agreed. However, they contain inconsistencies that may return to haunt the states parties in 2005, so rather than adopting them on the nod when the Conference opens, the President-designate, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil, and states parties would be well advised to take some time before May 2005 to sort out the contradictions and get them right. Regrettably, having 'agreed' the rules, it is more likely that inertia will prevail and they will be adopted without further consideration next year, thereby storing up procedural problems for the future.

Neither the agenda nor decisions about background documentation (normally provided in advance by the Secretariat, the IAEA, organisations like the CTBTO and nuclear free zone agencies) could be agreed. On this, the United States and France formed an unholy alliance to downgrade the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, since some of the commitments they negotiated on nuclear disarmament have come to be regarded as irksome. At issue was the 'chapeau' or framing introduction to item 16, which lists the areas to be discussed. Where most of the agenda is identical to that used in 2000, it seemed obvious to most states parties that any review of the operation of the NPT in 2005 should take into account not only the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995, but also the agreements adopted by consensus in 2000. While the preferred US-French position (tacitly abetted by the other nuclear weapon states) was to have the 2000 agreements omitted from the agenda altogether, they got little support for this, and so most of the final day was spent trying to find a formula that would downplay the significance of the 2000 outcome by lumping it in with the outcomes of previous review conferences.

These nuclear weapon state attempts to sideline and renege on negotiated, consensus undertakings caused anger and deep misgivings among others. There was speculation that this counterproductive tactic, unmistakably driven by John Bolton, could in part reflect his uncertainty about who would be in power in 2005: removing or minimising the 2000 commitments in advance may have been his way of ensuring that noncompliance by the nuclear weapon states would be less of an issue in 2005.

It is accepted wisdom in diplomatic circles that a difficult or failed PrepCom may pave the way for a successful conference better than a smooth or routine PrepCom. In this case, however, the pressure for more effective implementation of the Treaty, couple with inadequate or short-sighted management and, most importantly, conflicting agendas of key states, indicate that the problems go very deep. Elections and regime changes may make a difference, but it would take a seer or a fool to predict the outcome of the seventh Review Conference, which will take place May 2-27, 2005. To stand any chance of achieving a regime-enhancing outcome, the President-designate, ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, will have to be very deft and determined!

Chair's Summary

From Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia, as of May 6, 2004 (final version likely to carry the number NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.27, but not available at time of going to press).

1. States parties reaffirmed the preamble and articles of the Treaty. They also recognized the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and reaffirmed the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

2. States parties stressed that the Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They underscored that the Treaty rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation and agreed that these pillars represent a set of inter-related and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of States Parties.

3. States parties reaffirmed that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty is vital to international peace and security. They further reaffirmed that each article of the Treaty is binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances. States parties also reaffirmed that every effort should be made to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. They remained convinced that the best way to prevent such proliferation is through universal adherence to the Treaty, full compliance of all States parties with its provisions, and strict accountability.

4. States parties stressed that continued efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty are essential and called upon States that have not yet joined the Treaty - India, Israel and Pakistan - to accede promptly and unconditionally to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements. They further called on these States to refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

5. States parties emphasized multilateralism as indispensable in maintaining and strengthening universal norms for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and in enlarging their scope. States parties strongly supported the enforcement of multilateral treaties, and underlined the need to pursue further treaties and other international agreements that respond to today's threats to peace and stability. States parties also reaffirmed the authority of the Security Council to consider and to require effective multilateral action to deal with specific cases of non-compliance, while reaffirming the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance with safeguards obligations under the Treaty.

6. States parties stressed their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted without a vote, and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus.

7. States parties stressed the increasingly grave threat to the Treaty and international security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as the possibility that non-state actors might gain access to these weapons. The gravity of this threat reinforces the need for the full and effective implementation of treaty-based regimes. In this context, States parties noted the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004.

8. Nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitments under Article I of the Treaty. States parties emphasized that these undertakings should be fully implemented. Non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitments under Article II of the Treaty. States parties also emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon State parties should ensure that their Article II undertakings are being fully implemented. The importance of transparency, accountability, making available and exchange of information among themselves on measures related to the implementation and enforcement of their obligations under Articles I and II was stressed.

9. States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. In this context, they stressed that ownership of the capability that could be utilized to develop nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the States concerned to build confidence with the international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Such States need to ensure that the IAEA is able to verify that these capabilities are being used for peaceful purposes only, including through the mechanisms available under the Additional Protocol for strengthened safeguards.

10. States parties stressed the fundamental importance of full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and in the IAEA safeguards agreements. In this context, they reiterated their conviction that IAEA safeguards system provides a mechanism to ensure that States comply with their Treaty undertakings. They emphasized that IAEA safeguards promote further confidence among States, help to strengthen international security and play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

11. States Parties reaffirmed that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They also reaffirmed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. It was recalled that States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by other States parties, should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions, and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandates. In this context, States parties noted proposals for the Review Conference to examine the possibility of establishing procedures for convening extraordinary conferences of the States parties.

12. States parties welcomed the Agency's completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, as well as the first steps taken towards their application. States parties underscored the value of both comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocol in enabling the IAEA to provide assurance of both non-divergence of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities of material. States parties reaffirmed the need for the Additional Protocol to be universalized, and expressed their support for the implementation of the updated IAEA action plan. Support was expressed for a properly funded IAEA safeguards system, and it was noted that the 47th session of IAEA General Conference agreed to increase the 2004-2005 budget for safeguards. States parties that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements or that had not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol with the IAEA were called upon to do so without further delay. It was also stated that efforts to achieve the universal application of the Model Additional Protocol should not hamper efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements. Many States parties voiced their expectation that the strengthened safeguards system should constitute the Non-Proliferation Treaty's safeguards standard, and that this should come to be recognized as a requirement for new arrangements for nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States by the 2005 Review Conference.

13. States parties, particularly those with advanced nuclear programmes, were called upon to conclude, bring into force and implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement at the earliest opportunity. States parties recognized that such undertakings will enhance the confidence of States parties and helps eliminate concerns regarding their nuclear programmes.

14. In this context, and in light of the scope of its nuclear programme, States parties welcomed the Islamic Republic of Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and its commitment to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol pending its ratification, but they also noted that the Protocol has not yet been ratified and called on Iran to do so promptly. It was noted that the report by the IAEA Director General to the March 2004 Board of Governors recognized that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been actively cooperating with the Agency, but that it also highlights issues that remain of concern and require further clarification in accordance with the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 13 March 2004. It was also noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran clarified some issues in the IAEA Director General's March 2004 report to the Board of Governors. Some States parties noted with particular concern Iran's omission in its declarations to the IAEA concerning aspects of its uranium enrichment programme. It was further noted that the IAEA Director General is expected to report on the remaining outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme before the end of May 2004 for the IAEA Board of Governors' consideration at its June 2004 meeting. It was recalled that the Islamic Republic of Iran's statement of 29 April 2003 solemnly declaring that it does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons and that it is engaged in addressing in a detailed and substantiated manner the questions which have been raised about its nuclear programme.

15. States parties welcomed the voluntary decisions by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. While recognizing that this is a step forward, concerns remained about the development of such programmes. States parties also welcomed Libya's ratification of the CTBT, and its full cooperation the IAEA and other relevant international organizations, as well as signing of the Additional Protocol. States parties are encouraged to secure a prompt ratification of the Protocol.

16. States parties noted that the IAEA has a continuing mandate in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement and emphasized that the IAEA has to discharge its full responsibility in accordance with those commitments.

17. States parties expressed great concern at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear programmes, which undermine peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. They also expressed deep concern regarding the DPRK's decision last year to withdraw from the Treaty, which represents a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. States parties urged the DPRK to promptly come into compliance with the NPT. The DPRK was urged to promptly commit to and implement complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement. States parties stressed that the Korean Peninsula must be denuclearized, while the peace, security and stability of the region should be strengthened and the legitimate interests and concerns of the relevant parties should be satisfied. They emphasized the importance of resolving this issue through diplomatic and peaceful means within the framework of the ongoing six-party talks.

18. States parties reiterated their strong support for Article IV of the Treaty, which provides a framework for cooperation and confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States parties reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. In this connection, it was reaffirmed that each State's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies and international nuclear cooperation agreements. It was emphasized that this right places a special responsibility on the States to be in full compliance with their safeguards obligations in order to build confidence with the international community.

19. The ability of the IAEA Board of Governors to monitor and enforce compliance with safeguards agreements should be strengthened. States parties should cooperate with the IAEA at all times, including the provision of information as required by the Board in the context of an investigation into possible safeguards violations and should also support the IAEA's efforts to seek such information as necessary from non-States parties. It was proposed that measures to strengthen control over the most sensitive part of the nuclear fuel cycle be considered. It was also proposed that States parties that have been found by the Board to have failed to comply with their safeguards obligations should lose the right to develop their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

20. The proposal by the Director General of the IAEA for the restriction of the processing of weapon-usable material to facilities under multinational control was noted. Support was expressed for the initiative taken by the Director General of the IAEA to appoint an expert panel for examining possible solutions to the risks posed by the nuclear fuel cycle and to provide an interim report in a timely manner for the consideration of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. It was stressed that any consideration in this regard should respect the fundamental bargain underpinning the Treaty and should be accompanied by far reaching nuclear disarmament measures by the nuclear weapons States in order to maintaining the balance of the fundamental bargain underlying the Treaty.

21. States parties expressed support for the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA in improving health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. They stressed the importance of aligning technical cooperation programmes with the development goals and needs of the country concerned was emphasized, as well as the need to increase public awareness in this regard. States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources to further develop technical cooperation activities for the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They called upon Member States of the IAEA to bear in mind the shared responsibility and to pay in full and on time their assessed contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund as well as honoring their obligations to pay their Assessed Program Costs.

22. States parties expressed the desirability of exploring new and innovative approaches to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, while at the same time minimizing the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. Attention was drawn to the significance of developing proliferation resistant nuclear technologies and support was expressed for the work being carried out by the IAEA. Many States parties underlined the need to examine ways of strengthening control of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

23. State parties underlined that effective export controls, together with comprehensive safeguards, are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation. The importance of transparency in export controls was widely recognized. State parties should refrain from exporting sensitive materials and technologies that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons and should adopt the necessary export controls to ensure that such exports only take place for peaceful purpose. States parties were encouraged to assist other States parties in the establishment of effective national export control systems. The important role of the international export controls for nuclear related materials and technologies, including by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group were noted, in particular their utility in guiding States in setting up their national export control policies. In this context, it was proposed that the IAEA, in cooperation with the States parties, should define the minimum standard, as well as for the implementation thereof, of direct-use and dual-use export controls in the nuclear field that are necessary to achieve the non-proliferation goals of the Treaty.

24. States parties reaffirmed the importance of preventing nuclear terrorism and strongly supported existing IAEA initiatives in this regard, including the action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended. In this context, States parties stressed the importance of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund of the IAEA. States parties emphasized the need to cooperate in efforts to prevent and disrupt illicit trafficking activities in nuclear weapons related equipment, material and technology. Several States parties noted the G8's Kananaskis principles to prevent terrorists, and those harbouring them, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material.

25. States parties urged the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as an element of the non-proliferation regime that should be emphasized particularly in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism. They noted the conclusion of the work to prepare a well-defined draft amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and called for early action with respect to the strengthening of CPPNM. States parties supported a proposal for the early convening of a diplomatic conference to amend the CPPNM. States parties called upon States that had not yet done so to accede to the CPPNM. Support was expressed for the IAEA's International Physical Protection Service (IPPAS). State parties highlighted the urgent need to strengthen controls over orphan sources. Support was expressed for an initiative sponsored by the Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA on the safe management of radioactive sources. States parties were urged to implement the principles incorporated in the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiological Sources. A view was expressed that the Conference on Disarmament should revisit the issue of radiological weapons with a view to exploring the possibility of negotiating a convention on prohibiting these weapons thereby providing added support and legitimacy to the efforts of the IAEA aimed enhancing the security of radioactive sources.

26. States parties stressed the importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials. The need for maintaining the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation was also emphasized. States parties welcomed the efforts of the IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects. States parties that had not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.

27. States parties emphasized that all transport of nuclear and radioactive material, including maritime transport, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by the relevant international organizations, such as the IAEA and the International Maritime Organization. Some States parties called for effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation. States carrying out international transport stated that those transports are carried out in a safe and secure manner and in strict conformity with all relevant international standards. States parties welcomed the conclusions on safety contained in the IAEA General Conference resolution GC(47)/RES/7. States parties welcomed the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference of the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in September 2003. States parties also welcomed the outcome the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material organized by the IAEA in July 2003 and the IAEA Plan of Action on the safe Transport of Radioactive Material.

28. States parties attached importance to United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/40 on the Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes and called upon States to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would be in breach of established international law. States parties also expressed support for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.

29. States parties recalled that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

30. States parties remained committed to implementing Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of agreements reached in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. In this context, the need was identified to consider the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI as well as to consider their further development.

31. States parties noted that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress towards nuclear disarmament. They also noted that without the fulfilment of Article VI over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually interdependent and reinforcing, would lose its true value. They further noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps to ensure irreversibility.

32. States parties were of the view that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at the global and also particularly at the regional level, in line with the ultimate of objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

33. States parties reaffirmed the importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty's operation.

34. States parties recalled that the 2000 Review Conference agreed that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI. It was stressed that such reporting promotes transparency and accountability, provides a way for all States parties to demonstrate their commitment to the Treaty, serves to measure progress and compliance, builds confidence, and strengthens a sense of participation in implementing the Treaty.

35. States parties expressed continued disappointment over the lack of progress made in the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI, notwithstanding the recognition of the incremental nature of the process involved. Concern was expressed that despite the intentions of, and past achievements in, bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to many thousands. Concern and uncertainty were also expressed about new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as well as the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

36. The nuclear-weapon States parties reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear-weapon states described their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty. These include inter alia, reductions of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, deactivation of deployed nuclear warheads, dismantlement of nuclear submarines, destruction of missiles and missile silos, elimination of substantial stockpiles of weapon of mass destruction, and the intention not to develop new nuclear weapons.

37. Many States parties expressed concerns that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of arms race in outer space. They were also concerned that national missile defence system could trigger an arms race, the further development of advanced missile system and an increased in the number of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to refrain from any action that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

38. States parties acknowledged that the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") represent a positive first step, and called on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty transparent, verifiable and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure.

39. The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized to promote international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all States. In this context, a view was expressed that States parties must strictly respect their commitments under Articles I and II of the Treaty. There were calls for the preservation, reaffirmation and increased transparency in the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. There were also calls made for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives into a legal instrument and the initiation of negotiation on further reductions of such weapons. It was observed that substantial reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons had taken place through unilateral actions, and that the dismantling of these weapons under such initiatives had been partly concluded. It was stressed by States parties that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner, and that negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible. It was argued that such reductions, coupled with enhanced security, would also help to ensure that terrorists would not be able to gain access to such weapons.

40. Strong support was expressed for early entry into force of CTBT as an essential element of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation regime. In this context, it was emphasized that the commitment to achieve the conclusion of negotiation on, and the entry into force of the CTBT was an integral part of the agreements by the States parties that allowed the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The importance of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was also emphasized. States parties reaffirmed the importance of upholding and maintaining of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty and noted the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the International Monitoring System.

41. States parties emphasized that the commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, was the next logical step in the process of nuclear disarmament. States parties urged the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiation of such a treaty. States that had not yet done so were called upon to declare moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties urged the expeditious elimination of all surplus stocks of weapons-usable materials and nuclear warheads. It was noted that cooperative threat reduction programmes could also make an important contribution in this regard.

42. States parties reaffirmed the necessity to establish an appropriate subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament. States parties urged the CD to agree on a programme of work and in this regard took note of the Five Ambassadors' proposal.

43. States parties emphasized the importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place as soon as practicable fissile materials designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under safeguards.

44. It was noted that the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative - involving IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States of America - for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons under international safeguards was successfully completed by September 2002. A model legal framework has been agreed that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the IAEA and the Russian Federation or the United States of America. The Russian Federation and the United States of America were urged to approach the IAEA to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States. The Agency was urged to continue research and development into the practical aspects of verifying plutonium declared excess to military use. Consideration should also be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapon States. States parties recalled information provided by the United States of America on the placement some excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards. It was noted that several hundred tons of fissile material had been removed from military stockpiles by Russian Federation and the United States of America and would be disposed of so that it is no longer usable in nuclear weapons. Progress was welcomed in agreements for disposing of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The G-8 Global Partnership was highlighted as a positive contribution toward cooperation in reducing threats from all weapons of mass destruction through practical initiatives. States parties also noted the safeguards experience of IAEA in verifying nuclear materials and expressed the view that the Agency could play an important role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

45. States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. They emphasized that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference noted that further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that these steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. They also emphasized that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on security assurances. States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an agreement or protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective Security Council resolution. Views were expressed that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfilment of the Treaty obligations. States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Concern was expressed that recent developments regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons might undermine commitments taken under that resolution. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first-use policy.

46. States parties reaffirmed their support for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of all the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties was stressed. Support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status was also reiterated.

47. State parties welcomed efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world were welcomed. States parties welcomed that a Treaty on a Central Asian nuclear weapon free zone has been concluded, but noted that it has not been opened for signature. States parties were encouraged by the fact that Central Asian countries had been engaged in consultations. Hope was expressed that the consultations between the Central Asian States and the nuclear-weapon States would lead to a successful outcome. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.

48. The on-going consultations between ASEAN and the nuclear-weapon-states on the Protocol of the Southeast Asia NWFZ Treaty were noted. In this regard, it was also noted that one nuclear weapon State has reached agreement on the Treaty and its Protocol. Other nuclear-weapon States were urged to continue their consultations. States parties stressed the importance of the early accession of nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol.

49. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. States parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

50. States parties recalled that the 2000 Final Document request all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report to the United Nations Secretary-General, to the President of the 2005 Review Conference, as well as the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

51. States parties urged India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and to conclude Additional Protocols. States parties expressed concerns over the two countries' nuclear weapon programmes and urged them to fulfil the requirements of UNSC resolution 1172 (1998) and reaffirmed that these States do not in any way have the status of nuclear-weapons States. It was recalled that both States have declared moratoria on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the CTBT, and called upon them to sign the Treaty. It was further recalled that both States expressed their willingness to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. States parties welcomed the reduction of tension between the two States and subsequent steps taken by them towards the resolution of dividing issues.

52. While recognizing the right of each State party to withdraw from the Treaty as provided for in Article X (1), it was proposed that procedures be established for the exercise of this right in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty.

53. Recognizing the value of reporting in the context of the Treaty and given the interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of States parties, a proposal was made that the 2005 Review Conference adopt a distinct decision on reporting on the implementation of the Treaty as a whole.

54. States parties agreed that disarmament and non-proliferation education is important in strengthening the full implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In that connection, they welcomed recommendations for utilizing education in pursuit of this objective, which were contained in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted by the Secretary General to the General Assembly at its 57th session. It was recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 57/60 entitled "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education", conveyed the recommendations for implementation, as appropriate, by Member States, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations and the media. States parties were encouraged to include in their education and training programmes information on the Treaty, including its Review Conferences and the work of States parties to implement the Treaty. Relevant international organizations such as the IAEA also were encouraged to present educational and training programs related to implementation of the Treaty.

55. States parties acknowledged the involvement and contribution of civil society in the Treaty review process. Substantive proposals were made for the enhanced participation of non-governmental organizations.

Source: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org. This excellent website features almost all the statements and documents from the PrepCom, as well as the NGO statements and analyses and much more.

© 2004 The Acronym Institute.