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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 37, May 1999

China Nuclear Spying Allegations: The Cox Report

'Final Report of the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,' chaired by Christopher Cox (Republican - California); unclassified version released on 25 May 1999

Editor's notes: the unclassified version of the Cox Report is available on the Internet at http://www.house.gov/coxreport/

Summary of the Report's Overview

"One: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons.
  • The stolen information includes classified information on seven US thermonuclear warheads [W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM, W-86 Peacekeeper ICBM, W-78 Minuteman III (Mark 12A) ICBM, W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM, W-70 Lance SRBM, W-62 Minuteman III ICBM, W-56 Minuteman II ICBM], including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the US ballistic missile arsenal [W-88, W-86, W-78, W-76, W-62].
  • The stolen information also includes classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the 'neutron bomb') which neither the United States, nor any other nation, has yet deployed.
  • The PRC has obtained classified information on the following US thermonuclear warheads [Editor's note: all seven warheads itemised above], as well as a number of associated reentry vehicles (the hardened shell that protects the thermonuclear warhead during reentry). ...
  • The Select Committee has found that the primary focus of this long-term, ongoing PRC intelligence collection effort has been on the following national weapons laboratories: Los Alamos; Lawrence Livermore; Oak Ridge; Sandia. ...
  • The stolen US nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with our own. ...

The Select Committee judges that the PRC's next generation of thermonuclear weapons, currently under development, will exploit elements of stolen US design information.

  • The Select Committee judges that the PRC will in fact use a small nuclear warhead on its new generation ICBMs.
  • The Select Committee judges that:
1. The PRC is likely to continue to work on small thermonuclear warheads based on stolen US design information;

2. The PRC has the infrastructure and ability to produce such warheads, including warheads based on elements of the stolen W-88 Trident D5 design information;

3. The PRC could begin serial production of small thermonuclear warheads during the next decade in conjunction with its new generation of road-mobile missiles;

4. The introduction of small warheads into PLA [People's Liberation Army] service could coincide with the initial operational capability of the DF-32 [road-mobile solid-propellant ICBM], which could be ready for deployment in 2002. ...

  • The Select Committee judges that, if the PRC were successful in stealing nuclear test codes, computer models, and data from the United States, it could further accelerate its nuclear development. ...
  • In the near term, a PRC deployment of mobile thermonuclear weapons, or neutron bombs, based on stolen US design information, could have a significant effect on the regional balance of power, particularly with respect to Taiwan. ...
PRC penetration of our national weapons laboratories spans at least the past several decades and almost certainly continues today.
  • Counterintelligence programs at the national weapons laboratories today fail to meet even minimal standards. ...
Two: The PRC has stolen or otherwise illegally obtained US missile and space technology that improves the PRC's military and intelligence applications.
  • The PRC has stolen US missile technology and exploited it for the PRC's own ballistic missile applications.
  • The PRC has proliferated such missile technology to a number of other countries, including regimes hostile to the United States. ...
  • In the late 1990s, the PRC stole or illegally obtained US developmental and research technology that, if taken to successful conclusion, could be used to attack US satellites and submarines. ...
  • Currently deployed PRC ICBMs targeted on the United States are based in significant part on US technologies illegally obtained by the PRC in the 1950s. ...
  • In the aftermath of three failed satellite launches since 1992, US satellite manufacturers [Loral and Hughes] transferred missile design information and know-how to the PRC without obtaining the legally required licenses. This information has improved the reliability of PRC rockets useful for civilian and military purposes. The illegally transmitted information is useful for the design and improved reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles...
  • In light of the PRC's aggressive espionage campaign against US technology, it would be surprising if the PRC has not exploited security lapses that have occurred in connection with launches of US satellites in the PRC. ... The Select Committee has found numerous lapses in the intended pre-launch technology safeguards. ...
  • Foreign brokers and underwriters of satellite and space launch insurance have obtained controlled US space and missile-related technology outside of the system of export controls that applies to US satellite manufacturers. ...
  • The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act took important steps to correct deficiencies in the administration of US export controls on commercial space launches in the PRC. But the aggressive implementation if this law is vital, and other problems with launches in the PRC that the Act does not address require immediate attention. ...
  • It is in the national security interest of the United States to increase US domestic launch capacity.
Three: United States and international export control policies have facilitated the PRC's efforts to obtain militarily useful technology.
  • Recent changes in international and domestic export control regimes have reduced the ability to control transfers of militarily useful technology
  • The dissolution of COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] in 1994 left the United States without an effective, multilateral means to control exports of militarily useful goods and technology. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies leaves international controls over the transfer of military technologies to national discretion. ...
  • The expiration of the Export Administration Act 1994 has left export controls under different legislative authority that, among other things, carries lesser penalties for export violations than those that can be imposed under the Act. ...
  • US policy changes announced in 1995 that reduced the time available for national security agencies to consider export licenses need to be reexamined in the light of the volume and complexity of licensing activities. ...
  • Dividing the licensing responsibilities for satellites between the Departments of Commerce and State permitted the loss of US technology to the PRC. The 1996 decision to give Commerce the lead role in satellite exporting was properly reversed by the Congress. ...
  • US policies relying on corporate self-policing to prevent technology loss have not worked. Corporate self-policing does not sufficiently account for the risks posed by inherent conflicts of interest, and the lack of priority placed on security in comparison to other corporate objectives. ...
  • The PRC requires high performance computers (HPCs) for the design, modelling, testing, and maintenance of advanced nuclear weapons based on the nuclear weapons design information stolen from the United States. The United States relaxed restrictions on HPC sales in 1996; and the United States has no effective way to verify that HPC purchases reportedly made for commercial purposes are not diverted to military uses. The Select Committee judges that the PRC has in fact used HPCs to perform nuclear weapons applications. ...
  • The PRC has attempted to obtain US machine tools and jet engine technologies through fraud and diversions from commercial end uses. In one 1991 case studied by the Select Committee, the Department of Commerce decontrolled jet engines without consulting either the Defense Department or the State Department. ...
Four: The PRC seeks advanced US military technology to achieve its long-term goals. To acquire US technology the PRC uses a variety of techniques including espionage, controlled commercial entities, and a network of individuals and organizations that engage in a vast array of contacts with scientists, business people, and academics.
  • The PRC has mounted a widespread effort to obtain US military technologies by any means - legal or illegal. These pervasive efforts pose a particularly significant threat to US export control and counterintelligence efforts.
  • The Select Committee has determined that the Intelligence Community is insufficiently focused on the threat posed by PRC intelligence and the targeted effort to obtain militarily useful technology from the United States. ...
  • Efforts to deny the PRC access to US military technology are complicated by the broad range of items in which the PRC is interested, and by transfers to the PRC of Russian military and dual-use technologies, which may make the consequences of the PRC's thefts of US technology more severe. ...
  • The PRC uses commercial and political contacts to advance its efforts to obtain US military, as well as commercial, technology. ...
  • The PRC has proliferated nuclear, missile, and space-related technologies to a number of countries. ... The PRC has provided, or is providing, assistance to the missile and space programs of a number of countries... These countries include, but are not limited to: Iran...; Pakistan...; Saudi Arabia...; North Korea. ..."

Chapter 11: 38 Recommendations

"Nuclear Weapons

1. Semi-Annual Report by the President on PRC Espionage

The Select Committee recommends that the President report to the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate, no less frequently than every six months on the steps, including preventive action, being taken by the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all other relevant Executive departments and agencies to respond to espionage by the People's Republic of China as typified by the theft of sophisticated US nuclear weapons design information, and the targeting by the PRC of US nuclear weapons codes and other national security information of strategic concern.

2. Urgent Priority to Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program

… To this end, the Select Committee recommends the following:

3. Implementation and Adequacy of PDD-61

The appropriate congressional committees should review, as expeditiously as possible, the steps that the Executive branch is taking to implement Presidential Decision Directive...

4. Comprehensive Damage Assessment

The appropriate Executive departments and agencies should conduct a comprehensive damage assessment of the strategic implications of the security breaches that have taken place…

5. Legislation to Implement Urgent and Effective Counterintelligence. …

6. Five-Agency Inspectors General Examination of Scientific Exchange Program Risks to National Security

The Select Committee recommends that the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence direct their respective Inspectors General and appropriate counterintelligence officials to examine the risks to US national security of international scientific exchange programs between the United States and the PRC that involve the National Laboratories. Such Executive department and agency heads shall transmit the results of these examinations [to the Senate]…no later than July 1, 1999.

7. Congressional Examination of Whether Department of Energy Should Maintain US Nuclear Weapons Responsibility. …

8. Intelligence Community Failure to Comply with National Security Act; Need for Congressional Oversight. …

International Actions

9. Need for PRC Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime. …

10. Need for US Leadership to Enforce Missile Technology Control Regime. …

11. Need for US Leadership to Establish Binding International Proliferation Controls

In light of the demise of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and the insufficiency of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the United States should work, including in the context of the scheduled 1999 review of the Wassenaar Arrangement, to establish new binding international controls on technology transfers that threaten international peace and US national security.

12. US Action to Improve Multilateral Tracking of Sensitive Technology Exports

… [T]he United States should take appropriate action, including in the context of the scheduled 1999 review of the Wassenaar Arrangement, to improve the sharing of information by nations that are major exporters of technology…

13. US Action to Stem Russian Weapons Proliferation to PRC

… [T]he United States should work to reduce the transfers of weapons systems and other militarily significant technologies from Russia and other nations to the PRC. …

14. New Legal Requirements for Executive Branch Reporting on Proliferation

Appropriate congressional committees should report legislation requiring the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant Executive departments and agencies to report in a timely fashion to appropriate congressional committees…on technology transfers that raise a proliferation concern…

Satellite Launches

15. Implementation of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999. …

16. State Department Should Have Sole Satellite Licensing Authority. …

17. State Department Need for Adequate Personnel and Resources for Satellite Export Licensing. …

18. Corrective Tax Legislation for Satellite Exports. …

19. Heightened Requirements for Defense Department Monitoring of Foreign Launches. …

20. Defense Department, Not Satellite Firms, Should Be Responsible for Security at Foreign Launches. …

21. Need for Adequate and Permanent Force of Well Trained Defense Department Monitors. …

22. Need for Full and Timely Reporting of Technology Passed to PRC, and of Foreign Launch Security Violations. …

23. Application of Export Control Laws to Space Launch Insurers. …

24. Expansion of US Launch Capacity in National Security Interest. …

High Performance Computers

The Select Committee supports the sale of computers to the PRC for commercial but not military purposes. …

25. Legislation to Require Comprehensive Testing of HPCs, Clustering, and Massive Parallel Processing in National Security Applications. …

26. Annual Threat Assessment of HPC Exports to PRC. …

27. End Use Verification for PRC Use of HPCs. …

28. US Leadership for Multinational HPC Export Policies. …

Export Legislation and Other Technology Controls

29. Reauthorization of Export Administration Act

The Select Committee recommends that the appropriate congressional committees report legislation to reenact the Export Administration Act, with particular attention to re-establishing the higher penalties for violation of the Act that have been allowed to lapse since 1994.

30. Prioritization of National Security Concerns With Controlled Technologies; Continuous Updating. …

31. Executive Department Approvals for Exports of Greatest National Security Concern. …

32. Streamlined Licensing Procedures. …

33. Effect of Maintaining Looser National Security Controls for Hong Kong Since Its Absorption by PRC on 1 July, 1997

The Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees report legislation requiring appropriate Executive departments and agencies to conduct an initial study, followed by periodic reviews, of the sufficiency of customs arrangements maintained by Hong Kong with respect to the PRC…

34. Mandatory Notice of PRC or Other Foreign Acquisition of US National Security Industries. …

Intelligence/Counterintelligence Issues

35. Comprehensive Counterintelligence Threat Assessment of PRC Espionage. …

36. Legislation to Improve Sharing of Sensitive Law Enforcement Information within the Executive Branch. …

37. Five-Agency Inspectors General Examination of Countermeasures Against PRC Acquisition of Militarily Sensitive Technology

The Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees require the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence to direct their respective Inspectors General to investigate the adequacy of current export controls and counterintelligence measures…and to report to Congress by 1 July, 1999...

38. All-Source Intelligence Analysis of PRC Plans for Technology Acquisition. …"


White House Reaction

'Response to the Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,' The White House, 25 May 1999

"The Select Committee submitted its classified report to President Clinton on 4 January, 1999, including 38 recommendations to address issues related to export controls and counterintelligence. On 1 February, 1999, the President provided a written response to the Select Committee's recommendations, a portion of which was declassified and released to the public. In its response, the Administration agreed with the Committee on the need to maintain effective measures to prevent the diversion of US technology and prevent unauthorized disclosure of sensitive military information. This applies to our exports worldwide. We also agree with the Committee's recommendation to support US high tech competitiveness consistent with national security. This has been a longstanding premise of the Clinton Administration's technology transfer policies.

In this regard, the Administration agrees with the substance of nearly all the Committee's recommendations, many of which we have been implementing for months, and in some cases, years. We have worked cooperatively with the Committee to declassify as much of the report as possible so that the American public can be informed on these important issues, consistent with the need to protect sensitive national security and law enforcement information. The declassified report, released today, provides the Committee's detailed assessments and investigations underlying its recommendations. Although the Administration does not agree with all of the Committee's analysis, we share the Committee's objective of strengthening export controls and counterintelligence, while encouraging legitimate commerce for peaceful purposes. With regard to the specific issues raised in the report:

Security at US National Laboratories

The Administration is deeply concerned about the threat that China and other countries are seeking to acquire sensitive nuclear information from the US National Laboratories. Security at the labs has been a long-term concern, stretching back more than two decades. In 1997, the Administration recognized the need to respond to this threat with a systematic effort to strengthen counterintelligence and security at the US National Laboratories. In response, President Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-61) in February 1998. This directive is the most comprehensive and vigorous attempt ever taken to strengthen security and counterintelligence procedures at the Labs. The FBI, in cooperation with DOE, is continuing its investigation into the possible source and extent of sensitive information that China may have acquired.

We welcome the Select Committee's support for PDD-61. As the President indicated in February, the Administration agrees with all of the Committee's recommendations concerning lab security, and we are carrying out these recommendations:

  • The President asked the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct a formal Intelligence Community damage assessment on China, which was reviewed by an independent panel headed by Admiral David Jeremiah. This review was completed and briefed to Congress on 21 April, 1999.
  • The DCI will, at the President's direction, also consider the recommendations made by Admiral Jeremiah's group on intelligence collection and resources.
  • President Clinton asked the DOE to lead an interagency assessment of lab-to-lab programs with China, Russia, and other sensitive countries, which is scheduled for completion on 1 June, 1999. The Administration believes that these programs serve the national security interest, but we are committed to ensuring that appropriate protections are in place to prevent compromise of classified information.
  • Energy Secretary Bill Richardson is aggressively implementing PDD-61 on an expedited basis, and has been following the implementation plan that was submitted to Congress on 5 January, 1999. By the end of 1999, the DOE CI program will be as good as the best in the US Government.
  • In addition, Secretary Richardson has instituted a number of additional actions to improve counterintelligence security and safeguards at the National Laboratories, including in the critical area of cyber security. Secretary Richardson ordered a 14-day 'stand-down' of all classified computers at the weapons labs, has initiated a massive reorganization of department security functions, and has greatly increased the cyber security posture at DOE.
  • On 29 March, 1999, the Department of Energy submitted to Congress its annual Report on Safeguards and Security at the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Facilities. The report found that no nuclear material at DOE was at risk, but rated some areas 'marginal'. DOE initiated a thorough upgrade of all physical security and has committed to making all necessary upgrades so that all sites receive the highest rating by January 2000.
  • The Director of Central Intelligence, in coordination with appropriate agencies, is preparing a semi-annual report to Congress on the measures that are being taken to protect against espionage efforts by China to obtain nuclear weapons and other national security information of strategic concern.
In addition to the above steps recommended by the Select Committee, the President has requested Senator Warren Rudman, as Chairman of the bipartisan President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to evaluate security at the labs. Senator Rudman has assembled an excellent team of Board members to examine the issue.

Finally, the President asked the National Counterintelligence Policy Board to recommend measures to strengthen controls over nuclear information at facilities aside from the National Laboratories that handle nuclear weapons issues.

Missile & Space Technology

The Administration agrees with the Select Committee on the need to ensure that the launch of US-manufactured civilian satellites by China or any other foreign country does not inadvertently transfer missile technology. The Department of Justice is continuing to investigate the allegations of improper transfers cited by the report, and it is inappropriate to comment on the specifics of these cases. The Administration also agrees with the Committee on the need to establish procedures to ensure timely processing of licenses, consistent with national security.

In this regard, the Administration agrees with and is carrying out all of the Committee's recommendations concerning satellite launches:

  • The Administration has implemented the provisions of the FY99 Defense Authorization Act, by, among other things, transferring licensing for communications satellite exports from the Department of Commerce to the Department of State.
  • As recommended by the Select Committee, the Department of State has developed new procedures for timely review of licenses, and is increasing its licensing staff to ensure the procedures are implemented properly.
  • The Department of State has taken steps to ensure that the affected US companies understand and comply with the requirements of law and regulation for data that may be provided to the space insurance industry. The Department of Defense is implementing several measures proposed by the Committee to strengthen monitoring of foreign launches. Specifically:
5. DoD has established a new organization called the Space Launch Monitoring Division within the Technology Security Directorate of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and is hiring 39 additional staff for this function. The new division fulfills the congressional requirement in the FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act to recruit, train, and maintain a staff dedicated to all aspects of monitoring the export of space launch and satellite technology from the US.

6. The new dedicated, professional staff in DoD will provide end-to-end monitoring of controlled space launch and satellite technologies from the first export license application through to launch and failure analyses if necessary. The monitors will review and approve all technology transfer controls plans, and all controlled technical data proposed for export. Monitors will participate in all technical interchange meetings and other discussions involving controlled technical data. Monitors will also deploy to launch sites as a cohesive group with expertise in space launch security operations, and satellite and launch vehicle technologies.

7. Plans are also in place to ensure that there are also resources available within DoD to augment the full-time monitoring staff should that be necessary to meet temporary surges in requirements for monitoring of meetings and other activities. As well, State and DoD are requiring industry to establish electronic archiving of technical data to ensure a complete and readily accessible data base of all controlled data exported as part of a satellite launch campaign.

8. Training for the monitor staff is being enhanced through a program of initial and recurring training and evaluation. The training will be managed as a formal program through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's training facilities at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. The program will encompass the complete monitoring activities outlined in the FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act.

9. Finally, DoD is examining the recommendation regarding contracting for security personnel to provide physical security at foreign launch sites. DoD looks forward to a dialogue with the appropriate congressional oversight committees on this matter.

The Administration is encouraging development of the US domestic launch industry, to reduce our dependence on foreign launch services. Since 1994, the Administration has fostered the international competitiveness of the US commercial space launch industry by pursuing policies and programs aimed at developing new, lower cost US capabilities to meet both government and commercial needs. For instance, DoD is investing $3 billion in partnership with US commercial space companies to develop and begin flying two competing families of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) with a goal of significantly reducing launch costs for government and commercial payloads.

For the longer term, NASA has committed nearly $1 billion toward work with industry in developing and demonstrating technology for next generation reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). NASA's goal is to reduce launch costs by a factor of 10 within 10 years. To address the shifting balance from mostly government to predominantly commercial space launches in the US, the Administration recently initiated an interagency review to assess the appropriate division of roles and responsibilities between government agencies and the US commercial space sector in managing the operation, maintenance, improvement, and modernization of the US space launch bases and ranges. Together, these measures comprise an effective strategy aimed at strengthening domestic US space launch capabilities and our industry's international competitiveness.

Domestic and International Export Policies

The Administration agrees with the Committee that the end of the Cold War and dissolution of COCOM in 1994 has complicated efforts to control transfers of militarily important dual-use goods and technology. In this regard, the Administration agrees with the Committee on the desirability of strengthening the Wassenaar Arrangement to improve international coordination and reporting on the export of militarily useful goods and technology, and to prevent transfers of arms and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses if the situation in a region, or the behavior of a state is or becomes a cause of serious concern to the participating states. All Wassenaar members currently maintain national policies to prevent such transfers to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. We are making a concerted effort this year to strengthen and enhance existing transparency mechanisms and to expand restraint measures. We do not believe that other countries are prepared to accept a legally binding international regime like COCOM directed against China and we are not seeking such a regime. We note that a COCOM-style veto could act against US interests by letting other countries block US sales to our own security partners.

The Administration agrees with the Committee on the need to enact a new Export Administration Act with new penalties. We have operated for too long without updated legislation in this very important area. The Administration will work with the appropriate Committees in Congress and US industry to obtain a new Export Administration Act. The Administration believes that the existing dual-use export licensing system allows adequate time for careful review of license applications and provides effective procedures to take account of national security considerations in licensing decisions.

High Performance Computers

The Administration agrees with the Committee that we should encourage the sale of computers to China for commercial, but not military, purposes. The Administration has not licensed high performance computers (HPC) to China for military purposes.

  • As recommended by the Committee, we are reviewing the potential national security uses of various configurations of computers, the extent to which such computers are controllable, and the various consequences to the US industrial base of imposing export controls on such computers. Our target date for completing this review is May 1999.
  • We also agree with the Committee that we need the capability to visit US HPCs licensed for export to China to observe how they are being used. During President Clinton's visit to China in June 1998, we secured a long sought Chinese agreement to arrangements to conduct on-site visits in China to help verify the civilian use of HPCs and other dual-use technology. We have been working to expand and strengthen this arrangement. We believe that it is not possible to obtain agreement by China or any other country to a no-notice verification regime for US goods.
Chinese Technology Acquisition and Proliferation Activities

The Administration is well aware that China, like other countries, seeks to obtain sensitive US technology for military uses. We maintain strict policies prohibiting the export to China of munitions and dual-use items for military use. As recommended by the Select Committee, the FBI and CIA plan to complete their annual comprehensive threat assessment of PRC espionage by the end of May, 1999, and the Inspector Generals of State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, Treasury, and CIA expect to complete their review of export controls by June 1999.

The Administration agrees with the Select Committee on the need to obtain more responsible export behavior by China. Through our policy of engagement, we believe that significant gains have been realized on this front. For example, at our initiative China has committed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan or elsewhere, a commitment we believe is being observed by Beijing, terminated assistance to Iran on a project of nuclear proliferation concern and refrained from new civil and military nuclear cooperation with Iran, stopped exports of C-802 cruise missiles to Iran, and strengthened export controls over nuclear and chemical weapons related materials. China has also, with our urging, ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which are the key pillars of the international nonproliferation regime. On regional security, China has provided concrete assistance in dealing with proliferation threats in North Korea and South Asia.

The Administration agrees with the Committee that we should seek Chinese adherence to the MTCR. In June 1998, President Jiang announced that China will actively study MTCR membership. The Administration intends to continue actively pressing the Chinese on this issue and other proliferation issues of concern."

© 1999 The Acronym Institute.

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