Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 26, May 1998
PrepCom DocumentsThe Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Geneva, 27 April-8 May 1998
The Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS)
'Statement by the Delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,' 28 April
"1. As the Nuclear Weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America believe it is appropriate and useful in connection with the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty to express our shared views on issues relating to the implementation of the Treaty.
2. We welcome the fact that since the indefinite extension of the Treaty's duration on 11 May 1995, the Treaty has been strengthened by the almost universal adherence to it. It will be further strengthened when Brazil has implemented the declared and very welcome intention of its Government to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.
3. It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security. We underscore the important and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
4. The opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996, and its signature on that day by all of us, was a major achievement by the international community. We strongly support the earliest ratification of the Treaty by all States, in particular by those whose ratification ensures its entry into force. To this end France and the United Kingdom have already ratified the Treaty. In addition we are all fully supporting the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation. We call upon all States to contribute to the success of this Treaty.
5. We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the Decision on Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and as its second step, following the completion of the CTBT negotiations.
6. Such a treaty will cap the fissile material stockpiles available for use in nuclear weapons and, by adding new constraints, will strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and will constitute a significant step towards the eventual achievement of nuclear disarmament.
7. We encourage all States Parties to the NPT to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the NPT to join negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
8. In connection with our determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, we welcome:
9. We also welcome and encourage overall progress towards general and complete disarmament, as provided for in Article VI of the NPT, for which all States Parties share responsibility.
10. We emphasise the importance of the faithful adherence of all States Parties to their respective non-proliferation obligations under the NPT and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties. We reaffirm our conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security. We recall the security assurances we have provided to the parties to these treaties which now number nearly 100 countries. Moreover, we are working with the signatories of the South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty to remove those obstacles currently preventing the nuclear weapon States from signing the Protocol to that Treaty. We supported the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' in the Conference on Disarmament, as part of the decision adopted by the Conference on 26 March 1998.
11. We welcome the adoption on 15 May 1997 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency of a Model Additional Protocol containing measures which, when implemented, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
12. We urge all States which have not yet done so to start early negotiations with the IAEA and to conclude their Additional Protocol negotiations in accordance with this model as soon as possible. We also note that at the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting in May 1997 all of us made commitments to negotiate Additional Protocols or other legally binding agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each of us has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the protocol and as consistent with our obligations under Article I of the NPT.
13. We welcome the development and emphasise the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy which is used increasingly in many sectors of the economy, not just for the production of electricity but also for the improvement of the health and welfare of mankind.
14. Nuclear security is a fundamental issue. The acceptance by States of safeguards under Article III.1 of the NPT is a key requirement. The work of the Zangger Committee in setting guidelines for the implementation of Article III.2 of the NPT is also important. Moreover, both support the peaceful development of nuclear energy.
15. We remain determined to increase nuclear security and reinforce our joint efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. In this regard, we evaluate positively the implementation of the relevant decisions of the 1996 Moscow Summit.
16. We attach importance to the full implementation of Article IV of the NPT. In this context we reaffirm our commitment towards cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty and following up the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
17. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.
18. We reaffirm the absolute necessity of nuclear safety and the need to pursue research to ensure ever greater safety in the future, including in the field of waste management in order to ensure that nuclear waste does not become a burden for future generations.
19. We emphasise the importance of transparency in the development of nuclear energy, particularly regarding safety.
20. In recognition of the value of the NPT to global security and conscious of our obligations under the Treaty, we will continue to work together for the success of the preparatory process and the 2000 Review conference and on related issues."
Statement by Sha Zukang, Head of Delegation, 27 April 1998
"[Of all aspects of the NPT,] [n]uclear disarmament, which has direct bearings on every State's security, attracts most attention from the international community. It is true that with the relaxation of [the] international situation after the end of the Cold War and the joint efforts of the international community, some progress has been attained in this respect, as exemplified in particular by the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, which constitutes an important step forward in the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament. The United States and Russia, the two States with largest nuclear stockpiles, have concluded START I and START II. However, the aforementioned developments are far from meeting the expectations of the international community. We still have a long way to go in nuclear disarmament.
FMCT should have been the most appropriate subject for negotiation in the field of multilateral nuclear disarmament after CTBT. In 1995, the CD adopted by consensus the Shannon Report which defined the negotiation mandate. In the same year, the NPT Review Conference once again called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on FMCT. Since then, three years have passed, but the negotiations have been kept from starting. The CD has even been unable to re-establish an ad hoc committee on this matter.
Almost twenty years have elapsed since the proposal on negotiating a legally binding NSA instrument was first put forward at the Second NPT Review Conference in 1980. Little progress has been made on this issue due to causes known to all. The reasonable and justified demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States has been neglected.
In the field of bilateral nuclear disarmament, though START I and START II were reached between the US and Russia, it is clear that even after the implementation of the reductions required by START II in the year 2007, the two countries will retain 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads respectively in active deployment, which can destroy mankind many times, not to mention the large number of warheads they each keep in storage.
Strategic missile and its defense are inter-related. The development of [a] strategic missile defense system will certainly have serious and far-reaching impact on nuclear disarmament process. In recent years, some worrisome tendencies have emerged in the field of nuclear disarmament, which are inconsistent with or even run counter to the trend of the times. Some countries are conducting research on and development of advanced strategic missile defense systems and outer space weapons, in an attempt to consolidate and even expand their strategic advantage acquired in the Cold War era, and to seek absolute security for themselves.
China was forced to develop a very limited nuclear force due to historical reasons. As a nuclear-weapon State, however, China has adopted a firm and clear-cut attitude towards nuclear disarmament. We have never shied away from our responsibility on nuclear disarmament, and stand ready to undertake corresponding obligations at all time. In order to demonstrate China's sincere attitude towards nuclear disarmament and to promote the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons at an early date, we appeal once again that, a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons be concluded at an early date like the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal, we can take some practical and feasible measures. For this purpose, we make the following proposals:
The prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation is another task facing us. ...
In recent years, the Chinese Government, on the basis of its existing management system, has taken a series of measures to further strengthen and improve its nuclear export control mechanism. Last May, the State Council of China promulgated the Circular on Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear Export Policy, which enhanced its export control on nuclear-related dual use items. Last September, China's State Council promulgated the Regulations on Nuclear Export Control. At present, the departments concerned of China are in the process of formulating export control regulations on nuclear-related dual use items. The regulations are expected to be issued in mid-1998. The promulgation of the above-mentioned regulations will form a largely comprehensive legal system of China's nuclear export control. ...
I wish to highlight that the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation is to maintain world peace, security and stability for the benefit of mankind. Some countries, however, have deviated from this principle, advertising themselves as the sole crusader of non-proliferation, taking its enforcement as their prerogative and using it to further their own foreign policy objectives. They adopt double or multiple standards on nuclear non-proliferation according to their own criteria in total disregard of other countries' interests. On the one hand, they are indifferent to or even encourage and induce nuclear proliferation in some cases. On the other hand, if they think that their own interests might be compromised, they will intervene and impose sanctions on those activities, even though they are for peaceful purposes. This is by no means genuine nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, China holds that any concern related to nuclear proliferation should be resolved according to the procedures spelled out in relevant international legal instruments, including through dialogue and cooperation, so as to achieve the non-proliferation objectives shared by all. No country should impose its own law and interests on any other country or the international community at large. ..."
Statement by Ambassador Joelle Bourgois, Main Committee I, 29 April
"In 1995, the international community was no more able than before to reach complete understanding on assessing progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Perhaps it would be too much to hope for such an assessment in the year 2000. I believe, however, that in the absence of formal agreement, all of us here today share the opinion...that important results have been achieved... [N]amely:
(a) The conclusion, signing and, in France's case, ratification of the CTBT...
(b) The contribution to the overall reduction in nuclear stockpiles. ... When the [START II] process is complete, two-thirds of the systems existing in Russia and the United States during the Cold War will no longer be operational. This underlines the importance of ratification and launching START III negotiations.
The way ahead to reaching this objective is long, however, and remains strewn with obstacles, if only because of the accumulation of fissile materials which will result from the reductions. France is alert to these problems and, with others, is shouldering part of the burden...
(c) As regards negative security assurances, France is ready in this forum to examine the record to date and the outlook in this sector [see separate statement, below]...
(d) Lastly, the effort to launch immediately and conclude rapidly negotiations for a...'cut-off- has not faltered. ...
We should all be able to agree on the key points of the situation which I have outlined. And, on that basis, we should all turn our thoughts to the next steps. ...
I should like briefly to outline France's record, about which accurate and detailed information is too often missing. Nuclear disarmament action involves social, economic, technical and financial factors that make it a long-haul job. The safety, security and transparency aspects attached to the movement entail, in the interests of everyone, slow-maturing and complex administration, the basic details of which are too frequently regarded lightly. ...
(a) First, as regards nuclear weapons themselves, the President of the Republic in February 1996 announced the suppression...of the French ground nuclear component. The decision involves dismantling the...18 surface-to-surface strategic missiles, i.e. weapons whose reaction-time is by their nature extremely shirt, and 30 short-range mobile weapons. These weapons systems, both the fixed strategic system on the Plateau d'Albion and the Hades force mobile system, will be completely dismantled by the end of 1998. For this, an important financial effort has been made, covering not only the dismantling process itself and its related aspects (delocation, transfers and safe management of materials, etc.) but also aid to the regions affected by these changes and the necessary reconversion of several military sites.
This leaves the air component and the strategic ocean force. Here again, the principle of sufficiency which governs French thinking in the matter has had the effect of limiting to four the number of our missile-launching nuclear submarines. It is perhaps worth mentioning that France has no tactical weapons.
On the question of detargeting and alert posture drawdown, the changes are worth stressing. On 26 September 1997, France announced that, with the dismantling of the Plateau d'Albion surface-to-surface missiles, none of the nuclear assets of the French deterrence force would henceforth be targeted. Finally, air and submarine force alert levels have been drawn down in accordance with the new world strategic context.
Taken overall, the French defence budget now represents only 3% of GDP as compared with 3.5% in 1990. Within this budget, the nuclear force's share is down to 10% as against 17% in 1990. ... Nuclear appropriations, in other words, have been divided by two since 1990 despite the extra costs occasioned by the weapons reductions. What I am saying is that the adjustments relating to the new international context have been reflected in tangible and measurable decisions.
(b) As to the production of fissile materials, the cessation of plutonium production for explosive military use and in 1996 of high-enriched uranium production is a known fact. Why then talk about it, you may ask, since other nuclear powers also have announced cessation of their production? The difference is that France has taken the risk in this connection of dismantling the relevant installations.
Final shut-down operations in Marcoule and Pierrelatte will begin in 1998. This means two things. First, production of these materials could not physically resume on these sites even were a sudden change in the international situation and the stance of certain key players to make it necessary. Second, whereas there is no certainty as to the conduct of the others and the threshold States are developing their capacities in the matter, the financial sacrifice is huge, since dismantling and site rehabilitation will cost several tens of billions of francs.
(c) The name of Muroroa is fresh in the minds of everybody. The Pacific test site is now closed. In May, the IAEA is due to hand in its report on the tests' baneful or non-baneful effects on the region's environment and the health of its inhabitants [see next issue]. This is the final stage in the site-closing process. ... I should like to underscore the exceptional nature of our action, which consists here also in its conclusiveness. The test-specific installations have been disassembled and the dismantling operations at Muroroa and Fangataufa should all have been completed by Summer 1998.
All being said, the verdict reached [about the satisfactoriness of nuclear disarmament efforts] depends on the observer's chosen standpoint. There is still a long road to hoe before all nuclear stockpiles are eliminated. On the other hand, the distance travelled in the space of a few years by a country like France is vast. The efforts required to translate the decisions taken into reality will doubtless continue far into the future. ...
It is...natural that thinking should be pursued and should supply the policymakers of States having nuclear capacity with further matter for judgment. This year, before the Conference on Disarmament, France declared itself in favour of continuation within this forum of discussion on all the issues relating to nuclear disarmament in the most substantial and transparent manner possible. I am happy to note that the Chairman of the Conference has been instructed to intensify consultations on the subject on an ongoing basis. ...
All in all, what is needed is a recurring process that involves the impetus-giving machinery constituted by the NPT enhanced process; the Conference on Disarmament, [the] sole multilateral negotiating organ, which relies on the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and the resolutions drafted by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly; the development of regional solidarities; and unilateral decisions.
The NPT remains the cornerstone of this complex construction. Why? Because this forum, thanks to the summum of texts, and to the ideas that crystallise from the Preparatory Committees to the Review Conference, is the point where the ideal and the possible meet."
Statement by Ambassador G. V. Berdennikov,, 27 April
"We believe that the main goal of the Committee is the preparation of the regular review of the Treaty in 2000 in all its integrity. The documents adopted in 1995, i.e. the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and strengthening of the review of the Treaty, will be of great help. ...
Recommendations on further strengthening of the NPT should be the main result of our mutual work of the preparation to the 2000 Review Conference. We are confident that the PrepCom can accomplish this task without creating additional organs or duplicating functions of other international mechanisms.
We want to stress that today with the functioning of the Treaty there is a visual progress in the accomplishment of its basic objectives as well as of the priority goals agreed upon at the 1995 Conference. This only proves the wisdom in taking those decisions and, first of all, on the indefinite extension of the NPT. ...
We confirm the adherence of the Russian Federation to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as one of the final goals of the disarmament process in the framework of efforts of all countries aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Besides, we believe that [it] is necessary to move towards this goal in a phased manner, without artificial impediments as well as accelerations or putting forward unrealistic objectives and tasks. It can only be reached through gradual movement on the basis of [a] complex approach with the participation of all five nuclear States and having the preservation of the strategic stability. ...
Now the process of deep reductions of nuclear weapons is developing basically in the bilateral format and is based on the agreements between Russia and the United States. The implementation of START I with the participation of Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine and START II would provide for radical, up to two thirds of the Cold War...levels, reductions of the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear powers. An agreement was reached after the entry into force of the START II to conduct negotiations between Russia and the United States on START III. As the result even deeper cuts will be made.
So far, under START I, Russia:
Simultaneously, the realization of unilateral disarmament initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons is going on. These initiatives provide the elimination of all nuclear artillery shells, nuclear mines and nuclear warheads for sea-launched tactical missiles, half of the stockpiles of aircraft tactical nuclear ammunition and nuclear warheads for ABMs. ... We stand for other nuclear powers joining the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. We would like to draw your attention again to the Russian proposal that all nuclear weapons shall be placed at the territories of nuclear States. ...
It is evident that the implementation of bilateral...and then, possibly, other agreements on further nuclear weapons reductions will take certain time. Only after these interim steps it will be possible in practical terms and, as we understand on a multilateral basis, to conduct negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Under these circumstances we believe it is untimely and, consequently, counterproductive to start talks at the Conference on Disarmament on a programme for nuclear disarmament within specific time limits. We are convinced that it is not the right time to be seriously engaged in something that could even hardly acquire practical grounds during the first decade of the next century.
It would be more useful if we could concentrate on such imminent issues in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as elaboration of multilateral agreement on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. ...
President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin [has] stated Russia's readiness to gradually withdraw from its nuclear military programmes up to 500 tons of HEU and up to 50 tons of plutonium which are released in the process of nuclear disarmament. The pace and timing of this process shall depend on both: motion of further dismantling of nuclear weapons under existing agreements on reduction of nuclear weapons and building up necessary storage facilities for materials removed from the military programmes. Such a decision will contribute to the strengthening of mutual confidence and global stability.
We [propose] that fissile nuclear materials stockpiled during the implementation of military programmes should be used for the benefit of mankind. In 1995-1997 36 tons of weapon grade HEU had been already converted into a peaceful material - fuel for nuclear power plants. By the year 2000 we also intend to convert 120 tons of HEU into [peaceful]...activities. We are in favor of international cooperation for a search of economically reasonable and ecologically safe use of weapon materials in civil nuclear fuel cycle. ...
An important step demonstrating our adherence to the realization of the NPT provisions is the initiative of the Russian Federation, the United States and IAEA to put under the Agency verification weapon origin fissile materials releasing from the nuclear weapon programmes. Intensive study of complicated technical, legal and financial aspects of the realization of this initiative is under way.
We witness that new steps are taking place towards narrowing the geographic area of nuclear proliferation. The establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in different regions clearly testifies it. We believe that after negotiations proper conditions would be created for the nuclear-weapon States to join the protocol of the treaty on nuclear weapons free zone in South East Asia. At the same time we are concerned about unsuccessful efforts to establish such [a] zone in the Middle East as well as the absence of positive changes in advancing the nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia. It is also important to search for practical ways to foster other proposals on the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in other regions of the world. We welcome the initiatives aimed at the creation of the nuclear weapon free area in Central and East Europe and nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia.
We believe that the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones is the best way to get international legally binding security guaranties for non-nuclear-weapon States.
We consider positive the renewal of work on 'negative assurances' at the Conference on Disarmament... We believe that there can be no talks on 'negative assurances' in the framework of the PrepCom since the Committee is not a negotiating body. ...
Bearing in mind the great responsibility for the process of the NPT review the Russian delegation will contribute in a constructive dialogue of the participants at the Second PrepCom session in order to increase the effectiveness of this very important international Treaty.
Which considering procedural issues of the PrepCom agenda we feel it reasonable to utilize as much as possible the experience of the previous five Conferences with due note to the specifics of the forthcoming 2000 Conference.
To reduce cost we can, in particular, discuss the possibility of limiting the number and volume of background documentation which is usually prepared for the Conference. ..."
Statement by Ambassador Ian Soutar, 29 April
"1. 'The global elimination of nuclear weapons'. Mr Chairman, distinguished delegates, that simple phrase sums up the United Kingdom's goal in the nuclear sphere. It could hardly be more plainly stated. And it is a goal all NPT parties share. But how best to set about achieving it? That is the fundamental question which lies behind so many of the current debates on this crucial subject, both here and in the Conference on Disarmament. ...
A Question of Approach
2. [I]f we look beneath the surface of our debates I believe we can discern two major currents of thought about the best way to proceed towards our shared goal. On the one hand there are those who believe that the key point is to know the destination we are aiming at, and to concentrate on taking the next manageable steps towards it, knowing that as we move forward the subsequent steps, will become clear. On the other hand, there are those who, before going any further, want to have a much clearer map for the entire journey, preferably along with a firm indication of how long it will take.
3. In our view the basic difficulty with the latter approach is that it does not do justice to the complexity and variety of the problems we face in moving towards elimination. To assume that all these can be foreseen at this stage, let alone solved and then neatly encapsulated in a rigid time-frame or single Convention, seems to us to smack of unrealistic idealism. It also threatens to make the job seem almost impossibly difficult. ...
4. That great teacher, experience, also suggests that this is the way to make progress. Think of all those far-reaching plans for disarmament that were drawn up from the late forties to the early sixties. Where are they now? They are gathering dust on unvisited shelves in library basements. It was only when the international community forsook this approach for the pursuit of more limited measures that real progress began to be made, starting with the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Since then, the international community has come a very long way indeed by taking one incremental step after another. ...
6. The incremental approach has...proved its value as a means of controlling, and now of reducing, nuclear forces. People are apt to forget now that until 1972 there were no agreements at all regulating the nuclear forces of any nuclear-weapon State. Even then the agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on their strategic offensive arms did not deal at all with strategic bombers, made no effort to limit numbers of warheads, and contained no provisions for on-site inspections. It takes up a mere six pages of the most recent US compendium of arms control agreements. By contrast the strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which entered into force in 1994 is so comprehensive and detailed that it runs to 280 pages and requires a volume in its own right.
7. I mention these examples simply to demonstrate that the incremental approach has produced results. Why? Because it deals with issues in manageable clusters, and because it is flexible enough to be responsive to varying political conditions. There is every reason to suppose that if it could produce results in the harsh atmosphere of the Cold War it can produce even better ones in the future. ... If we are to make real progress we do not need endless debate about general plans; we need detailed negotiations for specific agreements.
8. I hear it said that the BWC and CWC give the lie to the case I am making. It is said that if we can eliminate biological and chemical weapons by means of these Conventions we can eliminate nuclear weapons by means of a similar convention. And it is pointed out that the CWC does contain a time-frame for the elimination of existing chemical weapons. That is true. But it is also irrelevant. The fact is that nuclear weapons have played a much more prominent part in the military thinking and planning of their possessors than chemical or biological weapons ever did. So the reality is that the approach that worked for the latter will not work for the former.
9. Mr Chairman, for all these reasons the United Kingdom is not persuaded that it would be productive to embark now on negotiations for a time-bound framework for nuclear elimination or on negotiations for an all-encompassing Nuclear Weapons Convention. The United Kingdom respects the motives of those who favour these approaches, but we think there are more sensible ways forward at this stage. ...
Elements in the Task Ahead
11. Within the nuclear sphere all five of the nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT clearly have a key role to play in movement towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But, equally clearly, there is, for the time being, a big distinction between the two largest nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and the three smaller nuclear-weapon States, China, France and my own country, the United Kingdom. What are their respective responsibilities in the march towards elimination?
12. Clearly an enormous responsibility lies upon the shoulders of the two largest nuclear-weapon States. Fortunately it is a responsibility they have not shirked. Over the last ten years, they have concluded agreements and taken unilateral actions which have vastly reduced the number of their deployed nuclear weapons - and they have begun dismantling their non-deployed weapons. But this welcome momentum needs to be sustained - initially by ratification both of the START II Treaty and its Protocol and of the recent ABMT-related agreements, and then by the subsequent opening and early conclusion of negotiations on the START III Treaty to which both sides are committed.
13. In emphasising the heavy responsibilities on the larger nuclear-weapon States, I do not mean in any way to diminish the burden of responsibility that also falls on the smaller nuclear-weapon States. Clearly their role on the path to elimination is, first of all, not to become large nuclear-weapon States, and, secondly, to accept that in due course they will need to join the larger nuclear-weapon States in negotiations about their nuclear weapons. ...
14. But if we are to achieve our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons it is not only the nuclear-weapon States who need to play their part. Also of great significance will be the actions taken, or not taken, by the three States not party to the NPT which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities - India, Israel and Pakistan. Of course, ideally, we would like them to become non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT tomorrow. But we are not naive. We recognise the reality that these States have spent thirty years refusing to adhere to the Treaty because, as things stand, they do not believe that renouncing the nuclear option would be in their interests.
15. Before they change their minds there will have to be changes in perceptions of their security environment. With our EU partners, the United States and others, we are working hard to bring about a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East... As for the Sub-Continent of Asia, we note the strengthened political contacts between India and China in recent years and the resumption last year of high-level contacts between India and Pakistan. The further favourable development of these contacts is clearly of major importance for the achievement of our goal.
16. Another group of States with a vital contribution to make to the global elimination of nuclear weapons is comprised of the 181 States which have undertaken obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons by becoming non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT. We recognise and acknowledge that this is an enormous contribution by these States towards facilitating the world's journey along the road to global elimination. ... [I]n the vast majority of cases, the commitment of these States is not in any doubt - and in many cases it has been reinforced by additional commitments to treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones, treaties we have been happy to support.
17. But we are all aware that there have been some very regrettable exceptions to the general rule. I need only recall the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme exposed by inspections since the Gulf War and the continuing uncertainties about the past activities of North Korea. ...
18. There is also a contribution which all States can make to the global elimination of nuclear weapons - regardless or their size or status. It is to support the two measures that can put a universal end to nuclear explosions and to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. ...
20. [I]t would be idle to pretend that the global elimination of nuclear weapons will be achieved solely by action in the nuclear sphere. I have already mentioned some of the parallel developments that will be necessary in the wider political sphere in relation to non-parties to the NPT. We are also conscious that much more needs to be done to alter ingrained habits of thought in the nuclear-weapon States. For almost fifty years we have operated in a world where the dominant concepts have been nuclear deterrence against each other and conventional defence against each other. Moving towards a new world of mutual cooperation with one another and joint partnership with one another is not easy. But continuing movement in this direction is the necessary political complement to continued progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. ...
22. It is also apparent that progress to nuclear elimination will be facilitated not only by improving political relationships between key States, but also by parallel progress in other areas. I am thinking, for example, of the need to ensure the elimination of both chemical and biological weapons through universal adherence to the relevant Conventions and effective implementation of them. I am thinking also of the need for careful consideration in due course of the arrangements for controlling conventional arms and strengthening collective security as we progress towards our goal - and of the verification and compliance issues that will no doubt arise.
The UK Contribution
24. I said earlier on that one of the responsibilities of a smaller nuclear-weapon State is not to become a large nuclear-weapon State. The United Kingdom is more than fulfilling this requirement. A decade ago, in addition to operating our force of Polaris submarines, we were involved in operating land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery, we had a maritime tactical nuclear weapon capability, and we had a significant number of free-fall nuclear bombs in service with our air force. Since then, far from becoming a larger nuclear-weapon State, we have been becoming a steadily smaller nuclear-weapon State.
25. Some years ago now we withdrew from any involvement with land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery systems. Subsequently we decided that we no longer needed to retain a maritime tactical nuclear weapon capability. And last month we withdrew from service the last of our free-fall nuclear bombs. These developments mean we now have only one nuclear system in operation. Furthermore, the number of warheads this system will carry in future is currently being considered as part of the new British Government's wider strategic Defence Review.
26. I also said earlier on that it is a responsibility of smaller nuclear-weapon States to accept that in due course they will have to join the United States and Russian Federation in negotiations on their nuclear weapons. The British Government has already made it quite clear that, when satisfied with progress towards its goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations. Meanwhile, we have ratified the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to demonstrate beyond doubt our commitment to that Treaty, and all the world knows that in April 1995 we made clear that we had ceased to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. ..."
Statement by Norman A. Wulf, 27 April
"US Support for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
1. Universal Adherence to the NPT
The United States has continued to promote universal adherence to the NPT. Eight additional states have joined the NPT since May 1995, and in June 1997, Brazil announced its intention to join the Treaty. ... The United States continues to encourage all non-NPT parties to join the Treaty as soon as possible. In regions where the NPT is not yet accepted, the United States has urged non-NPT parties to exercise restraint in their nuclear programs and to consider regional approaches that can decrease the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.
2. Promoting Full Compliance with the NPT
... The United States believes that the development of comprehensive nuclear export controls is one measure that has greatly facilitated the ability of NPT Parties, and nuclear weapon states in particular, to meet their obligations under the Treaty. In that context the US continues to place great importance on the work of the Zangger Committee, which has published guidelines for the interpretation of Article III.2 of the NPT.
3. Strengthening the NPT Safeguards System
... In May 1997, the United States joined with other members of the IAEA Board of Governors in approving a Model Protocol for strengthening IAEA safeguards. The Protocol, along with other recent strengthened safeguards measures, is a necessary and important contribution to the international safeguards system.
Last week, the United States concluded its negotiations with the IAEA on an additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. I am pleased to announce that the United States plans to present this Protocol to the June meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors for approval. The United States calls upon all states to cooperate in the implementation of the new strengthened safeguards system. We note with satisfaction that, as of the end of the March 1998 IAEA Board of Governors, eight States (Armenia, Australia, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, Philippines, Poland, Uruguay) have signed protocols with the IAEA. We congratulate Australia for being the first state to have its protocol enter into force.
4. Support of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
The US supports the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, that meet our long-standing criteria. The US is a Protocol Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, in 1996, signed the protocols to the South Pacific and African nuclear weapon-free zone treaties. We continue to work with the signatories of the South East Asia Treaty to remove those obstacles currently preventing our signature of the protocol. In all, nearly 100 non-nuclear weapon states are now eligible for our legally binding negative security assurances.
US Support for Article VI
1. Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) Process
The United States continues to make steady progress to implement the START I Treaty. Both the United States and Russia have reduced their strategic nuclear warhead levels below those limits that were required to be met by December 1997. Both are almost two years ahead of schedule in meeting the limits that are not required to take effect until December 1999. As of January 1998, the United States had eliminated more than 900 heavy bombers and missile launchers, which carried over 4,000 accountable warheads. We are nearly three-quarters of the way to full realization of planned eliminations under the START I Treaty.
START II will achieve even deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces and will enhance strategic stability by eliminating the most destabilizing weapon Systems; that is, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile systems with multiple warheads. Once START II has been fully implemented, the United States will have reduced its strategic nuclear forces by two-thirds from Cold War levels.
During their 1997 Summit Meeting in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin pledged to begin negotiations on START III immediately after START II enters into force. While formal negotiations have not begun, the United States and Russia have reached an understanding on targets for reductions under START III and have agreed that START III will be the first strategic arms control agreement to include measures relating to transparency of strategic warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. START III will also include measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions.
On 26 September, 1997, the United States and Russia signed agreements that will help promote Russian ratification of START II, including a Protocol to START II extending its implementation until 31 December, 2007. The US and Russia also exchanged letters legally codifying the commitment to deactivate by 31 December, 2003, the strategic nuclear delivery' vehicles that will be eliminated under START II. This measure will help ensure that START II's security benefits are realized in roughly the same time period as originally envisioned under the Treaty. The two sides also signed several agreements that will help to enhance the viability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a step that has fundamental significance for the strategic arms reduction process. ...
3. Other Disarmament Efforts
(a) Cessation of Plutonium Production for Nuclear Weapons
On 23 September of last year, the United States and Russia signed the 'US-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement,' which entered into force immediately. All plutonium production reactors in the US and Russia must be shut down and all will be subject to bilateral inspection activities. Together, the US and Russia will work to convert by the year 2000 Russia's three plutonium-production reactors that remain in operation so that they no longer produce weapon-grade plutonium.
As a practical result, this agreement marks the first time that the United States and Russia have placed limits on materials available for warheads themselves, and also represents a new stage in US-Russian cooperation to regulate and verify nuclear materials, to limit their use in weapons, and to increase transparency. It also reinforces and builds upon the unilateral US commitment not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
(b) Reduction and Elimination of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The United States has continued to implement the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to reduce non-strategic nuclear forces. All non-strategic nuclear weapons have been removed from surface ships, multipurpose submarines, and land-based naval craft. In addition, several non-strategic nuclear weapon modernization programs have been terminated. The US air-delivered tactical bomb stockpile has been reduced by 60 percent, and all excess tactical bombs have been eliminated. Overall, 90 percent of the US non-strategic nuclear stockpile has been eliminated. Moreover, all surface warships no longer have the capability to deploy nuclear weapons. All nuclear artillery, short-range tactical missile warheads, and nuclear depth bombs have been eliminated or will have been by 1999.
(c) Nuclear Weapon Detargeting and De-Alerting Measures
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has taken numerous steps to reduce the alert posture of its nuclear forces. As of May 1994, the United States decided it would no longer target any country with its strategic nuclear forces. This action was taken not only as a confidence-building measure, but also to illustrate the improved security environment in the post-Cold War era.
(d) Fissile Material Transparency Efforts
Since September 1996, the United States has unilaterally removed approximately 226 metric tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile and has voluntarily pledged to make this excess fissile material available for IAEA safeguards. Twelve metric tons of this excess material is now under IAEA safeguards to ensure that this material is never again used for weapons purposes. Twenty-six metric tons has been committed for inspections by the end of 1999, and an additional 52 metric tons of excess material is being readied for international inspection.
In addition, the United States is working with the IAEA on a verification experiment on the downblending of weapon-grade high enriched uranium (HEU). Only uranium that has been highly enriched can be used for nuclear weapons, and once HEU has been blended down to low enrichment levels, its most appropriate use is for power reactors. This experiment, which began in December 1997 and will conclude by July 1998, will help to demonstrate the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.
The alternative to use of high-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons is use of separated plutonium. Two alternatives have been identified for long-term disposition of excess separated plutonium-mixing the plutonium with low-enriched or natural uranium and burning the resulting mixed fuel in power reactors or mixing the plutonium with other waste products so that it would be at least as difficult to re-separate this plutonium as it would be to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel. Pursuit of whichever alternative is eventually chosen will not only require large sums of money but also lengthy periods of time. Meanwhile, the separated plutonium will require storage. The United States is working with the IAEA to incorporate international safeguards features into the design for the planned storage facility for excess plutonium at the Savannah River Site.
In addition, the United States, the Russian Federation, and the IAEA commenced a Trilateral Initiative in September 1996, to address the unique challenges of providing assurances that fissile material withdrawn from weapons programs is not returned to the defense stockpile. The Trilateral Initiative has to date resulted in programs to consider IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material; to address the scope and objectives of IAEA verification; and to develop approaches and technologies to support IAEA inspections. ...
Mr. Chairman, the steps outlined above are illustrative of the numerous measures the United States has taken in support of the nuclear disarmament process. The United States wants its NPT partners to recognize and understand the relationship between this range of 'non-classic' arms control measures and the nuclear disarmament process. To that end, my delegation has come to this Preparatory Committee meeting prepared to provide detailed information about US efforts in support of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In doing so, we hope not only to promote greater transparency and an enhanced understanding of efforts underway, but also to illustrate the complexities and difficulties of the nuclear disarmament process. ..."
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
'Working Paper Presented by the Members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty,' 28 April
"The Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe, in terms of the strengthened review process and in the context of fully implementing the Treaty and pursuant to the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, that recommendations which have been deliberated upon throughout its preparatory process, should be forwarded to the Review Conference in 2000 for further refining, finalization and adoption. We also believe that this kind of approach will strengthen the review process and will provide the basis for a successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference. In this vein, the NAM proposes the following draft recommendations to be considered by Preparatory Committee:
1. The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
2. The States Parties undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfill their commitments on the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without exception.
3. The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.
4. The Nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapons States, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.
5. The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States Parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
6. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.
7. The States Parties believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.
8. The States Parties call on the nuclear weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA.
9. The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any State Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all State Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State Party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.
10. The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of full-scope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.
11. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
12. The States Parties reaffirm their inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.
13. The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.
14. The States Parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear supplier States Parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear energy of the States Parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.
15. The States Parties reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter in considering that any attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants; and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
16. The States Parties encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security and support current efforts within the IAEA to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard.
17. The States Parties will take into account all the provisions of the CTBT related to this Article.
18. The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon States to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.
19. The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.
20. The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective.
21. The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals.
22. The States Parties reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations shall be nuclear weapons in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.
23. The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
24. The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
25. The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.
26. The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.
27. The States Parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.
28. The States Parties express support on measures taken by a State Party or Group of States Parties to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They also support proposals to these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States Parties welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region.
29. The States Parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.
30. The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.
31. The States Parties reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal.
32. The States Parties reaffirm that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence, the States Parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. They note the Ad-hoc Committee on NSA established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
The Resolution on the Middle East
33. The States Parties recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a Resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that Resolution. In this regard, the States Parties recognize the special responsibility of the depository States, as cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
34. The States Parties note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, all States in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States Parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle Fast.
35. The nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.
36. All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.
37. The States Parties reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems."
European Union (EU)
'Statement by Ambassador Ian Soutar, Representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Union,' 27 April
"1. I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union, as well as on behalf of the Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Republic of Slovenia) and the Associated Country Cyprus. Iceland and Liechtenstein, EFTA [European Free Trade Arrangement] countries and members of the European Economic Area also align themselves with this statement. ...
4. The first Preparatory Committee set in motion the new strengthened review process for the Treaty. Thanks to the excellent chairmanship of Ambassador Patokallio, and the constructive contributions of participants, it made a successful start and should provide a useful model for future meetings. Our task now is to carry this work forward. We should continue to pursue the practical implementation of the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and prepare the conditions for a successful Review Conference in the year 2000. The results of the first Preparatory Committee last year constitute a good basis for our work. We should build further on the recommendations in the Chairman's Working Paper. The first Preparatory Committee session was able to identify key points on which there was general agreement at that time. We should look carefully at the other interesting views and proposals put forward by delegations, which made up the basket of proposals on which consensus did not yet exist. The Union hopes that the discussions at this session will make it possible for some of these ideas to be developed further. We hope it will then be possible for the number of agreed elements currently found in the Chairman's working paper to be expanded. ...
6. The European Union made an active contribution to last year's Preparatory Committee proceedings. We are ready to continue to play an active and constructive role, in particular to promote consensus in drafting recommendations and making procedural preparations for the 2000 Review Conference. Our firm commitment is underlined by the Common Position the Union has recently adopted which provides a clear framework for EU participation in the strengthened review process.
7. In this context we wish to submit the following thoughts on the main aspects relating to the NPT's implementation.
8. The successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 made a positive contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security. ...
9. As the CTBT negotiations have been successfully concluded, the realisation of the second measure under the action programme contained in the decision on Principles and Objectives is now called for. This involves the immediate commencement and rapid conclusion of negotiations on a...Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The Union is deeply disappointed that, although an Ad Hoc Committee was established in 1995, negotiations have still not begun. ...
10. The Union also continues to emphasise the third measure of the action programme: the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control The Union welcomes the progress achieved in this area. ... The Union urges Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay so as to enable its entry into force and implementation and the immediate opening and rapid conclusion of negotiations on a START Ill Treaty. The EU expresses the hope that START Ill will be followed by further reductions with the aim of eliminating these weapons globally.
11. In line with the Principles and Objectives, the EU recommends that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. In this respect, the EU welcomes the recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances.
12. In the Union's view, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely concluded between the States in the region concerned, strengthens global and regional peace and security. The Union considers such zones, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, to be important complementary instruments to the NPT and welcomes advances made which extend the areas of the world covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones.
13. The Union also welcomes the adoption on 15 May 1997 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a Model Protocol containing measures which, when implemented, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives by increasing its ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapon States. For its part, the EU is determined to conclude Additional Protocols to the three relevant safeguards agreements as soon as possible. Negotiations with the IAEA were concluded successfully on 27 March this year and we will bring all three Additional Protocols to the June meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA for approval. ... The European Union fully supports the Principles and Objectives statement that fissile material transferred from military uses to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States; and welcomes in this context the progress made by the discussions in Vienna among plutonium-using and -producing countries in adopting a set of guidelines for plutonium management.
14. The EU supports the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in complete conformity with Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.
15. The various international conventions which are the expression of the wish of the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must be backed up in practice by export control measures. It is essential that exporting States assume their responsibilities and take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies are subject to an appropriate system of surveillance and control. ...
16. The European Union fully supports the Principles and Objectives statement that transparency in export control regimes should be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Parties to the Treaty. In the nuclear field, the Union both welcomes and is playing a major role in the transparency activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. One practical expression of this commitment to the principle of transparency was the substantial support that the Union gave to the seminar on nuclear export controls organised by the NSG which took place in Vienna in October last year. This seminar, which attracted a wide participation from a large number of States and NGOs was notable for the constructive and positive dialogue leading to a greater general understanding both of the basis for export controls and also of the needs and views of developing countries seeking advanced technology.
17. The EU welcomes the steps taken by the G8, with the support of the IAEA to increase cooperation on, and implementation of, the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material: namely the adoption of the advisory 'Framework for Enhanced Cooperation and Information-Sharing' aimed at encouraging enhanced cooperation among law enforcement, intelligence and customs services; the establishment of a 'Points of Contact' system for the exchange of information on illicit trafficking incidents; and continuing efforts by the G8 to encourage expanded participation in the Programme.
18. Turning briefly to some procedural considerations for our work in the Preparatory Committee, the Union welcomes the recommendation that was agreed in our first session that we should continue the consideration of all aspects of the Treaty in a structured and balanced manner. Moreover, we must also take account of the need for our work in preparing for the 2000 Review Conference to be forward-looking. The preparatory process needs both to evaluate progress in the implementation of undertakings of the States Parties under the Treaty; and identify those areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought. ..."
Canada: Draft Statement on START
'Draft Statement on Current START Standstill: Submitted by Canada,' NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/4, 30 April
"The States Parties present at the 1998 NPT PrepCom consider that the START process, a key element in systematic and progressive efforts toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, needs to be reinvigorated. While actual reductions in deployed nuclear weapons are taking place through the implementation of START I, START II is in limbo pending its ratification by the Russian Federation and the ratification by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of several associated agreements.
These States Parties recall the importance of States Parties' undertakings in the NPT and the 1995 decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. These States Parties also recall recent resolutions by the UN General Assembly on this issue, including resolution 52/38 M, 'Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament' which, in particular, expressed satisfaction with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States of America to START II, expressed hope that it will soon be possible for the Russian Federation to take corresponding steps to ratify the Treaty, and urged 'the Russian Federation and the United States of America to commence negotiations on a START III agreement immediately after START II enters into force'. These States Parties wish to emphatically confirm the importance of the START process to the continuing reduction of nuclear weapons and thereby to the strengthening of international security and stability.
These States Parties call on the Russian Federation to ratify START II as quickly as possible and call on both the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approve formally all agreements and undertakings associated with the ratification and implementation of START II.
These States Parties reiterate the importance of the Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on 21 March, 1997, setting out parameters for a START Ill negotiation. That Statement demonstrates the continuing commitment by those two states to the process of nuclear weapons reductions through START II, START III and beyond. These States Parties urge the early implementation of that Statement at the lowest possible levels.
These States Parties also express the view that the process of negotiated nuclear weapons reductions and transparency measures should be expanded at an appropriate point in the near future to include all five nuclear-weapon States."
South Africa: Statement & Proposed Decision and Recommendations
'Statement by the Republic of South Africa on Cluster I,' 29 April
"As my delegation at the PrepCom's meeting in 1997 stated, South Africa continues to see the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT as one of its most important international commitments, and it continues, either nationally or in cooperation with others, to take active measures to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technologies, material and equipment for all weapons of mass destruction. We, however, believe that the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT should not be given a limited and self-serving interpretation. From South Africa's perspective, Articles I and II of the NPT are not limited to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons or their technologies, material or equipment, but also relate to obligations for preventing any recipient from obtaining, directly or indirectly, control over such weapons or explosive devices. It is for this reason that we placed on record at the 1997 PrepCom our concern about the non-proliferation implications of the plans for the expansion of NATO and the proposals which have been made for a dialogue in Europe on the future role of nuclear deterrence in the context of the European Defence Policy. The planned expansion of NATO would, in our view, entail an increase in the number of non-nuclear-weapon States which participate in nuclear training, planning and decision-making and which have an element of nuclear deterrence in their defence policies. ...
The obligations of Article VI are... clearly obligations undertaken by all of the Parties to the Treaty. The argument that Article VI contains divided obligations and that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is the sole preserve of the nuclear-weapon States, while general and complete disarmament is for all of the Treaty parties is not correct. The fact that it is only the States which possess nuclear weapons that can actually eliminate these weapons is self evident, but the obligation of all States Parties to have an interest and to be involved in all of the obligations contained in Article VI cannot be repudiated. The task which South Africa would argue faces the NPT States Parties is to determine, as a part of the Strengthened Review Process agreed to in 1995, how we are to achieve and structure this involvement.
As all of the delegations represented here are aware, the debate as to the international community's involvement in nuclear disarmament has largely been focused in the Conference on Disarmament, here in Geneva. This debate has to date largely proven to be fruitless, despite the submission of a number of proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc committee or some other institutional mechanism on this issue. During the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, two formal proposals on this issue have been submitted to the CD by NPT States Parties - South Africa and Belgium - and have drawn widespread (but unfortunately as yet not consensus) support. Both of these proposals were built around the NPT nuclear disarmament obligations. The proposal of South Africa focused its attention on the commitment undertaken in the 1995 Principles and Objectives to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, while Belgium focused on the NPT's Article VI obligations themselves.
Parallel to these initiatives we have seen a number of ideas being formulated both by States and by non-governmental organisations on how the nuclear disarmament obligations of all of the NPT States Parties in terms of Article VI can be translated into effective reality. The proposals which have been put forward by States and from within the NGO community can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, proposals on the substance of nuclear disarmament which investigate what measures can be taken individually, jointly or multilaterally towards diminishing the threat posed by nuclear weapons as well as on their reduction and eventual elimination. Within this category we find proposals for taking nuclear weapons off alert, transparency measures for nuclear weapons and military stockpiles of fissile material, no-first use, non-stationing of nuclear weapons outside the territories of nuclear-weapon States, the multilateralisation of the ABM Treaty, commitments not to modernise or increase the size of nuclear arsenals, etc. which have been put forward, inter alia, by the Canberra Commission, former United States General Lee Butler, the Stimson Center, the US National Academy of Sciences and others.
Secondly, there are proposals which have focused on the mechanisms which we can establish to provide a framework for achieving nuclear disarmament or for structuring the international community's involvement in the nuclear disarmament debate and process. Within this category we find initiatives such as those put forward by Belgium, Egypt and South Africa in the Conference on Disarmament as well as by members of the NGO community such as the Acronym Institute. It should be emphasised here that, from South Africa's perspective, and I believe that we are correct in saying this, that these initiatives are not, and I underline not, intended in any way to undermine or threaten the nuclear disarmament negotiations between Russia and the United States. These would continue to be of paramount importance to the reduction of nuclear weapons and for their eventual elimination, and so also will be the future negotiations involving the other nuclear-weapon States.
Given the fact that the disarmament obligations contained in Article VI of the NPT are the obligations of 'Each Party to the Treaty', it is South Africa's view that we should establish the practice within the Strengthened Review Process for the States Parties to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons which were envisaged in the 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' decision adopted at the 1995 NPT Conference. The purpose of these deliberations would be to provide:
It is South Africa's view that if an initiative such as this were to be implemented within the Strengthened Review Process then it would enhance confidence in the indefinitely extended NPT, complement initiatives already undertaken, lay the groundwork for future steps towards our common goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it would allow us to begin identifying the measures to achieve what is termed complete and general disarmament under strict and effective international control. It would also be in line with the thinking which has underpinned proposals made in other international fora by such NPT States Parties as Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Japan, South Africa and others as well as by members of the NGO community such as Rebecca Johnson from the Acronym Institute.
It is South Africa's intention to promote, seek support for and have language included in the recommendations agreed to at this session of the Preparatory Committee on the proposal outlined above. We will be seeking to have:
Some may attempt to argue that deliberations such as those which I have outlined should be conducted within the Main Committee I cluster. This issue and the obligation of 'Each of the Parties to the Treaty' under Article VI of the NPT is of such importance, and has been the cause of extended debates, that South Africa believes that it cannot be submerged in the Cluster I process. The Cluster I process will be dealing with the review, the preparation of recommendations, a general debate etc. on all of the issues (nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, universality, security assurances, etc.) covered by the cluster and does not lend itself to the focused deliberations which South Africa believes need to take place on nuclear disarmament."
Sweden: Next Steps for the Nuclear-Weapon States
'Statement by Sweden, Cluster 1, NPT PrepCom,' 30 April
"Since we are now preparing for the next Review Conference, it is only logical to compare factual developments during these three years with what we all unanimously agreed in 1995 to establish as our objectives and principles.
Sweden has repeatedly stressed that the concept of the systematic and progressive efforts by the nuclear-weapon States must be given a concrete content. The steps must be identified and fully translated into concrete action. It is indeed important that these commitments be fully observed in nuclear doctrines and translated into deeds, if confidence in the NPT process is to be maintained.
As a first step, the five nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.
Other concrete steps, which could - and indeed, should - be taken without delay by the nuclear-weapon States have been identified in the report by the Canberra Commission in 1997. One such measure is to take nuclear forces off alert. Such a step would greatly reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear weapons launch. It would also constitute an important confidence-building measure. Furthermore, it would facilitate the implementation of another of the Commission's proposals, namely to remove nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles. Sweden has welcomed the report of the Canberra Commission. The Commission's proposals deserve much more attention by the international community and should be considered in depth, with a view to their early implementation, in multilateral disarmament fora. ...
As those nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals continue the reduction process, they must be joined by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The five nuclear-weapon States should begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect. ...
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty constitutes a landmark event in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is imperative to make every effort to ensure its early entry into force. Sweden welcomes the recent ratification by France and the United Kingdom... In this context, Sweden also urges the nuclear-weapon States to exercise utmost restraint regarding any activity that could undermine the fundamental objectives of CTBT, including so-called sub-critical experiments.
The States Parties to the NPT have reason to be satisfied and encouraged that the goal of the CTBT, defined in the 1995 Principles and Objectives could be achieved. All NPT States Parties should take courage from this fact and redouble their efforts towards a speedy realization of the next goal identified in the Principles and Objectives, a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. ..."
'Cluster I Debate; Intervention by Norman A. Wulf,' 30 April
"Throughout the disarmament process, decisions and actions concerning the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons will necessarily remain the domain and responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States. The 1995 NPT conference decision on 'principles and objectives' recognized this responsibility in calling for the nuclear-weapon States to undertake 'progressive and systematic reductions of nuclear arsenals globally.'
This does not mean that non-nuclear-weapon States have no role in the nuclear disarmament process. On the contrary, the United States believes that all States have a responsibility to the nuclear disarmament process. This shared responsibility is recognized in Article VI of the NPT...
While the United States would not agree that non-nuclear-weapon States have a role in nuclear weapon reduction negotiations, the United States does believe that the critical role of the non-nuclear-weapon States is to help create the conditions under which the process toward nuclear disarmament can progress and ultimately result in a world free of nuclear weapons.
...here are a few of the practical, pragmatic steps that we believe NPT parties should take pursuant to their Article VI obligations to help create the conditions which promote further progress toward nuclear disarmament and which will take us closer to this shared goal such steps include:
This will in turn make progress toward nuclear disarmament more possible. The process of nuclear disarmament cannot be separated completely from efforts to promote regional and global stability and security, efforts which help create the conditions for further nuclear disarmament progress. The process of nuclear disarmament also cannot be separated completely from efforts to control more traditional conventional weapons that continue to threaten the security of many States in all parts of the world.
We all must recognize that the process of nuclear disarmament is not limited to actual nuclear arms reduction and elimination, but involves many other steps to which all...can and must contribute. Moreover, we all must be willing to do our part to create the security conditions under which the shared goal of a world free from nuclear weapons can be achieved."
The Resolution on the Middle East
Egypt: Working Paper
'The Resolution on the Middle East: Working Paper Submitted by Egypt,' NPT/CONF.2OOO/PC.II/22, 5 May
"Operative paragraph 1:
'Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East Peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard as well as other efforts contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;'
This paragraph recognizes that, in addition to the Middle East Peace process, 'other efforts' also contribute to a Middle East NWFZ or WMDFZ [Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone]. It remains for the PrepCom to identify specifically what is meant by 'other efforts' and to encourage States to contribute to such efforts. The PrepCom should thus recommend that agreement be reached on an agenda containing various items, including: the study of the nuclear status of the region; the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological; and other items related to arms control and disarmament as well as agreement on the lowest levels of armaments. Such efforts could also include, inter alia, workshops, seminars, conferences, etc. which are amended by the States of the region and which deal with relevant political as well as technical issues. These should result in agreement on a process of informal deliberations along the lines of the agenda proposed above. All of the above should be reflected in the report of the PrepCom and in its recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.
Operative paragraphs 2 & 3 & 4:
'2. Notes with satisfaction that in its report Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference 'call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept international Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities';'
'3. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in paragraph VI/3 of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full scope safeguards;'
'4. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;' Bearing in mind that Israel is now the only State in the Middle East which has not yet acceded to the NPT, not accepted any international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and not accepted full scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, the PrepCom must include in its report a strong recommendation to the 2000 Review Conference requesting Israel to accede to the NPT immediately and to place all its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards.
Operative paragraph 5:
'Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;'
The 'practical steps' referred to in paragraph 5 above, in Egypt's view, include the following:
Operative paragraph 6:
'Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.'
The States Parties to the NPT, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States should play an important role towards contributing to a Middle East as a zone free from nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. In application of paragraph 6 above, the PrepCom should request States Parties to the NPT, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to indicate at every PrepCom, starting with the present one, and at the 2000 Review Conference, in what ways they were able 'to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems'."
The NPT Review Process
Statement by Ambassador Mark J. Moher, 27 April
"The heart of this qualitatively different process is permanence with accountability. In our view, permanence with accountability means that, in the context of a Treaty extended indefinitely, all States have a continuous and continuing obligation to demonstrate that they are fulfilling all undertakings as set out in the NPT. All States are obliged to demonstrate that they are delivering on the promises - both procedural and substantive - as set out in the decisions on the Principles and Objectives and the Strengthened Review Process. As a part of that demonstration, we should use this process - these PrepComs - to engage on substance on a continuing basis. We should be pragmatic, recognizing that while only Review Conferences can take decisions related to the Review of the Treaty, the PrepCom should address issues on an ongoing and evolving basis from one PrepCom to the next culminating with the appropriate transmission of those reflections to the Review Conference itself.
What are the challenges before us? We wish to address two. The PrepCom process must provide for ongoing substantive, practical discussions to lay the basis for the document or documents to be adopted by the 2000 Review Conference. Our first challenge in 1998 therefore is to build on the outcome of last year's PrepCom. The question is 'how'? Paragraph 7 of the decision on the Strengthened Review Process says we should look forward as well as back. Therefore, in our view, we should be looking to provide to the 2000 Review Conference guidance or suggestions evaluating what we will have achieved since 1995. But, equally if not more importantly, we can and must identify areas in which further progress should be sought. This could form the basis of a 'Principles and Objectives 2000' if the 2000 Review Conference should so decide. This would be a new document, not an update of the 1995 document. We should not try to revise the 1995 Principles and Objectives decision. That document stands now as a part of the historical record. It exists and can never be undone. But what we agree to in 2000 would be a reflection on the state of this historic process at that point in history - looking both backward and forward. Thus, this - our first challenge - is to do our best to provide a productive basis for that effort at the 2000 Review Conference.
Our second challenge in 1998 is for this PrepCom to determine whether there is any specific topic or topics which should be addressed pragmatically now - in 1998 and not just in 2000. We have already identified three such themes or issues at our First PrepCom and we look forward to their detailed consideration during the sessions set aside for that purpose this year. But in our view there are others which we...would like to address at this Session [Editor's note: see Canada's proposal for a statement on the START process, above].
But first, let us expand further on how we might address our first challenge.
Challenge One: Evolution of the Chair's Working Paper
The PrepCom 'rolling document' proposed by Canada at the 1997 PrepCom was designed to provide the vehicle for moving the NPT review process from one PrepCom to the next, arriving at the Review Conference with a mature set of reflections for evaluation and action at that time. We continue to see the Chairman's Working Paper as such a vehicle. We readily acknowledge the caveats and conditionality of this document - it is a work in progress and can be nothing else before we arrive at the Review Conference.
The central process question we face, therefore, is - based on last year's result - how do we move forward at this PrepCom? ... The focus of our work at this PrepCom should be on identifying language which captures accomplishments, expectations and objectives as a basis for future work in 1999 and in 2000.
To facilitate a more streamlined consideration of the substantive aspects before us, Canada has reviewed the Chairman's Working Paper. We have revised and updated that document, retaining what was agreed in 1997 and building on the earlier submissions of many delegations. And we have inserted new ideas on the basis of work that is currently underway, particularly in the fields of nuclear disarmament and safeguards. We are circulating this document now. We hope it will provide a focus for the cluster debates to follow. We also hope it will provide the Chairman with a basis for moving our work forward. There is no question but that we would prefer that the status of the document agreed at the end of this PrepCom be enhanced from the status we achieved last year. But even if that should not be achievable we should continue to pursue the substantive aspect of our deliberations in a comprehensive way so as to facilitate our purpose - to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference'. It is the fervent hope of the Canadian delegation that we can agree to move forward in this manner. ..."
'Possible Products of the NPT's Strengthened Review Process: Working Paper by South Africa,' 4 May
The functions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) Preparatory Committee and Review Conference within the strengthened review process adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) are clearly defined. The function of the Preparatory Committee, as defined in paragraph 4 of NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, is twofold:
a. '… to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review conference. These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995.'
b. '… make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.'
The function of the Review Conference, as defined in paragraph 7 of NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, is threefold:
a. '… should look … back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of the undertakings of the States Parties under the Treaty ...'
b. '… should look forward ..., and identify the areas in which and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.'
c. 'address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.'
2. The Preparatory Committee
Given the abovementioned functions of the NPT's Preparatory Committee within the strengthened review process, the PrepCom should focus on producing three documents, which could have annexes:
(a) Document 1: Recommendations on principles, objectives and ways aimed at the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality.
This document would follow the same format and structure as the 1995 Principles and Objectives, developing those elements upon which the PrepCom is able to reach agreement. This document would form the basis for further negotiation and refinement at the Review Conference, and would also form the basis for a set of 2000 Principles and Objectives. A set of 2000 Principles and Objectives should not replace or be a renegotiation of the 1995 Principles and Objectives, an approach which would have the potential for weakening the achievements reached in 1995, but would rather be in addition to the 1995 agreement. ...
The primary area of attention of the PrepCom should be to consider and develop updated statements of objectives and ways which identify certain specific goals which should be striven for in the period until the Review Conference in 2005. While the language of the general or continuing principal elements of the 1995 Principles and Objectives could be strengthened or tightened, those elements which remain of continuing validity could be duplicated.
(b) Document 2: Recommendations on specific proposals or initiatives upon which agreement could not be reached and which could be considered further by the Review Conference.
Possible recommendations (eliminating duplication) which could be developed here are steps envisaged by the Principles and Objectives or in the Resolution on the Middle East, but might also include new initiatives launched during the preparatory process.
(c) Document 3: The procedural arrangements for the Review Conference, including annexes on such issues as the rules of procedure, financial arrangements, etc.
3. The Review Conference
Given the abovementioned functions of the NPT's Review Conference within the strengthened review process, the Review Conference should be focused on producing two documents:
(a) Document 1: A 2000 Principles and Objectives which would be negotiated on the basis of the recommendations prepared by the PrepCom and on inputs received at the Review Conference.
The document should look forward and identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the full implementation of the Treaty in the future, with specific reference to the next review period. The document should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of Treaty and to achieve its universality.
Owing to the nature of the document (i.e. setting the agenda for the implementation of the Treaty) it will be necessary that a consensus should exist on its content and adoption at the Review Conference. The nature of the document also dictates that it should be relatively concise.
(b) Document 2: A Final Declaration which should look back over the period under review, evaluating the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of the undertakings of the States Parties under the Treaty.
Owing to the nature of this document and given the differences of interpretation which might exist on issues under review (as has been demonstrated at previous Review Conferences) it will be necessary for a consensus to exist on its adoption but not necessarily on its content. In areas where it may prove to be impossible to reach agreement on an issue under review the document could contain statements reflecting the differences in interpretation or understanding."
Editor's note: the above selection has omitted documentation related to the debate on Negative Security Assurances (NSA) - this issue will be covered in our forthcoming ACRONYM Red Report devoted to the PrepCom. The documentation featured is from statements presented at the PrepCom, including a number reproduced on the web-site of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), http://www.basicint.org. The Editor is grateful to Stephen Young of BASIC for making such extensive documentation available.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.