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I. Bush-Putin Statement
'Joint Statement by US President George W. Bush and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic Issues, Genoa, Italy, July 22, 2001'; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 22.
"We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems."
II. Bush-Putin Press Conference, July 22
'Press Conference by President Bush and President Putin, Genoa, Italy, July 22, 2001,' The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 22.
"President Putin: 'Naturally, we discussed the issue of strategic stability. There we spent a lot of time. We talked in great detail. We've reached a most important accord, agreement on the beginning and the schedule for consultations. In Ljubljana [in June], we talked about setting up a working group, or series of working groups. As you know, in Moscow here, in a few days, Condoleezza Rice will come to visit us and we will work out finally the group structure within the overall interagency structure of foreign ministry, defense ministry and others. I have to say that to some extent what was unexpected both for me, and I think for President Bush, as well, was the understanding that was reached today between us on the issue that the offensive arms and issue of defensive arms will be discussed as a set. We're going to be talking about the mutual striving toward cutting back significantly offensive arms. We're not really ready at this time to talk about the threshold limits or the numbers themselves. But a joint striving exists and the specialists will get together and they'll make some recommendations. ... I think they're going to make a lot of progress and be quite successful.'
President Bush: '... We're young leaders who are interested in forging a more peaceful world. And along these lines, as the President said, that we're going to have open and honest dialogue about defensive systems, as well as reduction of offensive systems. The two go hand-in-hand in order to set up a new strategic framework for peace. And along these lines, as the President mentioned, my National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, will be visiting in Moscow, the purpose of which is to lay out a specific timetable of discussions between our defense ministers and our foreign ministers. So as we can continue progress to find common ground...to make the world more peaceful, both of us want to seize the moment and lead. And I appreciate this attitude so very much with President Putin.'
Question: '... How do you see the biggest difficulties in this dialogue? What are the principal differences between the two countries? And how do you see overcoming these differences?'
President Putin: 'As far as the ABM Treaty and the issues of offensive arms, I've already said we've come to the conclusion that two of these issues have to be discussed as a set, as one set. This is not [in] doubt whatsoever; one and the other are very closely tied. Neither one, nor the other side should feel it's somehow threatened or constrained. I felt and continue to feel that...we have to maintain a balance, thanks to which mankind could live in an environment of stability and relative peace. This is an issue of principle. And that's first. Second, we share the position of the US President on the need to have large cuts in offensive arms... And together, we're going to move forward in this direction, substantially changing the situation in the world, making it better throughout the whole world, reducing the thresholds of confrontation. ...'
Question: '[President Putin,] have you convinced him [President Bush] to scrap the ABM Treaty without building up his nuclear arsenal? ...'
President Putin: 'Now, as far as possible answer or response, as you say, from Russia, in the event that one side leaves the ABM Treaty, from the 1972 treaty, then I can say the following. We were talking about the possible kinds and versions of response in the event that one side comes out unilaterally. I was not talking about increasing the missiles. I was talking about how you would substitute single-unit warheads, make them MIRV [multiple] warheads. But...if we are ready to look at the issue of offensive and defensive systems together as a set, we might not ever need to look at that option. But this is one of the subjects of our future discussions. ...'"
III. Briefing by US National Security Advisor, July 22
'Readout to the press pool on the bilateral meeting of President Bush with President Putin of Russia by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Press Van En Route Cristoforo Colombo Airport Genoa, Italy, July 22, 2001'; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 22.
"Question: '... [S]o you're going to go and set up discussions between Ministers of Defense and Foreign Ministers. And then do you have any sort of timetable on when you hope things start rolling or getting a decision on any kind of cuts?'
Dr. Rice: 'Well, I think the important thing is that the schedule of consultations, is how I would describe it, we would hope to have completed by the time that I leave Moscow. And I think you'll see that they'd be very regular, because they talked about an intensive schedule of consultations. I don't think that either president has in mind a timetable at the other end, in other words, you have to do it by this date. But they clearly want to make this quite intensive, and want to get going very soon. So it's my job to go get that schedule put together.'
Question: 'Are they...further down the road now than they were after the Slovenia meeting? Did they make any progress today that's measurable?'
Dr. Rice: 'Well, I think that I'd just point you to the line in the joint statement that they already have some tangible areas of agreement. I think that they are making some progress on what the elements of a new strategic framework might entail, including discussions of defensive systems, although there's not yet agreement as to what form that would take, given the constraints of the ABM Treaty. But also that offensive reductions are a part of it, the non-proliferation efforts are a part of it, that discussions on terrorism are a part of it. So I think that what they've really moved forward on is what are the elements of a new strategic framework, and I think also, a kind of openness to the fact that a new strategic framework is a good idea.' ...
Question: 'President Putin seemed very excited about the idea of linking offensive weapons to defensive weapons. Did the President bring that up first? What's your sense of that agreement? ...'
Dr. Rice: '[I]n fact, it was the President who first linked these, all the way back in his pre-election speech, but then at the Fort McNair speech [on May 1 this year] he made [it] very...clear that he thinks these are all part of a package of elements of a new strategic framework. So again, I thought there was movement forward in hearing the Russian President say, all right, this has to be about defense and offense, not just as they tended to want to talk about offenses in the past. ... They had been talking, and it was actually Putin who said that he thought it would be good to say that they were about to discuss this, and they decided then on a joint statement.'
Question: 'Who was it that decided today? You guys hadn't already thought we'll have a statement?'
Dr. Rice: 'No, this came out in the meeting.' ...
Question: 'When you talked about going to Russia yourself, and setting up this timetable and the schedule of intensive consultations, are you talking just logistically setting dates, or also setting agendas, and what does that step-by-step unfolding look like, even just topic wise?'
Dr. Rice: 'Well, I'm also going, in addition to setting up dates and logistics, as you say, to listen to the Russians on what they have in mind for these consultations, so that we have a sense of how they see the agenda unfolding. ... And I want to emphasize that these are ministerial level consultations. This is not a set of 15-year arms control agreements - arms control discussions. This is at the ministerial level, and we expect to move quickly.' ...
Question: 'Will the schedule you set be consistent with the very loose timetable you and Powell and others have set out, in terms of dealing with the issues relating to the ABM Treaty and missile testing of months, not years, in that short period of time? Are you talking about setting an aggressive schedule that would allow you to get to the brunt of those issues in the next few months?'
Dr. Rice: 'It clearly will be an aggressive schedule. And I think both Presidents want it to be an aggressive schedule, allowing for the fact that these are busy people, these ministers. And so one has to allow for that. But they clearly want an aggressive schedule. We don't have a specific timetable in mind. We've made very clear that the constraints of the treaty are a problem for us, and that the President really believes that he's going to need to move forward at an appropriate time. But I think right now what we're focused on is getting in motion high-level consultations, to see how quickly we might be able to sketch out an agreement.'
Question: 'Back on the subject of linkage, what's your feeling, is it that there would be a linkage of nuclear arms reduction to just breaking the treaty, or that the arms reduction in nuclear forces would be a part in deploying an actual system?'
Dr. Rice: 'I wouldn't call it linkage. I think the better term is the one that's in the statement, which is that they're inter-related. And the reason that they're inter-related is that it's not that the offensive systems need to be maintained at a certain level to overwhelm the defensive systems, which was the thinking back in the Cold War days. Because the President has made very clear that this is a limited defense system, against several nuclear weapons, not against hundreds of nuclear weapons. The way that they're related is that they are both elements of a new way of security, which is lower levels of offensive forces on lower stages of alert, so that there's less danger of accident, or unauthorized release, missile defenses aimed at specific limited threats, and that we get out of a force structure that really came out of a time when we worried about a Soviet march across Europe that would lead then to nuclear war. So it's in that sense that they're linked, not that the defensive systems require a certain number of offensive systems.'
Question: 'Or that a reduction in the offensive systems is a precursor for Russian agreement?'
Dr. Rice: 'Right, we see it as all part of the same package. And I think that the good thing about today's statement was that there is no sequencing here. This seemed to be a package.'
Question: 'President Putin yesterday indicated he wanted specific information and details on what the problems were with the ABM, and what you wanted to change. Did you go into much more detail today?'
Dr. Rice: 'The President explained to him, as he said in the past, that the problem with the ABM Treaty is that it was signed to prevent you from building ballistic missile defenses. I mean, whenever you have a treaty that in every other line says, if you test in an ABM mode, you're in violation of the treaty, you have a problem with the treaty when you start trying to build ballistic missile defenses. We consistently said that we don't think the way to approach this is to line in, line out the treaty, where we say this test requires that change in the treaty, because the treaty is so restrictive. And our view is that we need to move beyond it. We need to get flexibility for a robust testing and evaluation system. A robust testing and evaluation program is going to run afoul of this treaty. There's just no doubt about that, because just to give you an example, everybody's favorite potential system is a sea-based system of some kind, because of its flexibility. And in fact it would clearly not threaten the Russian deterrent. You can't test a sea-based system in an ABM mode. There are just too many limitations. So I think the President, certainly when [US Defense Secretary] Don Rumsfeld and [Russian Defence Minister] Sergei Ivanov get together, I'm sure Don can show him where this test or that test is a problem. But the fact of the matter is, the ABM Treaty was intended to prevent the development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses. And we have to always keep that in mind. Let me just say one other thing. You can get five lawyers to give you different interpretations of when you're violating this treaty. ... We don't want to get into that. We really want to get to a place where we have flexibility to do the testing and evaluation we need to do.'
Question: 'Just on that, is it fair to say then that Putin essentially was trying to see how to amend the ABM, and you're saying let's start something new all together?'
Dr Rice: '... I don't want to put words in his mouth. He has not, to my knowledge, yet said what he has in mind. So we need to talk to him about it.'
Question: 'Dr. Rice, unless I misunderstood your briefing back at the White House a week or two ago, you said that you weren't interested in getting into another treaty that would put restrictions on defensive weapons. Is that still the view of the United States, that you're not interested in another treaty that would restrict defensive weapons? And if that's the case, then in what way are defensive weapons part of these talks? ...'
Dr. Rice: '[W]e're not interested in doing is replicating the old arms control process, by which it takes us 15 years to come to some agreement. We believe that that is something that happens when you have an implacably hostile relationship. And so we don't believe there's a need for such. As I've said, we will talk to the Russians about what forms they have in mind. But I would expect, or certainly it's our view that these are more like defense planning talks, that you look at what is required for each side to insure itself. ...'"
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.