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A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits
Much of the September issue is devoted to the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Rebecca Johnson reports from New York on the momentous, if nerve-wracking, culmination of three years of negotiations: "Applause at the end of the UN General Assembly session was as much from a sense of relief that the CTBT had finally gone through without the nightmare scenarios of amendments and procedural knock-backs as a celebration of the treaty itself."
All three CD Opinion Pieces ponder the future of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) after its failure to agree, but broad success in negotiating, the test ban. Michael Krepon, President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, argues that a task many States would like the CD to take on, "a negotiation on phased nuclear disarmament," is "likely to do more harm than good to the CD, and to near-term prospects for nuclear disarmament." In contrast, former Soviet arms control negotiator Nikolai Sokov asks "is it possible that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arsenals could return to the UN fold?" and answers that "recent events, as well as problems which are likely to emerge in the near future, do, indeed, suggest that this is possible." Rebecca Johnson foresees an important role for the CD in shaping the post-CTBT nuclear arms control agenda, but does not foresee that future as usefully encompassing negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty.
Two Guest Comments are also featured. Graham Pearson, former Chief Executive of Britain's Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, urges strong action to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and argues that such action is entirely possible as long as "the States Parties...stop indulging in the temptation to suggest that biological and toxin agents are too difficult to control effectively." Commenting on the July ruling of the World Court on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, Alyn Ware, Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, maintains that it "constitutes a resounding challenge to...continuing policies of nuclear deterrence."
Documents and Sources features extensive extracts from the Canberra Commission's impressive consideration of the verification necessary to reach, verify and maintain a nuclear-weapons-free world.
The adoption of the CTBT features prominently in the News Review, together with the US Senate's failure to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), progress towards implementing the US- North Korea Framework Agreement, and the violent disruption of UNSCOM's work in Iraq.
For the past three years I have observed the Conference on Disarmament and attempted to report on its deliberations as fairly and accurately as possible. The piece below is not a report, but a personal opinion, intended to provoke discussion and stimulate further thinking on the future role and work of the CD at this critical stage of its history.
The Conference on Disarmament is facing a crisis which combines danger and opportunity. This is not brought about by its failure to adopt the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and send it by consensus to New York. Nor is it caused by Australia's initiative which bypassed the CD's deadlock and transmitted the draft treaty to the UN General Assembly by way of a nationally sponsored resolution. These actions may have highlighted some of the CD's structural and decision-making weaknesses, but the crisis was bound to come to a head with or without the extraordinary events of the past two months. The principal challenge is for the CD to determine a role and relevance for itself in a multipolar and post Cold War world. The crisis looms because the CD has concluded negotiations on the CTBT, a measure that was born out of a desire to halt the East-West nuclear arms race and which codifies the end of that era. The Conference has no clear idea what to do next.
There has been recognition for some years in the CD that it needed to review and update its agenda and institutional arrangements. The original agenda, known as the 'decalogue' was established at the first UN special session on disarmament (UNSSODI) in 1978 as follows:
1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related measures
4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
8. Transparency in armaments
9. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures
10. Consideration and adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
In 1994 four ad hoc committees were established: on the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB); Transparency in Armaments (TIA); Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS); and Negative Security Assurances (NSA). However, only the NTB Committee had a negotiating mandate and sense of direction. The other committees were little more than acrimonious talk shops, and in 1995 and 1996 the CD failed to agree to reconvene them. This was blamed on 'linkage' by which certain delegations or groups made their agreement to establish one committee contingent on agreement to establish another or others. In particular, the split was seen to be between those (primarily in the western group) which wanted more emphasis on conventional arms (the TIA Committee), who argued that PAROS was outdated and NSA was inappropriate in this forum, and those in the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States which regarded nuclear disarmament as the main priority. They were therefore characterised as unenthusiastic about TIA, but insistent on the relevance of NSA and also PAROS, because of changes in US posture regarding ballistic missile defence.
After the 1993 UNGA resolution 48/75L, the CD undertook consideration of how to ban production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In March 1995, somewhat pressured by the up- coming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, a mandate was agreed, establishing an ad hoc 'Fissban' Committee. It has never been convened. Again, the demand for 'linkage' was blamed, at least by the Western group, as a number of G-21 States argued that the Fissban Committee should be complemented by an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
The core problem, however, was whether stockpiles of military plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be included in the fissban negotiations, as demanded by Pakistan and many non-aligned countries, or whether only a 'cut-off' of future production was to be addressed, the view of the P-5 nuclear-weapon States, Israel and India. The mandate agreed in March 1995 fudged the issue, the result of clever drafting by Gerald Shannon, the Canadian Special Coordinator, at a time when certain States wished to report progress to the NPT Conference but no real compromise could be agreed.
In the aftermath of the indefinite extension of the NPT, and clearly illustrated by the dynamics of the CTBT endgame, such fudges won't work. In his report to the CD on 3 September (see my Geneva Update in this issue), Hocine Meghlaoui, Special Coordinator in 1996 for the review of the agenda, delicately noted that 'no delegation is opposed to negotiating [the fissban], but the difficulties encountered since the presentation of Ambassador Shannon's report remain.' He further remarked that while some regard immediate negotiations on this as a priority, 'other delegations expressed reservations and sought prior clarification of the question of nuclear disarmament as a whole.'
In addition to the fundamental question of stockpiles, India has followed up its CTBT strategy by requiring that the fissban should be more clearly related to nuclear disarmament. In the Programme of Action put forward in August on behalf of 28 of the non-aligned CD members, India has also insisted on reference to immediate and concurrent commencement of negotiations on several measures including a fissban, no use convention and a convention eliminating nuclear weapons. The central contradiction in this posture is that India is one of the States most adamant in rejecting the consideration, declaration or control of stockpiles as part of the fissban. Without consideration of stocks, the fissban is no more than a basic 'cut-off', a non-proliferation measure, freezing the status quo and codifying a halt to production that at least four of the P-5 have already practically undertaken. However, if would leave the nuclear ambiguity of India and Israel intact, of fundamental importance to those two countries.
If the CTBT negotiations turned out to be, in essence, about the eight declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon States, the proposed fissban mandate for the CD will become bogged down in similar problems more quickly and to a greater extent. Those in the P-5 who insist on a multilateral treaty for a minimal fissile cut-off are misusing the CD in order to tie in the 'Threshold-3' (T-3) States - India, Israel and Pakistan. It is noticeable that those who are most adamant on this are the smaller nuclear powers, who also want to ensure that international control of fissile material goes no further than a weapons-related production cut-off.
Until the 1993 resolution, the UNGA regularly passed by overwhelming majorities fissban resolutions that covered stocks as well as future production. For the wider purposes of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the declaration, control, reduction and ultimate elimination of fissile stocks becomes inevitable. However, given the objections of some of the P-5, India and Israel, there is validity to the view that if the major producers are now willing to take a first step to halt production, it would at least be worthwhile to begin to put their military production facilities under some safeguards. That argument made some sense when there was a prospect of negotiating a cut-off in the CD within reasonable time. But as the arguments over the mandate and subsequent deadlock over the ad hoc committee have shown, this would not be easy. Furthermore, the CTBT endgame indicates that multilateral negotiations on a fissban are likely to be long drawn out, acrimonious, and in the end may fail to bring the T-3 on board.
As with nuclear testing, the fissile materials production capability and record of the five declared nuclear-weapon States so outweighs the stocks and capacity of the threshold countries, that the security interest of all would be better served by an immediate, legally binding and verified halt by the P-5 than by years of wrangling and posturing among 60 States in an attempt to catch the T-3. Even more than the test ban, this would become hostage to South Asian - and possibly Middle Eastern - regional politics. India has already served notice that it wants the fissban linked to a timetable for nuclear disarmament, and Pakistan denies the validity of a fissban without stocks.
The CTBT at least required international involvement and participation for its verification regime. For a cut-off, verification could be established, as in the NPT, by means of bilateral agreements between signatories and the International Atomic Energy Agency for full scope safeguards and inspections at the relevant facilities. Nothing would preclude the P-5 consulting with the IAEA, India, Israel, Pakistan or others during negotiations, with a view to meeting as many T-3 concerns as possible. The finalised agreement could then be opened for signature by the international community, as was the tripartite Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. For non-nuclear NPT Parties this would not involve any additional measures or costs for implementation.
If handled right politically, such a process to achieve a verified fissile cut-off would stand as good - if not better - chance of bringing the T-3 on board, and could be accomplished more quickly, cleanly and cheaply than bogging the CD down in what would be a sham multilateral exercise in P-5/T-3 arm wrestling.
Despite agreeing the Shannon mandate, the CD should look long and hard at whether it is, after all, the appropriate place to negotiate the fissile materials ban indicated in UNGA 48/75L. There are fissile materials issues which should be discussed multilaterally, but the basic cut-off which the P-5 are prepared to consider at present would be neither an efficient use of CD time, nor could it deliver an effective international agreement any time soon or guarantee India's early signature.
For the CD to decide now to hand the issue back to the P-5 (which in any case determined many of the crucial CTBT decisions in sidebar discussions among themselves) would be a brave but wise decision. A multilateral forum with 60 participating States and the rule of consensus should not be used merely to place an international, legal stamp on unilateral decisions by the nuclear powers nor to provide chaperones for the dangerous flirtations of those with continuing nuclear ambitions, declared and undeclared. It would be a mistake to fill the gap left by the CTBT too quickly. The CD must consider its role, structures and capabilities very carefully.
In his 3 September statement, Meghlaoui noted a general agreement from his consultations that the CD should not duplicate the UNGA First Committee or UN Disarmament Commission. The CD is the sole multilateral negotiating forum, and that responsibility should lie at the heart of decisions on its future agenda. This requires a limited size and procedures which enable countries with specific security interests to hammer them out within a safe working framework. Engaging in negotiations as a CD member is a responsibility as well as a right. Sixty is already large for a negotiating body, and care should be taken before adding new members. However, some significant international players are still on the outside: countries like Malaysia, Kazakstan and Ireland. There are also persistently empty seats. Where members have failed to attend or contribute for more than a year, there should be an agreed procedure to replace them with those on the waiting list, who should demonstrate their readiness by contributing fully as observers.
If the CD wants to ensure that its role as a negotiating body is respected, its relationship with other international fora needs to be thought through more fully. UN General Assembly resolutions have long been used as indicators of priorities for the CD, with consensus resolutions on CTBT and fissile materials acting as 'instructions' for the CD to consider appropriate negotiating mandates. Yet many diplomats feared that taking a CD-negotiated treaty back to the UN without CD consensus would undermine the Conference, and it was necessary for Australia and others to underline their support for the CD during the General Assembly debate on 9 and 10 September to counteract this unintended effect.
Given that CD membership comprises only one-third of the United Nations, it is right and proper that the full international community should have some say both in the CD's agenda and priorities for work and in endorsing its final products. Indeed, Meghlaoui also suggested this, at least in relation to the CD's agenda, which he characterised as a 'legislative matter.'
I would take this a step further, in the interests of democracy and effective decision-making. In its substantive negotiating role the Conference needs to limit its size and work by consensus, but its overall responsibility is to the international community. Consensus does not have to be a rigid concept and does not (at least in the outside world) always confer an indefinite right of veto on each party. While all attempts should be made to reach consensus on CD decisions, the jurisdiction of the wider international community should be available as a recognised mechanism if a blockage is intransigent, unreasonable or reflects only the interests of one or two particular States. These States would of course retain their sovereign right not to accede to any agreement or treaty, but the international community has a legitimate interest in CD outcomes, and this too must be fully incorporated in CD procedures.
As noted by Meghlaoui, there is agreement that the CD's future agenda should include both nuclear and conventional disarmament, but disagreement about the priorities and balance. Since I have argued that the CD should not now take on negotiating the fissban, I ought now to say what I think it should, or could, do.
Conventional Disarmament
In the arena of conventional weapons, there are a lot of good reasons for the CD to take on landmines, and a few arguments against. The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) comes under humanitarian law and governs use. It has been woefully inadequate. As shown by the recent review conferences, there are limits to how effectively this can be tightened up. To seek to amend the Convention by means of the CD would run into problems of participation, which also beset the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which some would like the CD to take on. The CD's membership is not the same as that of the CCW or BWC and it is difficult to see how the CD with its present institutional arrangements could negotiate changes to existing treaties.
In the case of landmines, however, as more of the international community comes to the conclusion that a ban on exports and/or production and possession of anti-personnel mines is the only way to deal with this scourge, the issue becomes one of disarmament rather than use. The changed international situation - and particularly the growing worldwide condemnation of landmines - means that negotiating a new treaty may well be a quicker and more effective route than continuing to review and tighten the existing CCW. If that is decided, perhaps by overwhelming decision of the UN General Assembly, then the CD may well be the most appropriate forum to negotiate a landmines ban.
Nuclear Disarmament
Once dismissed by diplomats and military strategists as the pie-in- the-sky idealism of the anti-nuclear lobby, the abolition of nuclear weapons is looking more and more realistic as the best (and most rational) response to the threat of proliferation. The Chemical Weapons Convention showed that it could be done with a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. The disintegration of the East-West ideological confrontation makes it possible, while the increased risks of nuclear theft and terrorism make stringent controls on all nuclear materials and technologies a necessity. On a fragmented security map, nuclear weapons are recognised by most military specialists themselves as having little or no reliable function, while their very possession creates an ambition and incentive for others to acquire them. Majority public opinion is against nuclear weapons and governments are less and less willing to cover the environmental and economic costs of their production.
The NPT was extended indefinitely in May 1995, carrying with it a permanent, binding and verified commitment on non-nuclear weapon parties not to acquire nuclear devices and an obligation on the nuclear powers to seek nuclear disarmament. In July this year, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion, unanimously endorsed and strengthened this obligation, stating that: 'There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international controls.'
In the past year several important studies have been published which outline practical steps to be undertaken towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, most notably from the Canberra Commission and the Henry L Stimson Center. Following up the non- aligned States' demand for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, 28 countries proposed a three-phase programme of action with the goal of achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.
None of these studies has come up with all the answers yet. The point is that there is a worldwide public clamour, growing intellectual credibility and a strong international momentum indicating that the time is ripe to consider how best to achieve total nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament has an important part to play in this process. Resolutions to the UN First Committee and Fifty-First General Assembly will call again for an ad hoc committee for nuclear disarmament, and some will demand that negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention should begin in 1997.
With only three of the nuclear powers still opposed, it is high time for the CD to convene a nuclear disarmament committee. However, I do not think that a hasty negotiating mandate for a Nuclear Weapon Convention would serve a useful purpose at this time. The G-21 Programme of Action has many useful ideas, but would also throw up barriers and problems which need to be re- considered very carefully before multilateral negotiations could go forward.
The nuclear disarmament committee, working under a mandate developed from the ICJ ruling and existing treaty obligations, should concentrate on developing an overall framework. Working in tandem with the enhanced review process of the NPT, the first PrepCom of which will meet in New York in April 1997, the CD (which includes not only the P-5 but also the T-3 threshold countries) needs to identify the steps to achieve nuclear disarmament and set realistic targets for the nuclear-weapon States to achieve by unilateral action and joint agreements. A Nuclear Weapon Convention should be the objective, but will take time, and is likely to be agreed only towards the end of the process, codifying and setting up the verification regime for complete abolition. Much more needs to be done by way of US/Russian and P-5 agreements, controls on fissile materials, verification development and confidence building before such a convention has a genuine prospect of being successfully negotiated.
It may be that the CD decides to negotiate an interim multilateral agreement, such as a warhead production ban (proposed last year by New Zealand) or a more comprehensive ban on production and stockpiling of fissile materials; or the Nuclear Weapon Convention could itself be a framework agreement, with protocols to deal with specific measures, such as a fissban, no first use and so on. No- one yet has the answers, and it would be a mistake to straitjacket the CD prematurely into one approach. However, I am not advocating turning the CD meanwhile into a talking shop on nuclear disarmament. There is more than enough of that in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC).
Whether or not the CD decides to negotiate a landmines convention, nuclear disarmament should remain a priority. I am merely arguing that much focused negotiation must take place before the CD is in a position to identify the right multilateral approach or agreement to undertake.
The intensive focus on the CTBT over the past three years has enabled the CD to avoid dealing with its underlying problems. In practical terms, few regretted the deadlock over other committees because it freed up time for the NTB Committee and its working groups. Conclusion of the test ban treaty now makes it imperative for the CD to resolve its conflicts over agenda and structure.
In my view, the linkage tactic is a symptom of the CD's problems, not the cause, but if it continues to paralyse the work of the Conference, it could destroy it. The western nuclear powers have never been very keen on the CD. They may play up its failures and try to tip all the disarmament eggs into the NPT review basket, thereby excluding the T-3 - and especially India - even further. While it is important that the NPT review process should be utilised as effectively as possible to further the implementation of Article VI on nuclear disarmament, it is not a negotiating forum. Attempts to replace the CD with the NPT review process would therefore be mistaken or hostile. It would be more appropriate to view the CD and NPT processes as working together in a pincer action to identify measures and apply pressure for further unilateral and bilateral actions and lay the groundwork for future multilateral agreements.
Rebecca Johnson is Director of Disarmament Intelligence Review in London.
The Conference on Disarmament has clearly been damaged by the government of India's decision to block transmittal by consensus of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) text to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Whether the CD returns to good health or is further damaged depends, in part, on its next negotiating agenda item. A negotiation on phased nuclear disarmament is likely to do more harm than good to the CD, and to near-term prospects for nuclear disarmament.
The test ban treaty that emerged from arduous negotiations in Geneva was generally welcome, if far from perfect. The text fairly reflected resolutions passed unanimously by the UNGA and the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference calling for a truly comprehensive, verifiable and universal test ban treaty. The CD's own negotiating mandate - again, approved by consensus in 1993 with India's complete support - demanded this outcome, as well. When, to the surprise of many, the CD actually managed to negotiate a truly comprehensive and verifiable treaty after four decades of sporadic effort, India flinched, troubled by the uncertainties of maintaining its nuclear option without testing. India's reversal places in limbo the universal treaty it has championed for four decades.
New Delhi's diplomatic offensive to block transmittal could not, of course, be framed in terms of the need to keep open the route to boosted fission or thermonuclear weapons. More inclusive themes were stressed, such as the need to strike a blow against nuclear apartheid and to force the nuclear weapons club to provide a timetable for disarmament. Widespread sympathy for these messages did not produce votes for the messenger.
New Delhi also defended its position by contending that the nuclear-weapon States could substitute simulations and laboratory experiments for new designs. This assertion is essential to prove that the CTBT is not truly comprehensive in scope, but it badly confuses theory with practice. Sophisticated new designs can be produced by computers - whether for nuclear, non-nuclear, or threshold States - but the designers cannot have confidence in them unless they are tested. Ironically, India's case against this 'loophole' in the treaty text reinforces the need for the CTBT's entry into force, now blocked by India's iconoclastic stand.
With the clock ticking in Geneva, and with continued P-5 support for the CTBT tenuous, at best, irregular procedures were required to circumvent India's veto by taking the treaty directly before the UNGA. There, the extent of New Delhi's isolation became painfully clear. Only Bhutan, whose national security calculations pass through New Delhi, and Libya voted with India to make the best the enemy of the good. Despite this lopsided vote, none should expect India's isolation to lead to a change of heart: New Delhi's diplomatic strategy may have appeared clumsy in Geneva and New York, but it received rave reviews at home. India is unlikely to sign this treaty, thereby blocking its formal entry into force, unless it first undertakes a series of nuclear tests.
Either way, India's sense of isolation from the international community will grow. Indeed, with Israel's signature on the CTBT, the number of countries that refuse to accept any formal treaty constraints on their nuclear options will dwindle to two: India and Pakistan, which follows New Delhi's lead on such matters. India's bete noire, the NPT, which it claims divides the world into nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots,' leverages against new nuclear powers. When the international community voted by acclamation in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely, India reacted with genuine disbelief, and great discomfort. Successful efforts at the Extension Conference by non-nuclear-weapon States to create yardsticks measuring progress in nuclear disarmament by the five 'haves,' as required by the NPT, were found completely wanting by New Delhi, which declined to accept observer status at the proceedings. The first concrete measure demanded by the non- nuclear States was, after all, the prompt completion of the test ban treaty.
Far removed from its vote bank at the NPT Conference, New Delhi could explain the treaty's indefinite renewal by poor leadership and divisions within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and by heavy arm-twisting by the nuclear-weapon States. The result would have been different, Indian analysts contended, had Delhi led the charge against indefinite extension. But the end result on the CTBT at the United Nations was a replay of the NPT's extension. India tried hard to summon support linking the CTBT to a timetable for complete nuclear disarmament, until preliminary vote counts necessitated a lonely, principled opposition instead of a full- court press. The insularity of India's stand must be doubly painful: twice within the past sixteen months, non-nuclear-weapon States have voted overwhelmingly in support of treaties that serve their national security interests while constraining India's freedom of choice.
New Delhi's game plan will now surely include a strong push for time-bound nuclear disarmament negotiations in Geneva. First, the guaranteed opposition to this proposal by some nuclear-weapon States provide justification for India's stand against the NPT and CTBT. Second, a strong push for time-bound nuclear disarmament in the CD will diminish India's isolation and reaffirm New Delhi's leadership position within the NAM.
India will have plenty of company pushing for nuclear disarmament negotiations in the CD. The non-nuclear-weapon States assumed the role of wounded parties in the CTBT, even though the Treaty's obligations fell on the five nuclear powers. These 'have nots' can reasonably be expected to use leverage newly granted by the NPT's extension and the CTBT's Preamble to join in this effort. The five nuclear-weapon States are, after all, clearly unwilling to accept this end state, and sustained international pressure is needed to make this happen.
While the CD's procedures requiring consensus have recently been broken to secure the CTBT, unanimous resolutions supporting the test ban treaty's prompt conclusion provided sufficient justification for the end run. The pursuit of time-bound nuclear disarmament will be far more contentious, with little hope of reaching anything remotely resembling consensus. Under these circumstances, the purpose of debates over starting ad-hoc CD disarmament negotiations would be to make a political point, not to achieve the desired outcome.
Public pressures on nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their end of the bargain found in Article VI of the NPT are necessary. They are also warranted by the CTBT's Preamble and by the Statement of Principles and Objectives approved by acclamation at the time of the NPT's indefinite extension. If the nuclear-weapon States do not like a CD negotiation reducing the size of the arsenals, they have every right to demonstrate with concrete measures why such negotiations are not needed.
The central issue here is not whether the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals is required, but how best to accomplish the desired end state. Under current conditions, public appeals for a CD negotiation on nuclear disarmament could provide useful leverage; actual negotiations could be a cause of concern, rather than jubilation. An old proverb, claimed by several cultures, warns us to be careful of what we wish for, because it might actually become true. In this context, the acceptance by the nuclear-weapon States of nuclear disarmament negotiations in the CD could facilitate efforts by those States to retard, rather than facilitate, the process of reductions.
Negotiations over a CD mandate to carry out negotiations on elimination would, no doubt, be long and contentious. China, which is the only nuclear-weapon State currently supporting these negotiations, has indicated that it would use this forum to harden and formalize its position that the United States and Russia must reduce their nuclear arsenals to China's level before Beijing would consent to accept constraints on its nuclear forces. Beijing would therefore take a page from New Delhi's play book, avoiding treaty obligations until other States reduce to one's level of nuclear capabilities. Great Britain and France might well adopt a position quite similar to that presumed for China. Russia might well argue that its deep reductions would be contingent upon proportionate reductions by the three smaller nuclear-weapon States. The United States might show more flexibility than the other nuclear powers, or might not, depending on the administration in Washington.
The resulting deadlock in Geneva could reinforce hard-line positions in all P-5 capitals, which are likely to seek maximum freedom of manoeuvre. China's bomb lobby could argue that, in order to increase leverage, Beijing should be free to enhance its nuclear weapon capabilities while negotiations are underway - a practice well-known in bilateral US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations. Nuclear weapon establishments in Great Britain and France could argue that their nuclear forces must not contract further pending resolution of CD negotiations, regardless of economic imperatives. Deadlocked talks could also reinforce the stance of those in the United States and Russia who are opposed to unilateral initiatives to reduce arsenals.
Anyone who observed the negotiating tactics on display in the interminably long and inconclusive Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks should be wary of replicating this process with multilateral nuclear force structure negotiations. In the MBFR talks, the United States and the Soviet Union learned well how to foreclose progress and maintain the status quo along the division of Europe: whenever the United States Senate was poised to reduce force levels unilaterally, the Kremlin would propose a new negotiating initiative, against which the Congress was told not to interfere.
It has been difficult enough to coax, prod, and insist on bilateral US-Soviet nuclear arms reductions. Those who supported this process were beset by negative political developments abroad and by entrenched domestic opposition. Bilateral negotiations have not become easier with the end of the Cold War. Opposition to deep cuts continues in the US and Russian nuclear weapon establishments. The Kremlin remains a thicket of intrigue; the coherence of the old Soviet Union, which could override problems in past negotiations, no longer exists.
If bilateral arms reduction negotiations remain so difficult, and require much sustained, high-level effort, does it make sense to complicate these matters far more, whether by bringing in all five nuclear-weapon States, or by bringing in the five plus the fifty- six other members of the CD? One presumption behind such proposals is that bringing more parties to the negotiating table would override resistance to nuclear disarmament so amply demonstrated in US-Soviet/Russian negotiations. But how would such resistance be softened by adding three more nuclear-weapon States to the negotiating table - States that have also amply demonstrated their attachment to nuclear weapons?
A second presumption behind proposals for a CD negotiation over elimination is that the nuclear-weapon States have so far denied their obligation to eliminate, and that unless negotiations to secure this commitment are undertaken, a system of nuclear apartheid will continue indefinitely. Ironically, the country that has done most to propagate this view, India, now blocks the treaty most likely to facilitate the progressive reductions - the CTBT.
As has already been noted, the P-5 have undertaken binding and solemn treaty commitments to pursue disarmament in Article VI of the NPT. Moreover, the P-5 have clarified this obligation by agreeing to take concrete steps to pursue this end state in the NPT's Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament. The P-5 have reluctantly delivered on the first such step - the CTBT. That India would choose to downplay these commitments is understandable, given New Delhi's antipathy to the NPT. That the NAM would join India in downplaying the NPT's obligations is both strange and injurious to the very goals they seek.
Does it make sense to demand a negotiation on nuclear disarmament that would invite blocking manoeuvres and ill-will when a solemn treaty commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament already exists? Tactically, would we not be better off by asserting obligations and demanding their fulfillment in whatever ways work best? After all, the NPT's solemn commitments were accepted voluntarily by the nuclear-weapon States. Yardsticks for measuring progress were codified by acclamation at the NPT Review and Extension Conference after lengthy negotiations. Opportunities for measurement will present themselves at every subsequent NPT Preparatory Committee and Review Conference. Why demand reductions in a forum that has the least chance of success and the highest probability of generating resistance rather than acceptance?
Concrete measures must be undertaken to progressively reduce and eliminate nuclear dangers, but success can take many routes, including unilateral initiatives, bilateral, P-5, or even, at some point in the future, CD negotiations. Whatever has a high probability of success should be pursued; whatever has a high probability of failure should be avoided. Leverage for nuclear disarmament comes from the requirement for results, not from the particulars of procedure.
To be sure, what the Article VI obligation lacks, and what proponents of a CD negotiation seek, are specific deadlines for phased nuclear disarmament. Will the negotiation of deadlines for disarmament in the CD really help matters? This presumption, too, requires careful reconsideration. Deadlines are useful when they help parties to overcome the last hurdles in a negotiation. Deadlines that cannot be met generate cynicism, not progress.
Deadlines for staged nuclear disarmament also constitute a mechanical approach to a profoundly political process. What conditions would be necessary for nuclear-weapon and threshold States to entirely forego the nuclear option? What degree of transparency would be required? Surely, existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear material would have to be revealed, and States would require a high level of confidence in the accuracy of such declarations. Arrangements would be needed to address concerns over covert production of nuclear material or the existence of undeclared stocks. Bilateral disputes involving nuclear-weapon and threshold States would have to be resolved amicably, and arrangements established to deal with unexpected threats to global nuclear disarmament. Many other difficult issues would have to be resolved, as the Canberra Commission report and the Stimson Center's study group, chaired by General Andrew Goodpaster, have begun to address. Significantly, these reports do not advocate time-bound frameworks for phased disarmament.
How then to proceed toward elimination? The least complicated (but far from simple) way at present is to continue US-Russian reductions. This may be a tall order, given leadership questions in the Kremlin, and Moscow's aversion to the far greater levels of transparency needed for deep, deep cuts. These difficulties, however, will not be ameliorated by inviting other parties to this negotiation, especially States that are even more averse to transparency than Russia. The level of bilateral reductions required before engaging the P-5 need not - and should not - be specified, if it can be avoided. In this process, concrete steps matter more than procedure. Reductions can be informal, if necessary, but preferably by formally verified agreements.
Michael Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.
The process of nuclear disarmament seems to be developing in a circle. It began within the United Nations framework - the US Baruch Plan, then Khruschev's proposals about nuclear disarmament. But in the early 1960s, 'serious' arms control - reduction of nuclear arsenals - began to 'slip' from the area of responsibility of the UN and became the responsibility of the nuclear powers, under the assumption that only the States that have nuclear weapons can deal with them.
The first practical measure - the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 - was concluded between three nuclear powers (the Soviet Union, US, and UK), while the first arms limitation agreements - the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty - were concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, as were a host of other agreements, including the two START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaties. START III talks, which are likely to begin in 1997 if Russia ratifies START II, will evidently be bilateral as well. In the meantime, the United Nations has been left to deal with very general, relatively uncontroversial measures, either legalising the decision to refrain from certain activities (like the ban on nuclear weapons in space) or affecting primarily the non-nuclear States (i.e. the NPT).
Recently, however, nuclear arms control has begun to return to the UN fold: the CTBT has been negotiated in the framework of the CD and will enter into force within the UN framework. Is it possible that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arsenals could return to the UN fold? Recent events, as well as problems which are likely to emerge in the near future, do, indeed, suggest that this is possible.
The 'division of labour' in nuclear arms control is implicitly codified in the NPT, built around the assumption that nuclear arms reduction is both a prerogative and a burden of the States which officially possess nuclear weapons. The famous Article VI of the Treaty explicitly recognised that it is the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons, while all other States were limited only to the power of 'oversight' - in other words, they could demand that the Five live up to their obligation, but could not prescribe in which ways or how soon the obligation should be discharged. The low effectiveness of the power of oversight was precisely the reason for the debate at the recent NPT Extension Conference about whether an indefinite extension might remove the political pressure upon the nuclear- weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The premises on which Article VI and its 'division of labour' rest are reasonably obvious.
First, it is the security of the nuclear-weapon States that is most directly affected by these weapons: they need to deter possible aggression by other nuclear States and thus need to keep all decision-making on the size and composition of their nuclear arsenals, as well as strategies of use (first strike, strike on warning, or second strike; first-use verses no-first-use, etc) in their own hands. Doing otherwise would be both an infringement upon the sovereignty of the nuclear-weapon States (because nuclear weapons are legally not fundamentally different from any other weapons) and upon their security, because non-nuclear States might inadvertently put forward conditions that would upset the strategic balance. Similar considerations guide nuclear arms reductions. Nuclear-weapon States reserve the right to determine for themselves the target levels and the target composition of their nuclear arsenals: although they are supposed to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, they need to control the process in order to avoid dangerous destabilisation of the strategic balance during the process.
An example of this situation is the Soviet Union's long-standing tradition of putting the majority of its warheads on land-based missiles, ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles), which in the middle of the 1970s began to be equipped with more than one warhead (by fitting ICBMs with MIRVs - Multiple Independently- Targetable Re-entry Vehicles). The United States saw these weapons as destabilising and insisted that they be eliminated. Only in the early 1990s did Russia come to accept notions of strategic stability similar to those advanced by the United States. But, as the debate around START II ratification has demonstrated, that recognition was far from uniform. Certainly, an attempt by other nuclear or non-nuclear States to urge the Soviet Union to shift its emphasis from land-based to sea- or air-based delivery platforms would have been roundly rejected.
The same is true for war contingency plans. The United States and NATO have had a first-use policy to balance what they saw as a vast Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. NATO would not have accepted any guidance on the part of non-nuclear States to change that strategy. The first-use strategy has recently been accepted by Russia to deter the superior conventional capability of NATO. Again, it will not change it no matter what others say, as long as it is perceived as essential for security.
There is also the question of secrecy. The finer details of calculation of nuclear balance are usually a matter of the most closely guarded State secret: such things as accuracy, the time it takes to launch a missile, its ability to withstand the first strike of the other side (for example, to what extent it is protected from the blast-wave of a nuclear explosion), and a myriad of other variables that affect the second-strike capability of a nuclear arsenal. Even at confidential bilateral talks the sides, as a rule, do not disclose the motives behind particular proposals, and the other side is left to guess whether a proposal reflects a desire to gain a unilateral advantage or a genuine concern about certain characteristics of weapons. This severely limits the ability of outsiders to provide useful input: many contributions based on common sense and/or publicly available information could seem naive and dangerous to those who know the real situation.
The points above - and many others - were considered in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union, when some proposed to move the START I talks to the CD. In that dispute, I was on the side of those who wanted to keep the talks bilateral, and even today I think that that was a correct decision. But times change, and what was unthinkable then might become advisable in the future
While the 'division of labour' can be rationalised, it has caused mounting problems. The tension between the global impact of nuclear weapons (their presence affects the international system as a whole and their use is likely to affect the whole Earth) and the limited number of actors who have an impact upon the solution has been growing. The proposition put forward in this article is that it is time to start thinking about returning the discussion of nuclear arms reductions to the UN framework; specifically, of shifting that discussion to the CD. Several problems with things as they stand may warrant this step.
First, nuclear arms control and reduction processes will have, ultimately, to become a multilateral endeavour. At present, the difference between the levels provided for by the START I Treaty (6,000 accountable warheads, but many more in reality, because the Treaty undercounts air-based nuclear weapons) makes it possible to disregard the potential impact of Great Britain, France, and China. One might remember, though, that in the early 1980s the Soviet Union insisted on including Great Britain and France in a regional, European, nuclear balance, although it ultimately turned out not to be necessary for the conclusion of the Intermediate- range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Even the level of START II - 3,500 warheads - is sufficiently high to essentially view the global balance as a bilateral one. START III will also still be a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia. But START IV might well become a multilateral, five-party agreement, depending on the level reached under START III. The threshold is probably somewhere around 1,500-2,000 warheads, so the day when all five nuclear powers will have to sit around a negotiating table is not that far away.
A transition to the new format will hardly be smooth. None of the three players currently outside arms control negotiations is particularly anxious to take part; they will have to be persuaded or induced. Even if they agree to join, other problems will emerge. The United States and Russia have developed, over almost 30 years of negotiations, certain conventions and shared assumptions about the arms control process (a complicated classification of weapons into various categories, ways of reducing various types of weapons, verification procedures, etc). The new players will have to be integrated into the existing framework, and the framework itself will probably have to be changed to suit their particular preferences. An obvious problem is that no one knows how to calculate a five-sided nuclear balance: it is difficult enough with a two-sided one.
Another problem, whose solution cannot be postponed much longer, is that of the 'threshold nuclear States.' The distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States established by the NPT leaves India, Pakistan, Israel and perhaps some other similar States outside the nuclear disarmament framework. The principle of sovereignty, applied to them, effectively means that there does not exist a forum to discuss their weapons and that such a forum will not exist until they officially admit they have them.
The 'unofficial' nuclear-weapon States cannot legally join negotiations, even after all five 'official' nuclear States take part in them, because that would be a violation of the NPT. But their nuclear weapons and/or the capability to manufacture them exist and are present in the calculations of the military planners of the 'official' nuclear powers. In other words, they contribute - in their own way - to the problem, but do not bear the responsibility. This locks both the nuclear-weapon States and all the non-nuclear States Parties to the NPT into an awkward position: they cannot discuss nuclear weapons elimination with 'unofficial' nuclear States, they can only demand it, which might not be a practical approach to this difficult problem.
At the same time, as the nuclear non-proliferation crisis in the former Soviet Union has demonstrated, the stability of the non- proliferation regime is essential for a successful arms reduction process. The Russian military, after a careful analysis, concluded that five is about the maximum number of nuclear States that could be encompassed by an analysis of the nuclear balance; going beyond that figure would create insurmountable problems and would essentially make the nuclear balance unpredictable. Thus, even if nuclear arms reduction talks were to continue in the present bilateral, and later five-sided, format, at a certain stage they would stall because the impact of the 'unofficial' nuclear States would have to be taken into account. And, since the presence of eight or more players would increase the uncertainties of the situation beyond reasonable limits, the process of arms reduction would simply come to a standstill. From this it follows that the sooner the 'unofficial' nuclear States divulge of their arsenals, the better. Obviously, the institutional gap between arms reduction talks, which do not and cannot include the 'unofficial' nuclear States, on the one hand, and the UN framework, where these States are present, complicates the solution.
The CD might provide a convenient forum to overcome these and other difficulties and give a strong boost to nuclear arms reduction talks. Of course, members of the CD will not acquire the power of prescription (as noted above, that would run counter to the principle of sovereignty), but they might acquire the power of advice - that is, they may help to develop guidelines, arbitrate in deadlocks, and exert political and moral pressure upon the participants in negotiations.
The five declared nuclear-weapon States could form a permanent Commission within the CD framework. This Commission would conduct the daily job of developing agreements on further reductions of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, would be the only forum where final decisions could be made. In addition, an advisory Commission selected out of the 'non-nuclear' CD members could be created to oversee the process, provide input, and arbitrate, if necessary; membership in the advisory Commission could be made permanent, or be rotating. The permanent Commission of the Five would report to the CD on a regular basis to update on the status of negotiations.
Of course, a way must be found to preserve confidentiality: if all negotiations are conducted with full public knowledge, concessions and package deals would become less likely. The advisory Commission would provide a balance between a multilateral, CD context and the requirement of confidentiality. In other words, one might foresee a hierarchical structure, which would provide a balance between the sovereign right of nuclear powers to dispose of their nuclear arsenals, a multilateral context that could facilitate the search for solutions, and the need to keep negotiations confidential.
The CD context might prove particularly convenient in finding solutions to several outstanding problems.
First, a consensus, albeit slowly, is emerging on the principles of strategic stability. Both the United States and Russia now implicitly recognise that the second-strike posture is stabilising, while the posture which facilitates strike-on-warning is not. From this it follows, for example, that MIRVed ICBMs (or, at least, excessive reliance on MIRVed ICBMs) contradict long-term goals of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. On a more general plane, the counterforce (first-strike) potential of SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles) might be limited as well, while the second-strike role of these weapons could be further enhanced through such measures as limits on anti-submarine warfare. A broad discussion in the CD context could help to expedite further development and concretization of these principles and thus help to achieve a faster rate of progress at the talks between the nuclear powers.
Second, an intelligent and expert international discussion might help to deal with difficult and sensitive issues of modernisation. It is an open secret that, as the number of nuclear weapons is increased, the demands upon survivability and reliability become stricter, which means that existing weapons have to be replaced with new ones. On the other hand, there are examples of destabilising modernisation, such as a strategic ABM system. A serious international discussion might facilitate finding a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' modernisation, even while the ultimate right to make decisions would continue to rest solely with the State which plans it. The minimum benefit derived from a discussion within the CD context would be the absence of misperceptions, but more benefits might result.
Third, the political pressure of the members of the CD might help to bring the three nuclear-weapon States currently not participating in negotiations to the table. Of course, the current two participants would have to make the first step and transfer the talks to that forum and make it clear why they think they cannot proceed without the participation of the other three. While the three can easily resist pressure in favour of five-party negotiations if such pressure is applied in an 'unorganised fashion,' it might be more difficult to resist the sustained pressure of a legitimate international forum.
The context of the CD might also facilitate the adoption of basic principles of strategic stability by Great Britain, France and China. The existing, consensus-based principles may be seen as an imposition on the part of the United States and Russia if talks are conducted in a strictly five-party context, and much precious time would be lost in gaining acceptance by all the participants. The same principles may gain added legitimacy if an established multilateral forum, such as the CD, was supporting them.
Fourth, if nuclear arms reduction talks are conducted within the CD, India, Pakistan, Israel and others could, conceivably, be involved in a significant way without an explicit recognition on their or others' part that they have nuclear weapons. That is, if the elimination of nuclear weapons is tackled as a global problem which affects all States, the 'unofficial' nuclear States cannot escape responsibility and would have no pretext to shift the blame and the responsibility solely to the five 'official' nuclear- weapon States.
As noted above, nuclear disarmament is virtually impossible in the absence of a strong nuclear non-proliferation regime. As long as uncertainties regarding the possession of, or the ability to manufacture, nuclear weapons by States other than the five listed in the NPT persists, those five will not go below a certain point in the arms reduction process.
Before the five agree on implementing deep reductions in their nuclear arsenals, they will need to be sure that there are no more nuclear States around. In other words, reductions could proceed only if all the States that currently have undeclared nuclear weapons stockpiles and have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons joined the NPT and submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regime. The CD context might be the most convenient and practical forum in which to arrive at such an outcome, because otherwise pressure will have to be applied by the five directly upon 'semi-nuclear' States, generating understandable resistance. Within a multilateral context, the same result might conceivably be achieved in a non-confrontational fashion.
To summarise, the process of nuclear disarmament is likely to complete the circle and return to the UN fold, where it began in the first place. This will not happen very soon: START III will, in all probability, be a bilateral treaty. But it is also very likely that START IV would involve a five-party negotiation, and the potential benefits of moving the process to the CD has to be explored. The points above do not exhaust the pros and contras of the proposed move, but even the short list presented here seems to constitute sufficient evidence that there is much to discuss.
Dr. Nikolai N. Sokov is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Affairs, US. Between 1987-92, he served in the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Soviet/Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was a delegate to numerous arms control meetings and negotiations, including those for START I.
Marie Chevrier, in her Guest Analysis in the July/August issue of Disarmament Diplomacy, has outlined the current scene in relation to the ongoing negotiations to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally-binding instrument. A strengthened BTWC is essential, feasible and achievable(1); what is needed is for the States Parties to face up to the facts about the world in which we live today, realise the unacceptable dangers of failing to seize this opportunity to strengthen the BTWC, and stop indulging in the temptation to suggest that biological and toxin agents are too difficult to control effectively.
Deliberate disease - or biological warfare (BW) - is a real threat to international security and stability (2). As the Director- General of the World Health Organization (WHO) has stated in the 1996 World Health Report: "we also stand on the brink of a global crisis in infectious diseases. No country is safe from them. No country can any longer afford to ignore their threat."(3) Proliferation of BW continues to be of concern to John Deutch, Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who stated in testimony on 22 February 1996 that "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons systems pose the gravest threat to national security and world stability. At least 20 countries have or may be developing nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missile systems to deliver them. Biological weapons, often called the poor man's atomic bomb, are also on the rise. Small less developed countries are often eager to acquire such weapons to compensate on the cheap for shortcomings in conventional arms."(4) The danger of the possible use of chemical and biological materials for terrorist purposes was recognised by the G-7 meeting in Lyons, France, on 27 June 1996, with a communique on terrorism stating: "Special attention should be paid to threat of utilization of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes."(5) As President Clinton said on 24 September 1996, "we must better protect our people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war, by giving the Biological Weapons Convention the means to strengthen compliance..."(6)
There has been clear international recognition of the dangers posed by biological warfare, and increasing signs of political will have been shown during the past decade. The agreement on four politically-binding Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) at the Third Review Conference in 1986, their extension and improvement at the Third Review Conference in 1991, the steadily increasing number of States Parties providing the required annual declarations, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, the ensuing Special Conference and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to consider proposals to strengthen the Convention through a legally-binding instrument, all show progress in the right direction. Nevertheless, the negotiations at the AHG currently meeting in Geneva have progressed slowly, due in part to only eight weeks thus far having been made avilable for substantive discussion.
There is a clear need for the AHG to be given added impetus. At present, there appear to be some topics which some of the negotiators seem to want to believe will go away if they continue to move slowly. There are some key issues which the AHG needs to squarely address:
a. the essential necessity for on-site measures;
b. the requirement for a BTWC Organization; and
c. the relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Each of these is addressed in turn below.
At present, the only contribution to building confidence and transparency in the BTWC comes from the existing politically- binding CBMs which are essentially a set of declarations with considerably variable contents(7), with no other measures to complement them. No-one is suggesting that the present arrangements would suffice to strengthen the BTWC even if the CBMs were to be made legally-binding and thus mandatory. Experience at biological facilities from other bilateral and multilateral arrangements has shown that on-site measures are a vitally important tool in building confidence about the nature of the activities being carried out at a particular site. It is through on-site visits that a sound appreciation can be obtained of the type of activity being carried out, its purpose and its scale. A regime without on-site measures would not be credible in either building confidence or addressing compliance concerns.
Moreover, three quite different categories of on-site activity need to be included in a strengthened BTWC regime:
a. inspections to investigate compliance concerns;
b. visits to build confidence and develop the essential microbiological norm for the State concerned; and
c. investigations of an alleged use.
It is vital not to confuse these different types of inspection and visit - which it seems that some are content to do, so as to complicate the issues and thinking needed to develop the legally- binding instrument.
Compliance concern inspections
Such inspections will arise the generation when one State Party raises the concern that another State Party is carrying out an activity that may be non-compliant with the Convention. Any such compliance concerns must be thoroughly and promptly investigated by an impartial professional inspectorate whose report will be accepted as being factual and accurate. This will be vital for the Convention - and for international security and safety, which depends on a strong Convention. It needs to be recognised that there are three possible outcomes to a compliance concern inspection:
a. a determination that the site is in compliance with the Convention;
b. a determination that the site is non-compliant with the Convention; and
c. a determination that there are unanswered questions and thus that compliance cannot be shown.
Experience in the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of Iraq have shown that outcome can frequently be in the third category.
Clearly the tools available to the inspectorate carrying out such a compliance concern visit need to be capable of providing information to aid the determination of the purpose of the site. Thus, sampling and identification techniques need to be able to determine what materials are being used - or have been used previously - at the site. And because this is a compliance concern inspection, there can be no suggestion of limiting the sampling and identification capabilities to a particular list of pathogens and toxins. It would be all too easy for a State seeking to cheat under the Convention to decide to use a pathogen or toxin that is not on the particular list as a way of evading detection of its illegal programme.
A compliance concern inspection would not be something carried out lightly. Precautions will need to be in place to prevent abuse, yet these precautions should not be such as to build-in a delay before an inspection could commence. Because of the nature of biological materials, any such inspection must be carried out as quickly as possible after the compliance concern has arisen. The assumption must therefore be that once a compliance concern inspection request has been made to the future BTWC Organization, then the visit would take place very quickly - within 24 or 48 hours - unless the procedure to prevent abuse is invoked and concludes that an inspection should not proceed. Any alternative arrangement would send a message to would-be proliferators that the States Parties of the BTWC could be misled into accepting politically motivated delays.
Visits to build confidence
Such visits are needed to build confidence in the veracity of the declarations being made by the State Party about activities of relevance to the BTWC being carried out within that State. Such visits would be cooperative in their nature and would be non- challenging. They would ensure that declarations are accurately compiled and thus enable States Parties to gain confidence under the strengthened BTWC that other States Parties take their obligations under the Convention and the future legally-binding instrument seriously. Such visits would also ensure that the BTWC continued to be an active obligation for all States Parties, and avoid the risk that, through inaction, less and less attention was paid in successive years by a State Party in meeting its obligations under the Convention and the legally-binding instrument(8). More importantly, over time, the combination of such visits with the declarations made by the State will enable the future BTWC Organization to build up an appreciation of the approaches to microbiology taken in that State, thus providing the understanding that would be vital should there ever be a compliance concern inspection of a site within that State. Without the experience gained from previous non-challenge visits, there would be a serious risk that the determinations made during a subsequent compliance concern inspection would be inaccurate and unreliable due to the lack of understanding of the norm for microbiological activities in the State concerned. Without such an understanding, false positive or negative conclusions could be drawn.
Such visits will gather freely available information. It is also probable that the site or facility would have been the subject of a declaration under the legally-binding instrument. A useful analogy is the visits that are made, and indeed welcomed, in most countries by politically elected representatives at both the national and local level to sites and facilities of all kinds. When politically elected representatives make such visits, the management of the site or facility generally goes out of its way to demonstrate its competence and effectiveness in carrying out its business - and thus to gain the confidence of the politically elected representatives that it is engaged in worthwhile and valuable activity. As non-challenge visits would be to sites and facilities engaged in activities permitted under the Convention, there should be no difficulty in the site or facility providing information to the future BTWC Organization about the nature and extent of the activities being carried out. It would be up to the management of the site to decide what information was provided to the future BTWC Organization inspectorate; it would, however, be very much in the interest of the management, and of the State, for it to be as forthcoming as possible in order for the BTWC Organization to gain the greatest possible degree of confidence, as well as the greatest degree of appreciation of the approaches to microbiology in that site and State. Consequently, there should be no question of the visiting team from the BTWC Organization arriving with requests to obtain samples or to seek access to information regarded by the management team as sensitive. It would be much more a question of the visiting team receiving whatever information is provided - which might include sampling, should the management decide that this would be helpful -and, through discussion of this information, seeking clarification, amplification and understanding of the activities carried out at the site or facility.
Investigation of alleged use
Such investigations are needed to investigate an alleged use, a release or an expose. These will generally be field investigations but may also include invesigation of adjacent facilities should there be evidence linking the facility with the alleged use, release or exposure. The AHG deliberations into such investigations have progressed to the extent that there now appears to be acceptance that the future legally-binding instrument will need, in accordance with the AHG mandate, to include measures to enable such investigations to take place urgently on-site.
The need for a permanent, professional and trained inspectorate appears to be questioned by some. The probable elements of a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the Convention are mandatory declarations, on-site measures (both visits to address compliance concerns and to build confidence), and measures to investigate allegations of use. It is also clear that most analysts recognise that the effectiveness of a strengthened BTWC will depend upon the existence of an Organization which would receive and analyse declarations made by States Parties, and would conduct on-site inspections and visits and investigate allegations of use. Although from time to time suggestions are made that other organizations such as the WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), etc, might carry out such activities, these fail to recognise that such organizations do not have trained teams of inspectors who are knowledgeable and respected experts with a sufficient understanding of biological warfare. These suggestions also fail to recognise the very different responsibilities of organizations such as the WHO whose role is to help Member States to combat disease and ill-health, and not to act as an investigator seeking evidence of non-compliance which may lead to concerted international reaction such as sanctions against the State concerned. Indeed, it is likely that the WHO, FAO, etc, would refuse to take on BTWC responsibilities because they could jeopardize their primary mission.
It is already clear from the meetings of the AHG so far that a major concern of many States can be identified in respect of the protection of commercial proprietary information, whether provided in declarations or during on-site activities. The advantages of a professional permanent Organization to receive and analyse such information should be apparent. The experience(9) of UNSCOM has shown how successful a small organization can be in receiving and analysing sensitive information; it has equally been apparent that the absence of a permanent inspectorate to carry out inspections was exploited by the Iraqis during the early years where the lack of a corporate memory meant that claims could be made that information had been given to the previous, or would be given to the subsequent, team of inspectors. UNSCOM has achieved a very great deal with the capabilities available to it: nevertheless, there has been much variation in the styles of the various inspection team in response to various situations, with consequential inefficiencies.
An independent, professional BTWC Organization with a trained inspectorate to carry out on-site inspections and visits and investigations of alleged use will be an essential instrument in a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC. An alternative based on ad hoc arrangements, or relying on teams of inspectors drawn from Member States or the WHO, etc, would be less effective and, it might be argued, less neutral. Furthermore, forming teams as required takes time and effort which could be better spent.
There appears to be a reluctance in the AHG to build upon the work that has been done to develop procedures and measures for the CWC(10). This is particularly surprising when it is recalled that there is essentially a spectrum of Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) agents ranging from the classical chemical weapon (CW) agents, such as phosgene and mustard, through bioregulators and toxins to the traditional BW agents. Whilst BW agents are living micro-organisms causing harm through infecting the target population and are thus quite different from the non-living chemical agents which cause harm through poisoning the target population, there is a lot of commonality between the various types of CBW agent in the spectrum. In particular, toxins, quite rightly, are covered by both the BTWC and the CWC. It would therefore be surprising if the regimes relating to toxins were to be very different under the two Conventions.
There is much of value in the CWC that could be adopted (11), with appropriate modification, in the legally-binding instrument for the BTWC. There is no suggestion that procedures and measures in the CWC should be slavishly copied and incorporated unmodified into the strengthened BTWC. Rather, the aim should be to seek out those elements and procedures that are relevant and to build upon the best of them. Thus the procedures developed in the CWC for the safeguarding of confidential information would appear to be just as relevant for the BTWC. Another example is the procedures in the CWC for the investigation of alleged use where a detailed study (12) has been made as to how these might be adapted for the purposes of the BTWC.
The Ad Hoc Group should recognise that by building upon what has been developed for the CWC - or has been learnt by UNSCOM - it will not only save time in the negotiation of the legally-binding instrument but also benefit from the greater confidence associated with the adaptation of proven procedures and measures. There is no merit in reinventing the wheel.
As Marie Chevrier has rightly said, the Ad Hoc process to strengthen the BTWC is too important to the security of too many nations to let it languish from insufficient attention. It is vitally important that the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference to be held in Geneva from 25 November to 6 December 1996 endorse the work of the AHG thus far towards devising a legally-binding instrument including declarations, on-site measures and investigations of alleged use. It should also give the work of the AHG an impetus by setting a date, no later than the start of the autumn 1998 UN General Assembly, by which time the proposals of the AHG for a legally-binding instrument shall have been prepared and circulated to States Parties for consideration with the aim that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution for a Special Conference to be held in 1999 to discuss and agree the AHG's proposals.
Disease, whether of natural or deliberate origin, should be on the agenda of governments and industry worldwide. The health and well- being of the global community (humans, livestock and crops) directly benefits prosperity and trade. It is in the interests of all to ensure that disease is countered. The opportunity now to strengthen the BTWC effectively in the ways considered above needs to be pursued urgently.
Notes and References
1. Graham S. Pearson, A Strengthened BTWC is Essential, Feasible
and Achievable, UNIDIR Newsletter No. 33, September 1996 (in
press).
2. Graham S. Pearson, Deliberate Disease - Why Biological Warfare
is a Real Concern, ISIS Briefing No. 54, June 1996; same author,
Why Biological Warfare Matters, CBACI Arena Publication, No. 3,
October 1995.
3. World Health Organization, The World Health Report 1996:
Fighting Disease, Fostering Development, Geneva, 1996.
4. John Deutch, Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief, US Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record, 22 February
1996.
5. G7 Lyons Summit, Declaration on Terrorism, 27 June 1996, Annex V
of the United Nations General Assembly/Security Council A/50/208,
S/1996/543 dated 12 July 1996.
6. William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President in Address to the
51st General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 24 September
1996.
7. Iris Hunger, Article V - Confidence Building Measures, in Graham
S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological
Weapons Convention: The Key Points for the Fourth Review
Conference, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, 1996.
8. Gordon K. Vachon, Verifying the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention: The Role of Visits and Inspections, Enhancing the
Biological Weapons Convention, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Bonn,
Germany, 6-7 May 1996.
9. Kathleen C. Bailey, The UN Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for On-
Site Verification, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1995.
10. United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction, United Nations 93-05070, 1993.
11. John Gee, Future Verification Regime for the BWC: Lessons to be
Learned from the Chemical Weapons Convention, presented at the VIII
Amaldi Conference, Overcoming the Obstacles to Peace in the
Post-Cold War Era, Piacenza, Italy, 5-7 October 1995.
12. Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological
Weapons Verification, Report of the Subgroup on Investigation of
Alleged Use or Release of Biological or Toxin Weapons Agents,
Washington, D.C., April 1996.
Dr. Graham S. Pearson, CB, is Honorary Senior Visiting Fellow in Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. He was previously Director-General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire, UK.
The bursting of the atom bomb in 1945 prompted Winston Churchill to note that "the Stone Age may return upon the gleaming wings of science." The succeeding years of nuclear test explosions lighting up the skies, and nuclear bombs rolling out of the factories five a day, seemed likely to fulfil Churchill's stark prophecy.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and with it the Superpower stand-off, brought a sigh of global relief as people around the world entertained a notion that previously had been considered as idealistic and unrealistic - the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Despite this huge change, the nuclear States have been reluctant to give up their nuclear security blanket, holding on to their policies of nuclear deterrence and to over 30,000 nuclear weapons. And while they hold onto nuclear weapons, there is every likelihood that other States, or even terrorist organisations, will obtain the fissile material and nuclear technology to make and possibly use a bomb.
However, on 8 July this year, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) took a giant step toward kicking the nuclear habit. Sitting only blocks away from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and using some of the same principles of law that apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the ICJ held that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict." The Court further declared unanimously that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
The opinion had been requested by the World Health Organisation (WHO), out of its concern about the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons, and the United Nations General Assembly, out of its concern for global security. While both these bodies are on record as opposing nuclear weapons outright, taking the case to the Court was a risky venture given the uncertainty over the legal status of nuclear weapons and the fact that, while an overwhelming majority of countries reject nuclear weapons, the Court was composed of a majority of judges from nuclear States or their allies.
The decision is much more than a slap on the wrist for the nuclear- weapon States, which, with the exception of China, tried to stop the WHO and the UN from taking the case to the Court, and then exerted pressure on the Court for it to decline to give an answer. It is indeed a resounding challenge to the continuing policies of nuclear deterrence, and to the resistance of the nuclear States to agree to negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons.
The Right Honorable Jim Bolger, Prime Minister of Aotearoa-New Zealand, commented immediately after the decision: "It adds absolute weight to countries like New Zealand who have argued for some time that there cannot be a position where five nations hold to themselves the rights of having nuclear weapons and say to the rest of the world 'trust us, we're OK, but the rest of you should have none.' Now that is not on." (1)
The first response of nuclear-weapon States was to jump on an area of uncertainty left by the Court when it said that it could not reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of "the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self defense in which its very survival would be at stake." The US and France commented that this therefore justified their policies of threatening to use nuclear weapons.
However, the President of the Court, Judge Bedjaoui, noted that the Court's indecision on the extreme circumstance cited in no way could be interpreted as amounting to a green light in such a circumstance, only a legal uncertainty. Even the extreme circumstance "cannot engender a situation in which a State would exonerate itself from compliance with the intransgressible norms of international humanitarian law."
Thus the main response from the nuclear States has been to attempt to downplay the decision. Jacques Rummelhardt, spokesperson for the French Foreign Ministry, stated on 8 July: "These opinions, which are not acts of jurisprudence, have no compulsory force." (2)
This, however, is both incorrect and misleading. An ICJ advisory opinion is an act of jurisprudence, as is any case in the Court. The term 'advisory' is so named to distinguish it from contentious cases, the other type of case the court can consider. Contentious cases concern disputes between two or more States. Advisory opinions concern questions of international law asked by a UN body. In both cases the Court declares the law applicable and declares where necessary the legal rights and obligations that flow from the law so laid down.
It is true that the ICJ has no power to compel States to adhere to its decisions. But this is not its purpose. Its purpose is to declare what the law is, and it is up to other bodies to see to it that the law is implemented. Internationally that could include the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. Nationally it could include actions in the supreme or high courts of individual countries.
As to whether the law applied by the Court in this case is binding or not, the answer would have to be that it is. The Court was applying principally the humanitarian laws of warfare which are binding on all States, and include the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which the nuclear-weapon States have all ratified.
The decision will thus be likely to generate much debate within the military establishments and foreign ministries of the nuclear- weapon States over their existing policies of threat and use of nuclear weapons. No longer will they be able to make nuclear threats such as those made against North Korea and Libya without there being a challenge that these are contrary to the decision of the Court. Similar challenges from within the nuclear militaries could arise regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons systems, which could be claimed to be in violation of the Court's ruling.
France's disclaimer on the effect of the Court's decision on its policies should be seen in the light of the 1974 Nuclear Tests Case, which challenged atmospheric testing in the South Pacific. Despite making a similar disclaimer in this case, France halted its atmospheric testing the following year.
Already legal ramifications are occurring. A High Court case was initiated, following the Court hearings, by an Australian citizen against his government regarding its participation in US nuclear war preparations through hosting such facilities as a nuclear command and communication base at Pine Gap. Also in the South Pacific, Papua New Guinea has raised the question of whether the transit of nuclear armed vessels through international waters can any longer be categorized as 'innocent passage.' If not, there could be grounds for excluding such passage from nuclear-weapon- free zones which cover half the world's oceans.
Irrespective of the legal implications of this case, the political implications will be profound. Non-nuclear States which for 50 years have been calling unsuccessfully for the nuclear-weapon States to disarm now have a much strengthened negotiating hand. The legal obligation, which the Court affirmed, on States to conclude negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons will be very difficult to avoid. If the nuclear States refuse to accept their legal obligations to begin such negotiations, they will find it that much harder trying to keep other States to their obligations under the NPT not to develop nuclear weapons; or, in the case of India, Pakistan and Israel, to make them accept obligations not to test nuclear weapons. One cannot flout the law and expect others to keep it.
Mexico, for example, stated in the hearings of the Court case, that if the nuclear States did not implement their obligations to negotiate for nuclear disarmament, they might feel compelled to reconsider their membership of the NPT, and their obligations thereby to not acquire nuclear weapons.
During the UN debate on the CTBT in early September, a number of countries, while not supporting India's desire to maintain a nuclear option, did join India in criticizing the nuclear States for not accepting their obligations to negotiate for nuclear disarmament.
The pressure on the nuclear States will increase during the current session of the UN General Assembly when a resolution will be introduced welcoming the decision of the ICJ and calling for the beginning of negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, providing for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international verification and control.
Pressure is likely to build at the NPT preparatory meeting in 1997 starting the count-down to the next Review Conference in 2000. In response to the ICJ's decision, Philippines has called for a Special Conference of States Parties to the NPT to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Such moves as those listed above are supported by the International Abolition 2000 Network, comprising over 600 citizens' organizations worldwide, which was established at the ICJ hearings last November, with the aim of achieving a Nuclear Weapons Convention by 2000. While citizens' organizations cannot participate in such negotiations directly, the Network is likely to have a considerable effect in initiating and guiding such negotiations, much as the ICJ advisory opinion was initiated and guided by citizens' organizations under the umbrella of the World Court Project. The Project also assisted countries in their legal presentations to the Court, and gathered over 3 million declarations of public conscience which were presented to the Court in support of the case.
The movement for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been given a shot in the arm not only by the ICJ ruling but by the recent report from the prestigious Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as covered in Disarmament Diplomacy. The Commission concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons is not only vital in order to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by accident or design, but also that such a course of action is practical and verifiable.
The Commission, aided in particular by the experience of Rolf Ekeus, Chair of the UN Special Commission on the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, described the growing sophistication and effectiveness of monitoring technologies, which would make the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons, if not perfect, at least capable of success to a degree that would prevent unacceptable risk. Other political or non-nuclear military measures would be able to be introduced to cope with the small risk of breakout from a non-nuclear regime.
While science has created the potential to send the Earth back into the Stone Age, it can also provide the possibility to effectively eliminate that threat, as long as there is the political will to do so. That is the real challenge that now faces us.
Notes and references
1. Press statement, Wellington, 9 July 1996.
2.France says World Court upholds its nuclear stance, Reuter News
Reports, 8 July 1996.
Alyn Ware is the Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy and the Pacific Representative for the International Peace Bureau.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on 24 September at the United Nations in New York, after being endorsed two weeks earlier by 158 votes to 3 in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). On the first day, 71 nations signed, led by President Clinton of the United States and the foreign ministers of China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom. Israel was among the 9 who signed the next day, and many more are expected to follow. India, however, voted against the UN resolution and reiterated that it would not sign this treaty, while Pakistan indicated that its signature would await India's.
This dramatic finish to three years of negotiations and more than 40 years of public and political campaigning came after the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva became deadlocked on the adoption and transmission of the treaty text, as finalised in the Nuclear Test Ban Committee, chaired by Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands. Since the 60-nation Conference, which works by consensus, could not adopt the treaty or agree to send it to the United Nations for consideration, Australia decided that this should not prevent 185 UN members from deciding for themselves whether to endorse the treaty or not. On 22 August, Australia submitted to the UNGA a resolution attaching the finalised CTBT.
By the time its resolution came up for consideration in New York, on 9 and 10 September, Australia had attracted 127 co-sponsors, more than two-thirds of the Assembly. Following the difficulties in Geneva, many CD members helped Australia to inform non-CD nations about the treaty and sign up co-sponsors, as it was considered necessary to have as many as possible backing the resolution and committing themselves to oppose any procedural initiatives or amendments likely to harm the treaty. Britain, France and the United States were among the co-sponsors, as were Israel, Kazakstan and South Africa.
Although the non-aligned countries were under-represented, notable co-sponsors included Brazil, Colombia (which leads the non-aligned movement), Peru, the Philippines and Venezuela. Japan and Australia had worked hard to sign up the Pacific countries and in a noted reversal from 1995, France lobbied the African francophone nations, persuading many to co-sponsor the resolution. (Last year France got those countries to vote against Australia's resolution condemning French and Chinese testing.) By contrast, few former British colonies in Africa were among the co-sponsors. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) States were almost fully represented. Russia and China withheld co- sponsorship on the grounds that they did not want to endorse the 'unprecedented process' of bypassing of the CD. Both spoke on the first day, underlining their willingness to sign the treaty in its present form and promising to vote for the resolution.
In the face of this overwhelming backing for the treaty, opposition collapsed. India spoke against the resolution, but made no attempt at blocking it procedurally or amending the treaty. Although Iran kept everyone guessing until the last possible moment whether it would try to tie things up procedurally, in the end it went along with the resolution, and was among the first countries to sign the treaty.
Introducing the resolution - A/50/L.78 - Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia argued that it had been necessary to take the CTBT to New York after CD consensus was vetoed, but emphasised that there was no intention to undermine the CD. Noting that 'we utterly respect and defend the right of any State to form its sovereign view and to act on it', Butler said that 'what we cannot accept is the extension of a national point of view to the point of seeking to prevent others from acting on theirs.' Australia emphasised that the treaty text (A/50/1027), circulated to the Assembly with the resolution, was identical with that negotiated by the CD, and that 'any suggestion that it is a merely national text would be wrong.' It met the criteria in the CD's negotiating mandate and it was only due to 'exceptional circumstances' that 'one member State has vetoed the transmission of the treaty' from the CD to the GA. Clearly intent on allaying concern that the CD was being sidelined, Butler reaffirmed the work and operating procedures of the CD and said that its bypass 'cannot and should not set a precedent.'
Following Butler's speech, China, the Marshall Islands, Ireland for the European Union and Associated States, Fiji, Brazil (on behalf of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile), Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, India, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Russia, Indonesia made statements. Of these, China, Russia, Malaysia, Mexico, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia were not co-sponsors of the Australian resolution, but all except India and Sri Lanka clearly stated that they would support the resolution and endorse the treaty, despite its flaws.
India made clear that it would not be supportive, using arguments now familiar from the past three months' debate in the CD (see recent Geneva Updates, especially in issues 6 & 7). UN Ambassador Prakash Shah said that India 'cannot permit our option to be constrained or eroded in any manner as long as the nuclear-weapon States remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.'
Sri Lanka, which subsequently voted for the resolution, expressed serious criticisms of the treaty and the process of taking it to the UNGA for adoption, stressing that the original intent was for the GA to endorse a treaty text adopted by the CD.
Pakistan said that while it would support the resolution it would not sign the treaty until its regional situation warranted, understood by many to include a requirement that India signs. Accusing India of hypocrisy, Ambassador Munir Akram noted that Pakistan had also supported timebound nuclear disarmament and had sponsored the programme of action with 27 others, but argued that India's insistence on this as a precondition of the CTBT was 'a transparent device to avoid a commitment to a nuclear test ban treaty, to veto a vital disarmament measure which has virtually universal support.'
On 10 September, the representatives of Egypt, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Iraq, Nepal, Western Samoa, Ukraine, Canada, Iran, Zambia, Thailand, Nigeria, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Bangladesh spoke. Over the two days, many issues were addressed, but four principal themes could be discerned:
* that bypassing the CD should not set a precedent and should not be perceived as undermining the CD in any way;
* concern about entry-into-force;
* the treaty's inadequacy regarding prohibition of non explosive testing and the prevention of qualitative improvement and development of more advanced nuclear weapons;
* and the need for more progress on nuclear disarmament.
Additionally, some Middle Eastern States reiterated their opposition to including Israel in that region for the purposes of allocating Executive Council seats, but in view of the large co- sponsorship did not attempt an amendment to alter the treaty.
The vote on the Australian resolution was taken at 4.00 pm (New York time) on 10 September, endorsing the CTBT by a resounding 158 votes to 3. India, Bhutan and Libya voted against. There were 5 abstentions: Tanzania, Cuba, Syria, Lebanon, and Mauritius. Additionally, 19 countries were diplomatically absent. Of these, several (including a number of co-sponsors and Iraq) were not permitted to vote because their payments to the UN were in serious arrears.
Seven countries made statements about their vote: Mauritius, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria and Tanzania cited problems with the treaty, the inclusion of Israel in the Middle East and their dissatisfaction with the negotiating process. India's Geneva Ambassador, Arundhati Ghose, declared that India would 'never sign this unequal treaty, not now, not later.' Referring to the treaty's provision that 44 named members of the CD with nuclear research or power reactors must sign and ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force, Ghose promised that 'as long as this text contains this article [XIV], this treaty will never enter into force.'
Following the overwhelming endorsement of the Geneva treaty by the UN General Assembly, the CTBT was opened for signature in a ceremony at the UN on 24 September. UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali called the treaty a 'turning point' and a 'major milestone' in efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation. Referring to the 'terrifying might' of more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions, Boutros-Ghali paid tribute to the officials and citizens 'who have struggled for so long to achieve this treaty.' He spoke of the 'constant and passionate flow of petitions, appeals and support from the peoples of the world' whom he thanked 'for making the world a safer place for our children and grandchildren.' He noted that adoption of the CTBT 'meets the demand of the great majority of the world's people for a clear signal that the nuclear arms race is coming towards its end.' Underlining the necessity to abide by the treaty and not to test during the time before the treaty enters into full legal effect, Boutros-Ghali called on all signatory States to ensure 'that their actions always conform to the purpose of the treaty.'
US President Bill Clinton was first to sign the CTBT, using the pen with which John F Kennedy had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. He was followed by the foreign ministers of China, France, Russia and Britain and then 11 more countries which had played a significant part in obtaining the treaty. During the first day, 71 nations signed the treaty, including Mexico, Colombia, Iran, Indonesia, Brazil and a number of States from the Pacific, which suffered most harm from the past 51 years of nuclear testing. By the end of the week over 90 countries had signed the treaty, including Israel and most European Union and OSCE States.
Later in the UN General Assembly, Clinton called the treaty a 'giant step forward' and said that the signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers and others 'will immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing - even before the treaty formally enters into force.' He underlined that a CTBT would 'help prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and dangerous weapons. It will limit the ability of other States to acquire such devices themselves. It points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be even further reduced -- and eventually eliminated.'
Clinton paid tribute to all who had contributed to the treaty, with especial reference to Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, chair of the NTB Committee, and to Australia, for taking the lead at the UN. He sent a clear message also to India and other potential hold-outs, noting that 'some have complained that it does not mandate total nuclear disarmament by a date certain.' Clinton responded: 'I say to them: do not forsake the benefits of this achievement by ignoring the tremendous progress we have already made toward that goal.'
Russia's Foreign Secretary, Yevgeni Primakov called the CTBT a 'huge step' and underscored the 'principal importance that all countries capable of creating nuclear weapons accede to the Treaty.' Sounding a clear note of warning to India and Pakistan, Primakov said that 'testing of a nuclear explosive device by any country before the Treaty enters into force will cardinally change the international situation, greatly prejudice the Treaty itself and may compel many countries to revise their attitude to it.' Specifically for 'the attention of the opponents of the treaty', Primakov emphasised that the CTBT 'will not only contribute to the promotion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime but will also objectively stimulate a gradual transition to nuclear disarmament of the multilateral basis.' He reiterated Yeltsin's proposal for a 'Treaty on Nuclear Security and Stability' and for nuclear arsenals to be placed only on the territories of the nuclear powers concerned.
Malcolm Rifkind, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs told the General Assembly that the world 'is safer today' with the 'historic signature' of the CTBT. He said that the treaty 'can make an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international security', showing 'that we can, by acting with determination and by making sacrifices, reap the benefits of the end of the cold war.' Defending Britain's stand on the treaty's entry-into-force provision, Rifkind reiterated that the treaty must 'command universal support' in order to be fully effective. While recognising 'the sovereign right of every State to decide whether or not to be bound by international agreements', he urged all States to give it their full support.
China's Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, speaking on 25 September, called the CTBT 'only a first step in the entire process of comprehensive nuclear disarmament' and said that there was still 'a long way to go...in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' He called on the major powers to renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence, renounce the first use, and use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and for further drastic cutbacks by those 'possessing huge nuclear arsenals.' China backed nuclear-free zones and considered that nuclear weapons should not be deployed overseas or in outer space, with reference also to 'missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and stability.' Finally, Qian called on all States to 'negotiate with a view to concluding an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.'
For France, the Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette referred to the 'honour' of signing the CTBT, which had been 'for many years...the wish of public opinion, a hope, a project that was desirable certainly but which was blocked by the reality of East- West confrontation.' Characterising the treaty as 'a major turning point in the world's strategic balances', de Charette said it 'puts an end to the possibility of the nuclear-weapon States developing new types of nuclear weapons and makes a decisive contribution to the fight against nuclear weapons proliferation.' He concluded that the CTBT opened the way 'to a more stable, safer world which will cease to be haunted by the twin dangers of the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of these weapons.'
Editor's note: see also Documents and Sources for coverage of the statements by China, Russia and the US.
Applause at the end of the UN General Assembly session was as much from a sense of relief that the CTBT had finally gone through without the nightmare scenarios of amendments and procedural knock- backs as a celebration of the treaty itself.
It's not the best possible treaty, but it must be hoped that it will prove adequate to its task. Its final weeks caused painful heartsearching among many long-time test ban advocates. Better provisions on entry into force and clearer objectives in the preamble would have greatly improved the treaty's implementation, but by the time it reached New York, amendments would only have wrecked it. Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States had all declared that their support was contingent on the treaty remaining in the form finalised by Ramaker. In the end, rather than lose the chance of a CTBT altogether, the vast majority of countries chose to give it the strongest endorsement they could, in hope of creating a powerful and enduring norm against nuclear testing, even if the treaty itself does not enter into force.
Despite its flaws, there were important victories in the negotiations. The zero yield scope bans all nuclear explosions. This will provide a stronger legal and technical constraint on the development of new types of nuclear weapons than if hydronuclear testing had been exempted, which at one point looked possible. So- called peaceful nuclear explosions are also banned, requiring consensus in both a review conference and an amendment conference in order to be considered again. France has already announced the closure of its Pacific test sites, and pressure will now mount for the other nuclear-weapon States to follow. With their signatures the P-5 nuclear powers have extended their moratoria and undertaken to act in conformity with the purposes of the treaty. A test from India could severely rock this commitment, but (notwithstanding Russia's explicit warning), retaliation in kind would not be the most effective way to respond. Should India take its desire to wreck the CTBT to these dangerous lengths, more effective international political and public pressure could be exerted which would not play into the hands of India's pro-nuclear hawks.
It is too soon to gauge the effect of the CTBT on progress for nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming vote in the UN will help counteract any damage from the lack of agreement in Geneva, but ratifications may come slowly if countries think that the treaty is not viable without India's signature. Arguments that the treaty does nothing to curb qualitative development are exaggerated, but confidence in the test ban will be undermined if the United States continues with sub-critical tests and the nuclear-weapon States pour more money into research, development and laboratory testing of nuclear weapons.
As was clear from many statements in New York, there is concern among diplomats that the CD has been seriously damaged by its failure to get agreement and the process by which it was eventually bypassed. Negotiations on defence or security issues are notoriously difficult, even among two or three protagonists. Put 60 countries into the chamber, and the competing agendas and interests will multiply the complexities, especially when only a few possess the weapons under discussion.
The P-5 nuclear-weapon States are reluctant to give up their power and privile