Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The use of chemical and biological weapons in war was prohibited in 1925 as a result of universal abhorrence at their effects on First World War soldiers. The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction (BWC), which entered into force in 1975, prohibited the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons and required the destruction or conversion of such weapons or delivery means. At time of writing, the BWC has 153 states parties. A further 16 have signed but not ratified, while 25 remain outside the treaty.

The BWC broke new ground in establishing a non-discriminatory prohibition regime, making no distinction between states with existing BW programmes and those without, and explicitly building on the 1925 prohibition on use. However, it contained no provisions for the monitoring or verification of compliance or implementation.

The end of the cold war provided the opportunity to negotiate a verification protocol, but in 2001, after six years of painstaking technical and diplomatic work, negotiations collapsed without agreement after the United States first weakened the verification provisions and then scuppered agreement on the Protocol, arguing that verification would be inadequate and overly intrusive.

Coverage in Disarmament Diplomacy

The 2006 BWC Review Conference: The President’s Reflections
by Masood Khan, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
The President of the Sixth Biological and Toxin Weapons Review Conference reflects on the factors that contributed to a significant success, with lessons for future multilateral diplomacy.
Rising Out of the Doldrums: Report on the BWC Review Conference
by Richard Guthrie, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
From the author of daily reports during the BWC conference, a detailed assessment of the conduct and outcome, with annexes on the proposed (but unadopted) Action Plans and civil society contributions.
A Counter-Bioterrorism Strategy for the new UN Secretary-General
by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
Argues for new multilateral approaches for dealing with bioterrorism, including reorganisation and resourcing of the UN Secretary-General's investigational capability to strengthen BWC compliance.
Strategies to Prevent Bioterrorism: Biosecurity Policies in the US and Germany, by Jonathan B. Tucker, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
A detailed comparison of US and German approaches for addressing biosecurity in the age of international terrorism, drawing out the strengths and weaknesses.
Towards the BWC Review Conference:
Diplomacy Still in the Doldrums
by Nicholas A. Sims, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.82, Spring 2006.
Reports back from the December meeting of BWC parties and looks ahead to the challenges and opportunities facing the Sixth BWC Review Conference.
Practical Steps to Accelerate BWC Universality
by Daniel Feakes, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.82, Spring 2006.
Considers the obstacles to universality and proposes ways forward for the BWC

For past coverage BWC-related issues, please see our BWC archive page.

Useful Information and Links

UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, for text of the BWC, relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, and official documentation from the previous Review Conference in December 1996
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, for extensive background information and research on Biological Weapons

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