Public Accounts Committee Inquiry on the United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability

• Uncorrected transcript of Oral Evidence given by Sir Bill Jeffrey, KCB, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Dr Paul Hollinshead, BSc (Hons), PHD, MBE, OBE, Director, Strategic Requirement, Mr Guy Lester, Director General, Equipment, and Rear Admiral A D H Mathews, CB, Director General, Submarines, 19 November 2008, excerpts

REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S FUTURE NUCLEAR DETERRENT CAPABILITY (HC1115)

Please note: The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings as neither Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record.

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Sir Bill Jeffrey, KCB, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Dr Paul Hollinshead, BSc (Hons), PhD, MBA, OBE, Director, Strategic Requirement, Mr Guy Lester, Director General, Equipment, and Rear Admiral A D H Mathews, CB, Director General, Submarines, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: ... Sir Bill, given your experience with the Astute submarine, if we look at box three, "Problems associated with the Astute submarine programme ...", we see there that it was hugely over-budget, 40% over budget. It has slipped by three years. How are we going to avoid the same problems occurring with the Trident replacement system?

Sir Bill Jeffrey: Although, as you say, it is unusual for your Committee to tackle a project like this as early as this, I never thought I would hear myself say this but we very much welcome this as well. Of course, the Astute project is one of those longstanding projects in our portfolio which have been very much delayed and subject to cost growth. In a short answer to your question, we feel we have learned the lessons of that. In a slightly longer answer, if you look at box three, the reasons for why Astute went long - slow contract negotiations and over-estimation of how much of this we can realistically transfer to our suppliers, problems with the computer assisted design and crucially - I think my colleagues would endorse this - the loss of key skills and the gap between the end of the Vanguard class and the beginning of the Astute class - in each of these areas I think we are well aware of the risks. We believe we are managing them successfully.

Q2 Chairman: You cannot make a mistake on this, can you, because your existing submarines run out of time in 2023. Your existing submarines apparently have not missed a day since 1068.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: That is correct.

Q3 Chairman: There has not been a single gap in our nuclear deterrent. It is not like other defence systems where you can patch them up; you can put them to sea and hope for the best. You have to have these new submarines in perfect condition. 16 years sounds a lot of time, does it not, but it is not a lot, is it, for a submarine of this complexity?

Sir Bill Jeffrey: There was some question, at the time of the White Paper and the parliamentary debate, as to whether the decision was in fact being taken too early. We have felt throughout that time is quite tight, although as you say, Chairman, it seems a very long way off. The thinking in the White Paper and in all our planning at the moment is that we can extend the Vanguard class by five years which would be quite a normal period of extension. It is quite possible that it could be extended for longer.

Q4 Chairman: When could you conceivably extend it to?