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| W | Written Answers, House of Commons |
| WS | Written Ministerial Statements, House of Commons |
| Column number with no letters | Oral Proceedings in the House of Commons |
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will consider the recommendations of the naval base review in respect of Faslane, when published, from the point of view of his role as (a) Secretary of State for Defence and (b) Secretary of State for Scotland; and if he will make a statement on resolving potential conflicts of interest.
Des Browne [holding answer 4 July 2007]: Defence is a reserved matter and, as such, all decisions relating to military capability, including the naval base review, are taken on the basis of what is best for defence and what provides value for money for the taxpayer.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was transported in the convoy which moved from AWE Burghfield to RAF Brize Norton on 11 June 2007; what the destination was of the transported goods; and what escorts for the convoy were in place.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I am withholding the information as its release would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will (a) instigate a moratorium on transporting nuclear warheads to Scotland by road during the current critical security alert and (b) ensure that any warheads currently ready for delivery are disassembled and remain at the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
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Des Browne: The safety and security of the UK nuclear weapons is paramount. Any transportation is kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements and all such movements are kept under constant review. This includes an advance evaluation of all relevant factors, including the risks and threats prevalent at the time, and involves close liaison with all appropriate stakeholders, including the civil authorities. Each movement is subject to procedures that are robust and sensitive to changing circumstances and priorities, commensurate with national defence and security requirements.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the estimated ongoing in-service costs are of the Trident replacement over its 30 year life span how much is accounted for by (a) facilities and revenue costs at Aldermaston, (b) new missiles required to carry the warheads, (c) Military Defence Police (MDP) costs for guarding (i) Aldermaston, (ii) Burghfield and (iii) Coulport and (d) MDP costs for escorting the convoys; and if he will make a statement.
Des Browne: As paragraph 5-14 of the White Paper: 'The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent' (column 6994) makes clear, in-service costs of the UK's nuclear deterrent, including the costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), will on average be around five to six per cent., of the defence budget once the proposed fleet of replacement SSBNs comes into service. Further information on the costs of replacing the Trident D5 missile and the costs of the AWE are included in paragraphs 5-11 and 5-13 of the White Paper respectively. The future costs of the Ministry of Defence Police for guarding Aldermaston, Burghfield and Coulport and for escorting nuclear convoys, which are included in the in-service cost mentioned above, are expected to be similar to today however, it is too early to provide a precise estimate.
The Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (Mr. John Hutton): Further to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry's announcement on 24 October 2006, Official Report column 85WS, regarding the sale by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) of British Nuclear Group (BNG) and establishment of a National Nuclear Laboratory, I would like to announce that BNFL has commenced the process to sell the group's one third stake in Atomic Weapons Establishment Management Ltd. (AWEML). AWEML is currently owned equally by BNFL, Serco and Lockheed Martin. In addition to seeking to maximise shareholder return through the sale process, the Government and BNFL will seek to ensure an AWEML consortium is in place to manage the enduring performance of AWEML's subsidiary, AWE plc. in continuing to meet the requirements of its customer, the Ministry of Defence.
I will update Parliament on the progress of the sale at a later date.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 9 July 2007, Official Report, column 1286W, on transport: AWE Burghfield, under what circumstances special nuclear materials convoys travel from AWE Burghfield without (a) a visible police escort and (b) emergency support vehicles; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I am withholding the information as its release would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether local incident management plans are put in place when special nuclear materials convoys travel from AWE Burghfield; and whether local authorities are informed before those convoys travel.
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Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The transportation of nuclear and other hazardous materials is governed by the Radioactive Material (Road Transport) (Great Britain) Regulations 2002 and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2004 (as amended in 2005). Although the Department is exempt from the regulations, it is nevertheless MOD policy to comply with their principles although they place no obligation on a carrier to inform local authorities. The publicly available Local Authority Emergency Services Information (LAESI) document provides the emergency services, local and health authorities with information on contingency arrangements for the transport of Special Nuclear Material.
Mr. Llwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what expenditure has been incurred since 14 March 2007 on (a) the Trident D5 missile life extension programme and (b) the initial review of the need to replace the Vanguard-class ballistic-missile submarine platform for Trident D5 nuclear weapons systems.
Des Browne [holding answer 18 July 2007]: No expenditure has been incurred since 14 March 2007 on the Trident D5 missile life extension programme. The programme to replace the Vanguard-class ballistic-missile submarine platform incurred expenditure of around £900,000 from 1 April to 30 June 2007, the most recent quarter for which information is available.
Independent Nuclear Deterrent
30. The UK’s Trident submarine force continued to provide a constant and independent nuclear deterrent capability at sea, in support of NATO and as the ultimate guarantee of our national security. The MoD continues to make the necessary investment at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston to ensure that it has the requisite facilities and skills to maintain a safe and reliable Trident warhead stockpile and to prepare for decisions, likely to be necessary in the next Parliament, on the possible refurbishment or replacement of the existing warhead. [page 35]
Deterrence
77. Deterrence aims to convince a potential adversary that the consequence of a particular course of action outweighs the potential gains. All the UK’s military capabilities, conventional and nuclear, have a role to play in this. The fundamental principles underpinning nuclear deterrence have not changed since the end of the Cold War. However deterrence in the 21st Century is going to be more complex in a multi-faceted and more fragmented security environment, populated by an array of potential adversaries and presenting less predictable security challenges. The UK’s deterrence posture must therefore remain flexible enough to respond to these potential challenges, in whatever form they present themselves. The publication in December 2006 of the Government’s White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (see essay on page 60), which Parliament approved in March 2007, sets out this position against a particular range of possible future risks and challenges. Nuclear weapons continue to provide the ultimate guarantee of the UK’s security by deterring and preventing nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against the UK’s vital interests that cannot be countered by other means. The UK will retain only the minimum amount of destructive power required to achieve deterrence objectives. The Government deliberately maintains ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale the UK would contemplate using nuclear weapons. To do otherwise would simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which the Government might consider the use of the UK’s nuclear capabilities. However, the Government has made clear many times over many years that the UK would only contemplate using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence and in accordance with the UK’s international legal obligations. [page 55]
Essay – The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent
The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent has been a central plank of our national security strategy for fifty years. Over this time no country has ever used a nuclear weapon, nor has there been a single significant conflict between the world’s major powers. The UK’s nuclear deterrent, within NATO, helped make this happen. Following detailed assessment and analysis, the Government set out its plans to maintain the UK’s nuclear deterrent capability in a White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, published in December 2006. After three months of extensive public and Parliamentary discussion and debate, the House of Commons voted in March 2007 to endorse the Government’s plans.
The timing of these decisions was driven by the life of the Vanguard class submarines and the time it will take to develop replacements. The Department’s analysis demonstrated that it was highly unlikely to be technically feasible or cost effective to extend the life of the Vanguard class beyond around 30 years, which already represents a five-year extension to their original design life. Equally, all the Department’s experience, and that of industry, France and the US, is that it will take around 17 years to design, build and deploy new ballistic-missile carrying submarines. Given that the second of the Vanguard class is expected to leave service around 2024, this means detailed concept and assessment work needs to begin in 2007 if the UK is to avoid a risk of a gap in deterrence coverage.
The Rationale for retaining a Nuclear Deterrent
The Government believes that the concept of deterrence is just as relevant now as it was during the Cold War. Deterrence is about dissuading a potential adversary from carrying out a particular act because of the consequences of your likely retaliation. This is not an especially complex or unique concept. Nor does it have anything inherently to do with nuclear weapons, or superpower blocs. The United Kingdom’s and our Allies’ conventional forces are themselves a form of deterrent; they can and do deter various different kinds of states and non-state actors even in today’s post-Cold War world.
But nuclear weapons are unique in terms of their destructive power, and as such, only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear threats. No country currently possesses both the capability and intent to threaten the United Kingdom’s vital interests with nuclear weapons. But the Government has concluded that it is impossible to be certain that, over the next 20 to 50 years, such a threat may not re-emerge. This is not just a question of uncertainty, although it is important to be realistic about the potential to predict with confidence the strategic developments over these extended periods. There are also identifiable risks and trends of concern. Large nuclear arsenals remain around the world, some of which are being modernised and expanded. Despite international efforts to counter nuclear proliferation, the number of countries with nuclear weapons continues to grow, albeit less quickly than some have predicted. And the Government remains concerned at the implications should international terrorists get access to nuclear weapons.
The Government will continue to maintain only the minimum capability the United Kingdom requires. But it believes the best way to achieve the goal of a world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons is through a process of international dialogue and negotiation. The next steps in this process should be the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the beginning of negotiations without preconditions on a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty which, if successful, would end the production of weapon-useable nuclear material. But this will inevitably take time. And in the interim, the Government has a responsibility to take the steps necessary to ensure our national security and this includes retention of a minimum, independent nuclear deterrent. [page 60]
Renewing Trident
The White Paper set out three main decisions:
Key to the decision to retain a submarine based deterrent was the requirement to ensure the credibility of the United Kingdom’s deterrent posture. And fundamental to credibility is the need for the deterrent to be invulnerable to pre-emptive attack, to be able to sustain a high degree of readiness, and to be able to deliver the required destructive power wherever might be required for effective deterrence. There were no credible alternatives to retaining a submarine-based system. All the other options were significantly more vulnerable to pre-emptive attack and all were at least as expensive as the submarine option, some significantly more so. This analysis also led to the conclusion that it was necessary for the foreseeable future for the United Kingdom to continue the existing posture of continuously maintaining a single submarine on deterrent patrol.
The Government’s initial estimate is that the cost of procuring a new class of submarines will be in the range £11-14Bn (at 2006-07 prices) for a four submarine solution. This investment will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities that Armed Forces need. Participation in the Trident D5 life extension programme will cost around £250M and the estimate also includes some £2-3Bn on renewing infrastructure to support the deterrent over the lifetime of the new submarines. The Government will also continue to invest in sustaining capabilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The bulk of these costs are likely to be incurred 2012 to 2027. Once the new submarines come into service, the running costs of the nuclear deterrent are expected to be similar to those of today.
Future Decisions
The Government envisages placing contracts for the detailed design and manufacture of the new submarines in the period 2012-14. It has yet to decide whether the United Kingdom will require a fleet of three or four submarines to meet future deterrent requirements. Four Vanguard-class submarines are needed to sustain continuous deterrent patrols, but work will be undertaken to assess the scope for sufficiently radical design, operating and support changes to enable the MoD to maintain continuous deterrent patrols with a fleet of only three. It is likely to be necessary to decide on any refurbishment or replacement of our existing nuclear warhead in the next Parliament. Such a programme might involve procurement costs of some £2-3Bn. Decisions on any replacement for the Trident D5 missile are unlikely to be necessary until the 2020s. In all this, the Government will continue to work closely with the United States. Details of this collaboration were set out in an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, signed in December 2006.
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F41D32B5-11B8-45CC-801A-F9D9FB0896FE/0/purpose.pdf
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost to the public purse was of holding the media open day at AWE Aldermaston in June 2007; what plans he has to hold other such open days at atomic weapons establishment sites; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The only identifiable cost of the AWE media open day was £494.40. These costs were for catering and the production of press packs. There will have been other small unquantifiable costs associated with employees' time. The media open day was organised to coincide with an on-site exhibition for employees, contractors and their families. This was in response to the House of Commons Defence Committee's (HCDC) view that there was a case for greater openness regarding the work undertaken at
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AWE. The Government response to the HCDC's report 'The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base' (HC 59 dated 19 December 2006) provides further details.
Currently we have no plans to hold another media open day at an AWE site.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/The Minister for Energy (Malcolm Wicks): The Department will be placing the figures for the United Kingdom's stocks of civil plutonium and uranium as at 31 December 2006 in the Libraries of both Houses. In accordance with our commitment under the "Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium", we will also send the figures to the Director General of the International
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who will circulate them to Member States. The figures will be available on the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the IAEA websites.
The figures show that stocks of unirradiated plutonium in the UK totalled 106.9 tonnes at the end of 2006. Changes from the corresponding figures for 2005 are a consequence of continuing reprocessing operations (e.g. as reflected in the increased quantity of unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants. High enriched uranium (HEU) stocks decreased mainly as a result of down-blending material recovered during decommissioning of the UK's gas diffusion enrichment plant. The increase in the civil depleted, natural and low enriched uranium figures reflects the increased stocks at the UK enrichment plant at Capenhurst.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr. Bob Ainsworth): I am pleased to announce that a 10 year partnering contract worth up to £1 billion has been signed with Rolls-Royce, for the in-service support of Nuclear Steam Raising Plants which power the Royal Navy’s submarines. This contract is a key deliverable under the “Defence Industrial Strategy” published in December 2005.
This landmark 10-year contract marks a significant departure from former practices and will transform Rolls-Royce’s relationship with the Department in this sector. It will sustain the UK capability in the long-term, enable the risks and rewards to be managed jointly, and is a further example of partnering in action. Rolls-Royce and MOD will work together as a single, high-performing team, to improve performance and drive down costs. Savings of over £120 million are anticipated over the term of the contract.
The Nuclear Steam Raising Plant drives not only our current submarines but will also power the new Astute submarines. Rolls-Royce has been supplying Nuclear Steam Raising Plants to the Royal Navy for almost 50 years from their production site at Raynesway in Derby, and this new contract will help secure the future of staff working in this part of the business.
The contract sustains the UK’s capability to support Nuclear Steam Raising Plants, as stated in the defence industrial strategy, and uses the principles of the MOD’s procurement reform programme to develop more effective relationships with one of our top ten major industrial partners.
Today marks a significant achievement in securing the UK’s capability to support submarines in the future.
Chris Huhne: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many accidents there were involving the transportation of radioactive material by (a) air, (b) road, (c) rail and (d) ship in each year since 1977.
Jim Fitzpatrick: Since 1989, annual reports detailing all abnormal events involving the transport of radioactive material in the UK have been prepared by the Health Protection Agency (HPA), working under contract to the Department for Transport. In addition, periodic reports have been produced examining trends in events since the late 1950s. The latest reports in these series are:
Radiological consequences resulting from accidents and incidents involving the transport of radioactive materials in the UK - 2005 review (HPA-RPD-021)
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Review of events involving the transport of radioactive materials in the UK, from 1958 to 2004, and their radiological consequences (HPA-RPD-014)
A full list of earlier reports can be found in the reference section of each report. The report detailing events that occurred during 2006 will be published later this year.
Copies of these reports have been placed in the House Library and recent ones are available on the HPA website. A list of recent reports is also available on the Department's website at the following address.
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/freight/dgt1/publications/
notes/theradiologicalimpactofthetr1178
Mark Pritchard: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what safeguards the Government have put in place to ensure that (a) national security and (b) sensitive design and manufacture systems are safeguarded from foreign powers following the auction of the Government stake in the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: As indicated by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform in his written statement to the House on 16 July 2007, Official Report, column 1WS, as part of the process of the sale of British Nuclear Group's share in AWE Management Limited (AWEML), the Government will be seeking to ensure the enduring performance of AWEML in continuing to meet the requirements of its customer, the Ministry of Defence.
Such performance covers all aspects of work at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, with particular emphasis on the protection of national security and warhead design information, which are paramount considerations. We shall be applying a strict set of criteria in order to establish the acceptability of prospective purchasers before finalising an agreed shortlist of potential bidders. All factors will be taken into account in our analysis.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/Mr. Llwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to make the first of the regular reports to Parliament on progress made in the Trident replacement programme, as referred to by the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 14 March 2007, Official Report, column 309.
Des Browne: In accordance with the usual practice on major procurement projects, the first full progress report on the programme to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent will be made after the Initial Gate for the new class of submarines, currently estimated to be in 2009. Interim reports will be provided depending on progress with the programme.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr. Bob Ainsworth): I have now approved, effective from 1 August 2007, the early closure of the non-explosive (NE) elements of the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency (DSDA) site at Longtown.
Under the Future Defence Supply Chain Initiative (FDSCi) the MOD assessed a range of options for managing and operating the defence supply chain to reduce costs of ownership, while maintaining or improving service levels and enhancing operational capability. The selected option included plans for the withdrawal of all non-explosive storage from DSDA Longtown by mid-2009.
Since the announcement, work has been undertaken to design a stock relocation plan that will reposition Longtown non-explosive (NE) stocks to other retained DSDA sites. The stock relocation plan has matured and, as a consequence, it is now clear that DSDA has the opportunity to bring forward the planned Longtown NE closure date to the end of July 2007.
The proposal to withdraw NE stocks from Longtown early will affect 62 staff. Approximately 350 staff will be left at the site. Additional staff will be required for the ammunition box task (refurbishing ammo boxes), which transfers from the NE to the explosives business at the site on 31 July 2007. As a consequence there will be no early release scheme or compulsory redundancies.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Des Browne): ...
The creation of such a joint venture will enable the Royal Navy to work with industry to deliver the infrastructure that the Navy will need to support the fleet in the future while retaining all three of our existing naval bases at Portsmouth, Devonport and Faslane. This will be good news for the three communities and the service, civilian and contractor personnel employed at the bases. None the less, some reductions in the 17,600 personnel currently employed will be necessary and will be taken forward in consultation with trade unions in the usual way. We aim to rationalise infrastructure and spare capacity, streamline processes and build on partnering and other commercial arrangements. For example, today we are also announcing a £1 billion partnering arrangement with Rolls-Royce for the in-service support of the nuclear steam raising plant that powers the Royal Navy's submarines over the next decade.
See also:
Defence Secretary Des Browne has welcomed the announcement by the Government today, Wednesday 25 July 2007, which will see a £7.7bn increase in the defence budget over the next three years.
Today's announcement also paves the way for the purchase of two new aircraft carriers, a decision which will offer unprecedented capabilities for the UK's Armed Forces.
The settlement of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) for defence breaks down into an annual budget of £34bn in 2008/9, £35.3bn in 2009/10 and £36.9bn in 2010/11.
This is an additional £7.7bn for Defence by 2011, equating to 1.5 per cent average annual real growth against our CSR baseline, which excludes the cost of operations and the time-limited Defence Modernisation Fund. In addition, The Treasury will continue to fund the additional cost of operations over and above the Defence Budget, having already invested some £6.6bn in supporting the front line since 2001...
The key outcomes for defence:
The decision to retain Clyde, Portsmouth and Plymouth Naval Bases has been announced by the Ministry of Defence today, Wednesday 25 July 2007.
Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence and Scotland, said today:
"I'm pleased to announce that Naval Bases at Clyde, Devonport and Portsmouth will lead the Royal Navy and Defence into the future with the new aircraft carriers. We are not only preserving history; we are also writing it.
"The aim of the Naval Base Review was to ensure that we have the right naval base infrastructure to meet the needs of the future Fleet. The Review has looked in great detail at the manpower, skills, infrastructure and future requirement at each naval base, and has concluded that the best option for defence – and each of the local areas – is to keep all three open.
"The conclusion follows the announcement today of an agreed budget for defence for the next three years, which includes the decision to buy the new carriers."
The naval bases, currently home to most of the Royal Navy's fleet of surface ships will maintain their world class status with Portsmouth becoming the home of two new aircraft carriers, the largest warships ever to be built in the UK.
For hundreds of years the three bases have evolved to meet the changing requirements of the Royal Navy. Further work will now be carried out to determine how to optimise the performance of each of these historic bases to ensure that they continue to support the needs of the front line.
This work will take place in conjunction with the Transforming Submarine Support and Transforming Ship Support initiatives. These change programmes are designed to ensure the bases and the Royal Navy are prepared to meet the demands of the future fleet.
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/
DefencePolicyAndBusiness/FutureOfNavalBasesSecure.htm
Mr. Harper: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the outcome of the North Atlantic Council defence ministers meeting on 14 and 15 June 2007.
Mr. Ingram [holding answer 19 June 2007]: NATO Defence Ministers discussed a range of issues including the continuing transformation of NATO's capabilities, missile defence, and operational commitments in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Force planning issues were discussed at the annual meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in Defence Ministers' Session, and nuclear planning issues at the Nuclear Planning Group.
In addition, Afghanistan's Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak attended a special session of the North Atlantic Council together with the non-NATO nations contributing to the International Security Assistance Force. Allies underlined their commitment to the mission in Afghanistan, noted the progress that has already been made, and stressed the importance of Afghan ownership of security issues. The Council noted that the UN had been given a wider remit in the current Security Council Resolution and supported the efforts of the UN to maximise its impact and to expand its presence in the provinces of Afghanistan.
The Council also condemned the Taliban practice of deliberately endangering the civilian population of Afghanistan and underlined NATO's commitment to avoiding civilian casualties.
A copy of the final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers' Session can be found at:
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many US nuclear weapons are based at USAF Lakenheath, Suffolk; and what plans there are to reduce the number.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: NATO's Strategic Concept (paragraph 63) states that
"Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe."
It is NATO and UK policy not to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/Dr. Gibson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent discussions he has had with his US counterpart on reducing the number of US free-fall nuclear bombs stored at RAF Lakenheath.
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had with his US counterpart in respect of reducing the number of United States free-fall nuclear bombs stored at RAF Lakenheath.
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Mr. Bob Ainsworth [holding answer 28 July 2007]: It is not the practice of the Government to make public details of all discussions with foreign Governments as this would, or would be likely to, prejudice international relations.
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what contribution the UK has made to the study agreed at the NATO summit in Riga in 2006 on a collective alliance territorial missile defence system.
Des Browne: The missile defence feasibility study that was delivered to the NATO summit in 2006 was financed from NATO common funds to which the UK contributes. QinetiQ were part of the industrial consortium that undertook the work. In common with other NATO nations, the UK reviewed and commented upon the feasibility study, and contributes to the continuing discussions in NATO on the implications of missile defence for the alliance.
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made in developing a Space Based Infra-Red System (a) for the United Kingdom and (b) in collaboration with the United States.
Des Browne: The Space Based Infra Red System is a US programme with no involvement by the UK.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of the missile defence feasibility study that was delivered to the NATO summit in Riga in 2006.
Des Browne: I refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave on 26 June 2006, Official Report, column 165W, to the hon. Member for North Devon (Nick Harvey).
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/The Secretary of State for Defence (Des Browne): On 5 February 2003 the the Secretary of State for Defence announced the Government's agreement to a request from the US to upgrade the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar at RAF Fylingdales. The UK already makes a contribution to US capability in the area of missile warning, through our operation of the radar at RAF Fylingdales. That upgrade process is now complete and we expect that the radar will switch its operations to the new equipment from August 2007. There is no change to the existing UK-US mission for the radar and the station remains under full UK command. Its primary mission is to warn of ballistic missile attack, with secondary functions of space surveillance and satellite warning. The radar will contribute to the US ballistic missile defence system, alongside a global network of other US-owned sensors based on land, at sea and in space and the data it produces is shared between the UK and US military authorities. The UK will have full insight into the operation of the US missile defence system when missile engagements take place that are wholly or partly influenced by data from the radar at RAF Fylingdales.
Also, at RAF Menwith Hill, equipment will be installed and operated by the US Government to allow receipt of satellite warnings of potentially hostile missile launches, and will pass this warning data to both UK and US authorities. The data will also be fed into the US ballistic missile defence system for use in their response to any missile attack on the US. This will guarantee the UK's continued access to essential missile attack warning data, as well as enhancing the US's ability to deal with any attack aimed at their country.
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The Government welcome US plans to place further missile defence assets in Europe to address the emerging threat from rogue states. We welcome assurances from the US that the UK and other European allies will be covered by the system elements they propose to deploy to Poland and the Czech Republic and we have been exploring ways in which the UK can continue to contribute to the US system as well as to any future NATO missile defence system.
These developments reflect the Government's continuing commitment to supporting the development of the US missile defence system. We continue to regard this system as a building block to enhance our national and collective security. NATO has made no decisions about acquiring missile defence for the alliance, and we want to examine how the US system can be complemented and built upon to provide wider coverage for Europe. We have no plans to site missile interceptors in the UK but will keep this under review as the threat evolves. We also want to reassure Russia about the defensive nature and intent of the US system as it develops and to take forward alliance cooperation with them in the field of missile defence.
Graham Stringer: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport when he expects the European Geo-Stationary Navigation Overlay System to be fully operational.
Dr. Ladyman [holding answer 11 June 2007]: The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) is a joint project of the European Space Agency (ESA), the European Commission and Eurocontrol, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. ESA has overall responsibility for the design and development of the EGNOS system.
The integration of EGNOS into the Galileo programme was decided by Transport Council in its conclusions of June 2003. The failure of the current concession negotiations for Galileo has also affected the EGNOS augmentation programme since the concessionaire was to provide the long-term management and funding structure necessary for the certification of EGNOS.
At 8 June Transport Council, Ministers agreed a Council resolution which invited the Commission to continue with the implementation of a certifiable EGNOS with initial service availability by 2008. This is to be distinguished from a service agreed for aviation use. There is not yet a timetable for certification of EGNOS for aviation use because it will first be necessary to identify clearly the funding and management structure that will guarantee an operational system in the long-term. These guarantees are dependent on the decisions to be taken in the autumn on the future of the European GNSS Programme.
Mrs. Dunwoody: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many meetings (a) Ministers and (b) officials in his Department have attended to discuss the Galileo project since its inception; which Ministers attended; on what dates the meetings were held; what the grade was of the civil servants attending meetings to discuss the Galileo project alone and jointly with Ministers; and if he will place in the Library a paper on the proposed future financing, governance and exploitation of Galileo. [141021]
Dr. Ladyman: Ministers have attended all transport councils since 1999, when it was agreed at the Cologne European Council that Galileo 'should be given careful scrutiny'.
Departmental officials have attended all meetings of the Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU) Supervisory Board, since November 2002, and all meetings of the European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA), since January 2005. Departmental officials usually attend council working groups where Galileo is discussed, in support of the UK representation. Transport officials have been involved with the meetings of the ESA programme board that deals with EGNOS and Galileo
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since its inception in July 1999 and have attended many of them. The British National Space Centre takes the lead on ESA.
Information could be provided at disproportionate cost only on the dates of all the meetings that Transport Ministers and officials have held or attended on Galileo, within the Department, with Government colleagues, or with the GJU, GSA, Commission, ESA, and EU or ESA member states. The grade of the civil servants attending meetings has varied as appropriate. Senior officials, including the permanent secretary, have been involved.
An explanatory memorandum on the Commission's Communication of 16 May 2007 has been submitted to the European Scrutiny Select Committees. The Communication is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/doc/com Galileo en_final_16mav2007.pdf
Mr. Arbuthnot: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether a representative of his Department has attended meetings on the Galileo project in the last six months; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Department for Transport (DFT) is the lead Government Department for Galileo. MOD policy officials, along with officials from other Government Departments, provide DFT advice on wider issues.
In addition, the British National Space Centre (BNSC) has contracted satellite navigation experts from the Defence Scientific and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), an MOD executive agency, to provide technical support to the UK's involvement in the EU's Galileo civil satellite navigation programme.
They have regularly attended meetings on Galileo since the earliest days of the programme.
Mr. Arbuthnot: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 3 July 2007, Official Report, column 955W, on Galileo project, what the wider issues in relation to Galileo are on which his Department provides advice to the Department of Transport.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The MOD provides the Department for Transport with policy advice on the security aspects of Galileo, including system security and security implications of the programme. Along with other Government Departments the MOD also provides advice on EU institutional issues. In addition, drawing on its experience of large procurement projects, the MOD can offer advice on project management, governance, PPP funding and risk management issues.
Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps are being taken to widen international participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; and if she will make a statement.
Margaret Beckett: The UK has been actively involved in outreach activities for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which now includes over 80 countries. We continue to use suitable bilateral or multilateral lobbying opportunities to encourage other countries to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. For example, last year a UK Government team made a useful PSI outreach visit to Vietnam and in March, UK officials were involved in an Asia-Pacific PSI Outreach Forum organised in New Zealand.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when the Financial Action Task Force is expected to complete its examination of the risks involved in weapons of mass destruction proliferation finance and to review its mandate, as called for by the G7 Finance Ministers in Essen in February 2007; and if she will make a statement.
Ed Balls: I have been asked to reply.
The Financial Action Task Force is due to complete a review of its mandate by the end of June 2008. Its examination of the risks involved in weapons of mass destruction proliferation finance is in progress. There is no formal deadline for completing this work.
Mr. Flello: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he is taking in preparation for the non-proliferation treaty review conference in 2010.
Dr. Howells: On 25 June, my right hon. Friend the then Foreign Secretary (Margaret Beckett) set out how we intended to work towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2010.
She called for a reinvigorated commitment to a world free from nuclear weapons and recognised the pressure on the nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, particularly from Iran and North Korea. She made clear that we are committed to strengthen all aspects of the Nuclear NPT.
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when the United Nations convention on suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism entered into force; when the United Kingdom (a) signed and (b) ratified the convention; what responsibilities signatory states have to report on implementation of the convention in (i) member states and (ii) their overseas territories; and what steps the Government are taking to encourage non-signatory states to sign.
Dr. Howells: The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism entered into force on 7 July. The UK signed the Convention on 14 September 2005. The legislation required to implement the Convention is now in place in the UK, and the Government are currently preparing the necessary documents to be laid before Parliament prior to ratification. The Convention imposes an obligation on States Parties to report to the UN Secretary-General the final outcome of criminal proceedings undertaken in respect of the offences set out in the Convention. States Parties will also be expected to report to the committees of the UN Security Council that monitor implementation of States' counter-terrorism and non-proliferation obligations, on the implementation of their obligations under the Convention in a more general sense. While the Overseas Territories will not be included at the time of the UK's ratification, there remains the possibility of extending the Convention to the Overseas Territories following consultation with them and the passing of any necessary legislation in each Territory. With our international partners, the UK has strongly encouraged all States to sign and ratify the Convention. Most recently, in a joint statement on counter-terrorism issued at the Heiligendamm Summit on 8 June, the leaders of the G8 called on all States to ratify the Convention.
Mr. Jim Cunningham: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what role his Department plays in delivering the objectives of the G8 global partnership.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I refer my hon. Friend to the Global Partnership, UK Fourth Annual Report 2006, copies of which are available in the Library of the House.
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by what means he plans to take forward the proposals announced by his predecessor to the Carnegie International conference on 25 June of creating a disarmament laboratory to support a verification of the dismantlement of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.
Dr. Howells: My right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary (Margaret Beckett) announced that the UK would act as a "disarmament laboratory" for the thinking and practical work required to move forward global nuclear disarmament.
As the speech made clear, we are supporting an independent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. In particular, we are working with IISS on holding a workshop to focus on some of the crucial technical questions in this area.
We have also tasked the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston with some detailed work on key stages in the verification of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. This work is beginning and will produce results over the next few years.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband): The Voluntary Vetting Scheme (VVS) is an arrangement designed to prevent states of proliferation concern using the UK as a training ground for their scientists and engineers. It is administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and seeks co-operation from universities in identifying postgraduate applicants of proliferation concern. The
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Government asses the proliferation risk and inform the university, which then decides whether or not to offer a place to the applicant.
As the proliferation threat has evolved, we have looked again at whether there is room to improve the scheme. In particular, and as recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), we have looked at the scope to make it compulsory, so that we catch a greater proportion of students of potential concern. We have also looked to shift the emphasis from universities to Government, where both feel it properly belongs.
Proposed Changes
In essence, the student section of the Immigration Rules contains a requirement for certain postgraduate students to have prior counter-proliferation clearance in order to qualify for a visa. The proposed new scheme-the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)-requires all non-EEA students in the designated categories to apply for Counter-Proliferation (CP) clearance. Details of the disciplines affected by these provisions will appear in the 'Rules'. There is also a requirement to obtain CP clearance when students wish to extend their stay in the UK (for example, when moving from undergraduate studies to a postgraduate programme that is covered by the provisions of the new scheme). Clearance (in the form of a certificate) will be obtained through the FCO, using an easy-to-use, online form, and we aim to process the vast majority of applications within 10 working days. A separate clearance certificate will be required for each separate institution or programme of study.
We estimate that the ATAS will substantially increase the proportion of students of potential concern who are subject to scrutiny. At the same time, we would tighten the scheme considerably by assessing predominantly PhD and Masters by research students, rather than all postgraduate students of potential concern, as was the case under the VVS. However, we would still wish to assess the small number of students wishing to undertake taught Masters studies in Physics, Mechanical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering or Materials Technology, due to potential CP concerns. This allows us to target the areas of greatest concern more efficiently and in a manner proportionate to the threat. It is in line with the Government's publicly stated CP policy, and is a useful reaffirmation of our commitment. The academic community has also been extensively consulted and is supportive of the new scheme.
Timing
We anticipate implementing a voluntary go-live date for the scheme on Monday 3 September 2007. From this date onwards we will be seeking volunteers from Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to advise their students to apply for ATAS clearance. However it will not be a mandatory requirement under the Immigration Rules at this point and we will continue operating the VVS during this transition period. Assuming no problems are found we would have a mandatory go-live date of 1 November 2007 with a corresponding amendment to the Immigration Rules. This date has been decided after consultation with the UK academic community and allows them to deal with their busiest time for new arrivals, that is; September and October, without having to produce amended offer letters to meet the ATAS requirements.
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Westminster Hall
Tuesday 24 July 2007
[Miss Anne Begg in the Chair]
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the sitting be now adjourned.-[Mr. Frank Roy .]
9.30 am
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab): I welcome the opportunity to have this debate and hope that at the end of it the Government will give some good news on their future strategy towards non-proliferation. I congratulate the Minister on her appointment and welcome her to the debate.
On 14 March, the House voted on the Trident issue after a long debate. An unprecedented number of Labour Members voted against a renewal of the Trident nuclear submarine system. That reflected public opinion and the views of the large number of people who contacted MPs about the issue. Nuclear arms and proliferation is not a dead issue; it is very much a live one. I want to tease out the Government's view on the non-proliferation treaty system and what their strategy is leading up to the next five-yearly review in 2010.
It is worth setting out some of the background to the non-proliferation treaty. It was envisaged in 1968 and was promoted by Ireland, among a number of other non-aligned countries, many of which had completely neutral foreign policies. I shall quote from the original documentation. The five declared nuclear weapon states, which were the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China and the United Kingdom, all eventually signed the treaty and agreed that nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could
"not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to...acquire nuclear weapons".
They agreed not to receive, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or to seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Some important statements were made and considering the treaty was signed in 1968 at the height of the cold war, it was a seminal document that countries had courage to sign up to.
The second pillar of the non-proliferation treaty was disarmament. The five declared nuclear weapon states were committed to a process of long-term disarmament. That is the heart of the issue: the five declared nuclear weapon states agreed that they would not provide the technology to enable the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the other countries who signed and who were not nuclear powers agreed not to adopt nuclear weapons in any way.
The third pillar of the treaty was the peaceful use of nuclear energy. I am completely opposed to nuclear power because it is dangerous and dangerously polluting, but it is not illegal under the terms of the NPT for a country to develop its own nuclear power industry. That is one of the issues that is at the heart of the current debate concerning relations with Iran.
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Mr. David Drew (Stroud) (Lab/Co-op): My hon. Friend and I have slightly different views on nuclear power, but not on nuclear weapons. It has effectively been proposed that there should be multilateral control of Iran's ability to reprocess material for use in its nuclear industry. If that can apply to Iran, why cannot it apply to every other country, so that we develop the ability of individual countries to use materials, which could be used against the betterment of man, more positively?
Jeremy Corbyn: Indeed. Negotiations with Iran are based on Iran's wish to develop its own nuclear power industry and on whether that is a precursor to developing nuclear weapons. Clearly, nuclear power and nuclear weapons are inextricably linked; it is impossible to have nuclear weapons without nuclear reactors and a nuclear power industry, but it does not follow that by having a nuclear power industry and nuclear power reactors we get nuclear weapons. I disagree with my hon. Friend on very few things, but we do disagree on that particular subject. However, I am sure that we completely agree on the issue of nuclear weapons, which is important.
I shall set out what has happened since the NPT was signed. It grew from quite small beginnings, but there is now an impressive list of countries who have signed the non-proliferation treaty. It almost reads-I stress almost-like a list of members of the UN. The list is formidable in every conceivable way and we should be proud and supportive of that. Over the years since the original NPT was signed, countries that have tried to develop nuclear weapons have subsequently renounced the use of nuclear weapons completely. I am thinking, for example, of South Africa, which under the apartheid regime and possibly with the assistance of Israel, tried to develop a nuclear weapons system. There are uncorroborated reports that South Africa may have tried to test such weapons and it was certainly attempting to develop a weapons system. It is to the eternal credit of the African National Congress Government and former President Nelson Mandela that South Africa completely renounced the development, use and consideration of nuclear weapons in any way. We should remember that as one of Nelson Mandela's great contributions during his time as President. Argentina and Brazil also decided that they would not pursue any nuclear weapons options and a number of the former Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine, have done likewise. That has encouraged the development of nuclear-free zones around the world, particularly in Latin America. There is also an African nuclear-free zone and a developing central Asian nuclear-free zone.
Some countries have developed nuclear weapons and they are either not signatories to the NPT, have renounced the NPT, or never sought to sign the NPT in the first place. One such country is Israel, which it is reported has around 200 nuclear warheads. The reason that we know about Israel's nuclear weapons programme is that Mordechai Vanunu bravely told the world about it, after which he was spirited out of Britain into Italy. After the revelations that he made to The Sunday Times, he was taken from Italy to Israel where he was tried at a military court. He then spent 18 years in prison as a result, 13 of which were in solitary confinement. When he was finally released from prison, he was put under restrictive powers by the Israeli courts and has now been sentenced to a further period of imprisonment for
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talking to foreign nationals while living utterly peacefully in Jerusalem. Indeed, I am one of the people whom he has met since he came out of prison. I hope that the Minister will indicate whether the Government continue to think that Mordechai Vanunu should be given complete freedom to travel and to lead a normal life.
Miss Anne Begg (in the Chair): Order. We may have to suspend the sitting because there is a problem with the sound. I am now informed that the sound is back on.
Jeremy Corbyn: It would indeed be a shocking business if there were an attempt to silence a debate on nuclear weapons.
Dr. Ian Gibson (Norwich, North) (Lab): It's not MI5 is it?
Jeremy Corbyn: My hon. Friend tempts me down the road of conspiracy theories.
Tragically, India and Pakistan have both developed nuclear weapons. Both have a delivery system and a testing capability and the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan in 2002 was one of the most serious threats to world peace since nuclear weapons were developed. I hope that India and Pakistan will eventually sign the non-proliferation treaty and undertake mutual nuclear disarmament because their weapons are designed as much to attack each other as anyone else. Obviously, I hope that that happens, but I must say that the existence of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan is encouraged in part by the rewarding of nuclear technology to India by the United States, after President Bush's recent visit. If we are serious about the non-proliferation treaty, countries that develop nuclear weapons should not be rewarded for doing so, but should be put under the utmost pressure to undertake nuclear disarmament.
Allegedly, North Korea has also developed nuclear weapons, around which there has been a great deal of publicity. Nuclear weapons were an aim of the North Korean regime, which has carried out a nuclear test, although there are doubts about whether it was a fully-fledged nuclear weapon. Clearly, however, North Korea had an aim and a wish to develop nuclear weapons, which is quite bizarre for a country racked by such poverty, economic difficulties and isolation. It must also be said, however, that the talks with North Korea undertaken very patiently by the six-party group have had a very interesting effect. Only last week, we saw the first delivery of fuel oil shipments to North Korea, in return for which it deactivated part of its nuclear development programme. North Korea is to be congratulated on that, and the rest of the world should use this opportunity to develop engagement rather than hostilities with North Korea, in order to encourage it down the path of disarmament. Surely, that would be a good way forward.
Lastly, I want to mention Iran, which, I suspect, will dominate much of the debate. Obviously, Iran is an oil-rich country and, at the moment, wishes to develop a nuclear power industry so that it has energy supplies for the future. That is its stated aim. I do not agree with nuclear power, but Iran is legally entitled to develop it.
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It is a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty and is now judged to be in breach of a supplementary protocol, which allows instant inspections of its facilities. As a result, sanctions have been applied and Iran is becoming increasingly isolated throughout the world. The rather bellicose language used particularly by the United States towards Iran is unfortunate and dangerous for the region as a whole.
Dr. Gibson: I share my hon. Friend's abhorrence of nuclear weaponry and have no time for nuclear power, which, as he said, Iran is in the process of developing. Is it not incongruous that, under the aegis of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency has withdrawn from Iran technical co-operation on 55 fronts, which means that it has to turn to other countries for high-class technology and expertise, which might not be up to the standards that we are used to in the west? For example, if those involved in Chernobyl were to advise Iran, would we not have fears about their knowledge not being quite up to the mark? Someone once said of the control room at Chernobyl that it looked like someone had thrown dials into a bag and tossed it against a wall.
Jeremy Corbyn: My hon. Friend is far more of an expert on this subject than I am, and there is a great deal of merit in what he says. If a country develops nuclear power, but there is an accident or disaster, we all suffer. Nuclear fallout does not respect national boundaries. I can think back to debates in this House after the Chernobyl disaster, when a lot of people happily sat back and said, "Well, it is all the fault of Soviet technology". The reality was that thousands of people were terminally affected by the fallout-not only those around the plant, but in Scandinavia and, indeed, this country, despite the fact that we are a very great distance from Chernobyl. That is the reality of a nuclear power system failure.
Therefore, if Iran is denied high-quality nuclear technology, and resorts to that which has far less certainty and safety, we are all at risk, not least the Iranian people and those in neighbouring countries. I urge the Minister, in her response, to tell us that the attitude taken-
Miss Anne Begg (in the Chair): Order. We have had a request from the sound person: the position where the hon. Gentleman is standing is creating a problem, so will he move to the next microphone? That should solve the problem.
Jeremy Corbyn: To the left or the right?
Miss Anne Begg (in the Chair): I leave that entirely up to the hon. Gentleman.
Jeremy Corbyn: I can assure the audience that this is a tactical move to the right only.
When the Minister replies, I hope that she will help us on the question of relations with Iran. During the hostage crisis earlier this year, I was quite relieved that the bellicose language used against Iran up until that point was toned down a great deal. In the end, diplomacy triumphed and there was no military stand-off. Surely, that must be the way forward, and I hope that she will tell us that the Government intend to engage with Iran,
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rather than continually attack and criticise it. I accept that there is much to criticise in Iran concerning human rights and political rights and developments, and it is correct that those criticisms be made, but to start a quasi-military or, ultimately, military conflict would be disastrous for the whole region, particularly given the horrors in neighbouring Iraq.
Bob Spink (Castle Point) (Con): The hon. Gentleman has secured a very important debate at a key time in our history. Actually, it is a historic debate on a very important question. Does he think that the question of Iran, and of the middle east generally, shows that the British Government and the Americans do not understand the political dynamics in those areas? Is he aware of comments made by the Iranian envoy to the IAEA, Mr. Ali Asghar Soltanieh? He said:
"Britain does not have the right to question others when they're not complying with their obligations"-
under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Does that not pose an important question?
Jeremy Corbyn: Indeed. I shall return to the NPT system in a few moments, but yes, that is an important point: we should abide by the NPT, if we expect others to do the same. The other point that the hon. Gentleman made concerning internal politics in Iran is an important one as well. We hear some incredibly simplistic reports of what goes on in Iran, and everything that the President says and the language that he uses is taken as the gospel according to the whole country. It simply is not like that. There are different power centres in Iran; the political President is one, but there are many others. We should try and understand a little bit more about the country. I commend to anyone interested in Iran Rageh Omaar's films on the BBC about life and attitudes in Iran. It is a huge, proud and important country resting on the Persian tradition, and the simplistic remarks about and attacks made on it do no good at all; in fact, they do a great deal of harm. We should have some respect for the history and position of that country.
The purpose of this debate is to tease out the Government's position on the development of a peaceful nuclear process. The Government are quite keen, apparently, on developing nuclear power stations. I am not! But in a sense that is a separate debate from the one surrounding nuclear weapons. However, the assertion that we have an independent nuclear deterrent has been questioned by many of us for many years, both in this House and in the wider peace movement in this country. I do not believe that we have an independent nuclear deterrent, but that it relies entirely on technology and information from the United States to be fired or used. In reality, we are a subdivision of the US when it comes to nuclear weapons. However, that does not stop us spending vast amounts of money on our existing nuclear weapons, the development of the Aldermaston facilities and the putative replacement of the Trident system, which could cost as much as £70 billion. That was one of the big issues-it was not the only one-in the debate on 14 March.
I hope that the Government will recognise that if we are serious about our signing of the NPT all those years ago, committing us to long-term nuclear disarmament, as well as committing all those declared non-nuclear-weapon states to not developing such weapons, it is up to us to
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use this historic opportunity to say that we will go no further with the Trident project and that instead we will accept the terms of the NPT.
I had the good fortune, because I am one of the national vice-chairs of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, to attend the NPT PrepCom-the preparatory committee meeting-in Vienna in April and early May this year, and I did so with great interest. I spoke at length with my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) at a seminar that was conducted in parallel to the conference and I listened very carefully to the statements made by the Russian delegation, the United States delegation, many other delegations, the European Union and the British representative who spoke at the same session.
Let me quote from the statement made by Ambassador John Duncan, the head of the UK delegation to the first preparatory committee. He said:
"Mr. Chairman, you will be aware that at the end of last year we published a White Paper explaining the reasoning behind the UK government's decision to maintain a nuclear deterrent."
He went on to explain that the UK Parliament voted to support that decision. He said:
"Firstly, I should make clear what we have decided. The UK has decided to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current ballistic missile submarine fleet; and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life expectancy.
This does not mean that we have taken an irreversible decision that commits us irrevocably to possessing nuclear weapons in 40 or 50 years' time. Indeed, our White Paper is clear that the UK remains committed to the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons."
The next part was, to me, the most interesting. Ambassador Duncan said:
"Mr Chairman, some suggest that it is hypocritical for the UK to maintain its nuclear weapons while calling on others to desist from their development. Let me make clear that the UK does not belong to an opposite camp that insists on 'non-proliferation first.' The UK fully accepts the proposition that progress must be made on the disarmament and non-proliferation tracks in parallel. The UK White Paper on the nuclear deterrent makes clear our continuing commitment to meet our disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT."
The interesting thing was that nobody, at that stage, had accused Britain or anybody else of being hypocritical; it was the ambassador who brought up the question of hypocrisy, which was somewhat surprising to us. He then fairly pointed out that Britain had reduced its number of nuclear warheads considerably.
I was interested in Ambassador Duncan's statement and I was obviously pleased that he was at the committee and able to make the statement, but if he or, indeed, the delegation recognises that we are likely to be charged with hypocrisy, let us lance the boil and not go there. Let us say that we fully support all the principles of the NPT, which includes us not developing nuclear weapons or continuing with the replacement of Trident.
As I understand it, the 14 March vote was a vote in principle; it did not commit us to expenditure. I would be grateful if the Minister, when she replies to the debate, could explain exactly how much money has been spent on the development of a possible replacement for Trident and what is being invested now at Aldermaston in the development of further nuclear-bomb-making facilities.
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Dr. Gibson: I do not know whether my hon. Friend was lucky enough to hear the speech by the previous Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Margaret Beckett), at the Carnegie foundation in Washington, in which, again, it was pointed out that nothing was for ever in terms of British foreign policy, warheads and so on, and that we are now moving to a state in which, independently, there is consideration of how far we can go and the fact that the deterrent effect may be different in different countries. So there was a chink of light from the previous Foreign Secretary, too. I just have this wonderful feeling that something is opening up and I am sorry that she lost her job.
Jeremy Corbyn: I have always known my hon. Friend to be a brilliant man, but he has read my mind on this occasion.
Mr. Drew: Or even the script.
Jeremy Corbyn: Not the script because there is no script-I cannot do scripts. I was indeed about to refer to the speech by the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Margaret Beckett), to the Carnegie international non-proliferation conference on 25 June. In my view, it is a very interesting, very seminal speech and extremely well put. I shall quote a couple of extracts from it, because I think it important that the House understands what she said.
My right hon. Friend talked about the possibilities of long-term nuclear disarmament and quoted Kofi Annan. She went on to say that "there are some very specific triggers for action-key impending decisions-that we are fast approaching."
She drew attention to the fact that START-the strategic arms reduction treaty-expires in 2009; there is not long to go. She said:
"We will need to start thinking about how we move from a bilateral disarmament framework built by the US and Russia to one more suited to our multi-polar world".
That was an interesting use of language. She went on to say:
"And then in 2010 we will have the NPT Review Conference. By the time that is held, we need the international community to be foursquare and united behind the global non-proliferation regime. We can't afford for that conference to be a fractured or fractious one: rather we must strengthen the NPT in all its aspects."
Towards the end of the speech, my right hon. Friend said:
"What we need is both vision-a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action-progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, both at the moment too weak."
In the historical context, my right hon. Friend drew a parallel with people who have stood against impossible odds and achieved something. She cited the example of those who campaigned for the end of the slave trade and quoted William Wilberforce. She cited those who sought the millennium development goals to make poverty history in our society and in our world. Her words at that conference were prescient and important.
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Nuclear weapons were used once in anger-in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. They were mere fireworks compared with the weapons that are now available in the world. Every year on 6 August, Hiroshima day, we have commemorations around the world-I always attend the one in Tavistock square in London-and every year we have aged Japanese guests who come along, who are dying of cancers, as others are dying of cancers, as a result of weapons used more than 60 years ago that are mere fireworks compared with what is now available. Those people are living the legacy of the only use of nuclear weapons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki have dedicated themselves as cities of peace. We should pay tribute to Mayor Ito of Nagasaki, who was tragically murdered earlier this year. He campaigned for peace on behalf of his city.
We came very near to nuclear war in 1962 in the Cuban missile crisis. We came very near to nuclear war between India and Pakistan in 2002. Is it really conscionable that in the 21st century, with all the problems of poverty, hunger, malnutrition, the AIDS pandemic and the lack of sanitation around the world, we should be thinking of spending billions of pounds on developing weapons of mass destruction? Why do we not accept in its totality the NPT that came into force in 1970, the reasons that we signed it and what it commits us to? Why do we not say that our intention, our purpose, is to bring about long-term nuclear disarmament and start by setting an example by saying that this country will not proceed any further with the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons? We could use that to encourage others.
The six-party talks have shown, in the case of North Korea, that it is possible to make progress. There are many people in this Room who would recognise that it is quite possible and, indeed, probable that progress will be made with Iran. If, however, we decide to go ahead with the new generation of nuclear weapons and the US, Russia, France and China do the same, who on earth are we to go to the NPT review conference in 2010 and proceed to lecture people in the rest of the world about why they should not develop nuclear weapons?
This, essentially, is a moral quest with a moral purpose. Millions out there would like to see a better world, as do many in here, and we do not believe that nuclear weapons bring about peace, justice or security. Instead, they bring about danger, the possibility of proliferation and, by their very manufacture and existence, the danger of pollution. The NPT was a seminal treaty, which was promoted by countries that did not have nuclear weapons, did not want them and did not want anybody else to have them. Although the PrepCom meeting in Vienna eventually concluded with a degree of harmony and good purpose, there is no guarantee that the review conference in 2010 will achieve the same, unless the UK, as one of the five declared nuclear weapon states, does all that it can to develop the process of nuclear disarmament. That is why I called for this debate, and I look forward to the contributions of others and to the Minister's reply. This is an issue for our time; it is one that will allow us to make a real contribution and bring about a more peaceful world.
10 am
Bob Spink (Castle Point) (Con): In politics, timing is everything, so why on earth would Britain broadcast the message this year that it is time to ramp up the
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nuclear weapons race? The Government have shown to our cost that, as I said earlier, they simply do not understand the dynamics of politics in the middle east and North Korea or the evolving terrorist threats. The awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons makes any decision that the Government take a historic one for this country and the world. We have the opportunity to set an example-good or bad-but I am afraid that Parliament has not truly debated or consulted on that decision in the wide manner that its importance demands.
Britain had a unique opportunity, as the bishops' conference put it, to jump start
"an approach to security and legitimate self-defence without the unconscionable threat of nuclear destruction"
and
"give a new impetus to the wider process towards total nuclear disarmament."
The question is whether we should trust the Prime Minister or have a proper, full debate on such a historic decision, rather than just pushing it through, with the Whips driving MPs through the voting Lobbies. All MPs worth their vote want eventual nuclear disarmament, which is our legal responsibility under the NPT. We signed up to that and we should follow through or explain why we will not. The answer to the question whether we should have a proper debate is, of course, a no-brainer, but MPs on both sides of the House were railroaded when the issue was discussed this spring.
Of course, the Government have a grave duty to maintain security, but the burning question is whether their, and indeed the Opposition's, strident push for even more destructive nuclear weapons platforms and capabilities would provide that security or facilitate less stable countries-some with desperate and dangerous leaders-in taking up the nuclear option. Do such weapons defend us against the evolving, asymmetric threats of terrorism? Mutually assured destruction-MAD-simply does not work as a deterrent against terrorist threats; we can ask any suicide bomber that and we will get a very clear answer.
We have seen a litany of disastrous weapons and major systems procurement decisions in the past decade, and overstretch in the conventional forces is certainly no illusion. Some MPs could therefore be forgiven for thinking that spending money on proven conventional forces would be a lot more effective way of creating a safer world and a safer Britain. The point, however, is that society needs to have a comprehensive debate, and it has not yet had one. Tony Blair said that the cost was about £20 billion over the relevant period, so pundits watching the issue would not be surprised if the cost escalated to £40 billion, given what we all know about cost estimates for major weapons, platforms and systems.
As I said, we could spend some of that money on conventional arms. We could also spend it on tackling climate change to help save the planet from certain and serious damage. Equally, we could spend it on international development to remove some of the inequalities around the world, which drive terrorism in the first place. Trident also raises key domestic questions, and there are serious domestic calls on the money involved-the health service, education and tackling law and order spring readily to mind.
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MPs really can make a difference; we all know that, which is why we come here. However, we need the courage to put our country first, to put people before politics and occasionally to ignore the party Whips and do what we think is right so that we can force the Government to make good decisions, particularly when the matter is so historically important. I made a mistake believing and following the Government on Iraq, but I will not make that mistake so easily again.
Let me make it clear, however, that I am not advocating nuclear disarmament now, unlike the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), who made an excellent speech. I am not a disarmer by nature and I believe in strong defences. I am arguing that now is not the right time to make a decision; in fact, it is totally the wrong time. A decision is not necessary technically and the systems can be extended beyond 2020, when, if we want to look at a nuclear option for the future, there will be new, cheaper and more effective technologies that can be better targeted. There are also better ways to spend the money right now. We as MPs can send a historic message to the rest of the world and really make a difference if we have the courage to do what is right.
10.7 am
Mr. Dai Davies (Blaenau Gwent) (Ind): I congratulate the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) not only on his speech but on the campaign that he has supported for many years to keep Trident and nuclear weapons on the political agenda.
My constituency boasts Michael Foot and Llew Smith as my predecessors, and they were unilateralists, who campaigned for unilateral nuclear disarmament for many years. I was a multilateralist until relatively recently, but what changed my mind primarily-other than the campaigns by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament-was the reduction of nuclear weapons across the world, including in Britain, Russia and America, as well as the existence of parts of the world without nuclear weapons. Now seems to be the time to take the next step.
The issue of a free vote has been mentioned. As an independent MP, I believe that the most important point is that all hon. Members must go out into their constituencies and listen to their constituents. Then, I would urge the Government to bring the issue back to Parliament and to give Parliament a free vote.
Many things have been said about Trident, nuclear power and nuclear weapons in the past months, including during election campaigns for deputy party leaders. Many Ministers have indicated that there should perhaps be a rethink, and they should be listened to. The most important thing is that we lead as a country to show that there is another way. We must use the disarming of Trident as a negotiating point with countries such as Iran to persuade them that disarmament is the right thing to do.
The Government held a debate that took a matter of hours, but this issue needs debating over a long time. CND has said that the move to renew does not have to be taken for six, seven, 10 and ma
Proliferation in Parliament