Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the IAEA Director-General

Author(s): IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
2 September 2005
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, GOV/2005/67, September 2, 2005.

components imported by Iran had been stored by the supply network prior to their shipment to Iran. Additional samples were taken in March 2005 at one of the locations. The analysis of the environmental samples collected at these locations is still in progress.

12. On 21 May 2005, the Agency received from another Member State a number of centrifuge components, environmental sampling of which was thought might provide information on the origin of the LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran. The analysis of swipe samples taken from those components, which was carried out at the Agency's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), was completed in early August 2005. Based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of that analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination.

B.2. Enrichment Programme

13. As explained by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) in March 2005, there have been developments since November 2004 in four areas related to the Agency's verification of Iran's P-1 centrifuge enrichment programme, specifically in connection with: (a) a 1987 offer for centrifuge related design, technology and sample components; (b) the genesis of the mid-1990s offer for P-1 centrifuge documentation and components for 500 centrifuges; (c) shipping documents and other documentation related to the delivery of items in connection with the mid-1990s offer; and (d) technical discussions held between Iran and the intermediaries concerning centrifuge enrichment. These developments, as well as the status of the Agency's inquiries about Iran's P-2 programme, are addressed below.

B.2.1. The 1987 offer

14. During a meeting on 12 January 2005 in Tehran, Iran showed the Agency a handwritten one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. The document suggests that the offer was for the delivery of: a sample machine (disassembled), including drawings, descriptions and specifications for production; drawings, specifications and calculations for a "complete plant"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also reflects an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities. Iran stated that only some of these items had been delivered, and that all of those items had been declared to the Agency. Iran further stated that the intermediaries had offered the re-conversion unit with casting equipment on their own initiative and that, as the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) had not requested it, the AEOI had not received it.

15. The Agency has repeatedly asked to have access to, and copies of, original documentation related to the 1987 offer. Iran has maintained that the only document that exists reflecting the 1987 offer is the handwritten one-page document. Iran has also reiterated its previous statement that it had not received the re-conversion unit, but has agreed to continue its search for additional supporting documentation on this and other items included in the offer.

B.2.2. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer

16. Iran has informed the Agency that there is no written document reflecting the mid-1990s offer, made initially to an Iranian company unrelated to AEOI, for the delivery of P-1 centrifuge documentation and components for 500 centrifuges. According to Iran, an employee of that company (said by Iran to have been set up to purchase computer software and hardware for the State Organization for Management and Planning (OMP) was approached with an oral offer from the network. This information was conveyed to the head of the OMP, who, according to Iran, realized that the OMP did not have a mandate for the transaction, and reported it to higher authorities. The President of the AEOI was made aware of the offer, which resulted in renewed contacts in 1993 between the AEOI and the network intermediaries.

B.2.3. Shipping documents and other documentation

17. The Agency has sought from Iran access to documentation which supports Iran's declarations concerning the number of shipments of enrichment related equipment received by Iran, and the specific contents of those shipments. In January 2005, Iran provided the Agency with copies of a number of shipping documents indicating four shipments between 1994 and 1995. In a letter dated 14 April 2005, the Agency asked