Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the IAEA Director-General

Author(s): IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
2 September 2005
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, GOV/2005/67, September 2, 2005.


c. Failure to provide design information, or updated design information, for:

(i) the facilities where the natural uranium imported in 1991 (including wastes generated) was received, stored and processed (the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories at TNRC (JHL); TRR; ENTC; waste storage facility at Esfahan and Anarak);

(ii) the facilities at ENTC and TNRC where UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and AUC from imported depleted UO2, depleted U3O8 and natural U3O8 had been produced;

(iii) the waste storages at Esfahan and at Anarak, in a timely manner;

(iv) the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop;

(v) the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad, and locations where resulting wastes had been processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj; and

(vi) TRR, with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets, and the facility at TNRC where plutonium separation had taken place, as well as the waste handling facility at TNRC.

d. Failure on many occasions to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, as evidenced by extensive concealment activities.

5. As corrective actions, Iran:

a. Submitted inventory change reports relevant to imports, transfers, domestic receipts and shipments, losses and discards of nuclear material;

b. Provided physical inventory listings and material balance reports with respect to all declared nuclear material, and presented the available material for Agency verification;

c. Submitted declarations with respect to the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad and the waste storages at Esfahan and Anarak; and

d. Provided design information with respect to the facilities identified above (the facilities located at TNRC and ENTC).

6. As a result of these corrective actions and other activities, the Agency was able by November 2004 to confirm certain aspects of Iran's declarations (related to conversion activities and laser enrichment), which, as indicated to the Board, would be followed up as matters of routine safeguards implementation under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

7. As reported to the Board of Governors in March 2005, Iran failed to report to the Agency in a timely manner certain underground excavation activities that were already underway in December 2004 at the UCF at Esfahan. Although Iran submitted the necessary design information in December 2004, Iran should have provided such information to the Agency at the time the decision was taken to authorize or carry out such construction, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement Subsidiary Arrangements.

8. No additional failures have been identified. Iran has, however, provided some new information with respect to the dates of the plutonium research activities that is at variance with some of the dates provided earlier (see discussion below). As in November 2004, while there are a number of other matters requiring follow-up, the two important outstanding issues relevant to the Agency's efforts to provide assurance that there is no undeclared nuclear material and that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran are: the origin of LEU and HEU3 particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.

B. Developments since November 2004

B.1. Contamination

9. As a vital part of its investigation into Iran's enrichment programme, the Agency has conducted extensive environmental sampling at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components were manufactured, used and/or stored, with a view to assessing the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities.4

10. Analysis of these samples has revealed particles of LEU and HEU indicative of types of nuclear material that are not included in Iran's inventory of declared nuclear material, and has thus called into question the completeness of Iran's declarations about its centrifuge enrichment activities. The Iranian authorities have attributed the presence of these particles to contamination originating from imported centrifuge components. In that context, Iran has stated that it has not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges.

11. In January 2005, an Agency team re-visited locations in a Member State where, according to Iran, the centrifuge