Reviving The Disarament Regimes: Recommendations of the High Level Panel and Secretary-General's Advisory Board

1 November 2005

Harald Müller

There is practically universal agreement that overarmament is a threat to humanity, international peace and security. In particular, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is not only a danger in its own right, but increases the risk that interstate wars, though becoming less frequent, may be fought with such weapons, with appalling consequences that would not be confined to the warring parties.[1]

As well as posing an increasing threat with regard to war, the spread of WMD provides a growing number of sites of access for non-state actors. That certain kinds of terrorists would use WMD if they were afforded the opportunity is beyond doubt.[2] Yet as the dangers grow, they reveal inadequacies in the instruments created by the international community to cope with them. While the 1996 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is fairly robust, the Draft Protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was opposed by the United States, leaving this treaty without an effective mechanism for verification and compliance. Following this failure, in May 2005, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference ended in a spectacular disagreement among the parties.

During the past year, two important international studies have addressed ways of curbing the further spread of WMD and diminishing those already in existence. The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP),[3] appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to develop proposals to reform the United Nations, gave a prominent place to consideration of WMD. The Secretary-General had also tasked his Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to provide input on disarmament issues to the HLP, and to focus, in particular, on the utility and needs of the existing regimes and the role of the United Nations in improving their functioning and implementation.[4] In addition, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei had instituted an international expert group to explore practical options for the multilateralisation of the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to examine how such initiatives could contribute to enhanced international security.[5] This article compares the disarmament recommendations in the reports from the HLP and Advisory Board, with additional consideration of some of the relevant proposals from the IAEA expert group.

On multilateral disarmament regimes

In para 110 of its report, the HLP labels the NPT as "not as effective a constraint as it was". The panel gives as reasons for this harsh assessment the possibility and threat of withdrawal and the spread of nuclear technology, but it does not highlight the lack of disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, one of the main causes of divisions among the Treaty members. Mitigating this negativity, the HLP concedes that the strict non-proliferation regime, embodied by the IAEA and the NPT, "helped dramatically to slow the predicted rate of proliferation".

Undoubtedly, as illustrated by the 2005 Review Conference, the NPT is in crisis. but this should not blind us to its strengths. NPT membership, at 188 states, is close to universal. The overwhelming majority of parties abide by their undertakings. There are only a few exceptions: some proven, such as Iraq and North Korea; others suspected, notably Iran. The nuclear weapons programmes of these states, however, reach well into the past. Originating in the Cold War, they cannot be ascribed to new or emerging weaknesses of the Treaty regime. The same applies for the chronic "holdouts" Israel, India, and Pakistan. They all started their nuclear weapons programmes in the 1950s and 1960s. As far as the majority of the international community is concerned, the NPT appears to have maintained its effectiveness as an international norm.

By contrast with the HLP, the Advisory Board chose to characterise the NPT as "largely successful", seeing it as an important norm that has convinced a number of countries to renounce nuclear weapons, to halt or convert weapons-related programmes or to disarm already existing weapons in their possession.

The HLP's scepticism towards multilateral non-proliferation regimes is manifest in the catalogue of strategic instruments which it proposes for controlling the dangers of WMD proliferation (§§ 117-126): In the first section, the report talks only about new instruments; the second part provides for "supply-side" tools; and the third part enumerates means to prevent, and to respond to, emergencies. There is no mention of the existing multilateral instruments in this strategic context, although the ensuing paragraphs contain some proposals to improve them. Altogether, the regimes appear to be judged as marginal - perhaps in reaction to the prevailing opinion in Washington. This interpretation is supported by the surprising fact that the failure of the nuclear weapon states to fulfil their disarmament obligations[6] plays no role in the HLP's discussion about the NPT's crisis.

In contrast, the Advisory Board characterised the NPT, BWC and CWC as the first line of defence against state and non-state proliferation and started its considerations by highlighting the utility of these regimes. Multilateral disarmament, in the eyes of the Advisory Board, is of central importance and must be maintained, because without it, the legitimacy of counter-proliferation measures disappears: the Advisory Board wants to provide for a broad consensus for such measures, should they be needed. In contrast, the HLP report shows a tendency to enhance the role of the Security Council at the cost of other multilateral institutions, such as the treaty communities and their review conferences, the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and also the UN General Assembly. As important as the Security Council no doubt is, the magnified authority accorded to it by the HLP is problematic, and could strengthen the already existing concerns of the UN membership that an ever more tangible transfer of power to the Security Council could result in the loss of their own opportunities for participation and decision-making. That the Security Council has to play the role as the ultimate guarantor of the treaty regimes is uncontested; but power-sharing and the seamless co-operation of the various institutions involved in the field of WMD is indispensable for optimal efficiency.

The remaining considerations of the HLP on the threat emerging from WMD (§§ 112-116) are well reasoned, even though they should have distinguished more between the different types of weapons concerned: the effects of chemical weapons - as horrible as they might be for unprotected civilians - lag far behind the damage likely from the use of biological and nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation

Concerning nuclear disarmament, the studies of the HLP and Advisory Board have much in common. Both call for the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes (fissban). Strangely, the HLP confines the fissban to a cut-off of the production of highly enriched uranium (§ 138), while it is generally understood that such a treaty must also cover plutonium. Beyond the CTBT and the fissban, the HLP recommends the de-alerting of nuclear arsenals, a time-honoured interest promoted by its American member Brent Scowcroft (§ 121). The Advisory Board emphasises the urgency of further reductions and the eventual elimination of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. It argues that these weapons are most likely to be used first in interstate war, and are smaller and more mobile, increasing the risk that they could be stolen by non-state actors or used more readily than other types of nuclear weapons.[7]

Another difference between the two reports lies in how they handle the "Thirteen Steps" for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the NPT Review Conference in 2000. While the HLP criticises the nuclear weapon states for ignoring that agreement, it takes no effort to request their implementation, probably anticipating the stubborn American refusal during the 2005 Review Conference to acknowledge them as relevant. The Advisory Board, in contrast, demands the full realisation of the Thirteen Steps.

The HLP rightly pleads for strengthening the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Originating with the G-8, this initiative aims at securing dangerous materials and technologies on the territory of the former Soviet Union and beyond, particularly with a view to preventing access by terrorists. The Panel also suggest cutting by half the time allotted for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons withdrawn from deployment and for disposing of their fissile material. The Advisory Board does not explicitly deal with the GTRI, apart from endorsing the Thirteen Steps, which cover two subjects addressed by it. On a related subject, however, it makes a daring proposal, arguing for highly enriched uranium to be phased out not only in relation to civilian uses, but also in naval reactors. This would force the US, British, Russian and probably Chinese navies to undertake comprehensive re-engineering of those parts of their fleets that are nuclear powered. Only France would not be affected, since its nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers already run on lower enriched uranium fuel - proving that it is possible to do so.

Verification measures and multilateral nuclear fuel arrangements

On the supply side, the HLP proposed that the IAEA Board of Governors shall "recognise" the Additional Protocol to the NPT which enhances greatly the verification measures available to the Agency to detect clandestine nuclear activities the "current standard of IAEA verification". The Protocol becomes legally binding once a NPT State Party signs and ratifies it. But this proposal is not currently feasible, as the IAEA Board of Governors lacks the mandate or authority to make the Protocol binding. It would require the UN Security Council or the NPT Review Conference to agree to declare the Protocol politically binding in conformity with the NPT's Article III obligation. In addition, the Nuclear Suppliers Group could agree to apply the Protocol as a condition of supply for all new, or for all sensitive, nuclear transfer. Both of these steps were proposed during the NPT Review Conference in 2005, but failed to attract consensus, mainly due to the considerable resistance of some non-aligned states parties. The only possibility for the IAEA Board of Governors would be the merely symbolic recognition of the Protocol as the appropriate verification standard. Such a declaration could be helpful, but it would have no binding effect on anybody.

Concerning the nuclear fuel cycle, where the Advisory Board confined itself to proposing a five-year moratorium for all new enrichment and reprocessing facility construction, the HLP suggests an open-ended moratorium, with no specification of duration. As mentioned, the Board recommends phasing out all uses of highly enriched uranium, together with a reconsideration of civilian reprocessing for the separation of plutonium. Apart from these recommendations, it chose to wait for the results of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements (MNA).

A system of assurances of supply would help persuade nuclear energy users to renounce national enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The HLP called for immediate talks within the IAEA to make the Agency the "guarantor" for fuel supply (§ 130). The IAEA expert group also speaks about the Agency as "guarantor", but it spells out more precisely what is meant by this term: "Depending on the specific agreement negotiated, the term 'guarantor' could cover a variety of roles to be played by the IAEA: judging whether the conditions of supply are being met, including assessing the non-proliferation status of the recipient; activation of any decision to supply, including requesting governments/companies to fulfil supply obligations; acting as a broker between supplier and recipient; and overall management of the arrangement. In all such 'guarantor' functions, the IAEA will need to rely on the cooperation of other actors, i.e. governments and companies" (IAEA Expert Group, p. 43). This clarification aims at preventing the misunderstanding that the IAEA could, on its own, cope with interruptions of supply and, by itself, inspire sufficient confidence into recipients to abstain from national fuel cycle projects. Rather, the report enumerates a number of conditions that would enable the IAEA to serve in such a guarantor role in the first place. These include: the readiness of a significant number of supplier countries to drop their right of a case-by-case licensing procedure in favour of generic consent for all customers of the assurance system found by the IAEA to be in compliance with their non-proliferation, physical security and export control obligations; regulations for fixing the price for emergency supply; and a fair procedure to determine the compliance status of the recipient.

The Expert Group believes that such a system could be installed, but only on a voluntary basis. If the idea is to establish a new binding norm that would prevent non-nuclear weapon states from developing national fuel cycle facilities, the Expert Group sees the necessity to adjust the balance of rights and duties between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. In other words, further restrictions on Article IV nuclear energy rights would not be regarded as acceptable as long as the nuclear weapon states have not convincingly demonstrated their implementation of Article VI on nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, the Expert Group views a satisfactory fissban as a necessary basis for a mandatory MNA rule, as this would create a level playing field for all states - nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, and non-NPT states. Under an appropriate fissban, no-one would be permitted to operate fissile material production facilities for weapon purposes. On this basis, a new universal prohibition of such national facilities could become possible. However, the Expert Group thought it probable that beyond the fissban, additional disarmament steps pursuant to the "Thirteen Steps" agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference would be necessary to persuade the non-nuclear weapon states to agree to such a new norm. Thus, the Expert Group, in contrast to both the HLP and the Advisory Board, has connected the issues of MNA and fissban, and thus introduced a new, interesting element into the discussion.

Radiological, biological and chemical weapons

The HLP highlighted the dangers emerging from radiological weapons (so-called 'dirty bombs'). The Advisory Board proposed negotiations on a legal prohibition of such weapons. Such negotiations had failed in the CD during the 1980s, but could be revived, with new emphasis on non-state actors. Both reports demanded sufficient funds for the IAEA efforts to combat radiological terrorism, notably to recover radiological sources and waste containing highly radioactive isotopes that could be misused for making dirty bombs.

Both documents agree on the high risks emanating from modern biotechnology. Many of the former barriers to producing and storing biological agents in large quantities have been eliminated. Producing such agents has been vastly facilitated for terrorist groups as well.[8] The HLP goes beyond the recommendations of the Advisory Board in categorically demanding the resumption of negotiations on a Verification Protocol to the BWC (§ 126). These negotiations had failed in 2001 on grounds of principal US objections. Since 2002, national experts and States Parties delegates have been meeting annually to deliberate on a range of measures to strengthen the Convention, though strictly non-binding, on American insistence.

The HLP's demand is no doubt correct, but cannot be realised as long as the Bush administration pursues its present policies. For this reason, the Advisory Board has focussed its recommendations on the current deliberative process within the BWC. The Board sees the necessity of helping developing countries to institute preventive measures for coping with emergencies caused by terrorist acts or pandemics. The HLP has developed a series of specific proposals in this context as well, such as a surveillance system for the suspicious outbreak of diseases and negotiations on a Biosecurity Protocol.

Both groups are in agreement that existing chemical weapons stocks must be dismantled in the shortest period possible. If feasible, the current 2012 deadline should be shortened, with provision of the necessary funds to carry out the safe destruction of the weapons' components. As with biological weapons, the Advisory Board calls for assistance programmes for poorer countries in order to built an effective emergency response capacity and to enhance the respective know how about protective measures and decontamination techniques.

Small Arms, Landmines and Missiles

The HLP put much emphasis on human security, the concept that defines the well-being of the weakest members of society as the standard for security policy.[9] It is therefore all the more surprising that its report has little to say about small arms and landmines, devoting only three paragraphs (95-97). In its brief account of weapons that dominate current conflicts and have a horrendous mass destructive impact over time, the panel promotes (as does the Advisory Board) the prompt conclusion of conventions on the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons, and on controlling trade and brokering. All member states are also called upon to report regularly to the UN Arms Register, which collects data on major conventional weapons systems but not small arms.

The Advisory Board goes further. It requires the prohibition of arms transfers to non-state actors, with sanctions against anybody not abiding by this new rule, or more generally by UN arms embargos. It wants all states to be obliged to introduce appropriate national legislation, possibly through a Security Council resolution. A code of conduct is proposed to regulate the transfer of weapons from legal to illicit trade. This is an important issue that the UN Small Arms Action Program was not able to deal with, in large part due to the objections of the National Rifle Association, the powerful US arms lobby group.

Landmines are not mentioned at all in the HLP report. The Advisory Board notes the different approaches: a majority of states supports the Ottawa Convention, the categorical prohibition of anti-personal mines; a minority, but including major states such as Russia, India, the United States and China, prefers strengthening the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) which only constrains the use of landmines, but prohibits mines that are non detectable or have no self-destruct mechanism. The Advisory Board recommends that both tracks be pursued in parallel. It calls for enhancing demining efforts and the consideration of prohibiting anti-vehicle mines as well, as they have such devastating effects on the restoration of civilian life, notably in rural areas, after the termination of armed conflict.

The HLP also remains silent on missiles. The Advisory Board encourages the further search for global instruments to contain the spread of missiles and missile technology, beyond the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles. The Board is particularly alarmed about the problem of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) that in the hands of terrorists would present an acute threat to civil aviation. A new Security Council resolution modelled after UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) is proposed which would oblige states to take specific measures to control non-state actors' access to MANPADS.

Export Controls

The Advisory Board devotes much more attention to export controls than the HLP. The Board wants to complement the existing regimes - the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the Australia Group (biological and chemical technology), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Regime (conventional Arms and related technology) by open-ended working groups and open seminars. This measure is meant to enhance the transparency of these voluntary 'clubs', which are deeply distrusted by many developing countries who view them as exclusive cartels; in addition, the Board proposes sharing expertise more openly on the complex problems involved in setting up and maintaining effective export control systems. Both reports deem it necessary to set up programmes of assistance for developing countries to install and improve export control mechanisms, including giving legal and institutional advice. The HLP, however, advocates entrusting this assistance mission to the 1540 Committee that supervises the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540.

The Advisory Board deals in more detail with the content of export control laws, arguing that they should contain: lists of goods and technologies subject to licensing; a catch-all clause to cover non-listed goods meant for weapons programmes; rules for non-tangible technology transfers such as through the internet and email; standards for enforcement, including penalties for perpetrations; and a no-undercut stipulation prohibiting countries from jumping in to benefit from the denial of a license by another.

Both reports support the contested Proliferation Security Initiative, in which some twenty states collaborate, with the support of more than forty others, to intercept transports of dangerous goods that are deemed to have violated nonproliferation agreements and slipped through export controls. The reports advocate closing the gap in international law related to high-sea intercepts without the consent of either the flag or the owner state of the ship in question and invite all states to become members or at least to support the PSI. They differ in that the HLP believes that the International Maritime Organisation is the best body to negotiate a new legal instrument, while the Advisory Board prefers the Law of the Sea Convention. The HLP is satisfied with continuing the PSI as a voluntary initiative, whereas the Advisory Board would prefer to develop it into a binding universal regime.

Compliance, Enforcement, and the Role of the United Nations

North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT has exposed how states can use the Article IV nuclear cooperation provision of the NPT to assemble everything they need for a nuclear weapon programme and then leave the Treaty using the withdrawal clause in Article X. The HLP dangerously appears to accept such behaviour as "within the letter but perhaps not the spirit of the Treaty" (§ 108). By contrast, the Advisory Board considers such a strategy bad faith and thus in violation of the treaty. It calls on the international community to develop mechanisms to determine whether bad faith has guided the behaviour of a withdrawing state and if so, to trigger a response, including sanctions. This is also the position of the IAEA Expert Group, which states that North Korea's behaviour is "unacceptable; a breach of good faith in Treaty law " (§ 19). For the non-proliferation regime it is essential that the North Korean example is clearly defined as illegal.

The HLP's call for an international response (§ 134) rests on much weaker grounds than if it had distinguished between legal and illegal modes of withdrawal, as the Advisory Board did. The HLP calls for the IAEA to determine immediately after the notification of withdrawal whether the withdrawing party is in good standing with its obligations under the NPT; if necessary, the Security Council should mandate such action. The IAEA is then required to end technical assistance immediately - a relatively weak sanction.

The Advisory Board, in contrast, calls for a special conference of NPT States Parties as a first step. This idea is motivated by the consideration that the parties are the 'owners' of the Treaty and thus the ones immediately affected by an state's decision to withdraw; if the withdrawing state acted in bad faith, the parties' rights would be violated. With such a special conference (first proposed by the German government at the NPT PrepCom in 2004[10] ) compliance policy would gain a new, additional level of action, stronger than current procedures but less highly-charged than the arena of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII.

As far as treaty enforcement is concerned, the HLP has no explicit section dealing with that subject, in keeping with its somewhat dismissive attitude towards the existing regimes. It addresses the issue more implicitly in its general considerations about the use of force in the framework of collective security (Part III). The HLP maintains correctly that the acquisition of WMD by an aggressive actor might necessitate a preemptive use of military force (§ 189). The respective considerations must be conducted according to the same set of standards as other uses of force: seriousness of threat; proper purpose (that is, undistorted by vested national interests); force as last resort after exhaustion of all alternatives; proportional means; balance of consequences - in other words, the cure must not be worse than the disease (§207).

The proposals by the Advisory Board complement the HLP's considerations, but are guided by a conceptual emphasis on the existing regimes. They highlight the pivotal role of the Security Council as ultimate guarantor of the regimes, for example, if the procedures available within the regime context - the first line of defence - have been fully used but did not succeed in settling the issue. The level and nature of Security Council response would need to be dependent on the gravity of the threat. In order to conduct as objective a threat assessment as possible, the Advisory Board holds that the Security Council needs its own technical expertise.

In the same vein, the HLP had proposed having the directors general of the IAEA and OPCW brief the Security Council twice annually, in a formal session, including about events and findings they view as suspect even in cases where their respective organisations have not yet determined that a definite violation of treaty obligations has occurred. This could be problematic however, since the secretariats of the organisations are responsible to their membership and have no authority to pass on information outside of established procedures and without the assent of the decision-making bodies. Such restrictions apply all the more for information that has a standing of no more than a speculation by the secretariat. To avoid such a contradiction, it might be better to continue with the present practice of informal briefings twice a year, in which it is precisely the informal character of the briefings that permits greater openness.

Since the BWC did not establish an implementing organisation when it was agreed in 1972 and in view of the difficulties surrounding negotiations on an additional protocol, the HLP proposes that the Security Council falls back on the list of experts which the Secretary General holds for investigations pursuant to his functions with regard to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. However, this list is outdated and a mere ad-hoc arrangement. It is not an appropriate substitute for a full-fledged organisation directing a corps of experienced and well-trained inspectors. It is for this reason that the Advisory Board has proposed that there should be a more permanent institution of experts on threat assessment and verification, directly under the auspices of the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the UN Secretariat. The idea envisages a small but functioning body with emphasis on biological weapons; for nuclear and chemical weapons, this unit would have a mere liaison function with the IAEA and the OPCW with which the threat assessment and verification work would primarily rest. This expertise would be available to the Security Council, to the Secretary General for his mission related to the Geneva Protocol and would provide more coordinated expertise when there is a suspicion of the use of chemical or biological weapons. Moreover, the General Assembly could also request the unit's advice. The Advisory Board's proposal reflects the belief of the majority of its members that the Iraqi experiences necessitate such a UN-specific expertise, because the intelligence information supplied by member states may be politically distorted and thus not a reliable basis for Security Council decision-making.

In a further difference, the Advisory Board addresses the misgivings caused by UNSC Resolution 1540 among numerous member states, while the HLP supports it without reservation. Among the concerns are that the resolution is an attempt in universal legislation, which is a deviation from what most countries see as the scope of Chapter VII of the Charter, the authority of the Security Council to address authoritatively and with mandatory consequences specific situations relating to acute threats to international peace and security. UNSCR 1540 obliges all UN member states to adopt legislation and export regulations with a view to prevent the access of terrorists to WMD and related materials. The Advisory Board recognises that the Security Council had to fill a yawning gap in existing rules to cope with a serious, emerging threat, and that the normal way - negotiations among states to conclude a legal instrument - would have taken too long. The Advisory Board recommends, however, putting a sunset clause on all resolutions with a universally legislative character; this would force the Security Council, at the end of the specified period, to consider the efficiency and effectiveness of the measure, and decide whether it was still needed. If the conclusion is positive, the Security Council must adopt the resolution anew, with a new expiration date. In addition, the Advisory Board asks for comprehensive consultations in advance of the adoption of any such resolution, and suggests installing a negotiating body to transform its content into a regular international binding instrument.

Conclusion

The HLP clearly carries more political weight than the report of the Advisory Board. Regrettably, its lack of specialised expertise in the field of disarmament shows in the overall weakness of these parts. Its tilt in favour of the Security Council, visible also in other parts of the report, is particularly detrimental in relation to its sections on WMD, which not only disadvantage the General Assembly, but also devalue the treaty regimes. These regimes, however, have been remarkably successful and are the decisive wall of defence against the spread of WMD. Their relative weaknesses must be repaired through internal reforms and supplementary measures, not through transferring competences to the Security Council. That the HLP is so reticent about the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapon states is a missed opportunity, like its meagre harvest of ideas on small arms and landmines.

In this regard, the contribution from the Advisory Board is a welcome correction and complement to the HLP report, especially with regard to its series of recommendations aimed at strengthening the regimes and defining the interface between the regimes and the Security Council more comprehensively. The IAEA Expert Group study, finally, recalls strongly that the problems of nuclear proliferation cannot be healed by imposing ever new obligations and constraints on the non-nuclear weapon states without commensurate compliance efforts by the nuclear 'haves' and the de facto nuclear weapons possessors outside of the NPT.

Notes

[1] Michael E. Brown et al, New Global Dangers. Changing Dimensions of International Security, MIT Press (Cambridge, Mass., 2004)

[2] Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter (with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, Fred L. Wehling), The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Monterey, MIIS Center for Nonproliferation Studies 2004

[3] "A more secure world: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change", United Nations (New York, 2004)

[4] "Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and the role of the United Nations: an evaluation." Contribution of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs Occasional Paper 8, 2004

[5] Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wien, IAEA, INFCIRC/640, 2005

[6] Rebecca Johnson, "Incentives, Obligations and Enforcement: Does the NPT Meet Its States Parties Needs", in Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 70, (April/May 2003), pp. 3-10

[7] cf.. Ferguson/Potter, op. cit.

[8] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons. From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, Columbia University Press, (New York, 2005)

[9] Michael Sheehan, International Security, Lynne Rienner (London, 2005)

[10] "Strengthening the NPT against withdrawal and non-compliance", Working paper submitted by Germany. NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/ WP.15, April 29, 2004

Professor Harald Müller is executive director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany, and Professor of International Relations at Frankfurt University. He served as Chair of the UNSG's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in 2004 and was a member of the IAEA Expert Group.