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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 54, February 2001

Bush Administration Pushes NMD, Orders Nuclear Review


The Bush administration devoted considerable time and energy during its first weeks in power to the related issues of US nuclear weapons and a national missile defence (NMD) system. On January 26, the President repeated his desire to oversee both NMD deployment and a reduction in US nuclear weapons: "I think it's important for us, commensurate with our ability to keep the peace, to reduce our nuclear weapons on our own, and I'm going to fulfil that campaign promise. We'll see how that affects possible arms talks. ... I want America to lead the world toward a more safe world when it comes to nuclear weaponry. On the offensive side we can do so, and we can do so on the defensive side as well." The same day, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters that the "President has not been ambivalent about" NMD: "He intends to deploy."

On February 9, the President ordered Rumsfeld to conduct a "top-to-bottom" review of the US military, including a study of possible reductions in the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. According to an unnamed senior administration official:

"The review, I understand, could be a step toward a new strategic doctrine. We would balance strong defence with a smaller nuclear offense - unlike the massive number of warheads during the Cold War. ... You now have to manage the transition from the old world to the new world. And the new world, once we get there, would be one in which defence forces play an important role in keeping the peace, in which you have offensive forces that are properly sized and configured to deal with the new deterrent tasks, rather than the deterrent tasks of 1972. ... The effort now is going to be to get a coherent policy that ties these pieces together so you can talk to allies and to the Russians and to others, conceptually, about the new nuclear environment."

In addition to the Rumsfeld study, a Congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is scheduled to begin this spring. Pending the conclusion of the NPR, current Congressional law prohibits the administration from unilaterally reducing US deployed nuclear warheads below the 6,000 maximum specified in the US-Russia START I Treaty. During his election campaign, Governor Bush discussed the possibility of reductions to as low as 1,500 warheads - a target also preferred by Russia for any START III accord. The Clinton administration's START III target was 2,000-2,500 warheads, a figure rooted in the last NPR, conducted in 1994. Following the February 9 announcement, most media reports spoke of the possibility of unilateral US reductions to the 2,000-2,500 warhead range, although some accounts referred to the prospect of reductions below the 2,000 mark. According to Secretary of State Powell (February 9), the final figure will depend on the elaboration of "an overall strategic framework that involves offensive nuclear weapons, our non-proliferation efforts, and defensive systems, both of [a] theatre missile defence nature and [a] national missile defence nature..."

US NMD plans have incurred the opposition both of anti-nuclear activists and those who worry it marks a break from traditional deterrence. The Bush administration is seeking to reassure the latter group that their fears are groundless. As Secretary of State Powell told reporters on February 9:

"We think [NMD] is, at the end of the day, stabilising, that it is a part of an overall deterrent system, and that it will strengthen deterrence. And so the President is fully committed to move in this direction, but we will do it in a deliberate way, examining technology to make sure it works, understanding the arms control and diplomatic considerations that must be taken into account to do this in a way that will reassure the world that this adds to deterrence. ... Humility can coexist with principle. Our principle and our belief is that this adds to deterrence. ... And we are going to consult with our allies to hear their concerns, but we are not going to get knocked off the track of moving in this direction as long as the technology points us in that direction."

Powell's remarks highlight an obvious diplomatic difficulty for the new administration: how to hold genuine consultations about a programme you are determined not to be dissuaded from implementing by anything other than technical considerations. In a television interview on February 4, Powell directly addressed this point:

"Question (Sam Donaldson, ABC TV): 'Will you scrap the ABM Treaty, if necessary?'

Powell: '[W]e are committed to go forward with missile defence because we think it is in our national interest, and we think it is in the interest of our allies and the interest of the world. And at some point we will bump up against the limits of the ABM Treaty. At that time, we will have to negotiate with the Russians what modifications might be appropriate, and we have to hold out the possibility that it may be necessary to leave that treaty if it is no longer serving our purposes, or if it is not something that we can accommodate our programmes within. But it's not something that is going to happen without full consultation with our friends and allies and full consultation with the Russians and, beyond that, full consultation with other nations that have an interest in this, in Asia, Japan, Korea and China.'

Question: 'Well, does full consultation simply mean informing them at some point?'

Powell: 'No, no, no.'

Question: 'Because our allies oppose it, China opposes it, Russia opposes it. If we find the world is basically against this, would we then have, in the words of the famous phrase, "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind"?'

Powell: 'We will have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, and full consultation means that. It doesn't mean we dictate to anybody. ... We believe that theatre missile defence and national missile defence is in our interest, and in the interest of our allies in the world. And in these consultations, we hope to persuade them of that.'"

For the last eighteen months, Russia has been proposing an alternative, multilateral framework for addressing the issue of missile proliferation - a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies (GCS). As is clear from the following Foreign Ministry Statement, Russia is assiduously coordinating detailed and extensive discussions on the possible parameters and substance of such a system:

"On February 15, 2001, the second international working meeting of experts on the problem of creating a Global Control System...was held in Moscow. Representatives of more than 70 countries, and of the United Nations, took part. ... The GCS idea was put forward by Russia in June of 1999 as a complex of politico-diplomatic measures aimed at countering the origination of missile threats in the world, oriented to the creation of conditions which would be conducive to weakening the motives for [acquiring and spreading] missile rocket technologies, and targeted for the creation in the long term of a comprehensive missile non-proliferation regime. The GCS concept, among other things, envisages the creation of such multilateral mechanism as: a mechanism for notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and of space carrier rockets; a mechanism for stimulating and encouraging states which renounce possession of rocket means for WMD delivery; a mechanism for providing security guarantees to such states; an international consultations mechanism for resolving unclear and disputable questions and for the further improvement of GCS; and a mechanism for ensuring openness in the field of space carrier rocket programmes."

The statement continues enthusiastically: "All these and other ideas...were the subject of consideration at the meeting, which bore a working and informal character, with a free-wheeling discussion and a broad exchange of opinions. The participation in GCS-2 of the representatives of practically all states members of the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] and of the PRC [People's Republic of China], India, Iran, the DPRK [North Korea], Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea and other influential states, gave special relevance to the discussions... The second meeting of experts has demonstrated the world community's mounting support of the GCS idea, of a line for resolving the issues of missile non-proliferation not by military, but primarily by politico-diplomatic and economic methods. ... Meetings of experts on [the] GCS will continue."

Note: in Moscow on February 20, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev delivered a nine-page, confidential paper entitled 'Phases of European Missile Defence' to visiting NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson. The 'Euroshield' plan reportedly sketches out options for a limited, mobile defence system designed to protect portions of European territory against tactical missiles. See Documents & Sources, and News Review in the next issue, for further details and reaction.

Statements and Comment


President-Elect Bush. January 18: "Russia needs to know that development of a defensive system is not aimed to create a world in which we're the sole power. It's aimed to create a stable world so no one can point a weapon at us, our friends, or Russia herself... I want to make the case to Mr. Putin himself. And I don't know when that's going to be..."

Note: on January 25, the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the appearance in numerous Western media reports of an "outright forgery" of a letter from President Putin to President Bush purportedly "setting out Moscow's 'secret approaches' to START-ABM problems, including 'proposals' for talks to modify the ABM Treaty". The Ministry's statement continued: "Subsequent press explanations that those items were but a 'joke' only confirm the irresponsibility of their authors, provoking the international community exactly when there exists a serious worldwide concern over the real possibility that global strategic stability might be disrupted."

President Bush, speech on the NATO Alliance at Allied Command Atlantic Headquarters, Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia, February 13: "The defences we build must defend us all... From the Command Centre here, I had a glimpse of future threats and of the technology that will be used to meet them... It's pretty exciting technology we're using and it's only going to get better. ... With advanced technology, we must confront the threats that come on a missile..."

Secretary of State Powell, television interview, February 11: "We've got to keep moving forward. ... If we can make it work, then we can demonstrate, I'm convinced, to everybody, our European friends, the Russians and the Chinese, friends around the world, that it is in their interest for us to go forward with this kind of protective technology which threatens no one. The only thing it does is [it] shoots down missiles that are headed toward them and us."

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Munich Security Conference, February 3: "No US President can responsibly say that his defence policy is calculated and designed to leave the American people undefended against threats that are known to exist. And they are there, the threats. Let there be no doubt. A system of defence need not be perfect; but the American people must not be left completely defenceless. It is not so much a technical question as a matter of the President's constitutional responsibility. Indeed, it is, in many respects, as Dr. Kissinger has said, a moral issue. Therefore, the United States intends to develop and deploy a missile defence designed to defend our people and forces against a limited ballistic missile attack, and is prepared to assist friends and allies threatened by missile attack to deploy such defences. ... Let me be clear to our friends in Europe here: we will consult with you. The United States has no interest in deploying defences that would separate us from our friends and allies. .... Far from being a divisive issue, we see this as a new opportunity for a collective approach to enhancing security for us all."

Senator Joseph Lieberman (Democrat), Munich, February 4: "The chance that a hostile nation may acquire weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them is a threat to our homeland in America, but it is also a threat to Russia's homeland and to Europe's. ... [W]e and you, our allies in Europe, and our friends in Russia, should work together to build defences. ... The ABM Treaty was an expression of a bipolar world. We are today in a multi-polar world, and therefore need new documents suited for a multi-polar world..."

Senator John McCain (Republican), Munich Security Conference, February 3: "[T]he institutionalisation of a situation where the United States spends hundreds of billions of dollars to defend against terrorism, armed invasion, and air strikes by manned aircraft, yet leaves us vulnerable to missiles armed with nuclear warheads, is simply no longer tenable. The action-reaction arms race phenomenon that justified the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty cannot continue to provide the basis of our approach to one of the most serious threats to the territory of the United States. Deterrence against missile strikes can fail. Defeated adversaries do strike out irrationally with the most destructive means at their proposal."

Senator Thad Cochran (Republican), February 15: "The Australian Foreign Minister [Alexander Downer] noted last week that until now, a lot of the debate has been directed at the United States. I frankly think an awful lot of the debate should instead be directed not only toward those countries that have got or are developing these missile systems but the countries that have been transferring that missile technology to others. ... If there were no missiles, there would be no need for a missile defence system."

Note: on February 16, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticising Australia's stance on the NMD issue. The statement noted: "The reports that have appeared in media concerning the support by Australia for [US] national missile defence plans arouse regret and concern. We have repeatedly pointed out that the deployment of a national missile defence system, and the destruction, as a consequence, of the ABM Treaty, would have the most perilous consequences for international security. In today's interdependent world, even the geographical remoteness of Australia will not save it from the adverse consequences of the undermining of strategic stability and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

Samuel R. Berger, National Security Advisor under President Clinton, 'Is This Shield Necessary?', The Washington Post, February 13: "In the first weeks of the Bush administration, national missile defence has risen to the top of the national security agenda. Having wrestled with this issue over the last years of the Clinton administration, I believe it would be a mistake to proceed pell-mell with missile defence deployment as though all legitimate questions about the system had been answered. They have not. ...Without question we need to broaden America's defences against weapons of mass destruction. But plunging ahead with missile defence deployment before critical questions are answered is looking through the telescope from the wrong end: from the perspective of bureaucratically driven technology rather than that of the greatest vulnerabilities of the American people. ...The ultimate question is whether Americans will be more secure with or without a national missile defence. The answer is not self-evident. We can't build the system that is farthest along in development - a land-based one - without cooperation from our allies. Their misgivings derive in significant part from the prospect of abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia; that could unravel the global arms control and non-proliferation system. ... Of course, no other country can ever have a veto over decisions we must take to protect our national security. But in making that judgment, we must understand that the basic logic of the ABM has not been repealed - that if either side has a defensive system the other believes can neutralise its offensive capabilities, mutual deterrence is undermined and the world is a less safe place."

Report from the Nixon Center policy group, February 15: "To the extent that the US has the technology, the money, and the domestic political will, it should be prepared to deploy NMD regardless of Russia's views... [Currently, however,] there is no reason to create a diplomatic crisis..."


President Putin, speech to Russian Foreign Ministry officials, January 26: "We have ratified the START II Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. ... Now we are expecting reciprocal moves, and I don't think that an overwhelming majority of participants in [the] international [community]...are interested in [seeing the] unilateral disarmament of Russia."

Defence Minster General Igor Sergeyev, February 6: "We had three mighty programmes to asymmetrically counter US national missile defences during Reagan's 'Star Wars'... We still have them and can take them up again... The Americans may regard these [NMD] systems as unique, but we do not share their opinion. These are really complex technologies, but complex technologies, as a rule, are not reliable... [NMD] will trigger a new spiral in the arms race and ruin the existing system of arms control..."

Sergei Ivanov, Security of the Presidential Security Council, Munich Security Conference, February 4: "[T]he destruction of the ABM Treaty, we are quite confident, will result in the annihilation of the whole sphere of strategic stability and create prerequisites for a new arms race - including one in outer space... If the ABM Treaty is maintained, Russia is ready for radical cuts with the United States in strategic offensive weapons to as low as 1,500 and even lower than this level... Restraining the so-called 'rogue' nations - to use the American terminology - may be carried out more effectively, from the point of view of both expense and consequences, by means of a common political effort... The situation in North Korea is the obvious example because the situation a year ago seemed much worse than today."

Ambassador Yuriy Kapralov, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Rome, January 19: "The deployment of NMD would result in undermining strategic stability and [in] a sharp increase in uncertainty and unpredictability. For the military it would mean heightened alert and readiness (who dreamed of dealerting and greater transparency at a recent NPT Review Conference?); for populations it would mean a much greater risk of serious accidents and use of nuclear weapons. Among other things, it would turn upside down the present correlation of offensive and defensive strategic arms, nullify the tested and proved effective 'rules of the game', [and] greatly complicate and toughen conditions of functioning for strategic forces' command-and-control centres."

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Defence Ministry's International Affairs Department, February 16: "Talk of the need to deploy a national missile defence system to counter intercontinental ballistic missile strikes from North Korea, Iran and Iraq is pure invention, and nobody in the world believes these tales."

First Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Valery Manilov, February 12: "Even a minimal modernisation of ABM emasculates it and destroys the system ensuring the balance of strategic weapons..."


NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, following a meeting with European Union officials, February 6: "I think people wanted to find a split between America and Europe on the issue of missile defence... The United States has made it clear that it intends to deploy some effective missile defence system and there has to be an acceptance that that was the decision made in the election campaign and we should treat it seriously and with respect..."

European Union Foreign Policy Envoy Javier Solana, Washington, February 5: "Of course, the United States has a perfect right to deploy NMD. The problem...is [that] this decision has consequences far beyond [the US]... [As for the ABM Treaty,] it's not a Bible..."

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, interview with Forbes magazine, February 15: "This [issue] is definitely in the box marked 'handle with care' on all sides... It is a very sensitive issue... My own judgment is that provided we handle it with care, there is a way through which meets America's objectives and other people's concerns... I understand totally America's desire to make sure that its people are properly protected. I also understand the concerns people have about the ABM Treaty and the desire to protect it..."

British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, press conference with Secretary of State Powell, Washington, February 6: "On the issue of consultation, yes, I'm absolutely confident that we will be consulted as the review of national missile defence moves forward. I have been assured there will be consultation, and the whole point of my being here is to establish a basis for frank, open dialogue of mutual trust between us. I mean, try stopping us from consulting each other..."

Robin Cook, British Embassy in Washington, February 7: "It should be possible to persuade Russia that this is not in any way destabilising to Russia and should go ahead on the basis of an accommodation with Russia... Nobody I met yesterday [members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees] argued for the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty... [Extending missile defence to Europe] is a potential angle to the dialogue...but at the same time I would not exaggerate the extent to which there is current interest in Europe in such protection... That reflects the fact that we're an awful lot further away from North Korea..."

Robin Cook, television interview, February 18: "[Participating in NMD] would have a big opportunity-cost on other things that we spend our current defence budget on. So at the moment there is no proposal that we should buy into it. And I'm very conscious of the importance of the other priorities in our defence budget... There are a lot of unresolved questions to be answered, of which perhaps the most critical is how the United States can take this forward in terms of its own relationship with Russia. ... It is very important that whatever is done reduces tension, reduces the sense of insecurity in the United States [and] does not increase tension with Russia..."

Retiring British Chief of Defence Staff Sir Charles Guthrie, February 15: "The thing that really worries me [about NMD] is that if the Russians become more nationalistic...[and] the Europeans and the Americans take a different view, then there would almost be a wedge put between us... It is extremely important that the Americans talk to the Europeans, the Russians and the Chinese. They have got to have a dialogue... The Americans are going to have an NMD [one day, even though it will be] bloody expensive and extremely difficult to use. ... I don't know whether we are under the umbrella, whether the Europeans will be, whether the Russians will be..."

Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Shanghai, February 14: "[President Bush] recognises that he has some communication and exchange to have with all the NATO partners, and with the Russians and with the Chinese [on NMD]... [He] has agreed that he wants a lot of discussion to occur. ...[T]he technology is not quite ready, but he thinks that he has a very good case."

Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley, House of Commons, February 14: "[I]t is appropriate to give the United States, as it has asked us to do, the time to define the project that is being described as national missile defence...and the time to take up what its plans are not only with its allies but with the Russians and the Chinese. It has recognised with us that it is overall global security that we want to achieve, not just continental security."

Canadian Senator Douglas Roche, February 8: "[D]oes Canada want a new nuclear arms race? Does Canada want the carefully built structure of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties now to collapse? Does Canada want the unity of NATO to be shattered? Of course, the answer top these questions is a resounding 'no', but the development and deployment of a national missile defence system by the United States will produce these unfortunate results."

French President Jacques Chirac, January 29: "Our concern is that, in our opinion, NMD cannot fail to re-launch the arms race in the world..."

French Defence Minister Alain Richard, Moscow, January 18: "We want to let the new US administration define and clarify its position... Our position is in favour of a stable system of arms control and the ABM Treaty is an important element [in that]... I told the Russian authorities that we were very interested in pursuing dialogue with them on this matter as soon as the project envisaged by the US administration is made clear. I also indicated to the Russians that we were interested in, as an element for reflection, the principle of a system of defence against non-strategic missiles in Europe as set down by President Putin..."

General Jean-Pierre Kelche, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, February 9: "I don't think this [NMD] is the right road. This is what I call the road of pessimism, the road of abandonment of non-proliferation, which was at the heart of our common policy, the policy of the international community."

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, January 26: "Differences over NMD cannot be the decisive factor in the German-American relationship."

Gerhard Schroeder, Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 3: "Within NATO...we must discuss what impact feasible implementation of this system would have, on the one hand on relations with China, and on the other hand relations with Russia..."

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Munich Security Conference, February 3: "New arms races must be avoided and further disarmament steps introduced. The tight net of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be retained, strengthened and built up..."

Joschka Fischer, Moscow, February 13: "It is [in] our substantial interest that [the] two major powers discuss all the issues related to possible NMD implementation...in a climate of cooperation, not confrontation.... We were therefore very happy here to note such a constructive approach...to all aspects of anti-missile defences... In the end, I think Russia will accept negotiations..."

German Defence Minister Rudolph Scharping, January 30: "[Germany has] a strong interest in maintaining and [seeing the US and Russia] observing the [ABM] treaty... We must not endanger the international security architecture of arms control and disarmament..."

Chun Yong-taik, Chair of the Defence Committee, South Korean National Assembly, January 29: "The [US NMD] plan is technically non-viable and politically undesirable. The only solution to North Korea's missile programme is a political solution."

Norwegian Defence Minister Bjorn Tore Godal, February 9: "We still support the ABM Treaty and we are concerned about the potential negative effects of a decision to deploy NMD..."

Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, February 8: "We call on the USA to consider the consequences for disarmament and non-proliferation of developing a national missile defence system, and to refrain from pursuing this project..."

Reports: Bush won't intervene in Calif. Crisis, Associated Press, January 18; French minister interested in Russian missile plan, Reuters, January 18; Effects of National Missile Defense on Arms Control and Strategic Stability - paper presented by Ambassador Yuriy Kapralov, Rome, January 19, text available from the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies (Moscow),

http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/publications/kapralov020601.htm; Putin writes to Bush, wants better US-Russia ties, Reuters, January 24; In connection with some foreign media publications on Russia's START-ABM position, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 118-25-01-2001, January 25; Bush confirms 'Star Wars' plan, BBC News Online, January 26; Schroeder discusses US relations, Associated Press, January 26; Remarks by President Putin of the Russian Federation, January 26, 2001, Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry text; Chirac sees US plan triggering arms race, Reuters, January 29; Seoul remains concerned about NMD, Korean Times, January 29; Russia worried about NATO expansion, Associated Press, January 30; Munich Conference on Security Policy, remarks of Senator John McCain, February 3, US Diplomatic Mission (Munich) text; Munich Conference on Security Policy, remarks of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, February 3, US Diplomatic Mission (Munich) text, http://www.usconsolate.de; Munich Conference on Security Policy, remarks of Senator Joseph Lieberman, February 4, US Diplomatic Mission (Munich) text; Suspicions among NATO allies out in open, Reuters, February 3; Rumsfeld assures Russia over arms, Associated Press, February 3; Russia says US missile plan risks space arms race, Reuters, February 4; Russian warns US on arms race, Associated Press, February 4; Solana - US needs tutoring on Euro defense, Reuters, February 5; Interview of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on ABC's 'This Week', US State Department, Office of the Spokesman, February 5; Biden zings Bush defense policy, Associated Press, February 6; Russia dismisses US missile plan, Associated Press, February 6; Joint press availability with British Foreign Minister Robin Cook and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, US Department of State, Department of the Spokesman, February 6; Cook urges US to talk to Russia on defense shield, Reuters, February 7; British leader pushes defense talks, Associated Press, February 7; Extracts from Debate in the Canadian Senate, 1st Session, 37th Parliament, Hansard, vol. 139, Issue 6, February 8; Sweden urges US to abandon NMD, Nordic Business Report, February 8; Bush takes first step to shrink arsenal of nuclear warheads, New York Times, February 9; Bush to review nuclear arsenal, Associated Press, February 9; Europe unhappy with US missile plan, Associated Press, February 9; On-the-record briefing by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, February 9, 2001, US State Department text; Bush plans review of US nuclear arsenal - official, Reuters, February 9; Transcript - Secretary of State Powell on CBS-TV's 'Face the Nation' Feb. 11, US State Department (Washington File), February 12; Germany's Fischer meets Putin to end Moscow visit, Reuters, February 12; Russia pledges 'constructive' approach on missiles, Reuters, February 12; Germans urge US, Russia talks, Associated Press, February 13; Is this shield necessary? By Samuel R. Berger, Washington Post, February 13; Bush vows cooperation with NATO on missile defense, Reuters, February 13; Extracts from Debate in Canadian House of Commons, February 14; German sees Russia bending on missiles, New York Times, February 14; Bush seeks missile shield dialogue with China, Reuters, February 14; On the outcome of the second Global Control System experts' international working meeting, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 250-15-02-2001, February 15; Transcript - Senator stresses need for missile defense system, US State Department (Washington File), February 15; Group advises Bush on nuke defense, Associated Press, February 15; UK military warns against rushing missile plans, Reuters, February 15; Blair offers some support on shield, Associated Press, February 16; In connection with media reports of Australia's support for NMD plans, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 253-16-02-2001, February 16; US plans for missiles 'rubbish,' Financial Times, February 17; Britain has no plans to buy into US missile shield, Reuters, February 18; Russia proposes Euro missile shield, BBC News Online, February 20; Global responses to national missile defense - key international leaders voice concerns, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Issue Brief, Volume 5, Number 3, February 20; Moscow signalling a change in tone on missile defense, New York Times, February 22.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.