Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 40, September - October 1999
US National Defense Authorization Act: Statement by the President"Statement by the President", The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 5, 1999.
"Today I have signed into law S. 1059, the 'National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.' This Act authorizes FY 2000 appropriations for military activities of the Department of Defense, military construction, and defense activities of the Department of Energy. Although I have serious reservations about some portions of this Act, I believe S. 1059 provides for a strong national defense, maintains our military readiness, and supports our deep commitment to a better quality of life for our military personnel and their families. ...
I am pleased with the Act's support for missile defense capabilities. The Act authorizes important funding for both theater and national missile defense. I am particularly pleased that the Act authorizes full funding for the Medium Extended Air Defense System [MEADS] cooperative program with Germany and Italy, authorizes funding for national missile defense military construction planning and design, and helps fix cost growth problems in the Patriot Advance Capability-3 and Navy Area Defense programs. The Act's requirement to develop Theater High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD] and Navy Theater Wide systems concurrently is being taken into account in the Department's review of its acquisition strategy for these upper-tier programs.
Although I believe most provisions of the Act...are beneficial and support a strong national defense, I have strong reservations about a number of provisions of S. 1059.
The most troubling features of the Act involve the reorganization of the nuclear defense functions within the Department of Energy. The original reorganization plan adopted by the Senate reflected a constructive effort to strengthen the effectiveness and security of the activities of the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories. Unfortunately, the success of this effort is jeopardized by changes that emerged from the conference, which altered the final product, making it weaker in enhancing national security. Particularly objectionable are features of the legislative charter of the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) that purport to isolate personnel and contractors of the NNSA from outside direction, and limit the Secretary's ability to employ his authorities to direct - both personally and through subordinates of his own choosing - the activities and personnel of the NNSA. Unaddressed, these deficiencies of the Act would impair effective health and safety oversight and program direction of the Department's nuclear defense complex.
Other provisions of S. 1059 have been faulted by the Attorneys General of over 40 States as placing in question the established duty of the Department of Energy's nuclear defense complex to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of environmental laws. Moreover, the Act removes from the Secretary his direct authority over certain extremely sensitive classified programs specified in the Atomic Energy Act, and establishes in the NNSA separate support functions - such as contracting, personnel, public affairs, and legal - that are redundant with those now within the Department. This redundancy even extends to the counterintelligence office reporting directly to the Secretary that was established in accordance with my Presidential Decision Directive 61, and which was designed to be the single authoritative source of counter-intelligence guidance throughout the Department. The Act establishes a companion counterintelligence entity within the NNSA, compounding simple redundancy with the blurring of lines of authority that can too readily result because the NNSA is largely immunized from outside direction within the Department.
Experience teaches that these are not abstract deficiencies. As the Hoover Commission concluded half a century ago, the accountability of a Cabinet Department head is not complete without the legal authority to meet the legal responsibilities for which that person is accountable. The Act's provisions summarized above skew that authority. These provisions blur the clear and unambiguous lines of authority intended by Presidential Decision Directive 61, and impair the Secretary of Energy's ability to assure compliance at all levels within the Department of Energy with instructions he may receive in meeting his national defense responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act.
The responsibilities placed by S. 1059 in the National Nuclear Security Administration potentially are of the most significant breadth, and the extent of the Secretary of Energy's authority with respect to those responsibilities is placed in doubt by various provisions of the Act. Therefore, by this Statement I direct and state the following:
I am concerned with the tone and language of a number of provisions of S. 1059 relating to China, which could be detrimental to our interests.
China is undergoing a profoundly important but uncertain process of change, and I believe we must work for the best possible outcome, even as we prepare for any outcome. The Act's provision requiring annual reports on Chinese military power, similar to those previously produced on Soviet military power, assumes an outcome that is far from foreordained - that China is bent on becoming a military threat to the United States. I believe we should not make it more likely that China will choose this path by acting as if the decision has already been made. The provision establishing the Center for Study of Chinese Military Affairs is troubling for the same reason. The Secretary of Defense will ensure that the Center is held to the highest standards of scholarship and impartiality and that it explores a wide range of perspectives on the Chinese military.
Our long-term strategy must be to encourage China to grow into a more prosperous and open society; to integrate China into the institutions that promote global norms on proliferation, trade, the environment, and human rights; to cooperate where we agree, even as we defend our interests and values with realism and candor where we do not. ... I intend to implement the China provisions of the bill in a manner consistent with this policy, including, where appropriate, combining several of the reporting requirements.
Further, I am disappointed that S. 1059 contains damaging restrictions on our threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. Since 1992, these programs have helped to deactivate almost 5,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union; eliminate nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and materials at over 100 sites in the region; tighten export controls and detect illicit trafficking; engage over 30,000 former weapons scientists in civilian research; and purchase hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian weapons.
Restrictions on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and new certification requirements on the Nuclear Cities Initiative threaten to slow the pace of Russian disarmament, which is contrary to our national interests. I urge that future appropriations for the Nuclear Cities Initiative not be conditioned on this certification. I also urge the Congress to reverse its current ban on chemical weapons destruction assistance to Russia.
In order to avoid any confusion among our allies or elsewhere regarding the new NATO Strategic Concept, I feel compelled to make clear that the document is a political, not a legal, document. As such, the Strategic Concept does not create any new commitment or obligation within my under-standing of section 1221(a) of the Act, and therefore, will not be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. ...".
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.