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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 27, June 1998

India & Pakistan Nuclear Tests: Continuing Developments & Reaction

Editor's note: please see the web-site of The Acronym Institute - http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym - for a Special Feature, updated regularly, on the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

G8 Communiqué, 12 June

'G8 Foreign Ministers Communiqué on Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests,' Lancaster House, London, 12 June 1998

Full text

"1. We, the Foreign Ministers of eight major industrialised democracies and the Representative of the European Commission, held a special meeting in London on 12 June 1998 to consider the serious global challenge posed by the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. Recalling the statement issued by our Heads of State or Government on 15 May, and emphasising the support of all of us for the communiqué issued by the P5 in Geneva on 4 June and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, we condemn the nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 May and 30 May. These tests have affected both countries' relationships with each of us, worsened rather than improved their security environment, damaged their prospects of achieving their goals of sustainable economic development, and run contrary to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

2. The negative impact of these tests on the international standing and ambitions of both countries will be serious and lasting. They will also have a serious negative impact on investor confidence. Both countries need to take positive actions directed towards defusing tension in the region and rejoining the international community's efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Urgent action is needed both to halt an arms race on the Sub-Continent, which would divert resources from urgent economic priorities, and to reduce tension, build confidence and encourage peaceful resolution of the differences between India and Pakistan, so that their peoples may face a better future.

3. With a view to halting the nuclear and missile arms race on the Sub-Continent, and taking note of the official statements of the Indian and Pakistani Governments that they wish to avoid such an arms race, we consider that India and Pakistan should immediately take the following steps, already endorsed by the United Nations Security Council:

  • stop all further nuclear tests and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force;
  • refrain from weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons and from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and enter into firm commitments not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles;
  • refrain from any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other States in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention with a view to reaching early agreement;
  • confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials and technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them, and undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.

We believe that such actions would be strongly in the interest of both countries.

4. With a view to reducing tension, building confidence and encouraging peaceful resolution of their differences through dialogue, India and Pakistan should:

  • undertake to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, including infiltrations or hot pursuit, or other provocative acts and statements;
  • discourage terrorist activity and any support for it;
  • implement fully the confidence- and security-building measures they have already agreed and develop further such measures;
  • resume without delay a direct dialogue that addresses the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, through such measures as early resumption of Foreign Secretary level talks, effective use of the hot-line between the two leaders, and realisation of a meeting between Prime Ministers on the occasion of the 10th SAARC Summit scheduled next month;
  • allow and encourage progress towards enhanced Indo-Pakistani economic cooperation, including through a free trade area in South Asia.

We encourage the development of a regional security dialogue.

5. We pledge actively to encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems and stand ready to assist India and Pakistan in pursuing any of these positive actions. Such assistance might be provided, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

6. The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan do not change the definition of a nuclear-weapon State in the NPT, and therefore, notwithstanding those tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the NPT. We continue to urge India and Pakistan to adhere to the NPT as it stands, without any conditions. We shall continue to apply firmly our respective policies to prevent the export of materials, equipment or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

7. It is our firm view that the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan reinforce the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non- proliferation regime and as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We all, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, reiterate our determination to fulfil the commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. These commitments were reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and included the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. We note the progress already made in this direction and welcome the firm intention both of the United States and of the Russian Federation to bring START II into force, and to negotiate and conclude a START III agreement at the earliest possible date. We also note contributions made by other nuclear-weapon States to the reductions process. We call upon all States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty rapidly to ensure its entry into force, and welcome the determination of the member governments of the G8 that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. We continue to look for the accession to the NPT of the remaining countries which are not yet parties to it.

8. We call on all the member States of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on the immediate opening of the Cut-Off negotiation at the CD.

9. Both India and Pakistan face enormous challenges in developing their economies and building prosperity. However, the recent nuclear tests have created an atmosphere of regional instability which will undermine the region's attractiveness to both foreign and domestic investment, damaging business confidence and the prospects for economic growth. The diversion of their resources to nuclear and other weapons programmes displaces more productive investment and weakens their ability to pursue sound economic policies. It calls into question the commitment of both governments to poverty reduction and undermines the regional cooperation between SAARC countries on social and economic issues. In line with the approach to development set out in the Naples, Lyon, Denver and Birmingham Communiqués, we call on both governments to reduce expenditure that undermines their objective of promoting sound economic policies that will benefit all members of society, especially the poorest, and to otherwise enhance cooperation in South Asia.

10. We believe it is important that India and Pakistan are aware of the strength of the international community's views on their recent tests and on these other subjects. Several among us have, on a unilateral basis, taken specific actions to underscore our strong concerns. All countries should act as they see fit to demonstrate their displeasure and address their concerns to India and Pakistan. We do not wish to punish the peoples of India or Pakistan as a result of actions by their governments, and we will therefore not oppose loans by international financial institutions to the two countries to meet basic human needs. We agree, however, to work for a postponement in consideration of other loans in the World Bank and other international financial institutions to India and Pakistan, and to any other country that will conduct nuclear tests.

11. We pledge to convey the common views of our Governments on these matters to those of India and Pakistan with a view to bringing about early and specific progress in the areas outlined above. We plan to keep developments under review and to continue the process of pursuing the goals on which we are all agreed."

Remarks by Japan

'Communiqué of the Group of Eight Foreign Ministers on the nuclear tests conducted by the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,' Press Conference of the Press Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 16 June 1998

"We believe that the outcome of the discussions in London was very positive. ... Let me just make a few comments on the meeting, focusing on some of the aspects that the Government of Japan attaches particular importance to. One of the things that Minister for Foreign Affairs Keizo Obuchi proposed to his G8 colleagues was the establishment of a Task Force which would look at specific ways to address the issue of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. We believe that the decision by the G8 Foreign Ministers to set up this Task Force in which some non-G8 governments will be participating, is very meaningful since it would help to maintain the momentum in the international community to continue efforts on this issue. Foreign Minister Obuchi also explained to his G8 colleagues our plans to host an Emergency Action Forum on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, another Japanese initiative that we have mentioned in previous press conferences. We believe that the Emergency Action Forum will be an important forum for looking at responses to this issue from a medium to long-term perspective. ..."

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Home Page http://www.mofa.go.jp

Reaction by India

'Statement by Official Spokesperson,' Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 13 June 1998

"We have seen the 'Communiqué' issued by the Foreign Ministers of the G-8 countries at their meeting held in London on 12 June, 1998. ... It is unfortunate that the G-8 statement ignores the positive gestures made by the Government of India in recent weeks. These include, inter alia, the institution of a moratorium on nuclear testing; our willingness to explore ways and means for de jure formalisation of this undertaking; readiness to engage in negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; maintenance and further development of strict export controls on nuclear related materials and technologies.

Further, India remains committed to developing a framework of peaceful relations with Pakistan through a broadbased and sustained bilateral dialogue. This provides an effective means of identifying the possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation and resolving outstanding issues through bilateral negotiations. It would also include consideration of CBMs [Confidence-Building Measures] such as our proposal for a no-first-use agreement. In this process of dialogue, there is no place for third party involvement of any kind whatsoever. These gestures reflect both our desire to further the cause of global disarmament and non-proliferation as well as our dedication to promoting peace and stability in the region. It is a matter of regret that the G-8 Foreign Ministers Joint Communiqué has not taken into account these proposals but has instead repeated unrealistic prescription, couched in the language of pressure.

India has been a responsible member of the international community and remains strongly committed to the objective disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular. However, we would like to make it clear that India's security concerns cannot be viewed in a narrow South Asian construct. Indeed, the pursuit of non proliferation in an arbitrary selective regional context remains the fundamental flaw in the global nuclear disarmament regime. The Government of India cannot consider any prescriptions which have the effect of undermining India's independent decision making. Like any sovereign nation, India will continue to take decisions in this regard on the basis of its own assessment and national security requirements.

The G-8 have professed an interest in the welfare and economic growth of the people of the region. These professions are inconsistent with the actions threatened in the Joint Communiqué.

Independent of the advice of those who claim to bear the responsibilities of the international community, the Government of India is autonomously embarked on a well-considered, comprehensive and purposeful programme meant to further genuine non-proliferation and global nuclear disarmament, and aimed at building confidence and cooperation in the region. Coercive and intrusive prescriptions are not only ill-advised but also counter-productive. Instead of offering homilies, the leading industrial economies should reflect seriously on the proposals made by India in recent weeks which offer a reasonable framework for dialogue in meeting our common concerns."

Source: Government of India web-site, http://www.indiagov.org

Security Council Resolution, 6 June

Security Council Resolution

Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted unanimously, 6 June 1998

Full text

"The Security Council,

Reaffirming the statements of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12) and of 29 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/l7),

Reiterating the statement of its President of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), which stated, inter alia, that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and stability in the region,

Deeply concerned at the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and determined to prevent such a race,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the successful outcome of that Conference,

Affirming the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and welcoming the determination of the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of that Treaty,

Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998;

2. Endorses the Joint Communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at their meeting; in Geneva on 4 June 1998 5/1998/473);

3. Demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

4. Urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;

5. Urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir;

6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage India and Pakistan to enter into dialogue;

7. Calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponisation or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard;

8. Encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering; such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect;

9. Expresses its grave concern at the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond;

10. Reaffirms its full commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament;

11. Expresses its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated and recalls that in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State;

12. Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;

13. Urges India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions;

14. Urges India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning; the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to reaching early agreement;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution;

16. Expresses its readiness to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present resolution;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."

Indian Response

'Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha regarding UN Security Council Resolution,' Statement by Prime Minister Vajpayee to Parliament, New Delhi, 8 June 1998

"We regret that the Security Council has acted in the manner in which it has and produced a Resolution which is completely unhelpful in respect of the objectives it seeks to address. The Resolution contains a number of references to nuclear non-proliferation. As I had mentioned in my earlier statement in the House, we are a responsible and committed member of the international community. The Resolution urges us not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosions. For India, such an urging is redundant because we have already instituted a voluntary moratorium. We have also indicated our willingness to explore ways and means of converting this undertaking into a de jure obligation. Further, we have made clear our readiness to engage in multilateral negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We cannot, however, be expected to commit ourselves in advance of these negotiations, to unilaterally restrain production of fissile materials. In keeping with our commitment to non-proliferation, we maintain the strictest controls over exports of nuclear materials and technologies. Our record in this regard has been impeccable and better than that of some countries who are parties to the NPT or members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or even Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

However, the call made in the Resolution that we should stop our nuclear programmes or missile programmes is unacceptable. Decisions in this regard will be taken by the Government on the basis of our own assessments and national security requirements, in a reasonable and responsible manner. This right, which we claim for ourselves is not something new; it is the right of every sovereign country, and a right that every Government in this country has strongly upheld for the last 50 years.

A glaring lacuna in the Resolution is the total absence of a recognition that the non proliferation issue is not a regional issue but has to be dealt with a non-discriminatory global context. We find it unfortunate that the UN Security Council Resolution does not reflect on the judgement of the highest international judicial body - the International Court of Justice, which has questioned the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and called for urgent negotiations for their elimination. In the paper on the Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy laid on the Table of this House, we have reiterated our commitment to nuclear disarmament. Let me categorically state that unlike other nuclear-weapon States who have sought to retain their exclusive hold over their nuclear arsenals, India has no such ambition. [The] Government is committed to initiatives that can open negotiations for a global convention for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The attempt to project the recent tests by India as a threat to peace and security is totally misguided and grossly out of focus. Such a portrayal of our policy ignores the positive steps announced by [the] Government to which I have already referred, both in the global disarmament framework and the regional context.

Our tests were necessary because of the failure of a flawed non-proliferation regime, and, therefore, we categorically reject the notion that these have adversely affected either regional or global security. [The] Government have indicated willingness to engage in a meaningful dialogue with key interlocutors on the whole range of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Last week, Special Envoy Shri Brajesh Mishra visited Paris and London in this regard. He had meetings at the most senior levels in the two capitals. Dialogues with other countries are also planned. These dialogues have to been seen as part of a process, a process that will lead to a better understanding of India's position.

...India has always desired a peaceful, friendly, and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan based on confidence and respect for each other's concerns. ... [A] secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. Our vision of our bilateral relationship is not confined to a resolution of outstanding issues, but is also directed to the future by seeking to build a stable structure of cooperation, which will benefit the people of both countries. As I wrote recently to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, we must not remain mired in the past, prisoners of old contentions. And I say to him today, let us put the past behind us, let us think of the welfare of our children and grandchildren.

We have remained committed to a path of direct bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. This reflects the nation's conviction and confidence that it is only through direct discussions in a sustained and constructive manner that we can move ahead in our bilateral relationship. I would again like to reiterate our desire for the earliest resumption of the official talks with Pakistan. The subject for discussions, including peace and security (along with confidence building measures), Jammu & Kashmir, economic and commercial cooperation and cross-border terrorism have been identified. Our proposals for the modalities of these talks have been with Pakistan since January this year. We await their response. We have also made it clear once again that there is no place for outside involvement of any nature whatsoever in our dialogue process with Pakistan.

Honourable Members have expressed strong reservations against attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue. There is simply no question of India ever agreeing to such internationalism. [The] UN Security Council has chosen to mention Kashmir in its Resolution. This is unacceptable and does not change the reality that the State of Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union. I would also like to draw...attention...to the terms in which Kashmir finds mention in the resolution. The UN Security Council has recognised that bilateral dialogue has to be the basis of India-Pakistan relations and mutually acceptable solutions have to be found for outstanding issues including Kashmir. This is in keeping with our position."

Source: Government of India web-site, http://www.indiagov.org

Response by Pakistan

'Statement issued by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in response to Security Council Resolution 1172,' New York, 6 June 1998

"1. Pakistan has kept the UN Secretary General and the Security Council fully informed, at all stages, of the developments pertaining to the current grave security crisis in South Asia.

2. Indeed, to some extent, it was the dereliction of its responsibilities by the Security Council that emboldened India to implement its hegemonic and aggressive designs, by crossing the nuclear threshold, threatening the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan, and resorting to nuclear blackmail to impose a military solution on Kashmir.

3. We informed the Council about India's provocative actions and unambiguous expression of intent to commit aggression against Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Council did not pay heed to the impending breach of peace.

4. Faced with these ominous developments resulting from India's deliberate and calculated actions to alter the strategic equation, Pakistan was left with no choice but to exercise its nuclear option in its supreme national interest, to restore the strategic balance and to preserve peace.

5. For almost fifty years, Pakistan repeatedly drew attention of the United Nations to the Indian illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. We demanded the implementation of the Council's own resolutions. We sought to draw attention of the international community to the Indian brutal campaign to deny to the Kashmiri people their inalienable right to self-determination, as provided for in the Council's resolutions.

6. We repeatedly drew attention of the Secretary General and his Council to the extremely volatile situation in Kashmir, resulting from grave violations of the Line of Control by Indian troops. We urged the Secretary General and his Council to take cognizance of this situation and even proposed the strengthening of the present United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

7. We regret to note that the Council paid no attention, whatsoever, to Pakistan's repeated warning and requests. Today again, the central issue which has bedeviled relations between India and Pakistan and is at the source of all conflicts and tensions in South Asia, is being ignored.

8. Now that the Council is seized of the volatile situation in South Asia, we note with regret that the approach that is being adopted is once again devoid of realism. Non-Proliferation cannot be pursued by creating or acquiescing in a situation of a security void. This has been and continues to be a major failure on the part of all those who have sought to promote the goal of non-proliferation. It is obviously counter-productive to bank once again on a uni-dimensional approach to non-proliferation based on selective sanctions, pressures and intimidation.

9. The Council has contented itself to deal with the non-proliferation aspects. Non-Proliferation is no longer an issue in South Asia. South Asia, which we wanted to be a nuclear weapon free zone, is today nuclearized, thanks to the encouragement and acquiescence of major powers. There is a real danger of nuclear conflict. Proliferation, regrettably, has taken place. No amount of sermonizing and lamentations can rectify or reverse this unfortunate development.

10. If this Council really wishes to have any role in containing the crisis and preventing the situation from deteriorating further, it must adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach.

11. We are convinced that a comprehensive approach to the issues of peace, security, confidence building, conventional imbalance, and conventional and nuclear arms control, is the only realistic way, whereby this Council and the international community could contribute to defusing the security crisis in South Asia which has endangered global peace and stability.

12. Mr. President, the Resolution which has emerged from the consultations is deficient in several aspects.

13. Let me first deal with procedure. Under Article 31 of the Charter, 'Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council, whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected'. We deeply regret that the Council has disregarded this Charter provision by not giving us an opportunity to participate in the discussions on this Resolution.

14. The attitude of the Council can, in short be described as, 'My mind is made up; please do not confuse me with facts'.

15. While I would be pointing out the substantive inadequacies, let me make a more general point.

16. I wish to state for the record and for posterity that the adoption of this Resolution will further marginalize the role of the Security Council, not only in dealing effectively with the security crisis in South Asia but on global security issues as a whole.

17. The approach that the Security Council has adopted is not only again devoid of realism but also of legality and morality.

18. I wonder whether the Security Council is not about to ignite an extremely short fuse that will destruct the entire global security order as is envisioned in the UN Charter.

19. Now let me deal with salient aspects of this Resolution which I believe fall in the following three categories:

a) Non-Proliferation;

b) The security problem in South Asia; and

c) The role of the Council.

20. As far as the non-proliferation aspects of this resolution are concerned, we cannot help but comment on the extremely short sighted approach that the Council has chosen to pursue.

21. This Resolution is not an expression of global concern about the failure of non-proliferation and ways and means to deal with this serious issue. It is in fact a transparent exercise in self assurance by the official Nuclear-5 to seek legitimacy for their possession of lethal arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

22. The Nuclear-5 draw comfort and questionable legitimacy from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan had never questioned this dubious distinction that they draw from the NPT. Today we are obliged perforce to reconsider our position.

23. For the first time, this sacrosanct institution is being used, today, to confer legitimacy upon the Nuclear-5. It is, therefore, not what is contained in this Resolution, but what is implied, which needs to be seen in its proper legal, strategic and political perspective.

24. For the first time, the Security Council is being asked to play a role in enforcing non-proliferation. This is contrary to the letter and spirit of the various international instruments and treaties on this subject.

25. Nuclear non-proliferation is the obverse side of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non- proliferation cannot be promoted in the absence of corresponding progress towards nuclear disarmament.

26. The Nuclear-5 have continued to use the NPT for a two-fold purpose: to legitimize their own possession of huge nuclear arsenals and the right to retain them in perpetuity; and as blunt instrument to curb further proliferation.

27. It is indeed evident that the Resolution 'welcomes' the commitment of the Nuclear-5 to Article VI of the NPT. There could be no more poignant travesty of facts.

28. Treaty provisions cannot be enforced on non-parties. Treaty obligations can only be assumed on a voluntary basis. Any attempt at imposition of treaty obligations on non-parties is, by its very nature, unequal and unsustainable.

29. How would the Council deal with the issue so aptly raised by the decision of [the] IC[J] [International Court of Justice] on the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons? How would the Council deal with the question of non-proliferation? How would the Council deal with the inter-linked issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation? The Council has given its verdict. Nuclear disarmament is apparently in safe hands! Nuclear non-proliferation is the only real issue.

30. The Non-Aligned Movement has consistently held that there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals, or for concepts of international security based on a policy of nuclear deterrence.

31. The Non-Aligned movement has also categorically pronounced itself on the present situation, whereby nuclear-weapon States insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits, and continue to make feverish efforts to monopolize them. The Non-Aligned Movement has said that this is a highly discriminatory and untenable approach, and one that cannot be sustained.

32. The Non-Aligned Movement's ministerial meeting in Cartagena recently affirmed the importance of the adoption of an action plan for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, as well as the need for negotiating and implementing universal, non-discriminatory disarmament measures, and mutually agreed confidence-building measures.

33. If the Council is, today, really concerned about non-proliferation, then the resolution that it has adopted does less than full justice to the predominant views of the Non-Aligned Movement, including of those who are parties to the NPT.

34. Let me once again clarify that the issue for Pakistan is one of security, and not of status.

35. Pakistan has demonstrated its nuclear weapon capability. We have officially stated that the nuclear devices tested on 28 and 30 May 1998 correspond to weapons configuration compatible with delivery systems.

36. We have already stated that South Asia has been nuclearized. We have been compelled to join the process of nuclearization by India's decision to weaponize and induct nuclear weapons.

37. We have been obliged to do so for our self-defence and to restore the strategic balance in South Asia.

38. It is India that has claimed status as the sixth nuclear-weapon State. Does the Council, by its lop-sided approach, desire that we also claim status as a nuclear-weapon State, and thus contribute to shredding to bits the myths about the legitimacy or otherwise...of nuclear weapons?

39. Moreover, the resolution does not take into account the fact that besides India and Pakistan, there are other States, non-parties to the NPT, which posses nuclear weapons and have so acknowledged.

40. We do not want to complicate the issue. The issue is simple and straightforward. It is about the security crisis in South Asia. We do not want to dilute the focus, and enter into academic arguments about non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

41. We also do not want to link extraneous issues which only serve to detract from the main issue, that is the security crisis in South Asia, which has endangered global peace and stability.

42. So, Mr. President, a highly skewed and self-defeating approach has been taken by the Security Council in trying to handle non-proliferation, which is strictly not within its competence.

43. The future of non-proliferation cannot be assured by setting aside its very legal and moral basis. This is exactly what is being done today by this Council. It is evident, therefore, that what is at stake is not the future of non-proliferation, but the exclusive privileges and status that the Nuclear-5 arrogate to monopolize, caring little about the wider aspects.

44. I, therefore, dread to say that the Council is about to embark on a totally unrealistic and self-defeating course as far as the future of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is concerned.

45. ... Pakistan has been subjected to double discrimination. At the regional level, we are discriminated because of a failure by the Security Council to make a distinction between an action and reaction, between a provocation and a response, between a cause and its effect.

46. Pakistan has acquired its nuclear capability only in reaction to India's steady development of its nuclear weapons programme. We cannot be asked to give up the right to defend our country against any external threat emanating from conventional or weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan reserves the right to maintain the ability to deter aggression by conventional weapons or non-conventional means.

47. We are also suffering a discrimination at the global level by the Nuclear-5 States, who claim for themselves the right to acquire and retain weapons of mass destruction against each other, or against non-nuclear-weapon States, and thus threaten the rest of the world.

48. This discrimination, at the global level, is epitomized by the possession of over 30,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the Nuclear-5 States, which they claim they will retain indefinitely while taking coercive measures to prevent any other State from acquiring similar capability, even in the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence.

49. This is totally unjust and unacceptable.

50. While the Security Council adopts this unjust decision, we are confident that the international community, the majority of the membership of the United Nations General Assembly, will reject this unfair and unequal decision, and uphold its demand for general and complete nuclear disarmament in the shortest period of time by the Nuclear-5 States.

51. The resolution before the Council presumes to deal with the security aspects of the situation in South Asia. Here again, the Council is ensuring that it would, in fact, have at best a disinterested spectator's role.

52. What are the immediate issues in the context of the situation in South Asia? We would have expected that the Council would seek to address earnestly and reasonably the following:

a) Reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict.

b) Promoting nuclear restraint and stabilization measures between Pakistan and India.

c) Defusing the volatile situation in Jammu and Kashmir, especially along the Line of Control.

53. Unfortunately, the Security Council is once again abnegating its responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security by adopting a totally unpragmatic and unrealistic approach.

54. This Resolution urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation. This Resolution also urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all matters pertaining to peace and security and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions to address the root cause of tension.

55. The mere mentioning of the root cause, Kashmir, is not enough. We regret that even the important element contained in the P-5 Ministerial Communiqué, of their readiness to assist India and Pakistan in promoting reconciliation and cooperation has been omitted from this Resolution.

56. It is evident that by adopting this approach the Council is in fact acknowledging its failure to address the critical elements of the situation.

57. In short, the Council wants Pakistan and India settle the issues bedeviling their relations by themselves.

58. If Pakistan and India could have sorted out these problems by themselves, today South Asia would not have been nuclearized.

59. What you, Mr. President, are asking us today, in short, amounts to an appeal to two nuclear-weapon States to settle their differences on the basis of the de facto situation. This de-facto situation is based on complex factors underlying the power balance in strategic and conventional terms.

60. In fact, what you are asking us today is to remain embarked on a disastrous course. You are asking us today to cross new thresholds in nuclear and ballistic system escalation.

61. You are asking us today to set aside [the] UN Charter, and international law, and to base our conduct on the imperatives of maintaining a strategic balance, whatever the cost.

62. You have once again ignored the fact that the direct cause of aggravation of the security situation in South Asia was the unilateral altering by India of the delicate strategic balance that had maintained peace in South Asia for the past two decades.

63. We cannot read any other message in your Resolution. You have once again abandoned your responsibility by asking us to find a mutually acceptable solution.

64. I say this more in sorrow than in anger, for the implications of this approach would be far and wide.

65. Not only would it oblige the countries in South Asia, but also 180 member States of the United Nations, to draw their own conclusions about the pathetic state of the UN and the global security order, which is premised to serve the strategic interests of the official Nuclear-5.

66. Mr. President, I regret to say that Pakistan is disappointed. We had pinned our hopes on the UN for more than 50 years. We were confident that it would be able to usher a new era, free from the scourge of war for our succeeding generations. What we have witnessed instead is a tale of missed opportunities, abdication of responsibilities, and selective and discriminatory application of the Charter. This track record does not fill anybody with pride. Nor does it conform to the ideals of its founding fathers, or to the principles of democracy.

67. Let me, however, hasten to add that we would still continue to base our conduct and actions on the noble principles of the UN Charter. The vision of the UN Charter would, I hope, one day bring the dawn of a new era. This would come about if the nations of the world would become true adherents to the principles and purposes of the Charter.

68. The Government and the people of Pakistan have faith in the inherent goodness of human kind. We place great value on the collective civilizational accomplishments of the human race, and the eventual triumph of morality. It is in view of these sublime sentiments that we have taken the liberty, today, to make a critical analysis of the shortcomings of the Security Council, that have only contributed to the spread of chaos and anarchy in various parts of the world.

69. Pakistan will continue to comply with its obligations under the UN Charter and international law.

70. We would continue to seek a just resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in accordance with Security Council resolutions. May I, at this stage, remind the Council of its own resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, which explicitly provide for the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

71. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has already stated, as I would like to reiterate that Pakistan is ready to enter into talks with India on all matters of mutual concern including a Non-Aggression Pact, on the basis of a just, equitable, and expeditious settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute."

Iran Statement to the CD, 4 June

Statement by Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 4 June 1998

"There are a large number of vital issues that need to be addressed at this forum. Recent developments in our region, which has been the subject of my consultation in Islamabad and New Delhi, justify leaving those issues to a future occasion.

The exchanges in Islamabad and New Delhi have been preliminary but extensive. They provided the opportunity to hear, first hand, the views and positions of both India and Pakistan on the nuclear tests that have been conducted and on their implications. We have listened and noted carefully the reasons that have been given to go ahead with the tests. We have also tried to maintain focus on the potential risks and dangers and what could be considered as possible ways to avoid aggravation of the situation and to move towards reducing tension. ...

There is no doubt...that lack of serious attention and absence of concrete action on nuclear disarmament has been [a] contributing factor. Indefinite extension of the NPT was to lead [to] definite moves towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. Instead, matters remained stalemate[d], progress became a rare commodity and the mood turned sombre. Alarm was particularly raised when some nuclear-weapon States, in defending their position against the near-universal consensus on illegality of the use of nuclear weapons expressed at [the Court of International Justice at] the Hague, claimed [the] permanent right [to the] possession of nuclear weapons basing their argument on [the] permanent extension of the Treaty.

This, along with the refusal to agree on commencing negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the failure to address some of the legitimate concerns raised by non-nuclear-weapon States during formation of the CTBT, yielded...fertile grounds for actions that we should all regret. ...

I should make it clear that to conduct tests is misconduct, in layman's terms, and the ensuing responsibilities cannot be evaded, nor eroded, under any pretext. All States, of course, have the legitimate and sovereign right to seek, acquire and develop any and all means necessary to preserve and ensure their national security. But, when it comes to the question of nuclear weapons, it is evident that it breeds instability and kills confidence by altering fundamentally the balance, and the status quo. What is not evident, however, is that it enhances security. It seems more likely that the reverse is the case, and security follows a diminishing trend ...

It is entirely understandable, of course, that States may find it indispensable to express strong opinions of deploring, out of frustration perhaps, and prescribe means of exerting pressure and imposing sanctions on India and Pakistan. There seems to be a growing trend in this direction. ... As the Chinese proverb goes, 'everyone pushes the falling fence'. But neither India nor Pakistan are falling fences or fences that fall. This, I believe, is wise to realise. Rather than remaining fixated on the negative, therefore, I suggest to seek and accentuate the positive; however modest or meagre it might be under the prevailing circumstances.

With this in mind, and having noted the positions of the Governments in Islamabad and New Delhi, it is my impression with a reasonable level of confidence that the following areas represent common elements and a basis for initiatives that might be explored by the two States:

  • A renewed commitment to resume and continue a comprehensive dialogue on all outstanding issues with the view to their early resolution... The dialogue would include, inter alia, the following:
    • Peace and security
    • Jammu and Kashmir
    • Confidence Building Measures
    • Nuclear issues, including the NPT and CTBT...
  • A commitment to refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests for at least as long as the dialogue is underway and ways of dealing with nuclear issues are being examined.
  • Commitment to engage in immediate discussion with a representative of a non-nuclear-weapon State and a nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT and signatory to the CTBT on joining these treaties. ...
  • A commitment to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from any act that may aggravate the situation.
  • Avoiding the assembly or deployment of nuclear weapons.
  • Along with this, I should add, is the commitment to refrain from transfer of weapons related materials.

There are other suggestions put forward such as conclusion of a non-aggression pact, a commitment to non-use or no-first use [of nuclear weapons], and readiness to commence negotiations on [an] FMCT. Some of these are not apparently ripe to move off the ground as of yet. The latter two seem to be difficult, for instance, at this stage while an imbalance in the broader array of armaments, and in stockpiles of fissile material, is perceived.

Confidence building measures, on the other hand, may include a variety of possibilities not unsimilar to those adopted in the European theatre. I do realise that some may not consider these elements as sufficient or satisfactory in the face of the gravity of events and the strong position of [the] international community as a whole against nuclear explosions. They are not, as a matter of fact, intended to be sufficient... They tend to provide a broad enough basis, however, for a process to start which hopefully will pick up its own momentum and open the way for further moves."

US Sanctions: Congressional Testimony, 18 June

Statement by Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, to the House International Committee Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 18 June 1998

"Implementation of Sanctions

In the six weeks that have passed since India tested, we have worked assiduously to collect the necessary information, put in place the needed mechanisms, and make the requisite decisions to establish the sanctions regime against both India and Pakistan. We have endeavored to ensure that the implementation of sanctions under the Glenn amendment and other legislative authorities is firm and correct, and that the sanctions are costly to the governments who took these steps but do not undercut efforts to meet basic humanitarian needs or unduly harm the interests of US businesses. In doing so, we are sending a strong message to any other state aspiring to a nuclear weapons capability.

At the same time, we wish to underscore that the purpose of these sanctions is to influence the behavior of both India and Pakistan, not simply to punish for punishment's sake. We do not wish to isolate either country, but rather encourage both to take steps to demonstrate a firm commitment to global non-proliferation norms and to improve their relationship with one another. ...

[O]ne outcome of our deliberations over the implementation of sanctions was a clear recognition that these mandatory sanctions were meant primarily as a deterrent; we had hoped they would never have to be implemented. We had to navigate our way through a wide array of issues and decisions about how the sanctions apply to different programs and activities, and are faced with the fact that the sanctions may result in unintended, negative consequences, and that there is no termination or sunset clause. While we have yet to see the kinds of concrete steps by either India or Pakistan that will allow us to move forward, I would point out that we are significantly constrained in our ability to respond to any future progress or positive steps by either country. We also have little flexibility to modify their application in the event that there is an unintended, negative outcome to their implementation. Already, we are aware that the sanctions require the termination of credits for agricultural sales, which is clearly at odds with the humanitarian provisions of the legislation. ...

Mr. Chairman, for our part and for the foreseeable future, we must continue to implement firmly our sanctions policy. At the same time, we must be prepared to help both India and Pakistan reduce tensions if they are prepared to do so. The United States and our partners in the P-5 and G-8 have pledged to fulfill our obligation to prevent destabilizing transfers of arms and sensitive technologies to South Asia. We stand ready to share our expertise and capabilities to help India and Pakistan monitor military activities and avoid miscalculation, and above all, to assist the two in settling their differences. ... Finally, I would like to make a fundamental point. While we do not accept the rationales given by India and Pakistan for testing or possessing nuclear weapons and believe that the tests have diminished their security, we must continue to recognize that as sovereign nations, both India and Pakistan have legitimate security concerns and interests, and we must bear that in mind as we move forward. We have far too many national interests at stake to do anything other than engage under these terms."

Source: Text - Inderfurth: US chagrined to implement sanctions on India, Pakistan, United States Information Service, 18 June.

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.

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