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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 13, February - March 1997

US Congressional Testimony:
Counterproliferation; Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme

Testimony of Franklin C. Miller, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 1997


"The United States faces growing threats to its security and other national interests due to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. In many of the world's regions where the United States is likely to deploy forces - including Northeast Asia, and the Middle East - potential adversaries are pursuing the development or acquisition of NBC weapons. The Gulf War experience showed the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning: DoD must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. Our forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions including those in which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. In December 1993, pursuant to a Presidential Directive, then Secretary of Defense Aspin launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, which represents our response to these challenges. This initiative took real form under former Secretary Perry and continues today in a very robust form under Secretary Cohen.

The principal goal of US counterproliferation policy is to ensure our forces are able to operate effectively and decisively even if an enemy employs WMD. By doing this we can help discourage proliferation in the first place. Secondarily, our policy supports US non-proliferation efforts which seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Department's activities contribute in many ways to achieving these goals. Military preparations for operations in an NBC environment make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from using military power where necessary in defense of our national interests. Simply put, an enemy might use weapons of mass destruction against our forces, but this will not prevent us from winning the fight and, in addition, it will draw devastating retaliation. Effective defense capabilities to counter NBC weapons systems also devalue the potential political and military benefits of those weapons to a would-be proliferant. In addition, many of the capabilities developed for the battlefield to deal with NBC proliferation - especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means - can be brought to bear in support of international regimes, export controls and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.

Integrating the counterproliferation mission within DoD

While preventing NBC proliferation from occurring in the first place remains a paramount goal of US policy, we recognize that a country determined to obtain NBC weapons and their means of delivery, a country which is willing to violate global nonproliferation norms in doing so, can in all likelihood succeed despite the strongest prevention efforts. Because experience has demonstrated that countries armed with NBC weapons can and will use these weapons, US armed forces must be prepared to counter fully the military threats posed by NBC proliferation. For these reasons, senior Department officials continue to play an active role in guiding implementation of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, and the Department has made substantial progress toward fully integrating the counterproliferation mission into its military planning, acquisition, intelligence and international cooperation activities.

These efforts have built upon the formal policy guidance issued by then Secretary of Defense Perry in May 1994, follow-on guidance contained in internal planning and programming documents, and a DoD Directive on Counterproliferation issued in July 1996 that delineates specific responsibilities, formalizes relationships among DoD organizations and establishes common terms of reference. These documents reflect the Department's role in the entire spectrum of US government activities related to NBC proliferation - from supporting diplomatic efforts to prevent or contain proliferation to protecting the United States and its friends and allies, and their military forces, from NBC attacks.

Counterproliferation (CP) Council

To ensure that these broad policy objectives are met and that the implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and focused, Secretary Perry established in April 1996 the DoD Counterproliferation Council (CPC). The CPC is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and it is composed of senior civilian and military officials. Its role is to monitor departmental progress in developing the strategy, doctrine and force planning necessary to execute effectively counterproliferation objectives. It also monitors DoD-wide efforts to train, exercise and equip US forces for the counterproliferation missions. The CP Council met several times during 1996, focusing on the potential impact of NBC proliferation on the Department's strategy for fighting two overlapping Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), as well as on joint and service CP doctrine, and on exercising and training for integrated operations in an NBC environment. In this connection, the Council identified the importance of understanding the likely NBC employment concepts and plans of proliferants, and it took steps to ensure that focused intelligence assessments in these areas inform the development of regional military plans, as well as doctrine and exercising policies.

Military Planning for Counterproliferation missions

One of the most important activities to integrate fully counterproliferation into the functions of the Department has been the implementation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) May 1995 counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study. The study concluded that each commander in chief (CINC) should be responsible for executing US counterproliferation policy within his respective area of responsibility, and that implementation would be executed directly through each CINC's standard deliberate force planning process. Based on this study, the Secretary of Defense approved a Counterproliferation Charter, prepared by the CJCS, that supplements top-level policy guidance and provides a military focus for implementing the counterproliferation initiative. The CJCS subsequently provided guidance to the CINCs for developing their own concept plans for the counterproliferation mission, further defining national level counterproliferation policy in terms of operational objectives and tasks that will assist the CINCs in developing their own area-specific plans.

Doctrine, training and exercising for the Counterproliferation mission

An equally important part of the job of implementing our policy, and fulfilling our requirements under P.L. 103-160, is to adapt joint doctrine, planning, training and exercises in light of the operational implications of the threat or use of NBC weapons. The Department's April 1996 report to Congress on Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense stressed that joint NBC defense doctrine needs to continue to evolve and include joint tactics, techniques and procedures. The US Army Chemical School's joint doctrine cell is assisting in the development of updated joint doctrine with the guidance of the Joint Staff. In addition, the regional commands, as part of their task to develop concept plans for operations in an NBC environment, are assessing more fully how regional proliferation risks may affect doctrine, operational concepts and methods. A more thorough understanding of how routine military tasks may be affected by the presence of NBC weapons and associated delivery vehicles will, in turn, help DoD better define hardware requirements and the proper emphasis to be placed on various capabilities, including theater missile defenses, passive defenses, counterforce, and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I).

The Department also continues to make extensive use of wargames and related activities to build a common understanding about warfighting issues associated with NBC proliferation. Senior civilian, Joint Staff and Service officials participated in a series of seminars involving scenarios where a proliferant had used NBC weapons against US forces in a regional setting. Participants' discussion about the potential political and operational impacts resulting from such uses reinforced the importance of maintaining a mix of capabilities in the face of proliferation risks and thinking about how NBC proliferation may affect the way the United States fights. In this connection, the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University is continuing its assessment of potential employment doctrine of NBC-armed adversaries and how US operational concepts and military operations could be adapted to improve the US ability to prevail in an NBC environment.

Intelligence support for Counterproliferation

The US Intelligence Community, with a leading role played by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), continues to improve its ability to provide DoD leaders the detailed information necessary to support efforts to discourage NBC acquisition, to deter the threat or use of NBC weapons by a proliferant, and to protect against potential NBC attacks on the United States, US forces, and US friends or allies. A high priority is being placed on assessing the intentions, programs, operational practices and supporting infrastructure of countries of concern (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea) as well as countries which are also of concern as suppliers. Greater attention also is being given to operational intelligence (such as the location and characterization of NBC facilities, target vulnerability, early warning tracking data) and its timely dissemination, both of which are critical for planning defenses and responses to NBC threats.

Acquisition efforts to support Counterproliferation

In order for our forces to be able to carry out their missions in support of our counterproliferation policy, they must be equipped with modern, effective weapons, sensors and defenses. ...

A key element in providing an important overview of our acquisition efforts is the interdepartmental Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC). The CPRC is composed of representatives the Secretary of Defense (Chairman), the Secretary of Energy (Vice-Chair), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Congress chartered the CPRC to review counterproliferation related research, development and acquisition programs of the represented Departments and to recommend programmatic and management initiatives to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter NBC proliferation threats. ...

The CPRC reviewed and modified the 15 counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs) for its upcoming 1997 report based on CINC staff's operational planning workshops, the DoD 'Front End Assessment,' and increased concerns about terrorist NBC threats. This year the CPRC Standing Committee decided that each CPRC representative organization would prioritize ACEs in accordance with departmental mission needs. They will be modified periodically to reflect changes in the international security environment. The ACEs characterize those areas where progress is needed to both enhance the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs, and the overall ability to promote national strategies to counter the growing proliferation threat. The counterproliferation ACEs, in DoD's priority order, are:

* Detection, identification and characterization of biological weapons (BW) agents.

* Detection, characterization and defeat of WMD facilities with minimal collateral effects.

* Detection, characterization and defeat of underground facilities with minimal collateral effects.

* Theater ballistic missile active defense.

* Support for Special Operations Forces and defense against paramilitary, covert delivery and terrorist WMD threats.

* Provide consequence management.

* Cruise missile defense.

* Collection, analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence to counter proliferation.

* Robust passive defense to enable sustained operations on the NBC battlefield.

* BW vaccine RDT&E and production to ensure stockpile availability.

* Target planning for WMD targets.

* Prompt mobile target detection and defeat.

* Detection, tracking and protection of WMD and WMD-related materials and components.

* Support export control activities of the US government.

* Support inspection and monitoring activities of arms control agreements and regimes. ...

Counterproliferation...support program and chemical and biological defense program

The core of DoD's acquisition efforts in support of our counterproliferation policy is contained in two broad programs: the Counterproliferation Support Program and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. ...

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program oversees and coordinates all DoD NBC passive defense efforts. The CP Support Program budget is $97.3 million in FY 97 and we are requesting $104.7 million in FY 98. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program budget is $523 million in FY 97 and we are requesting $531 million in FY 98. In addition to these efforts, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) programs involving theater missile defense also form an integral element of the counterproliferation effort.

Recognizing the increasing maturity of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative and the progress made over the last several years in substantially improving US counterproliferation capabilities, the Deputy Secretary directed in January 1996 that the Department take stock of its efforts to date and review all DoD counterproliferation-related programs to assess programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts and management alternatives. The goal of this so-called 'Front End Assessment' was to define a restructured and optimized acquisition program that will meet the CINCs' counterproliferation needs. The analytic assessment concluded that funding for a number of high payoff efforts should be accelerated and increased, including those aimed at detection of biological weapons and NBC warning. In addition, SOCOM's counterproliferation mission was defined and funded as part of the Front End Assessment. As a result, funding for counterproliferation programs during FY 1998-03 will increase substantially. The sections below describe recent progress to accelerate research, development and deployment of improved counterproliferation capabilities in five functional areas.


The CP Support Program Office, in partnership with the US Navy, successfully deployed the Navy's Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) prototype system to improve capabilities to identify and track ships at sea suspected of transporting NBC and NBC-related materials. Deployment began in 1995; a total of 28 units will be deployed by the end of FY 1997. The program will transition from an R&D supported program to Navy management in FY 1998. The CP Support Program is also supporting the joint DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) effort involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related materials and to apply DoD and FBI technologies, operational capabilities and training programs to train law enforcement officials in the Baltics, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. ...

Passive Defense

The DoD NBC Defense Program fulfills joint passive defense requirements to permit US forces to survive, fight and win in an NBC-contaminated environment. ...

Based on experiences in Operation DESERT STORM, DoD identified the following shortfalls and issues related to NBC defenses:

* Biological defenses needed more emphasis in DoD programs.

* Inadequacies existed in CW/BW detectors, vaccines, protection and decontamination capabilities.

* To ensure effective contamination avoidance on future battlefields, additional reconnaissance systems and standoff detection were required; and

* Continued modernization of individual and collective protection, medical support, detection, identification, warning and decontamination systems were necessary to ensure force survivability and mission accomplishment under chemical and biological warfare battlefield conditions.

Since the end of the Gulf War, significant and measurable progress has been made in addressing each of these issues. ... Specific examples of new and improved systems that have been fielded include new protective masks, advanced chemical and biological protective garments, standoff chemical detectors and first-ever capabilities for point biological agent detection and standoff aerosol/particulate detection. Additionally, there has been significant progress in such research and development initiatives as the development of miniature, pocket-sized chemical agent detectors, advanced point and stand-off biological detection and identification systems, and digitally automated warning and reporting networks.

An integrated 'system-of-systems' approach that incorporates detection systems, force protection, medical programs and decontamination will provide the most effective means to ensure that US forces will be ready to fight at the time and place of their choosing.

Active Defense

Theater missile defense (TMD) is an essential element of DoD's approach to countering risks posed by NBC weapons delivered by cruise and ballistic missiles. ... By intercepting and destroying NBC-armed missiles and aircraft, active defenses substantially enhance the ability of friendly forces to conduct successful military operations. The US theater missile defense program is managed and funded by BMDO, the Services and DARPA. The program calls for near-term improvements to existing systems, development of a new core set of TMD capabilities, and exploration of advanced technology and other risk reduction activities to complement the core programs. These include efforts aimed at gaining a better understanding of the atmospheric dispersion of chemical and biological agents, along with methods for neutralizing them upon intercept. To improve the effectiveness of active defense, the Department has also established the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) to enhance coordination between the requirements and acquisition communities.


The CP Support Program supports projects to enhance US military capabilities to identify, characterize and neutralize NBC weapons, related facilities and supporting infrastructure elements while minimizing and predicting the consequences of resulting collateral effects. The Counterproliferation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) - the core of the NBC counterforce effort - allow the operational community to evaluate and influence the development of NBC counterforce capabilities, while expediting emerging capabilities into concepts of operations. Key accomplishments include:

* Completion of static detonation and live weapon drops on a simulated BW storage facility to demonstrate the capabilities of NBC target planning tools and collateral effects prediction. ...

* Fielding of tools to US European Command for use in Bosnia as part of Operation Joint Endeavor. ...

* Initiation of system design and penetration studies and initial sled testing of an advanced earth penetrating weapon. The tests indicate that we can achieve a significant increase in penetration capability, allowing the CINCs to place more buried NBC facilities at risk.

* Demonstration of the ability of unattended ground sensors to locate and identify key components within a simulated NBC facility.

Covert/Terrorist NBC Threats

...Subtitle A of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandates an increased role for the Department of Defense in assisting domestic authorities to combat WMD terrorism. ... Of particular note in this discussion of acquisition activities...is the fact that the CP Support Program is coordinating its technology prototype development activities with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which develops joint interagency counterterrorism requirements, and with the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and joint Service explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) units to ensure relevance and responsiveness in meeting user needs. An effort is also underway to address critical shortfalls in adapting biological and chemical warfare defense technologies to meet the unique requirements of the special operations environment. Recently completed programs include a vented suppressive shield to contain biological and chemical weapons effects and a joint US-Canadian EOD suit for biological and chemical threats. Projects under way include development of NBC perimeter monitoring sensors, a Quick Mask for protection against biological and chemical agents, a non-intrusive chemical agent detection system, and a special chemical and biological agent sample extraction and rapid identification system.

Other OSD policy efforts in support of Counterproliferation

We in the Policy community also perform important roles in advancing our counterproliferation efforts by working with allies, raising public and allied awareness of the dangers posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and supporting administration arms controls efforts directed at the threat.

* Cooperating with International Partners in Addressing Shared Risks

The Department is continuing to work with America's long-standing allies in Europe and elsewhere to develop common approaches on counterproliferation. Notably, the Department played the leading role in moving counterproliferation to the top of NATO's agenda. Indeed, largely at the urging of DoD, the development of a NATO response to proliferation risks was endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at their Summit in 1994.

Accordingly, the NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), chaired jointly by the United States and rotating chair held by a European ally (currently Italy), was established in 1994 to determine the range of alliance and national capabilities needed in light of proliferation risks and to recommend improvements for NATO's defense posture to counter emerging threats from NBC weapons and their delivery means. NATO's counterproliferation initiative is an integral part of the Alliance's adaptation to the post-Cold War strategic environment, in which the proliferation of NBC weapons can pose a direct threat to Alliance security. As part of NATO's strategic reorientation toward greater security responsibilities beyond Europe, the DGP has recommended ways of improving the protection of allied forces deployed in new roles and missions, including operations beyond NATO's periphery where the military dangers posed by NBC proliferation are greatest. The DGP has recommended steps to ensure NATO develops needed defenses against the threat or use of biological weapons threats, which are of particular concern. In June 1996, the DGP presented its recommendations to NATO defense and foreign ministers. It stressed the importance of developing a core, integrative set of capabilities that will provide a basis for continuing capability enhancements and force improvements as proliferation risks evolve.

This core set of capabilities includes:

* Strategic and operational intelligence, including early warning data.

* Automated and deployable command, control and communications.

* Continuous, wide-area ground surveillance.

* Standoff and point BW/CW detection, identification and warning.

* Extended air defenses, including theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense for deployed forces.

* NBC individual protective equipment for ground forces.

NATO already has, or is on the way to developing, the requisite capabilities in many of these areas. The findings of the DGP are intended to give impetus and added rationale for fielding such capabilities, as well as to demonstrate how supplementing this nucleus of capabilities with other means - including layered defenses against TBM attack, special munitions for NBC agent defeat and hardened NBC targets, computer modeling and simulation, and medical countermeasures - would strengthen the alliance's overall ability to discourage NBC proliferation, deter the threat of use of NBC weapons, and protect against NBC attacks.

In June 1996 - for the first time in 12 years - NATO's defense ministers launched an accelerated out-of-cycle force planning process for counterproliferation, through which allies are making resource commitments to develop and field needed capabilities. This extraordinary effort demonstrates how counterproliferation has become a top priority for NATO in the post-Cold War era. ..."

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programme

"In reaction to the new challenges posed by the post-Cold War world, and through the visionary leadership of Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, Congress mandated the establishment of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in FY92 with three objectives:

* Assist the recipient states in destroying nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction;

* Assist those states to transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and

* Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.

In FY93, authorization was broadened to include:

* Preventing diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise;

* Facilitating demilitarization of defense industries and conversion of military capabilities and technologies;

* Establishing science and technology centers; and

* Expanding military-to-military and defense contacts between the US and the recipient states.

In FY97, the Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment which broadened funding for the CTR program to include, within its existing authorities, projects to: convert the cores of Russian plutonium-producing reactors; dismantle chemical and biological weapons production facilities; and expand defense and military contacts to include NIS other than Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. Those projects will be pursued in the FY97 CTR program, and further funding has been requested in FY98. ...

CTR Programs

... CTR is on the front lines of ensuring adequate controls on WMD capabilities. The CTR program is working in all four countries to reduce the threat of theft and/or diversion of these WMD and associated materials through support for safe and secure removal of nuclear warheads to Russia, destruction of WMD and related infrastructure, safe storage of warheads destined for destruction and of the fissile material removed from them. ...

The CTR program has notified over $1.5 billion to Congress for use in Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine. The FY97 notification, currently being staffed, will bring that total to $1.8 billion. Almost $1.2 billion has been obligated for this program, and our spending rates have increased steadily since the program's inception in FY92. Early in the program, there was criticism of CTR for its slow obligation rates. Indeed, it took time for the US and Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Kazakstani governments to define the assistance, sign the necessary agreements, and begin the work. It is a complicated process, but we have learned a great deal from our experience. ...

Destruction and dismantlement

Our Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) and Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) programs in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakstan, and Ukraine, and Nuclear and WMD Infrastructure Elimination programs in Kazakstan and Ukraine provide the recipient states with equipment, training, services, logistic support and other assistance for expediting the elimination of strategic offensive arms pursuant to the START treaties and facilities or infrastructure previously supporting WMD.

* Ukraine:

Destruction and Dismantlement includes, among other things, assistance to eliminate all SS-19 silo launchers and launch control silos in Ukraine. With CTR assistance, a liquid rocket fuel storage facility critical to defueling SS-19 missiles in Ukraine is storing over 3,500 metric tons of fuel and a missile neutralization facility in Ukraine is eliminating six SS-19 missiles per month. On-base propellant transfer facilities and nuclear storage structures will also be decontaminated and dismantled. We hope for a decision soon on Ukraine's plans for SS-24 missiles. The Lisbon Protocol requires the silos to be eliminated by December 2001, which means that silo elimination (and therefore missile removal) should begin in 1998.

* Kazakstan:

Through CTR, DoD is assisting Kazakstan in the safe elimination and clean up of all SS-18 silo launchers and launch control sites, training silos, and silo test launchers. The Russians have completed the initial phases of silo destruction, and CTR projects to complete the eliminations are underway. CTR is supporting bomber dismantlement and the elimination of infrastructure associated with nuclear weapons test tunnels at Degelen Mountain, as well as on base propellant transfer facilities and nuclear storage structures. Last year we began a US government project to be spearheaded by CTR to eliminate biological weapons production infrastructure at a former Soviet biological weapons facility, Stepnogorsk, in Kazakstan.

* Belarus:

In Belarus, assistance already obligated will be used, in part, to facilitate elimination of fixed structures associated with the SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and to dispose of approximately 10,000 metric tons of liquid fuel and oxidizer.

* Russia:

In Russia, SOAE assistance includes SSBN, bomber and silo launcher dismantlement. CTR has provided additional liquid freight intermodal containers to assist with fuel and oxidizer storage following defueling of liquid propellant missiles. We have begun efforts to increase the dismantlement rates at Russia's SS-18 missile elimination facility, and will soon let a contract for the solid propellant ICBM/SLBM elimination project.

The US government is also helping and encouraging Russia to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to eliminate their stockpiles. We intend to provide assistance in the form of equipment, services and training for the creation of a CW destruction facility to destroy artillery munitions with organophosphorous agent. A joint US-Russian technical evaluation closely examined the Russian two-stage chemical agent destruction process, and validated its effectiveness. Laboratory facilities are being upgraded to allow development of analytical methods for monitoring during destruction operations. Three mobile labs were delivered last fall, and in December we let a contract with Parsons Engineering for the design and, ultimately, construction of a destruction facility at Shchuchye. ...


In 1991, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus together had 3,300 strategic and roughly 2,600 tactical nuclear warheads on their soil. They would have been respectively - by far - the third, fourth and seventh largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, in what is probably the greatest nonproliferation achievement the world has seen, these three states are completely free of nuclear warheads. In addition, START I eliminations are well ahead of schedule. 431 ICBM launchers, 59 SS-18 ICBMs, 276 SLBM launchers (21 boats), and 53 heavy bombers have been eliminated in Russia and 104 ICBM launchers have been eliminated in Kazakstan. In Ukraine, 62 ICBM silos, 6 launch control centers, and 20 missiles have been dismantled.

Did CTR assistance do this alone? No. It is the cooperation, the pragmatic partnerships between ourselves and these countries that have enabled this steady movement to final success. But it would not have happened without CTR.

Chain of Custody

Chain of Custody programs provide assistance to enhance security of nuclear weapons and weapons material during storage and transport to dismantlement and storage sites - at every 'link' along the custody 'chain'. While complete assembled nuclear weapons are less prone to theft or diversion than stocks of fissile material or components, they are vulnerable nonetheless and the consequences of their falling into the wrong hands could be catastrophic. To support the safety and security of assembled weapons under MoD control, the DoD has developed a cooperative program with the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian MoD. The CTR assistance provided under the DoD-MoD Weapons Protection, Control and Accounting (WPC&A) project focuses on maintaining a high level of security during shipment and storage of Russian nuclear weapons in connection with their dismantlement. This program has been marked by excellent DoD-MoD cooperation and swift implementation.

Specifically, CTR has provided Russia with armored blankets to enhance weapons security during transport. We have helped upgrade cargo and guard railcars for the same purpose. Emergency Response Training/Equipment has been provided to all four recipient states to enhance their capability to respond to accidents involving nuclear weapons in transit for dismantlement activities. Working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) we will help automate their nuclear stockpile inventory and provide computer models to assess storage site vulnerability as well as information about possible guard force training. We have been working with the Russian MoD to apply a systematic approach which will provide a coordinated security system at MoD sites.

A high priority and high profile project is the fissile material storage facility at Mayak, near the formerly-closed city of Chelyabinsk. This facility will protect fissile material resulting from dismantled weapons, providing a safe and secure location for it. The United States is willing to provide up to half the cost of the facility. Lack of adequate and appropriate storage space could cause two problems: first, this material would be stored in facilities more vulnerable to theft; and second, the Russians have stated that lack of storage space for the fissile material would create a warhead dismantlement bottleneck.

While this program suffered from initial delays, we have recently seen progress. We believe the US-set milestones for this program, announced last year, have been effective in generating forward movement. We are now pleased to report that cooperation on design has accelerated, construction is proceeding uninterrupted, an on-site Design and Construction Contractor is in place, along with the Army Corps of Engineers. Both sides have agreed that a state-of-the-art Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) system will be designed and installed to ensure that material in the facility is protected and accounted for. DoD will begin negotiations with Minatom on specific transparency requirements this spring.

A new CTR project is underway which will reduce the amount of fissile material produced in Russia. Conversion of the fuel cores of three plutonium-producing reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk will permit their continued operation to produce needed heat and electricity for the region but prevent them from producing weapons-grade plutonium as a by-product. DoD is building on the experience and expertise of DoE personnel in carrying out this project. Design and engineering work on this project has begun, and the conversion of the cores is planned to be completed in 2000. ...


Demilitarization programs include projects that aim to enable facilities, organizations and individuals which had been involved in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) related fields to pursue peaceful endeavors. Under this category, we include the defense conversion programs which provide assistance to convert former military enterprises in all four recipient states to the production of civilian goods. Consistent with Congressional direction, CTR no longer provides assistance to FSU defense conversion. Instead, DoD now supports defense conversion through other mechanisms, leveraging capabilities of the entire US government and, more importantly, the private sector. ...

FY98 Program

...The CTR program is currently planned to make its last request for new funds in FY01. It was established to see certain goals accomplished, to enable us to see a safer world. Some of our needs have changed since the program was established, but its founding purpose continues. Russia not only retains a nuclear arsenal, but it continues to hold chemical weapons, and still possesses vast quantities of fissile material. Ukraine, from whose territory the last nuclear warheads were removed last June, still has more than one hundred ICBMs, dozens of launchers, and warhead storage bunkers. Kazakstan, which no longer has nuclear warheads on its soil and has returned all SS-18 missiles to Russia, still hosts some supporting infrastructure, as well as a former biological weapons facility and Soviet-era WMD test facilities at Baikonur, Degelen Mountain, Semipalatinsk and Sary-Shagan. Belarus returned the remaining SS-25 mobile missiles and associated warheads to Russia, but still has on its territory launch pads and supporting infrastructure. These remnants of the Soviet threat retain the potential to harm the US and our allies around the world, whether by unauthorized use or by illicit transfer to other parties. CTR programs have the capability to eliminate these threats.

We have, over the years, much improved our planning, learning from difficulties experienced earlier. We have developed plans for each of our projects.... Given adequate funding, we should meet our goals. Our plans for the FY98 budget are in line with this approach. With this plan, we will continue projects that are ongoing, completing some of them in FY98. ...

For Dismantlement activities, $210 million is requested in FY98 funds. This includes funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) in Russia, to help continue the projects now ongoing, such as SS-18 missile and SS-24 rail mobile launcher elimination, as well as continued bomber and SLBM elimination. Our Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination and Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination projects in Ukraine will require substantial funding in FY98, including continued support for demobilization infrastructure elimination, and silo launcher elimination, as well as SS-24 projects. It also includes additional funding for Chemical Weapons Destruction in Russia.

Complementing our dismantlement activities, a need will remain to ensure controls and safeguards over weapons and weapons materials. Our planning calls for $141.7 million in FY98 for Chain of Custody projects. Funding will support the Fissile Material Storage facility, acquisition of Fissile Material Containers, and Weapons Storage Security. We are moving into the second stage of that program - support for creating an integrated warhead control system - which will involve a more methodical analysis of MoD's security posture to support MoD's longer range needs (new computer inventory system), additional warhead shipments and the development of an integrated systems approach to upgrade physical security at MoD's nuclear weapons storage sites. Procurement will begin on the core conversion project.

Finally, our planning calls for an additional $30.5 million for Other Program Support, which will include continued funding for the defense and military contacts program, as well as covering our Congressionally-mandated audits and examinations and providing for various administrative and support costs. ..."

Source: Text - Assistant Defense Secretary Miller 3/5 testimony on proliferation, United States Information agency, 6 March.

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.

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