Issue No. 13, February - March 1997
NATO Expansion and Arms Control:
Press Conference with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Moscow, 21 February 1997
Statements and Remarks by US Secretary of State and Russian
"The NATO-Russia charter should not be a mechanical document. It
needs to allow for the evolution of our work together and the
emerging needs of European security in the coming century. NATO
today is a new NATO. It is not the NATO of the Cold War, its
guiding principles have changed and its structure has changed.
First, NATO no longer has an enemy to the East. Second, NATO's
military system is fundamentally different. Its doctrine has
changed and its forces have been reduced radically. NATO's nuclear
weapons have been reduced by 90 percent. In 1989 NATO had a total
of 6,000 combat aircraft in Europe and the US 2,900. Today, NATO
has reduced its total holdings to 3,800 and the US now has no more
than 900. In 1989 there were 17 US army brigades in Europe, in 1995
there were four.
The number of US forces has declined greatly. US forces in
Europe in 1989 numbered 300,000. They are now down to 100,000. So,
the point here is that NATO today is configured not to fight the
Cold War, but to work with partners, with Russia to build a more
stable and increasingly undivided Europe. ... "
Foreign Minister Primakov
"One of the irritants remaining between us is the issue of the
expansion of NATO. We are still negatively disposed towards the
expansion of NATO, however, we are doing everything we can
conceivably think of in order to minimize any negative consequences
that might arise in the event that NATO does expand.
Now the document or the charter, the agreement, whatever you
wish to call it, that is signed between Russia and NATO, for our
side, and in our view, must have a mandatory or binding nature upon
the two sides, and as far as we know, as far as we gather, Madam
Secretary of State shares this view.
We also have to say that we are interested in not having the
NATO infrastructure move eastward in our direction. And even those
reduced levels of armed forces in Europe, which my colleague so
very beautifully and so colorfully has described as reduced levels,
would be best even if those forces not move in our direction.
We are in favor of having NATO transform itself more in the
direction of becoming a political organization and that its
remaining functions be aimed primarily at peace- keeping functions.
"Question: 'Mr. Primakov, did you hear anything from the
American side that will make it easier for the Duma to act finally
on the long-delayed START Treaty? Gore-Chernomyrdin discussed some
guidelines for START-3, but are you getting any help to get that
through the Duma?'
Foreign Minister Primakov: '...as far as the START-2
ratification by our Duma, what I have to say here is that we have a
ways to go yet in trying to find a solution to the anti-ballistic
missile component and try to come to closure on that. We have given
corresponding instructions from both sides to our experts to sit
down and work this out.'
Question: 'Yevgeny Maximovich, on what guarantees of its
security will Russia insist in this charter, will the question of
deployment of NATO nuclear weapons in East European countries be
Foreign Minister Primakov: 'Mrs. Albright confirmed the
fact that there is no intention to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of the countries in Central and East Europe. We feel that
that should be reflected in the document.'"
US ADMNISTRATION REPORT ON NATO EXPANSION
'Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and
Implications,' Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US State
Department, 24 February 1997
"The major conclusions of this report include:
* NATO enlargement contributes to the broader goal of a
peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. NATO enlargement is one
part of a much broader, post-Cold War strategy to help create a
peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. That strategy has
included many other elements: support for German unification;
assistance to foster reforms in Russia, Ukraine and other new
independent States; negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty; and the evolution and strengthening of
European security and economic institutions, including the European
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Council of Europe and the Western European Union. ...
* NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free. The
United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn
security guarantees to additional nations, and NATO members must
provide the capability to back them up. Enlargement will not,
however, require a change in NATO's military doctrine, which has
already shifted from positional defense against an identified enemy
to a capacity for flexible deployment to areas of need. Because the
United States already has the world's pre-eminent deployment
capability, and substantial forces forward deployed in Europe,
there will be no need for additional US forces. Current European
NATO members are already investing in improved capabilities to
operate beyond their border, and Central European States, including
likely new members, are likewise investing in modernizing and
restructuring their forces. These efforts have already begun and
would continue whether or not NATO adds members.
* Costs to the United States will be modest. The Department of
Defense has estimated both the direct enlargement costs (e.g., for
interoperability between the forces of current and new members and
for extending NATO's integrated command, communications and air
defense surveillance systems) and the costs of force improvements
already being pursued by existing and new members which will also
contribute to carrying out NATO's missions in an enlarged alliance.
The direct enlargement costs are estimated to average $700-900
million annually, for a total of around $9-12 billion between 1997
and 2009, the date by which new NATO members are anticipated to
have reached a 'mature capability'... The US share of these costs,
chiefly for our share of the NATO budgets for direct enlargement
costs, would largely be incurred in the ten years following formal
accession in 1999, and would average about $150-200 million
annually during that period. The estimated costs for new members
associated with restructuring their forces are estimated to be
about $800 million-$1 billion annually, while those for
improvements of our Allies' regional reinforcement capabilities are
estimated at $600-800 million annually - respectively $10-13
billion and $8-10 billion over 1997-2009. ...
* The United States and NATO are committed to constructive
relations with Russia. ... Parallel to NATO enlargement, the United
States and NATO have proposed a series of initiatives, including a
NATO-Russia Charter and a permanent consultative mechanism, in
order to ensure that Russia plays an active part in efforts to
build a new Europe even as NATO enlargement proceeds.
In summary, the addition of new members to NATO will strengthen
the Alliance, contribute to a stronger and more peaceful Europe and
benefit American security interests. It is one of the President's
highest priorities for American foreign policy."
Rationale and Process for NATO Enlargement
"The United States and its NATO allies have pursued a number of
initiatives since the end of the Cold War in an effort to advance
this strategy. These include: ...
* Negotiation and implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which has led to the elimination of
over 50,000 pieces of military equipment. Negotiations to update
the CFE Treaty represent a further step.
* Negotiation and ratification of the START II strategic arms
control treaty, which when implemented, will achieve two-thirds
reductions in American and Russian nuclear arsenals.
* The elimination of INF missiles and a 90 percent overall
reduction in NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe, including the
unilateral renunciation of short range nuclear missiles and nuclear
artillery shells and the mutual detargeting of US and Russian
strategic nuclear missiles.
* Programs to help dismantle nuclear stockpiles and secure
nuclear materials in Russia and the newly-independent States.
Enlargement's Implications for NATO Strategy and
"NATO has agreed, and has informed Russia, that while new
members will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and
the essential role nuclear weapons play in Alliance strategy,
enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current
nuclear posture. For this reason, the Alliance has stated that it
has no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons
on the territory of new members; nor does it foresee any future
need to do so. Therefore, DoD does not expect enlargement to
produce any additional costs associated with nuclear forces.
Impact of Enlargement on Russian Policy and Relations with
"The United States and its allies... have undertaken a variety
of measures in recent years to create a coherent and constructive
relationship with Russia. As part of this effort, the United States
has supported Russia's democratic and market reforms, and has
promoted its integration into international fora and institutions,
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
and the G-7/Eight process. In parallel with NATO enlargement, the
United States and the Alliance seek to create a permanent
partnership with Russia, as an essential and complementary element
of new European security structures.
This is a challenge; we recognize that Russia will not endorse
NATO enlargement. Thus far, Moscow has pursued a two-track policy.
On the one hand, the Russian government and political elite
continue to voice opposition to enlargement. On the other hand,
President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Primakov and other senior
Russian officials are now engaging in an intensive dialogue with
the US, other key allies and NATO about the enlargement process and
prospects for developing the NATO-Russia relationship. ...
Statements of opposition to NATO enlargement have ranged from
concern about the threat to Russia's security and Russia's place in
Europe to suggestions that enlargement would harm reform or lead to
internal political instability in Russia. Some have suggested that
if NATO enlarges, Russia should respond by taking steps such as
increasing defense spending, refusing to ratify START II and
abrogating the CFE and INF treaties, pursuing reunification with
Belarus, building a counter-alliance to oppose NATO and redeploying
Russian forces and tactical nuclear weapons to areas along the
border with Poland, particularly if NATO stationed nuclear weapons
or multinational forces on the territory of new members. While the
Russian government has not in fact decided on any of these
measures, these statements convey the sense of concern among many
of Russia's elite. ..."
Impact of NATO Enlargement on Other Institutions and
"The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a
cornerstone of Europe's new security. Under the Treaty, more than
50,000 pieces of conventional military equipment have been
destroyed and conventional force levels are at their lowest in
decades. CFE caps equipment holdings of the major conventional
armies in Europe, thus ensuring predictability about those force
levels for the future. CFE limits help prevent destabilizing
concentrations of forces in any one region of its area of
application, from the Atlantic to the Urals. It seeks to ensure
military stability throughout the CFE area - for those States that
are members of an alliance as well as those that are not.
At the December 1996 OSCE summit in Lisbon, CFE Parties agreed
to begin adapting the Treaty to the new geopolitical landscape.
They approved a 'scope and parameters' document to guide the
process of adaptation, which began in January of this year.
From a legal point of view, NATO enlargement does not require
any change to the Treaty. Even though the Treaty is constructed
between two groups of State Parties (current NATO allies and the
countries of the former Warsaw Pact), these States are named
individually in the Treaty and its associated documents. However,
the Treaty was constructed to create an equal balance of forces
between the two groups.
The end of the Cold War has created a new security environment.
One of the groups that was party to the Treaty no longer exists;
the other plans to accept new members. In light of these
developments, NATO members have reviewed what changes to the Treaty
are warranted to preserve the benefits of CFE and ensure security
and stability at lower levels of forces in a changed security
environment. On 20 February, NATO countries put forward at the
Vienna negotiations a proposal on adapting the CFE Treaty to the
changes in Europe. The NATO initiative calls for replacing the
Treaty's outdated bloc-to-bloc approach with new national limits on
equipment. A key element of the proposal calls for lower equipment
levels throughout the CFE area, and contains a specific commitment
by the sixteen members of the alliance that the total of their
ground equipment entitlements under an adapted Treaty will be
'significantly less' than NATO is allowed under the current Treaty.
Another key element of the proposal would prevent an increase in
ground equipment levels in a key area of central Europe. The May
1996 Flank Agreement will be retained. Successful adaptation of the
CFE Treaty will result in increased stability and security for all
the States of Europe, including those not currently party to the
Treaty, such as the Baltic States."
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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