Documents from the Third NPT PrepCom
Draft Recommendations on Products, 21 May 1999
Chairman's Working Paper, 14 May
Chairman's Revised Working Paper, 20 May
Go to Briefings from the Acronym Institute on the Third NPT PrepCom
Go to Rebecca Johnson's report on the PrepCom for Disarmament Diplomacy No. 37
'Recommendations of the PrepCom on Products of the NPT 2000 Review Conference,' 21 May 1999
"1. The Preparatory Committee at its third session decided to have a general exchange of views focused on the expected outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.
2. In accordance with Article VIII paragraph 3 of the Treaty and taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in particular paragraph 7 of Decision 1, the Preparatory Committee recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, taking into account the work and reports of the Main Committees, should:
3. The 2000 Review Conference should examine the functioning of the review process itself, taking account of experience since 1995, and may wish to reflect appropriately the conclusions of the examination.
4. The 2000 Review Conference can also consider and adopt other outcomes.
5. The outcome should reaffirm the validity of the decisions and principles and objectives and the strengthening of the review process and the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference."
'Chairman's Working Paper,' 14 May 1999
"1. The Preparatory Committee agreed on the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference:
1. Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty.
2. Reaffirmation of conviction that the treaty is essential to international peace and security and recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
3. Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Universality
4. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibuti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187. Also urge all States not yet party to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
5. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts by States parties might include the enhancement of regional security. Non-Proliferation
6. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. Emphasise the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II.
7. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, of their commitments to the fullest implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.
8. Reaffirmation of the condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998 as stated in Security Council resolution 1172 and General Assembly resolution 53/77 G, and the importance of full compliance with each of the measures identified in those resolutions. Urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.
9. Reaffirmation of the integrity of the Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and the commitment of all State parties not to accord any status or recognition to additional States that possess nuclear weapon capabilities.
10. Reaffirmation that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security.
Nuclear Disarmament
11. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context, by the nuclear-weapon States, of their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons globally. Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament necessitates the co-operation of all States.
12. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Require that at an appropriate stage, the US and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS. Reaffirmation of the need to renew and revitalize this process, including accelerated efforts to ensure full implementation of the obligations under Article VI. Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons
13. Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States. Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime.
14. Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose, and urge its immediate reestablishment.
15. Reaffirmation that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions are to be viewed in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
16. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free-zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and realising the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Support of proposals for such zones as in the Middle East and South Asia. Welcome of the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
17. Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Raratonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies. Welcome and support the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived At Among The States of the Region Concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.
Security Assurances
18. Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Welcome the establishment in March 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament on Negative Security Assurances, and urge its immediate re-establishment.
Safeguards
19. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the existent safeguards agreements to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system; reaffirmation that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.
20. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of sources or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
21. Support for the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Protocol Additional to existing Safeguards Agreements. Also urge all States that have Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540.
22. Urge the nuclear-weapon States to include in Additional Protocols to their voluntary safeguards agreements those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Protocol.
23. Urge all States parties required by article III of the Treaty which have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Additionally call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
24. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.
The Resolution on the Middle East
25. Recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. Recognition, in this regard, of the special responsibility of the depositary States as cosponsors of this resolution.
26. To take note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution of the Middle East all States on the region have become parties to the treaty with the exception of Israel. To stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
27. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation between States parties in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
28. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
29. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
30. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area.
31. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end.
2. The following is a list of the specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation and that the list is not exclusive. ..."
'Chairman's Working Paper - Rev. 1,' 20 May 1999
"1. With reference to substantive issues discussed at its 1999 meeting, the Preparatory Committee recommends that the Review Conference consider the following agreed elements on the understanding that they may be reviewed, updated and added to at the Review Conference, as it proceeds to develop its final outcome:
1. Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty and to the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT.
2. Reaffirmation of conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty is essential to international peace and security
3. Recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. Reaffirmation that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
5. Recalling that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made on the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States of nuclear disarmament.
6. Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
7. Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and on 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty' as well as the 'Resolution on the Middle East' adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
8. Affirmation that all the articles of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are binding on all States parties and at all times and in all circumstances.
Universality
9. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187.
10. Urge all States not yet party to the Treaty, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, at the earliest possible date, without condition or further delay, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
11. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.
Non-Proliferation
12. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.
13. Reaffirmation by nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.
14. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, not to receive from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.
15. Expression of the concern of the States Parties with the cases on non-compliance of the treaty by two States Parties which demand the close attention and effective response of the States Parties of the NPT.
16. Condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998. Note that the States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
17. Reaffirmation that in accordance with Article IX, States not currently States parties may accede to the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
18. Reiteration of the call on those States which possess the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and which have not yet acceded to the NPT to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear-weapon development or deployment, and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
19. Reaffirmation that the cessation of all nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear explosion will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security.
Nuclear Disarmament
20. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context, by all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, of their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons. Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament necessitates the co-operation of all States.
21. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Recognition also of the unilateral reduction measures taken by the other nuclear weapon States.
22. Recognition that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place:
a) Call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to revitalize the START process by bringing START II into force without delay, and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion.
b) Require that in the near future the United States and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS, in a seamless process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
c) Reaffirm the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce further their reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and to pursue negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities.
d) Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and ensure the effective management of the resultant fissile materials.
e) Proceed with interim measures to prevent accidental or unauthorised launches, such as de-alerting, de-targetting and de-activating their nuclear weapons, and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.
f) Examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines.
23. Achievement of the following measures is important in the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:
a) Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States (France and the United Kingdom). Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime, including to provide the Preparatory Commission with the necessary financial means.
b) Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose under Item 1 of its Agenda 'Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament', and urge its immediate reestablishment.
c) Welcome the announcements made by some NWS that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and call upon all NWS to declare collectively a moratorium on the production of such material for such devices.
d) Establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee 1 of Review Conferences, and the provision of specific time at all future meetings of Preparatory Committees, for a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
e) Urge the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad-hoc Committee under Item 1 of its Agenda with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament.
24. Welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament, in particular the voluntary decision to withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories, and taking note with satisfaction of the current efforts of those States to strengthen the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.
25. Affirm that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
26. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free-zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
27. Support of proposals for the establishment of NWFZ where they do not yet exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia and welcome of the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
28. Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation.
29. Welcome the conclusion of the agreement regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and urge its rapid implementation.
30. Recognition of the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Raratonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons.
31. Reaffirmation of the importance of ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Raratonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as of the continued work by all concerned States to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zones treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so.
32. Welcome the consensus reached in the United Nation General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Urge all States directly concerned to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.
33. Welcome the report on the 'Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned', adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.
The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
34. Recall that the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. Recognition, in this regard, of the special responsibility of the depositary States as cosponsors of this resolution.
35. Reaffirmation of the provisions of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and reaffirmation of the determination to work diligently towards its speedy implementation.
36. Recognition that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, Djibouti, Oman and the UAE have become parties to the Treaty. Expression of deep concern that Israel continues to be the only state in the region which has not yet acceded to the Treaty and refuses to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA.
37. Call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards without further delay and without conditions.
38. Recognition of the need for all States Parties to the Treaty, and in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their co-operation and exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
39. Affirmation of the importance of full compliance of all States parties to the NPT in the region with their obligations under the treaty. Note that one State in the Middle East remains in non-compliance with the Treaty and with United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction, and that this State continues not to allow IAEA inspectors.
Security Assurances
40. Reaffirmation that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.
41. Welcome the establishment in March 1998 in the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and urge its immediate reestablishment.
42. Reiterate the need for the commitment, without any condition, by all the nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and conclude international legal instruments to this effect.
Safeguards
43. Reaffirmation that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and its safeguards system, compliance with Safeguards Agreements.
44. Urge all States which have not yet done so to conclude with the IAEA a full-scope Safeguards Agreement, as required by article III of the Treaty. Urge those States Parties to the IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreements, which are not in compliance, to implement all obligations under the Agreements fully and unconditionally.
45. Call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
46. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Additional protocol to existent safeguards Agreements (laid down in document INFCIRC/540) designed to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. Welcome the signature of such agreements by 36 non-nuclear weapon States.
47. Urge all States that have not yet done so to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540. Urge the nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so, to include in their Additional protocols those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Additional protocol.
48. Placement of nuclear material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States.
49. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary precondition, adherence to the treaty and acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.
50. Support for the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Additional Protocol with the traditional safeguards measures.
51. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, the IAEA recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.
52. Underline the importance of the conclusions of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security of 19 and 20 of April 1996, and the initiatives stemming from it.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
53. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
54. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and with due consideration of the needs of the developing areas of the world, call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
55. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area. Urge all States that have not yet done so to accede to these Conventions at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate nuclear facilities. Welcome the agreement reached in December 1997 among a group of nine countries on guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities.
56. Affirmation that it is in the interests of all States that the maritime transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in compliance with international standards of safety, security and environmental protection. Call on those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of such radioactive materials to continue to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.
57. Consideration of the potential contributions from new, inherently-safe nuclear-power technologies in enhancing the safety of nuclear power. In this connection, to propose the elaboration, under the auspices of IAEA, of such a project to ensure that energy is obtained safely with minimal risk from the point of view of non-proliferation.
58. Recognition of the obligation of NPT States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear items do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and recognition that co-ordination of national policies to this end can contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with Article IV.
59. Reaffirm the importance of non-discriminatory and universally-binding nuclear control regimes. Welcome for the two International Seminars on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation held in 1997 and 1999, as well as other ongoing efforts by nuclear suppliers to respond to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's call for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-export controls.
60. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeapordize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the respect of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly those under Chapter VII.
61. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end, inter alia review of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials at the earliest possible time with the aim of strengthening and broadening its scope.
2. The following is a list of specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation and that the list is not conclusive. ..."
'New Agenda Statement,' delivered by Ambassador Luiz Tupy Caldas de Moura of Brazil, 12 May 1999
"1. I wish to make a statement on behalf of the delegations of Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Iran, Indonesia, Ireland, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe
2. In 1995 the States parties extended the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty indefinitely. We undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. We strengthened the Review Process for the Treaty and we adopted Principles and Objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty.
3. The Decisions and Resolution we adopted in 1995 were taken against the promise heralded by a new era of international cooperation. We concluded that 'nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the Cold War.' We agreed that undertakings on nuclear disarmament should thus be fulfilled with determination. To this end we adopted a programme of action which we agreed was important in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States re-affirmed their commitment under Article VI 'to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament'.
4. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the following year, concluded unanimously that: 'There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control'.
5. The balance sheet in meeting the nuclear disarmament objectives set in 1995 is not, however, satisfactory. We have concluded the CTBT. Regrettably, negotiations on a fissile materials treaty are not taking place. An internationally legally binding instrument on negative security assurances is not in prospect.
6. At the outset we have unfinished business. The immediate commencement and rapid conclusion of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty is an outstanding priority. So too is the entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT as well as the strict observance of its purposes and provisions. And the further pursuit of negative security assurances must be maintained.
7. Regionally there has been some progress in the further development of nuclear weapon free zones, and, in particular, the movement towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas from such weapons.
8. There have been severe setbacks in South Asia where non-proliferation objectives have been blatantly disregarded. The situation in the Middle East remains of the utmost concern. Activities in the Korean Peninsula require on-going and close attention.
9. On the other side of the ledger, there is the potential of the bilateral START process. There have been welcome steps by some nuclear weapon states which will facilitate in due course their seamless integration into nuclear force reduction negotiations. But ratification of START II is unfortunately frozen. This in turn is blocking the commencement of negotiations on START III.
10. In reviewing all these developments the overwhelming conclusion must be that the pace of efforts to implement all the obligations of the NPT is faltering. As a consequence, negotiations on the measures required to achieve the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are in serious deficit.
11. Of profound concern is the lack of evidence that the nuclear-weapon states consider their treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons consistent with the Article VI obligations and the 1995 Principles and Objectives. On the contrary, the continued possession of nuclear weapons has been re-rationalised. Nuclear doctrines have been reaffirmed. This is happening at a time when the States parties have all agreed to work with determination for their elimination.
12. The indefinite extension of the NPT does not sanction the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. We must be absolutely clear about that. We must not enter the next millennium with the prospect that the retention of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future.
13. It must be stressed that all the articles of the NPT are binding on all States parties and at all times and in all circumstances.
14. The NPT non-nuclear weapon states have entered into an obligation to forego the nuclear weapons option. That decision was made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
15. But this fundamental and virtually universal bargain struck in the NPT is not being pursued. Its clear and unambiguous obligations are not being fulfilled with sufficient vigour. A world order whereby one group of five states can indefinitely retain nuclear weapons while more than one hundred and eighty states refrain from acquiring them in conformity with the same treaty is not acceptable. There must be a significant and visible acceleration in the process of elimination and a better balance in expectations.
16. It is inherent too in any treaty based on mutually agreed obligations that no one group of states can determine independently the pace with which the obligations of that treaty are implemented. It will no longer suffice in 2000 to rehearse the indefinite goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is imperative to secure a clear and unequivocal commitment to the speedy pursuit of the total elimination of these weapons.
17. And consistent with this unequivocal commitment it will be necessary to agree on such measures as are required to reduce the nuclear threat at the earliest date and to fully implement the Treaty in all its aspects. These measures must form the elements of a process of irreversibly ridding the world of nuclear weapons for all time. They will have to be realistic and achievable.
18. There will need to be a fine balance between bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral efforts, which should be mutually reinforcing and which should be pursued in concert. The continuing pursuit of the START process is fundamental and we urge the United States and the Russian Federation to overcome current obstacles to this process. The other nuclear weapon states should take the necessary steps towards their seamless integration into the process leading to the elimination of their nuclear weapons. The total and final elimination of nuclear weapons will require a multilateral agreement.
19. There are also a number of interim measures which should be addressed by the nuclear weapon states with a view to reducing the nuclear threat and de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies. These include the de-alerting of nuclear weapons and the removal of warheads from delivery vehicles, the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as the early examination of measures to enhance strategic stability and to review strategic doctrines accordingly. A legally binding instrument should be developed as regards the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT, so-called Negative Security Assurances.
20. Transparency by all nuclear weapon States about their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stocks and the placing under IAEA safeguards of materials surplus to requirements should be addressed.
21. Only four States remain outside the NPT. Three of them possess nuclear weapons capabilities. In the past year, two of these States have engaged in nuclear testing and they have echoed rationales for 'minimum credible deterrence'. A third is the only state remaining outside the NPT in its region. We call upon all these States to accede to the NPT unconditionally and without delay and to promptly place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.
22. We also call upon those States that have not done so to swiftly sign and/or ratify the CTBT unconditionally and without delay and, pending the Treaty's entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear testing.
23. It is essential that all the existing and fundamental bilateral and multilateral instruments that make up the international security architecture be maintained and upheld.
24. All these steps would constitute elements of an agenda for 2000 and beyond. We would not claim that it is exhaustive. There have been other constructive suggestions from many delegations. But what we are advocating today are some of the critical elements we shall need to confront.
25. Mr Chairman, the group of States, on behalf of whom this statement is made, tabled a draft resolution at the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1998, which sets out an agenda that will need to be pursued to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. This resolution was adopted in the General Assembly by a large majority of Member States of the United Nations and therefore by a large majority of the parties to this Treaty. Given the support which the international community has already given to the consideration of these proposals, they should guide states parties in their formulation of objectives that need to be considered for any forward looking products the PrepCom or Review Conference will produce. I request that the text of resolution 53/77Y be circulated as an official document of this Preparatory Committee meeting.
26. More than ever, we will all need to be constructive, creative and engaged. The NPT remains as indispensable as ever. But there must be a demonstrable shift in policy and commitment to a reinvigorated disarmament process. And it is incumbent on all States parties to demonstrate ownership of the NPT in taking it forward."
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
Go to Briefings from the Acronym Institute on the Third NPT PrepCom
Summary and analysis of the 1997 PrepCom is available from Disarmament Diplomacy No 14.