The Fissile Material Treaty

Breakthrough on FMT

KEY FMT DOCUMENTS

  1. UN General Assembly Resolution, December 1993
  2. The Shannon Report & mandate, March 1995
  3. G-21 Statement, August 1998
  4. Pakistan Statement, August 1998

Updates from The Acronym Institute

1. UNGA 48/75L CONSENSUS RESOLUTION, 16 December 1993

Prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the significant progress in reducing nuclear-weapon arsenals as evidenced by the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the USA and their respective unilateral undertakings regarding the disposition of fissile material,

Welcoming also the initiative of the USA concerning a multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Welcoming further the decision taken by the CD on 10 August 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and fully endorsing the contents of that decision,

Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects,

  1. Recommends the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

  2. Requests the IAEA to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty as required;

  3. Calls upon all states to demonstrate their commitment to the objectives of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

  4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nucelar explosive devices."

2. THE SHANNON REPORT & MANDATE, MARCH 1995

Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, CD/1299, 24 March 1995

At the beginning of last year's session, I was tasked with seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As you know I held numerous consultations, both bilaterally and with groups and reported formally to this plenary on five occasions in 1994. Mid-way through the last session, consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on this issue. At the end of the session in September, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee, there was agreement in principle, that an Ad Hoc Committee be established on this issue as soon as a mandate had been agreed. At that time, the CD asked me to continue consultations on an appropriate mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee in order to enable the convening of this Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.

At the beginning of this year's session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate.

I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a Committee should be based on Resolution 48/75L of the UN General Assembly, and reads as follows:

  1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a "Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

  2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

  3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session. During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile materials (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.

Mr President, it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.

Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an Ad Hoc Committee on Cut-Off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. This has for some time been the common objective of all delegations of this Conference.

I have appreciated the productive contribution and support of all delegations in arriving at this result."

3. G-21 STATEMENT, 11 AUGUST 1998

The G-21 emphasises that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority for the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In order to promote the work of the CD, the group underscores its flexibility in accepting the proposal to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda - entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" - to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices". This gesture should be reciprocated by others through their agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, as well as during the course of the negotiations to be conducted in the ad hoc committee which we have just agreed to establish.

The group of 21 stresses the importance of the elimination of the possibility of nuclear war and the threats derived from the continued existence of nuclear weapons, and the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The group expresses its support for the President's declaration that in accordance with paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, intensive consultations will continue with a view to reaching a decision on an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The group is of the view that these consultations should lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls the various proposals presented collectively and individually by its members.

The G-21 believes that the proposed treaty dealing with fissile material must constitute a nuclear disarmament measure, and not only a nuclear non-proliferation measure, and be an integral step leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty shall also promote international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mindful that the achievement of nuclear disarmament requires urgent negotiation, the group emphasises the imperative need for all states to commit themselves unequivocally to the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. An ad hoc committee should be established in the CD to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention.

The G-21 believes firmly that a satisfactory solution to the issue of nuclear disarmament will have a direct bearing on the work of the CD in the future.

4. PAKISTAN STATEMENT, 11 AUGUST 1998

'Fissile Material Treaty', Statement from Munir Akram, Ambassador of Pakistan

  1. Pakistan is happy that the CD has been able to adopt a decision to establish an ad hoc Committee to negotiate a Treaty on Fissile Material based on the Shannon Report.

    Mr President,

  2. A Fissile Material Treaty has been a long-standing goal of the international community. Para 50 of the Final Declaration of SSOD-I called for a ban on the production of fissile material as part of the measures for nuclear disarmament, the creation of NWFZs and a time-bound programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We continue to adhere firmly to this long-standing international consensus. It is the attempt to deny or compromise this consensus which has delayed the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty.

  3. As the discussions and consultations of the past two weeks have confirmed, there are some fundamental differences among members of the CD on the purpose and scope of the FMT. A few States -- including the 5 NWS and one self-declared NWS -- wish to restrict the proposed ban on fissile materials only to future production. The vast majority of the CD;s membership continues to adhere to the long-standing consensus that the FMT must address the issue of stockpiles of fissile material possessed by some States and, through their progressive and balanced reduction, to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty should not be, once again, a measure for nuclear non-proliferation alone.

  4. Therefore, my delegation does not agree to the Treaty being described as a fissile material "Cut-off" Treaty, implying only a halt in future production. We cannot endorse the loose abbreviation - FMCT - in any formal description of the Treaty which is to be negotiated by the CD.

  5. The existence of unequal stockpiles of fissile material in South Asia was always an issue of central importance since it threatened to destabilise the situation of "existential" or "non-weaponised" deterrence between India and Pakistan. This issue has become even more critical in the wake of India's declaration that it is now a nuclear weapon State and that it will produce and deploy nuclear weapons for what it calls "minimum deterrence". We can therefore only presume that India will transform its large fissile material stocks into nuclear weapons. This will accentuate the threat to stability and security in South Asia. In calculating the balance required to maintain deterrence vis-a-vis India and Pakistan, we shall need to take into account both India's nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles. We cannot therefore agree to freeze inequality, specially when this directly threatens our security. It is for this reason that Pakistan has asked for a clarification -- before commencing negotiations -- about India's nuclear status. Unfortunately, the response that has been given is legalistic rather than realistic. We shall therefore need to factor the "new realities" into our negotiations on the FMT.

    Mr President,

  6. A decision on the scope of the treaty will be essential to determine the nature of the Treaty and its provisions for verification and compliance. We shall need to proceed step by step in evolving agreement on the FMT.

  7. The negotiations we will commence in the ad hoc committee on the FMT will be complex, arduous and time-consuming.

  8. But, at this stage, we wish to affirm what has been stated by the G-21 in the informal consultations. The FMT is not the highest priority for the Group. As the coordinator of the G-21 has just stated, the realisation of nuclear disarmament enjoys the highest priority in our pantheon of the purposes of the CD. Together with the G-21, Pakistan will continue to seek the early establishment of an ad hoc Committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. We have proposed specific measures for nuclear disarmament, including a Convention to commit all States to the elimination of nuclear weapons. We hope this will be taken up by the CD in the near future. We expect that the NWS will be responsive to the desires and hopes of the vast majority of mankind in pursuing nuclear disarmament, specially in this sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament.

    Thank you, Mr President.

    UPDATES FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE

    For the latest information on the Fissile Materials Treaty, refer to the relevant sections in Rebecca Johnson's Geneva Update in Disarmament Diplomacy No 29, (August/September 1998) and First Committee Report in Disarmament Diplomacy No 32, November 1998. Watch this space for news of developments in the Conference on Disarmament, once it reconvenes on 18 January 1999.

    © 1998 The Acronym Institute.

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