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Disarmament Diplomacy No. 76, Cover design by Paul Aston

Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 76, March/April 2004

Dr. Khan's Nuclear WalMart

Christopher Clary

Following revelations in 2003 about the illicit sale of Pakistani nuclear technology to Iran and Libya, Pakistan initiated an investigation. On February 4, 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a national hero for his role in Pakistan's nuclear programme, addressed his nation on television. Khan confirmed: "The investigation has established that many of the reported activities did occur, and that these were invariably initiated at my behest." His explanation was less forthcoming. The "activities ... were based in good faith but on errors of judgment." His subordinates were just following orders.1

In recent months, the international community, particularly the United States, has been deeply troubled to learn that Pakistan was a primary source of nuclear enrichment technology, nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons designs to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. An anonymous Washington official voiced the frustration, saying, "These guys are now three for three as supplier to the biggest proliferation problems we have."2

The revelations have confronted Pakistan and the international community with two distinct problems. Pakistan faces a classic Scylla and Charybdis situation. If its past and present governments knew of the proliferation activities, it raises deep questions about Pakistan's nuclear stewardship. If, on the other hand, the Musharraf government was unaware, that could be even worse because it indicates that for the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weapon - the supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designs - were out of state oversight and control. Either way, the international community is confronted with the growing failure of nonproliferation norms and supplier cartels to restrain proliferation. Two trends - secondary proliferation and the globalisation of manufacturing - have seriously weakened the ability of 1970s-era nonproliferation regimes to contain twenty-first century problems.

Starting with what we know so far, this essay will examine what was proliferated, when, and to whom. Secondly, it will look at two possible explanations. Did the Pakistani state knowingly proliferate in a desperate attempt to maintain strategic parity in a difficult competition with India? Or, did one man abuse the autonomy he was given in order to advance his personal or ideological goals? In the end, both stories have problems. The data point in contradictory directions. Timelines don't fit. Rationales are confusing. In other words, neither storyline makes coherent sense. This essay concludes by attempting to craft policy solutions that can restore some semblance of control and stability in this ambiguous landscape of nuclear proliferation.

The Story So Far

When the first stories of possible Pakistani proliferation broke in 2002, nuclear technology from Pakistan had been available to foreign customers for as many as fifteen years. Open sources indicate nuclear technology was shared with three countries: Iran, North Korea, and Libya.3 Press accounts also allude to unsuccessful courtships with Iraq and perhaps one other Arab country before the first Gulf War.4

The story begins across the border in India. When India conducted its 1974 "peaceful nuclear experiment," it awakened the West to the dangers of the Atoms for Peace bargain.5 The United States soon corralled other nuclear suppliers into a cartel to prevent nuclear technology from being transferred to states who refused full scope safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Pakistan faced a daunting strategic challenge. India, which three years earlier had vivisected Pakistan into two with the creation of Bangladesh, now possessed a nuclear explosive device. In 1965, then-foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had predicted what would occur in such an event. "If India builds the bomb," he had promised, "we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own."6 Pakistan shifted massive resources to develop nuclear parity with its larger neighbour.

Pakistan faced obstacles, however, that India never did. The nuclear suppliers had suspended the technical assistance and reversed the lax export controls that had subsidised the Indian programme. Shortly after India's test, for instance, Canada cut off all supplies of nuclear fuel to the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. But sometimes it's better to be lucky than good. Pakistan had a second-rate metallurgist working for a huge European nuclear consortium who was willing to help. Thirteen years later, in 1987, that scientist would tell an Indian journalist that Pakistan had the ability to build nuclear weapons.7

Abdul Qadeer Khan had undertaken postgraduate work in metallurgical engineering in West Germany and Belgium, receiving his Ph.D. from the Catholic University of Leuven in 1972. He found employment working for the Anglo-Dutch-German centrifuge enrichment partnership, URENCO. In 1974, Khan wrote Bhutto that he was willing to return and work for Pakistan. He left URENCO in 1976, bringing with him stolen centrifuge designs and, perhaps more importantly, a list of 100 companies that supplied centrifuge parts and materials. After a brief stint within the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission structure, he moved to the Engineering Research Laboratories, setting up a uranium enrichment plant in Kahuta. Within four years of returning home, his progress was significant enough that then-President Zia ul-Haq renamed the facility. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) was born.8

Khan skilfully manoeuvred around international export controls. He later said, "My long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset. Within two years we had put up working prototypes of centrifuges and were going at full speed to build the facilities at Kahuta."9 The European firms were eager to do business: "They literally begged us to buy their equipment," Khan recalled.10 It was an impressive feat, something which Khan was well aware of. He boasted, "A country which could not make sewing needles, good bicycles or even ordinary durable metalled roads was embarking on one of the latest and most difficult technologies. We devised a strategy whereby we would go all out to buy everything that we needed in the open market to lay the foundation of a good infrastructure."11

To create the internal infrastructure - the roaring cascades of centrifuges gradually enriching the uranium gas - this external procurement network was critical. In the early years, however, Pakistan's desire for a nuclear weapon as soon as possible was tearing Khan's engine apart. Shortcuts, limited diagnostics, and an emphasis on speed over precision meant that the centrifuges were breaking down. Within five years, according to one Western intelligence official, their first cascades had been devastated from the loss of machines. Pakistan would have to expend significant resources just to replace the lost capacity.12 But the cost had been worth it. By the mid-1980s, within a decade of Khan leaving his URENCO offices for good, Pakistan had enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon. And Khan had created a network of middlemen, financiers, importers, and front companies that remained largely intact until just recently.

At this point, sometime in the late 1980s, Khan appears to have diverted the flow. He was still bringing in material and components for his nuclear enrichment process, but he appears to have ordered more than Pakistan needed.13 At the same time, Khan Research Laboratories was maturing. KRL scientists published papers, starting in 1987, on constructing more difficult centrifuges of maraging steel, rather than the earlier aluminium-based designs. In 1991, KRL scientists published details of how to etch special grooves into the bottom bearing of the centrifuge to incorporate lubricants.14 Both trends - over-ordering and technological evolution - left Khan with excess inventory. He had been forced to integrate an intentionally fragmented marketplace, and spent significant time and money to do so. Others would be willing to pay as well.

What, When, and To Whom?

From 1987 until perhaps as recently as last year, Pakistani nuclear technology was apparently available on the international black market. Iran is the first known instance of the proliferation of Pakistani know-how, whereas cooperation with Libya appears to be the most recent. Initial reports seemed to indicate that the scope of nuclear sharing was growing chronologically: Pakistan's sharing with Iran was fairly limited, Pakistani-North Korean cooperation was more significant, while Libya was in the midst of acquiring the most extensive "package" when it made the strategic decision to forego weapons in 2003. But more recent revelations from Iran have called into doubt that simpler narrative.

According to reports by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran received drawings of a centrifuge "through a foreign intermediary" some time "around 1987".15 Additionally, between 1985 and 1997 "about 2000 components and some subassemblies had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but no help was received from abroad in the assembly of centrifuges or in training, nor were any completed centrifuges imported."16 The IAEA report continues, in an implicit slap at the supplier: "Efforts had been concentrated on achieving an operating centrifuge, but many difficulties were encountered as a result of machine crashes attributed to poor quality components."17 Iran also claims that some of these components were contaminated at purchase, explaining away the high levels of enrichment on the sample swatches taken by international inspectors.

While details are sketchy, there are three reasons to believe Pakistan was a primary source of nuclear technology for Iran. First, while some of the sample swatches are reported to contain Soviet-produced highly enriched uranium, the IAEA suspects that the samples of most concern, containing traces of uranium enriched to higher than 90 percent U-235, may have come from Pakistan.18 Second, centrifuge drawings acquired by Iran and given to IAEA inspectors resemble the design of the Pakistan-1 centrifuge, an early generation Pakistan centrifuge with aluminium rotors.19 Third, and most convincingly, the IAEA discovered assembled centrifuges at the Doshan Tapeh military air base near Tehran which strongly resembled the Pakistan-2 centrifuge design.20

Chronologically, cooperation with North Korea appears next, though the 1997 date, which comes from background briefings by Pakistani officials, is uncertain. While most analysts note Pakistani-North Korean cooperation on ballistic missile technology started as early as 1992, the consensus appears that Pakistan's transfer of uranium enrichment technology did not occur until 1997. Analysts attribute the policy change to the lack of foreign reserves in 1996 to pay for the delivery of the Nodong missile system, or a secret visit by then-Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat to Pyongyang in December 1997, or else they simply accept the date without explanation.21

Pakistan has been surprisingly open, however, about the nature of the nuclear cooperation. Khan, in a signed statement, reportedly accepted responsibility for "supplying old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data and depleted Hexaflouride (UF6) gas to North Korea."22 And while there is debate about how recently cooperation ceased, Pakistan has admitted that technical assistance was provided after General Pervez Musharraf became Army chief in 1999.23

Cooperation with Libya also supposedly began in 1997. The scale was extensive, approaching a "turnkey" nuclear weapons programme. According to U.S. officials, "the principal supplier for the entire [Libyan] programme was A.Q. Khan and company." Though U.S. officials acknowledge "there were other suppliers for other elements of the programme... [Khan] provided the design, the technology, the expertise [and] equipment, primarily for the centrifuge. He also provided the warhead design."24


Two theses are offered to explain the A.Q. Khan revelations. One, favoured by many in Washington (and Delhi), argues that proliferation on such a scale had to occur with the knowledge of the Pakistani government. The other, heard in Islamabad, contends that Khan was a "rogue actor" who abused the autonomy he gained from his earlier patriotic actions to pursue personal goals. The evidence is indeterminate.

The case against the Pakistani government is based largely on the duration and scale of the operation. It is framed in terms of rhetorical questions. How could Khan arrange for the import and export of such quantities of material - sometimes on military cargo plans - without the awareness of the Pakistan military? Were the Pakistani authorities unaware of the massive fortune Khan was amassing? Why did Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto go to Pyongyang in 1993, and General Karamat go there in 1997? Why didn't Pakistan more seriously follow up Western allegations in the late 1990s of Khan's malfeasance?

The Pakistani response is not wholly comforting. To miss some of the indicators of malfeasance - purchasing a hotel in West Africa and renaming it after your wife for instance, which Khan did - requires that the regulatory regime bungled and bungled badly. Pakistani officials claim they had designed their programme to be covert and to deliver results.25 As a consequence, Khan was given broad autonomy and almost no oversight. While all those entering the nuclear establishment were rigorously screened by four different Pakistani agencies (Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau, and the Strategic Plans Division), top officials were screened by their organisations alone.26

Khan, in effect, was in charge of vouching for his own activities and those of his closest deputies. The overseers faced problems endemic for regulators everywhere. For instance, they appointed military officers approaching retirement to watch over security at Khan Research Laboratories. These officers were already planning for their post-retirement income, and were vulnerable to giving Khan autonomy in an attempt to secure follow-on employment. Khan had the ability to order planes to pick up parts, get containers through customs, and travel to far-flung places because he had delivered results. In the face of widespread international opposition, he had delivered to Pakistan the strategic deterrent it so desperately sought.

Visits to Pyongyang by high-level Pakistani officials are circumstantial evidence at best, and analysts should be wary of drawing conclusions. Pakistan and North Korea have had a pragmatic and broad arms-trading partnership for over a decade. Benazir Bhutto's 1993 visit most likely launched Pakistani-North Korean cooperation on liquid-fuel missile technology. Karamat's 1997 visit could have been to secure conventional arms cooperation, which also was occurring at the time.

Yes, Western officials had long been warning - chastising - their Pakistani colleagues about A.Q. Khan's activities, but the Western representatives never brought with them actionable intelligence so the Pakistani response was understandably dubious. Moreover, those same governments had historically sought to impede Pakistan's progress in the nuclear programme, so sidelining Khan was viewed as part of that overall policy. The Pakistani authorities claim, with some justification, that the first time they received usable intelligence - as a result of the Iran and Libya revelations - they acted upon it swiftly.

But, more persuasively, they throw the question back: "Why would we do this knowingly?" General Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff from 1988 to 1991, held peculiar notions about "strategic defiance" led by an Iranian-Afghan-Pakistani alliance, which might have seduced him into supporting nuclear cooperation. But the timelines don't neatly coincide with Beg's rule. If cooperation with Iran did begin as early as 1987, Zia ul-Haq was still in charge. If it extended until the mid-1990s, which sharing of the Pakistan-2 centrifuge designs may indicate, such cooperation would have outlived Beg's tenure as chief.

Cooperation with North Korea appears more rational, ostensibly a ballistic missile technology for uranium enrichment swap. But by the time the barter supposedly occurred, in 1997, Pakistan had already acquired superior Chinese solid-fuelled missile technology. Further, while it is true that foreign reserves sank to dire levels in 1996, it is a long leap to assume that Pakistan could find no other way to finance missile acquisitions than by a technology exchange. After all, in 1997, the Pakistani defence budget was nearly $3 billion, much of which had to be going to foreign goods of one sort or another. A uranium enrichment for plutonium separation technology swap makes more sense, but there is no evidence to indicate that this occurred.

Finally, any strategic rationale for Pakistan to supply Libya is difficult to imagine. Estimates of Libyan payments to KRL of between $50 and $100 million seem insufficient for the risk the Pakistani government would be taking. In comparison, Saudi Arabia reportedly paid $3 billion for between 36 and 40 Chinese CSS-2s.27 If the Pakistani state was trying to supplement its defence and nuclear budget, it was getting chump change.

Glass Half Empty or Half Full?

Should the news of the last six months make us feel better or worse? On the positive side, a huge nuclear black market - what Dr ElBaradei called the "WalMart of private sector proliferation" - has been revealed.28 Pakistan has launched what appears to be a serious investigation into Khan's misdeeds and connections over the past fifteen years. Perhaps more importantly, the international nonproliferation regime has once again demonstrated that it can work. Information coming out of Iran and Libya has dramatically increased our understanding of how some states may seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Libya appears to have made the strategic choice to abstain from such acquisition indefinitely. Iran looks less certain, but if progress can be maintained, another one of the hard cases can be put in the win column.

The glass looks half empty as well. Pakistan was unable to constrain a motivated actor working within the system from disseminating the most vital of national secrets, including to a country like Iran with which Islamabad has had historically troubled relations. The changes it has made to its oversight system may or may not be sufficient to fix the problems. More broadly, the global diffusion of nuclear information, combined with the globalisation of precision manufacturing, have seriously undercut the effectiveness of the supplier regimes.

When President Musharraf was interviewed by CNN, he trumpeted the ability of the Pakistan Army to account for "even a bolt of a rifle". Christiane Amanpour was quick to ask: if that were the case, how could nuclear technology be transferred without his knowledge. Musharraf's answer was disheartening and, to some extent, true: "Nuclear technology is in computers, on paper and in the minds of people."29 Implicitly, he was saying that what was intangible was uncontrollable.

The transfer of warhead designs from Pakistan to Libya indicates the difficulty of returning the genie to the bottle. Suspected 1960s-era Chinese warhead designs were at some point passed on to Pakistan. They were transferred to Libya in the undignified packaging of an Islamabad dry cleaner bag. Many of the blueprints, designs, sketches, and instructions found in Libya have been copies of copies of copies. If the copies were passed on through middlemen, control of the information may have been irrevocably lost.

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein capture some of this urgency in the conclusion to their examination of the Libyan centrifuge programme: "One troubling realisation is that many people had access to the kind of detailed, technical information needed to manufacture sensitive centrifuge components. For this reason, it is vital that all elements of the manufacturing and transporting network are identified and those involved thoroughly interrogated and prosecuted. An urgent goal is to try to get centrifuge design and associated manufacturing instructions out of the hands of the members of the network and to prevent it from spreading to others. Otherwise, this information could form the basis for a new or reconstituted network that will later sell centrifuges to other countries."30

The Way Ahead

Policy will have to navigate this environment where it is unclear who is providing what to whom. The policy responses to this ambiguous landscape are six-fold.

Continue to work with Pakistan

There have been cries from several capitals about the light punishment Pakistan seems likely to receive for the breach of nuclear secrets. A slap on the wrist does little to deter others from undertaking risky nuclear cooperation. Musharraf's public pardon of Khan for his activities also does little to scare would-be proliferators. But what can be done? As Anatol Lieven has noted, the American mind likes problems with solutions. Pakistan cannot be "solved", however; it presents problems that must be "managed". Multiple US national security interests intersect in Pakistan: continued cooperation with the war on terror; regional stability; and nonproliferation. Officials in Islamabad are all too aware of this. The United States must continue to work with Pakistan in rolling up the Khan network, in securing Pakistan's nuclear facilities, in creating personnel reliability programmes for its nuclear scientists, and a thousand other things.

Reinforce export controls

In Pakistan, draft export control legislation has been in circulation since 2000. The Strategic Plans Division has just undertaken another review of the legislation and it should be promulgated as soon as possible. The United States and other Western countries must examine how they can assist Pakistan and other states in setting up an adequate regulatory apparatus.31

Establish a framework for the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction

President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is a move in the right direction, but its ad hoc nature draws into doubt its legitimacy. Serious effort should be made to achieving an international agreement under which the PSI can operate. At present, the line between interdiction and piracy is thin and blurry.

Bring Pakistan (and India and Israel) into the international nonproliferation regime

Since it is not an NPT party, Pakistan did not actually break any law by sharing nuclear technology. A way, any way, must be found to incorporate these three key states into the international nonproliferation regime. Perhaps the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is an appropriate vehicle, though it will have a difficult enough task as it is.

Look for the next A.Q. Khan

The diffusion of dangerous weapons of mass destruction is no longer about precisely tooled metal parts; it is about what people know and who they know. Developed economies have a difficult policy path. If they are overly restrictive of scientists from developing countries, they risk choking off the lifeblood of their innovation. Further, denying information to an entire group of people based on place of birth is always morally suspect. But the next "A.Q. Khan" could be a bioweaponeer and the stakes are monumental. Developed countries, and the international community, need to start having this debate now.

Prepare for the worst

In the end, the battle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may be unwinnable. Former Clinton administration official Gary Samore may be correct: "The horse is out of the barn. At this point, we can't stop the technology from spreading."32 A gradual reorientation of strategies towards consequence management (public health surge capacity, vaccine research, missile defences) may be necessary in the long term. Accepting this fact, however, does not mean giving up on proven strategies for nonproliferation and threat reduction. Unsafeguarded nuclear, chemical, and biological stockpiles around the world, particularly in the former Soviet Union, are a danger now. Cooperative threat reduction programmes still represent the cheapest and easiest way to alleviate many of these dangers, even if they have sometimes been flawed in their execution.


1. Khan's statement was published in Rafaqat Ali, "Dr. Khan Seeks Pardon; Cabinet Decision Today; Meets Musharraf; Admits Error of Judgment," Dawn (Karachi), February 5, 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/05/top1.htm. It was reprinted in full in Disarmament Diplomacy 75 (January/February 2004), p 42.

2. Patrick E. Tyler and David E. Sanger, "Pakistan Called Libyan's Source of Atom Design," New York Times, January 6, 2004.

3. This consciously omits the decades-old Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship.

4. There are reports that nuclear know-how was requested by an unknown Arab country, most likely Saudi Arabia or Syria, in the early 1980s, but Khan turned down the request. Shahid-ur-Rehman and Mark Hibbs, "Islamabad was in the loop on foreign approaches to KRL," Nucleonics Week, January 29, 2004. The UN Special Commission's work in Iraq revealed evidence that Khan may have offered assistance to Iraq prior to the 1991 Gulf War. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?" February 4, 2004. http://www.isisonline.org/publications/khan_memo. html.

5. See Peter Lavoy, "The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace," Arms Control Today 33, no. 10 (December 2003): 26-30.

6. Indian commentators will frequently point out that the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme began prior to the 1974. While this is true, it was underfunded and poorly organised until after the 1974 stimulus.

7. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan gave an interview with the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar on January 28, 1987, in the midst of a crisis over India's "Brasstacks" exercises. Nayar did not publish the account until March 1, however, shopping around for an appropriate venue.

8. See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), pp 194-203.

9. Peter Edidin, "Pakistan's Hero: Dr. Khan Got What He Wanted, and He Explains How," New York Times, February 15, 2004.

10. William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network," New York Times, February 12, 2004.

11. "Pakistan's Hero," New York Times, February 15, 2004.

12. Mark Hibbs, "CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive Outside Help on Centrifuges," Nuclear Fuel, November 25, 2002.

13. "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation," New York Times, February 12, 2004.

14. "From Rogue Nuclear Programmes, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan," New York Times, January 4, 2004.

15. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, August 26, 2003, GOV/2003/63, p. 6, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.

16. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, November 10, 2003, GOV/2003/75, p. 8, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf.

17. Ibid.

18. Joby Warrick, "Nuclear Programme in Iran Tied to Pakistan," Washington Post, December 21, 2003; Craig S. Smith, "Alarm Raised Over Quality of Uranium Found in Iran," New York Times, March 11, 2004. Another source of enriched material would be Iranian enrichment activity.

19. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "The Centrifuge Connection," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, no. 2 (March­-April 2004), 61-66.

20. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Iran Admits That It Has Plans for a Newer Centrifuge," February 13, 2004; Barbara Slavin and John Diamond, "Nuclear Machinery Found in Iran," USA Today, February 19, 2004; and Peter Slevin and Joby Warrick, "U.N. Finds Uranium Enrichment Tools in Iran," Washington Post, February 20, 2004.

21. See Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals Between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?" (updated February 27, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/nkpaki2.pdf; John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe," Washington Post, February 3, 2004.

22. "Re-imposition of sanctions feared: US aid may be jeopardised - official," Dawn (Karachi), February 5, 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/05/top5.htm.

23. Ibid.

24. Erika Pontarelli, "U.S. Hails Libyan Nuclear Weapons Recovery as 'Important Victory,'" Agence France Presse, March 16, 2004; Reuters, "Libya paid Khan $100m for nuclear technology," FT.com, March 16, 2004.

25. See CNN, "Full text of Musharraf interview," January 23, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/01/23/musharraf.transcript.cnna/index.html.

26. "Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan" (Como, Italy: Landau Network, Centro Volta, January 2002), pp. 4-5, http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf.

27. Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan believed design data source for centrifuges to be built by Iran," Nuclear Fuel, January 20, 2003.

28. Mark Landler, "Trafficking in Nuclear Arms Called Widespread," International Herald Tribune, January 24, 2004.

29. "Full text of Musharraf interview," January 23, 2004

30. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," February 4, 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/cent_procure.html.

31. The civilian regulatory apparatus in Pakistan has worked fairly well. See "First fully independent nuclear regulator created", Nuclear News, March 2001.

32. Michael Hirsh and Sarah Schafer, "Black Market Nukes," Newsweek, February 23, 2004, 36.

Christopher Clary is a research associate at the Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. These views are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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