Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 7, July - August 1996

A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits

Return to main page

Contents

• • Editor's introduction
  • • The CD Agenda: a summary
    • The Decalogue
    • The review so far
• The review of the CD Agenda - Opinion
• • Abolish and Survive: The case and prospects for a nuclear-weapons-
  • • By Alan Cranston
    • Introduction: causes for hope and concern
    • The growing clamour for an abolitionist agenda
    • Conclusion: an appeal
  • Nuclear Disarmament and the post-Cold War crisis
  • • By Gerald Kaufman
    • Introduction: the origins and scale of the post-Cold War crisis
    • Rethinking security and arms control policies
    • The need for a nuclear disarmament conference
    • Conclusion
• Guest Analysis - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
• • Progress and Peril in the Ad Hoc Group to Strengthen the BWC
  • • By Marie Chevrier
    • Introduction: the BWC in peril?
    • Forces mitigating against progress
    • Skewed priorities?
    • Toward new principles
    • Practicalities and pressures
    • Conclusion
• CTB Negotiations - Geneva Update No. 30
• • • By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence Review
  • Introduction: No Consensus on CTBT Text
  • recent developments
  • Report of the ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban
  • • Section VI: National Statements
    • Section VII: Conclusions and Recommendations
  • Statements to the CD Plenary
  • • 1 August
    • 8 August
    • 15 August
    • 20 August
    • 22 August
  • A summary of the draft Treaty
  • • Preamble
    • Scope
    • The CTBT Organization (CTBTO)
    • Verification
    • On-Site Inspections (OSI)
    • Review of the Treaty
    • Entry into Force (EIF)
    • Duration and Withdrawal
    • Amendments
• Documents and Sources
• • Statements to the CD
  • • CTBT
    • The Nuclear-Weapon States
    • China
    • India
    • Pakistan
    • Russia
    • G-21 Programme for nuclear disarmament
    • Programme of Action
    • First Phase - 1996-2000
    • Second Phase: 2000 - 2010 Measures to reduce the nuclear arsenals
    • Third Phase: 2010-2020 Consolidation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
  • The report of the Canberra Commission
  • • Statement by Australian Foreign Minister
    • The Report
    • Statement
    • Executive Summary
    • A New Climate For Action
    • Immediate Steps
    • Reinforcing Steps
    • The Future Environment
  • International Court of Justice ruling on nuclear weapons
  • The Wassenaar Arrangement: Adoption of Initial Elements
  • • Press Statement
  • US DOE press releases: New Supercomputer; Surplus uranium.
  • • New Supercomputer
    • "President Clinton Announces Pact with IBM to Deliver Next
    • Surplus uranium
    • "Surplus Bomb-Grade Uranium Never Again To Be Used in Weapons
  • US Presidential Advisory Board report on proliferation and arms
  • • Improving the Government's Processes for Export Control Policy and
    • Negotiation of an International Control Regime
    • The Conventional Weapons Challenge
    • The Defense Industrial Base
    • Summary of major recommendations
  • Security Council discusses landmines
  • • Statements: summaries and quotes
    • Australia
    • Bosnia and Herzegovina
    • Canada
    • Croatia
    • Egypt
    • European Union (EU)
    • France
    • Germany
    • Hungary
    • India
    • Indonesia
    • International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    • Iran
    • Japan
    • Malaysia
    • New Zealand
    • Nicaragua
    • Norway
    • Pakistan
    • South Korea
    • Russian Federation
    • Ukraine
    • United Kingdom
    • United States
• News Review
• • Inconclusive World Court ruling on nuclear weapons
  • • Reaction
  • Canberra Commission delivers pro-zero verdict
  • China tests, declares moratorium
  • • Reaction
    • Australia
    • France
    • India
    • Japan
    • New Zealand
    • Philippines
    • Russia
    • South Korea
    • United Kingdom
    • United States
  • India opposition urges test
  • Former New Zealand Premier criticises test ban and nuclear-weapon
  • Belarus calls for Central Europe NWFZ
  • Missile defence developments
  • • Preliminary US-Russia agreement on ABM Treaty demarcation
    • Congressional TMD/NMD plans for 1997
    • Controversial Army testimony on NMD
    • THAAD criticised by GAO, backed by Congress
  • New Nunn-Lugar legislation
  • US and France said to deepen nuclear-weapons cooperation
  • US and Canada plans on handling weapons-grade materials
  • US-China non-proliferation talks
  • US-North Korea Accord: Progress on practicalities, fears over
  • Iraq and UNSCOM reach new misunderstanding
  • • Emergency humanitarian oil sales finally given go-ahead
  • US and Russia discuss CWC practicalities
  • Landmines developments

Editor's introduction

The July-August issue of Disarmament Diplomacy seeks to document and consider a flurry of important developments, including: the failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), reported and interpreted by Rebecca Johnson; the World Court's complicated and inconclusive ruling on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; the report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; and initial agreement on a major new arms exports regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement. Other areas featured in Documents and Sources and News Review include missile defence, landmines, US arms transfers policy, and the ongoing Iraq-UNSCOM and North Korea- KEDO sagas.

The issue also features two Opinion Pieces - from former US Senator Alan Cranston and former UK Labour Party Foreign Affairs spokesperson Gerald Kaufman - and a Guest Analysis by Dr. Marie Chevrier on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Senator Cranston's paper is an impassioned appeal on behalf of "a mission as important as any ever undertaken by humankind" - the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Though fearful of the consequences of continued nuclear-weapon State refusal to embrace this goal, Senator Cranston detects increasing, and increasingly powerful, political support for the pro-zero cause: "leaders in and out of public office, including major powers and nations very influential in world affairs, are consulting and cooperating increasingly in an effort to establish the goal of abolition."

Gerald Kaufman's paper identifies radical nuclear disarmament as an important means of improving the perilous condition of the post- Cold War international system. He advocates an international conference dedicated to setting in train deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, and reductions in the number of nuclear-weapon States. Kaufman argues that "France and Britain should offer to give up all their nuclear weapons," and adds that "even if France is not prepared to make this concession, I believe that Britain should."

In her analysis of the condition of the BWC, Marie Chevrier contends that "current negotiations" designed at strengthening it "are in danger of bogging down because some States Parties appear to be dragging their feet and the Ad Hoc Group process...lacks important principles to guide its deliberations." The United States is singled out and rebuked for evincing a "conspicuous lack of participation or leadership" on the issue.

The CD Agenda: a summary

Since its inception, Disarmament Diplomacy has featured a series of opinion pieces on the future of the CD, and in particular its agenda, currently under review. Contributors are invited to treat the subject as broadly or narrowly as they desire. Readers' comments on the issue are also invited.

The agenda, in place since 1978, has ten items, known collectively as The Decalogue.

The Decalogue

Item 1. Nuclear Test Ban

Item 2. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

Item 3. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Measures

Item 4. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Item 5. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear- Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

Item 6. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

Item 7. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Item 8. Transparency in Armaments

Item 9. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

Item 10. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

The review so far

For the 1994 Session of the Conference, Sweden's Ambassador, Lars Norberg, was appointed Special Co-ordinator on Review of the Agenda. No Special Co-ordinator was appointed for the 1995 or 1996 Sessions.

The fullest account of the review so far came on 1 September 1994 with Ambassador Norberg's report to the Conference, in which he observed:

"...consultations have revealed conflicting views among delegations as to the appropriate balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons on the agenda. Divergent views have also been expressed with regard to the question of a possible widening of the CD's scope of activities to include the negotiation of politically binding agreements covering, for example, global confidence building measures or regional questions."

The review of the CD Agenda - Opinion

Abolish and Survive: The case and prospects for a nuclear-weapons- free world

By Alan Cranston

Introduction: causes for hope and concern

I met Albert Einstein shortly after Hiroshima. He warned me, as he warned others, that all-out nuclear war could exterminate all life on this planet. Ever since then - before, during, and after my time in the US Senate - I've been devoted to the cause of preventing nuclear war.

Today, as we help Russia dismantle much of its nuclear arsenal, the danger of a Superpower holocaust is greatly reduced.

But the danger of nuclear war is not gone. Not as long as nuclear weapons exist. Not as long as rogue States work to acquire - and possibly use - nuclear weapons. Not as long as the world is awash in nuclear weapons-grade materials.

Public interest and concern has waned since the fearful days of the Cuban missile crisis - when American parents frantically dug bomb shelters, and their children were taught to cower under their desks - and since the nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s.

But thoughtful, experienced and active leaders in many nations believe that a great opportunity presently exists to reduce, restrain, and ultimately abolish nuclear weapons.

How long the opportunity will last, no one can foretell. So we must act decisively.

Consider just a few recent events that give cause for concern, but more importantly for hope.

In terms of concern:

* Chinese nuclear tests; and speculation that India was planning a test.

* Fears that Iran, Iraq and Libya seek nuclear weapons.

* China's transfers of nuclear technology to Iran.

* Troubled efforts to finalize the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), marked by China's opposition to adequate inspection, and hung up as I write over the entry into force issue precipitated by India's refusal to sign unless a timetable for abolition is signed and sealed.

* Indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), achieved midst acrimony between the five nuclear powers and nations that perceive the five as intending to retain for all eternity the capacity to threaten their very existence. The US, for its part, gave credence to this view when its most recent Nuclear Posture Review, conducted by the Pentagon, concluded that the current nuclear posture was optimal for the post-Cold War period. Extension of the NPT was finally achieved only on the basis of an ostensible understanding that there will be meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament.

In terms of hope:

* The worldwide uproar stirred by French tests demonstrated that people are not as apathetic as many leaders assume.

* The apparent success in freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and the powerful evidence that diplomacy, engagement, and cooperation can work even against rogue States.

* Innovative efforts at the Conference on Disarmament to cope with an array of war-peace issues involving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the conventional weapons that have maimed and killed so many millions since World War II.

* The International Court of Justice declaration - in an advisory ruling requested by the World Health Organisation and the UN General Assembly - that under most circumstances the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be "contrary to the rules of international law."

* The rapidly spreading movement to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones; zones, in other words, where nuclear weapons are not viewed as legitimate tools of State power. These zones already cover all of Africa, Latin America, South East Asia, and the South Pacific.

* The completion of denuclearisation in Kazakstan and Ukraine, and progress toward completion in Belarus by the end of 1996.

The growing clamour for an abolitionist agenda

All this has happened just in the past year. A great deal more will happen before this year is over, the cumulative effect of which should place firmly on the international agenda the issue of whether the presence on this planet of nuclear weapons is worthy of civilisation and compatible with survival.

There will be a series of important reports, statements and actions involving many individuals respected and greatly experienced in security matters. They will give a powerful voice to the view that far deeper reductions and restraints on nuclear weapons than those now contemplated are realistic, attainable and necessary - and that concrete steps can open the way to final abolition.

A consensus is rapidly growing among these individuals - including professional military leaders who have had direct command and control responsibilities over nuclear weapons - around the need for the following steps:

* Completion of the CTBT.

* Dismantling of all nuclear warheads withdrawn under the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) and subsequent agreements.

* Strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the entire international non-proliferation regime.

* Rendering remaining nuclear weapons inoperable for surprise attacks or accidental launches by transparent separation of warheads from delivery systems, and by going to zero alert.

* Banning further production of fissile materials.

* Transferring existing fissile material into internationally monitored storage.

* Banning production and possession of large, long-range ballistic missiles.

The developing consensus behind these steps will be expressed in the coming months in a variety of ways involving a literal whirlwind of activities:

* As I write, the Canberra Commission, a group of 15 eminent and experienced leaders from nine countries including the US and Russia, appointed by the Australian government, is about to issue a detailed and, I predict, compellingly convincing report proposing steps towards a nuclear-free world. It will spell out the sort of surveillance, inspection, security and enforcement procedures that must be in place before nations possessing nuclear weapons are likely to relinquish them. And it will express with eloquence and passion why, for the sake of all humanity for all time, abolition must be set as a goal, pursued, achieved.

* Early this Fall, the State of the World Forum in San Francisco will bring together leaders, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who with Ronald Reagan ended and reversed the nuclear arms race. A discussion on reducing and abolishing nuclear weapons by retired US and Russian military and security professionals will be central to the Conference.

* Before the year is over, several statements will be issued by US, Russian and other international military and security experts and other leaders who have influence in their homelands and elsewhere calling for actions to put an end to the nuclear nightmlare.

* A distinguished group of international security experts appointed by the government of Japan will meet in Kyoto in December to consider and propose ways to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

* The US National Academy of Science will issue a report on the general subject of arms, both conventional and nuclear, and what to do about the threats they pose to humanity. I expect the report to advocate nuclear abolition.

* The Lawyers Alliance for World Security is planning a major abolitionist effort; the Council on Foreign Relations is conducting relevant studies; and many other groups will be heard from. A number of foundations are playing a significant role in all this. Over 600 grass roots non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are increasingly active in the abolition movement.

* Leaders in and out of public office in a number of nations, including major powers and nations very influential in world affairs, are consulting and cooperating increasingly in an effort to establish the goal of abolition. These are nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. They are nations that do not presently want to possess them. But they are nations that do not find it acceptable that the US, Russia, China, France and the UK possess them and show no significant signs of keeping their commitment to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

These nations will be heard from more and more in the time ahead. What they are telling the US, and the other nuclear powers, is: you cannot forever be the only nuclear powers - you can either negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament, or you can watch as nuclear weapons proliferate. Since it is widely believed that the major military danger facing the US is the threat of nuclear proliferation, the US should listen to this logic. So should the other nuclear nations.

It is most of all important that the US, the only nation ever to use nuclear weapons, and now the pre-eminent world power, respond to these and other coming events and actions, and the circumstances that cause them, by leading the way in nuclear matters. It should do so for deeply moral reasons; for highly ethical reasons; and for eminently practical reasons.

Conclusion: an appeal

I congratulate and thank those of you reading these words who are engaged in the cause for what you have done over the years to bring us to this moment of opportunity. And to you I address the following request.

As several of the statements that world leaders plan to make take shape, and as signatures are gathered, help is needed to enlist the support of highly respected leaders whose participation would lend credence to the cause of abolition in their own nations and throughout the world.

I'm sure that many of you can suggest such individuals.

More precisely, what is needed are figures such as greatly respected past or present Presidents or Prime Ministers, parliamentary leaders, defense and foreign ministers, military and security experts, Nobel laureates, and others of prominence and prestige who you believe might be willing to join with those who are lending their names and voices to this cause.

Please send any suggestions you have to me - preferably by fax (see below) - and I will pass them along to those taking the lead in making the statements.

Once again, I thank you for your vision, your determination, and your dedication to a mission as important as any ever undertaken by humankind.

Alan Cranston was a member of the United States Senate, 1969-93. He is the Chair of the Gorbachev Foundation in the United States. He can be contacted at: State of the World Forum, The Presidio, P.O. Box 29434, San Francisco, CA 94129, US, fax +1 415 771 4443.

Nuclear Disarmament and the post-Cold War crisis

By Gerald Kaufman

Introduction: the origins and scale of the post-Cold War crisis

The world is a far more dangerous place today than it was in the final years of the Cold War. In the earlier years of the Cold War, there was reason to fear that a third world war might break out, by design or accident. Stalin's siege of Berlin was a test of the West's resolve. The Cuban missile crisis was regarded as a test of Kennedy's nerve; although, while Kennedy's nerve proved to be cool, it can be argued that he over-reacted to a placement of Soviet missiles which was no more provocative than the placement of American missiles very close to Soviet frontiers.

In later years, particularly the Gorbachev era, there was - among all except the Dr . Strangeloves of this world - no genuine fear that war could break out, even by accident. Indeed, it can be argued that the Cold War was a positive benefit. Each side of the divide had a firm grip not only on its own weapons but on those of its clients. Seepage of weapons or of nuclear materials, though possible, was not a clear and present danger. Nobody liked the Cold War, of course, but in its later stages it did produce a sort of international order which made the world more peaceful than it had been since before the rise of Hitler.

When the Cold War ended and Communism collapsed in the Central and Eastern European members of the Soviet bloc, it seemed that the possibilities were bright. A new European security system could be fashioned, involving the former Communists and the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) could be remodelled to take account of the new and promising situation. Everything in the garden could be lovely.

The key moment of failure, as far as European security was concerned, was the Group of Seven meeting in London in July 1991. That was the opportunity to help Gorbachev so that he could demonstrate that perestroika could actually deliver the goods - the consumer goods and economic progress which mattered far more to the Soviet people than glasnost, a treat for the favoured few. Perhaps the most catastrophic single decision since 1945 was the 4- 3 majority against helping Gorbachev, with the American Republican administration and the British Conservative government the predominantly guilty parties.

Gorbachev was sent away a humiliated man (I met him on the Friday of that week and saw the evidence of humiliation for myself). Almost immediately the coup took place. The thug Yeltsin spurned Gorbachev publicly and took over. The Soviet Union ended not in an orderly and planned way but in chaos. Control of weapons and nuclear material collapsed too. A huge weapons market, including a black market, arose. The collapse of Yugoslavia was a replication in miniature of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disasters there directly precipitated by the insane decision of the European Community - driven by Germany, with Britain in its traditional role of appeaser - to recognise every tin-pot little entity declaring itself an independent republic.

European order, with the promise of such rich possibilities, was now an unattainable chimera. But Europe was not the only danger zone. In the Middle East and western and southern Asia, nuclear aspirations went unconcealed. The United Nations was hopelessly incompetent in its invigilation of the destruction of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons capability in Iraq. In Iran, India and Pakistan there was not even any invigilation. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Americans and Russians - with lesser arsenals by Britain, France and China - were one thing. These countries, within their moral and psychological limitations, were stable. Iraq and Iran are countries of undisguised menace. India and Pakistan seek to disguise their nuclear capability, but it is well known that a nuclear conflict between them has been a real possibility in recent years. Both possess missiles which could deliver nuclear warheads to each other's territories, even though such delivery would mean poisoning their own territories too.

So, the swap that has been made is not a welcome swap. For 40 years we had a confrontational world in which everyone knew the stakes, most parties to the confrontation were rational about the stakes, and, while complacency was absurd, there was reasonable confidence that irrational behaviour was unlikely. Now, irrationality is the order of the day in vast tracts of the planet.

Rethinking security and arms control policies

Is there anything, or very much, that can be done about this situation? I am not at all sure. I am not sure to what extent governments' writs in a number of countries extend to the behaviour of their armed forces. I am not sure that certain governments, in full control of their armed forces, can be relied on to behave honestly and in good faith.

Yet, even though the problems are so great - indeed because the problems are so great - we have a duty to try. On general security policy, it is essential that NATO at long last gets down to working out its function, if any: the extent to which it makes sense to extend and expand NATO; which are desirable and which are undesirable additional members; and its relationship with the European Union. It needs to decide whether it is relevant and appropriate for NATO to become involved in civil wars on a policeman basis, on a self-defence basis, on a humanitarian basis, or on any permutation of the three.

Second, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should get together and try to decide exactly what the role of the Security Council is. This will be difficult because, of these five members, only two (the US and Britain) do not seem to have any private agenda of their own and the Russians and Chinese are in many ways unpredictable. Nevertheless, the effort must be made. The proposals of the five should go forward to the Security Council as a whole, and go from there to the General Assembly. I am not saying miracles will ensue. I am not overconfident that anything really operable and enforceable will ensue. But I am certain that nothing either operable or enforceable will ensue if the initiative is not even taken.

The need for a nuclear disarmament conference

Quite separate from this, an international nuclear disarmament conference should be held under the auspices of as many of the main nuclear powers (as it happens, the five permanent Security Council members) as will agree to sponsor it; but, if any of these five do not agree to sponsor it, it should still be held. While the US, China and Russia are unlikely to agree complete disarmament within the measureable future, efforts should be made to bring about general reductions among these three which will make a real impression on those countries which already possess nuclear capability (whether they admit it or not) and those which are aspirants to such capability.

Ideally, both France and Britain should offer to give up all their nuclear weapons, since such a gesture would have a major impact on countries like India and Pakistan. However, even if France is not prepared to make this concession, I believe that Britain should. Let me make it absolutely clear that I am not advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament for the UK. I am advocating that the UK should use its nuclear capability to dissuade other countries from increasing, maintaining or obtaining nuclear capability.

I believe this nuclear disarmament conference should impose an international embargo on the proliferation of nuclear materials and that stringent sanctions should be imposed on countries which fail to abide by the embargo. Sanctions should also be imposed on countries such as India and Israel which refuse to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Conclusion

I repeat, I do not expect these suggested arrangements to work faultlessly or without a hitch. The world is imperfect and its agencies and treaties are imperfect. But the world is a powder-keg of a kind unlike anything this planet has previously experienced. Every moiety of progress will reduce the volatility of that powder- keg.

No rational person can deny that the world is in a sorry state. Due to the lack of statesmanship of countries such as Britain and the US, the bombast of countries such as Russia, and the narrowness of vision of countries like France and China, that sorry state has come about. The only remedy, or possibility of partial remedy, is for just someone to exhibit just some statesmanship now.

Gerald Kaufman is a Labour member of the British House of Commons. Between 1987-92 he was his Party's spokesperson on Foreign Affairs.

Guest Analysis - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

Progress and Peril in the Ad Hoc Group to Strengthen the BWC

By Marie Chevrier

Introduction: the BWC in peril?

The potential of biological and toxin weapons to kill large numbers of people is matched only by nuclear weapons. The risk of their use is growing with increasing worries of their proliferation and that of delivery systems that could aim them at distant targets. Facing this threat the international community should be devoting additional resources to the process already under way to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which outlaws their very possession. A strong instrument to deter would-be proliferators and detect illicit programs is needed to make sure that the possession of biological or toxin weapons declines and that their use does not become a reality. Unfortunately, the current negotiations are in danger of bogging down because some States Parties appear to be dragging their feet and the Ad Hoc Group process, whereby the proposals for a legally binding instrument are developed, lacks important principles to guide its deliberations. A renewed political commitment accompanied by concerted action, however, could turn the process around.

At a Special Conference in September 1994, the States Parties to the BTWC established an Ad Hoc Group chaired by Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary to, as stated in the Final Declaration of the conference "consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties." Some participants in the special conference (though not all) were optimistic that the Ad Hoc Group could draft such proposals in time for the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty which will begin in late November. In the intervening two years, however, the hope of meeting the Review Conference target has withered away. The Ad Hoc group will not have proposals ready for the States Parties to consider by November and some fear that the negotiations could be headed for a protracted stalemate where there is much activity but little progress.

Forces mitigating against progress

One major factor hampering progress in the Ad Hoc Group is that the negotiations are taking place among nations, some of whom may have clandestine weapons programs that they are trying to protect from international scrutiny. President Boris Yeltsin, for instance, admitted that the Soviet Union maintained a biological weapons program in violation of the BTWC and that the program continued in Russia after the breakup of the USSR. Moreover, the trilateral process among Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom has thus far failed to demonstrate that Russia has terminated its program, according to the most recent (August 1996) compliance report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1). Moreover, the United States retains serious concerns about Iraqi, Chinese, and Iranian compliance with the provisions of the BTWC. While the US evidence of noncompliance is greatest for these countries, it undoubtedly has suspicions about the compliance of other countries as well (2). The secret nature of the trilateral process makes its progress difficult to discern. Nevertheless, the consultations and inspections that are a part of this process are in the spirit of the BTWC and should continue with renewed effort until the status of Russia's compliance is resolved.

The United States, as one of the three depository States, has shown a conspicuous lack of participation or leadership within the Ad Hoc Group, despite President Clinton's agreement to the July 1996 G-7 communique that "We will continue to work hard to implement the...[BTWC], including the establishment of an effective verification mechanism."(3) The US has submitted few working papers to the Ad Hoc Group, suggesting that the remaining superpower has yet to demonstrate its whole hearted commitment to drafting proposals for a strong, legally binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC. Of the twenty-eight working papers submitted at the fourth session of the Ad Hoc Group (July 1996), only one was submitted by the United States. By contrast, the European Union submitted seven working papers, South Africa submitted six, Australia, Canada and Russia submitted three each, the United Kingdom also submitted three, two of which were with Brazil. The US record is worse if one takes into account submissions from beginning of work of the Ad Hoc Group in January 1995.

While recognizing that submitting working papers is not the only way to contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Group, the United States does not appear to be pulling its weight in the deliberations. Moreover, the United States is not the only State Party appearing to be less than fully engaged in the Ad Hoc process. Where is the substantive participation of China or Japan or India? The Ad Hoc group has made progress without the enthusiastic participation of key countries and can continue to do so. But to the extent that any of them plays the role of spoiler or critic, without offering reasonable alternatives to proposals put forward by others, the entire process lags.

Skewed priorities?

Undue attention has frequently been focused on the modifying words and phrases of the mandate given the Group by the States Parties to the detriment of the essentials: "to consider...measures...and draft proposals...[for] a legally binding instrument...to strengthen the Convention." The mandate directs the group to consider four separate areas in the context of drafting proposals to strengthen the Convention: 1) definitions of terms and objective criteria; 2) confidence-building and transparency measures; 3) measures to promote compliance; and, 4) measures to implement Article X of the Convention (4). The work of the Ad Hoc Group has been organized around these four areas under the guidance of Friends of the Chair. Each of the subgroups considers measures in an attempt to build agreement for the content of proposals. While using an inductive or 'from the bottom up' method of reaching consensus on the details of proposals has merit, the exercise can flounder without a set of guiding principles from the top.

For instance, the subgroup on definitions of terms has identified criteria for human, animal and plant pathogens that could be used for declaration purposes in a protocol (5). The subgroup on compliance measures, however, has not yet determined precisely what the purpose and uses of this list might be in the context of declarations, not to mention the use of lists within the full context of proposals to strengthen the Convention. One State reportedly wants to limit on-site measures to declared facilities that work with agents or toxins on the lists. Many members of the Western Group and others, accentuating the potential of offensive biological warfare programs to be housed in facilities that could be relatively easy to conceal, seem to be leaning toward using such lists in relation to non-challenge visits to declared facilities; but they oppose using the list of agents and toxins to limit on-site activities in the case of challenge inspections or allegations of use.

Toward new principles

This example illustrates the need for a set of agreed upon principles for the proposals to strengthen the BTWC or a basic framework upon which to attach the details that are being developed from below. The set of principles should be short, and simple. I propose the following:

1. The proposals to strength the BTWC will contain both off-site and on-site measures.

2. The off-site measures will include declarations from all parties of facilities and activities that could give rise to concerns about compliance with the Convention.

3. The on-site measures will not be confined to declared facilities nor will they be limited to challenge inspections. Appropriate on-site measures for visits to, or inspections of, declared facilities and challenge inspections of declared or undeclared facilities will be included among the proposals.

4. Nothing within the proposals shall restrict the deliberately broad prohibitions concerning the possession of biological agents and toxins contained in Article I of the Convention.

Reasons for the proposals have been well articulated elsewhere but deserve to be reiterated here (6).

Since the establishment of VEREX - the group of experts convened to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint - the effort to strengthen the BTWC has been driven by both off-site and on-site measures. Indeed, any proposals to strengthen the Convention without the benefit of on-site measures would be destined to fail miserably. The most common measures that the VEREX group suggested be used in combination were declarations of activities and on-site inspections (7). Because governments believe that a biological weapons program could be hidden with relative ease, challenge inspections at undeclared sites are necessary to provide grounds for increased confidence in compliance, the most important component in strengthening the Convention.

Non-challenge visits, confined to declared sites and facilities, are necessary to assure the attention of all States Parties to the importance of national monitoring of biological sites and facilities of most relevance to the Convention. They are also necessary to develop inspectors with the requisite experience and expertise to evaluate evidence from any subsequent inspections relating to compliance concerns. Finally, one of the strongest elements of the BTWC is its Article I ban on the possession of biological agents and toxins that have no justification for peaceful purposes. This principle is included to ensure that the Ad Hoc Group, meant to bolster biological and toxin weapons arms control, does not undermine the foundation of the regime.

Practicalities and pressures

How much time does the Ad Hoc group need to complete its task? Some observers note that it took the CD seventeen years after the entry into force of the BTWC to complete the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), suggesting that ten years or more may be needed to complete a protocol for the BWC. At the other end of the spectrum is the observation that VEREX needed only four two-week sessions over a period of just over two years to complete its work.

Both these comparisons are flawed, however. The comparison with the CWC negotiations ignores the fact that during most of those seventeen years the CD was deadlocked between the Eastern and Western groups and their widely divergent opinions regarding verification, fueled by the Cold War conflict. Once an agreement to the principle of on-site inspections was achieved, agreement on a lengthy and complicated text was reached fairly rapidly. The VEREX analogy does not acknowledge the different nature of the tasks facing VEREX and the Ad Hoc Group. VEREX was limited to evaluating measures from a scientific and technical standpoint only; it grappled only tangentially, if at all, with questions such as access to sites that are sensitive for security or commercial reasons, or the political implications of making challenge inspections. It will be up to the Fourth Review Conference to decide a reasonable length of time for the Ad Hoc Group to report back to the States Parties. While a rigid deadline to complete proposals has drawbacks, the Conference could set a 1998 goal for completing the work of the Ad Hoc Group. It would be a mistake not to encourage early completion of the proposals; mid- 1998 is realistic and would not interfere with plans for the Fifth Review Conference.

Conclusion

The Ad Hoc process to strengthen the BTWC is too important to the security of too many nations to let it languish from insufficient attention. In September the group meets once again to continue its work and, in its last few days, to prepare its progress report for the upcoming Review Conference. This Autumn should also be a time for all governments involved to take stock of their contributions to a strengthened BTWC and weigh what they must do to renew or revitalize their commitment. The fate of the BTWC hinges on the willingness of the State Parties to show the political will necessary to construct a legally binding instrument that will have the necessary teeth to minimize the risk of catastrophic biological warfare in the 21st century.

Notes and references

Dr. Marie Isabelle Chevrier is Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas.

CTB Negotiations - Geneva Update No. 30

By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence Review

Introduction: No Consensus on CTBT Text

After the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva failed to adopt by consensus the text for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which it has been negotiating for over 30 months, Australia announced that a group of the treaty's 'Friends' would take it to the United Nations General Assembly by the 16 September deadline set last year by UNGA resolution 50/65. This effectively ended weeks of increasingly desperate manoeuvres by proponents and opponents of the treaty, but leaves serious questions about the viability of this test ban treaty and the future credibility of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues. Lacking CD endorsement, the treaty could face a rough ride in New York, where most decisions are decided by the majority vote of 185 countries. All five declared nuclear-weapon States have indicated a willingness to sign this treaty provided it is not amended, but many other countries have expressed dissatisfaction with some of its provisions, particularly entry-into-force, the preamble and the geographical distribution of seats for the Executive Council.

Following announcements in July by government representatives of the US, UK, France and Russia, that they would support the draft text submitted on 28 June by the Chair of the ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (NTB), Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of The Netherlands (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.1), further multilateral negotiations were halted when the CD reconvened on 29 July. China gave its support for the treaty following intensive bilateral negotiations with the US on on-site inspections (OSI) and national technical means (NTM), which was reflected in an amendment to the decisionmaking procedure in the text. On 14 August, Ramaker brought out his final treaty draft (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2), incorporating this decision and other minor modifications correcting inconsistencies in the earlier drafts.

By mid August it was clear that unless negotiations were reopened on entry into force (EIF), India would block CD endorsement of the treaty. As the domestic debate over India's nuclear options reached fever pitch, New Delhi had announced in June that it would not sign the treaty without a binding commitment to timebound nuclear disarmament. This was rejected by the P-5 nuclear-weapon States. India then argued that its inclusion on a list of 44 States required for the CTBT to enter into force was unacceptable, given its public rejection of the treaty. After blocking agreement on the treaty text, India refused consent for the text to be attached to the NTB Committee's report covering its work this year. After much lengthy debate, the report - minus the treaty text - was adopted by the CD on 20 August, acknowledging that consensus had not been reached on the text itself or its transmission onwards. As some delegations moved to bypass the CD's deadlock on the treaty, India and Iran used procedural tactics to prevent even this truncated NTB Committee report from being sent to the UNGA before the CD's full report at the end of its session.

Australia's resolution to the UN General Assembly, lodged on 22 August, has presently attracted over 50 co-sponsors, including Britain, France, and the US, as well as non-nuclear-weapon States from Europe, Latin America and the Pacific, though non-aligned movement (NAM) countries are so far under-represented. Russia and China and a number of NAM States have said that they are unwilling to endorse this bypassing of the CD, although they will support the resolution and sign the treaty. The resolution, likely to be considered on 9 September, requests the UN General Secretary to be the depositary for the CTBT and open it for signature, and calls upon all States to sign and ratify. If the resolution is endorsed, a signing ceremony could be held in New York before the end of September. If not, it will deal a major blow to prospects for non- proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

recent developments

China conducted its 45th nuclear test as the third part of the CD's 1996 session opened on 29 July. Although a few countries expressed 'regret' that China had tested again, criticism was muted by the widespread welcome given to Beijing's announcement that this was its final test before joining the other declared nuclear-weapon States in a moratorium. However, the test (and apparent acquiescence of the international community) further incensed India, which opened the session by reiterating its decision not to sign the treaty contained in the 28 June Chair's text and warning that it would block the treaty altogether unless the EIF provision were modified. It appears that this warning was not initially believed, although few expected India to be able to sign the treaty in the near future.

Despite its misgivings about the implications of Article XIV of the draft treaty on entry into force, the Clinton Administration made a policy decision in early July to support the Chair's text in WP.330/Rev.1 as it was and to deter any attempts at further negotiations, on grounds that the danger of unravelling the treaty would be too great. Consequently the US obtained early declarations of support for the Chair's text from Britain, France, Russia, Indonesia and several others. During July, thirteen G-21 (the CD grouping of non-aligned States) delegations - from Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Myanmar and Venzuela - had revised their proposals on the preamble, submitted on 27 June as WP.336, with a view to negotiating for stronger commitments on qualitative developments and nuclear disarmament.

The nuclear-weapon States, and Britain, France and the US in particular, refused to consider the G-21 proposals, and it became clear in early August that Ramaker had decided that only procedure and no issues of substance were to be discussed in the remaining NTB Committee meetings. Multilateral negotiations continued under the auspices of Friends of the Chair only on the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) arrangements and funding, and agreements with Austria over hosting the CTBT Organization, neither of which affected the treaty text.

Apart from a reiteration by India of its simple numerical proposal on EIF, that the treaty should take effect upon ratification by 65 States, none of the other delegations which had expressed grave reservations about the inflexibility of Article XIV in the draft text proposed alternatives to the provision listing 44 nuclear capable CD members. Given the expressed determination by Russia, Britain and China, as well as Pakistan and Egypt, to ensure that the treaty would not take effect without all eight nuclear test capable States on board, advocates of a more flexible provision seemed to regard any attempt to reopen the negotiations as doomed unless the United States and France were prepared to move Russia, China and Britain. Despite some half-hearted attempts, the political leadership for this was lacking.

Many delegates expressed anxiety that India's declaration on 20 June that it would not sign the treaty in its present form turned the EIF provision into an invitation to India to veto the treaty altogether. Yet, though the majority, including Australia, Germany and most EU countries, Japan, Canada and most of the G-21, considered that a more flexible provision, combined with political pressure once the furore in the Indian press had died down, would be more likely to deliver India's future accession than imposing a structural condition in the treaty itself, the US determination not to let negotiations be re-opened seemed to act as a gag on its allies and on the NTB Committee Chair.

However, notwithstanding its declarations against re-opening the treaty, the US acceded to China's demand for further discussions on inspections and NTM. During P-5 negotiations in June and July, Britain, France and Russia had already been willing to accept an OSI decisionmaking procedure based on a 'three-fifths' majority, viewed as a bridging formula between the simple majority reflected in Ramaker's text and the two-thirds majority demanded by China, Pakistan and others. After hard bargaining, during which China's support for the treaty appeared to hang in the balance, the US accepted Ambassador Sha Zukang's proposal for decisionmaking by 'at least 30 affirmative votes' of the 51-member Executive Council. For the text to be amended to meet China's needs while the US and Ramaker remained adamant that no further negotiations were possible, Ramaker added this in to a list of procedural 'modifications'. This fed Indian anger even further, resulting in editorials calling for the Indian government to conduct a nuclear test and weaponize its nuclear capability in order to be taken seriously in international negotiations.

Hope that the CD would approve the treaty faded when Ambassador Arundhati Ghose on 8 August said that unless the EIF provision were amended, India would be 'reluctantly obliged to oppose' consensus on the text. She said that Article XIV 'totally disregards' India's position, seeking to enforce its signature, contrary to international law and pointed out that the provision was 'not in accordance with the wishes of the majority of CD members', but had been included at the insistence of a small number of States which did not really want the treaty.

Ghose's complaint that there had been no willingness to negotiate on its concerns was echoed by others who felt that negotiations in the committee need not have been curtailed so abruptly. However, there was also a strong undercurrent of opinion that India's decision to block on the EIF provision was strategic: that India did not want the CTBT, and would have found another reason to block, even if entry into force were made more flexible. Since three of the nuclear-weapon States attached great importance to retaining the current Article XIV and the US had decided not to prioritise this issue, Ramaker considered he had no alternative but to secure a treaty that at least the P-5 would accept.

This decision overshadowed the endgame. Once India had blocked, the question became how to take the treaty to New York for General Assembly endorsement with the maximum possible support. Attached to a resolution from the CD, the text would almost certainly have been adopted without a vote, but if it were submitted to the UN by only a handful of States, the risks increased that it could be derailed or amended in such a way that the P-5 would refuse to sign. With many delegations reluctant to bypass the CD until all possible avenues had been exhausted, the United States began to exert pressure on the CD's credibility. Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, speaking to the press on 15 August, referred to 'grave perhaps fatal damage to the Conference as an institution', warning that 'it is not necessary for India or Iran...to destroy the CD as a credible institution in order to make their points'.

The non-aligned - and particularly India - have traditionally regarded the CD as a vital component for multilateral engagement on disarmament issues. Since this view is not generally shared by the Western nuclear powers, such comments were considered a scarcely-veiled threat. Recognising that the time had passed for obtaining stronger commitments in the preamble, 28 of the 30 non- aligned States in the CD proposed a 'programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons', arguing that this could provide a basis for discussions in a CD committee on nuclear disarmament. Opinion was divided, with some arguing that the programme would merely harden US-UK opposition to a nuclear disarmament committee, while others, such as Chile, emphasised that the programme should be regarded as a contribution to debate, together with the Canberra Commission, the judgement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and related NGO studies.

Although the non-aligned were substantially supported by western countries and China in pressing for a CD committee as the appropriate place to initiate multilateral discussions on further steps towards nuclear disarmament, and despite significant flexibility by Russia and France, the US and UK have continued to oppose this committee, arguing instead for negotiations to open on a fissile materials ban. However, this issue is still deadlocked over whether to include stockpiles, with India now pushing to renegotiate the mandate to exclude stocks explicitly and link the measure with a wider commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Based on recent CTBT experience, few now expect that the CD will be successful in negotiating a fissban anytime soon. While some had hoped to bargain their support for the CTBT in New York with P- 5 agreement on a nuclear disarmament committee, the US and UK (at least) are determined to keep the two things separate. This is contributing to the high degree of frustration among non-nuclear- weapon States over the final stages of CTBT negotiations and especially the treaty's weak preamble.

It is clear that most non-aligned countries would prefer a stronger preamble and more flexible EIF provision in the treaty. However, in view of the P-5 threats not to sign an amended treaty, their decisions on amendments will have to be tactical. An amendment on a time-bound framework, for example, could well split the NAM. Although it was adopted as NAM policy in Cartagena in 1995, thereby potentially carrying 113 votes, some would feel bound to vote against in order to safeguard the CTBT, while the majority would be likely to abstain.

The cost of a showdown over such an amendment, whether passed or failed, could have serious and adverse long term consequences, which will have to be carefully calculated by any State considering this. There are perhaps fewer risks if Syria, Iran or others propose amendments to eject Israel from the Middle Eastern regional grouping. The geographical basis for distribution of Executive Council seats was a carefully crafted balance and most States want Israel in the treaty, so a majority for such a change would be extremely unlikely.

To view the passage of the CTBT through the UNGA purely in terms of the numbers would be a serious mistake. The nuclear-weapon States as well as India and Iran bear a heavy responsibility for the precarious condition of this long-sought treaty. Whether the treaty unravels now or in the next few years as it sits in legal limbo will depend on many political factors. There will have to be clear, practical demonstrations that the CTBT was not intended merely as a non-proliferation measure to reinforce the nuclear status quo, involving further bilateral progress on reducing the largest arsenals and a genuine commitment in both the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enhanced review process and the CD to negotiate the further steps towards eliminating nuclear weapons, in accordance with NPT obligations.

Report of the ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban

Accepted as a 'factual record' of the work of the NTB Committee in 1996, the report (WP.340/Rev.2) first listed the personnel who had taken responsibility for specific issues during CTBT negotiations and provided a record of 26 official documents and 67 working papers submitted during the year. It summarised the substantive work, noting that the Chair's text WP.330 was presented after 'building upon agreements' reached during the negotiations and on the basis of Ramaker's 'best judgement', calling it 'an essential and indispensable step towards the conclusion of a treaty within the time frame set by the international community.' Referring to 'a new negotiating framework' from that point, though acknowledging that some delegations preferred the rolling text, the report establishes that the Chair's text had effectively become the basis for negotiations after 28 May.

Section V, 'Conclusions of the Chairman on his Consultations', included the main points from the statement made by Ramaker to the committee on 9 August, clarifying or interpreting aspects of the text and determining that continuing negotiations on the draft treaty 'would not likely yield further results'. He noted that 'every solution' attempted on outstanding concerns, including entry into force, nuclear disarmament and the preamble, the Executive Council (EC) composition, etc, 'seemed to create a new problem'.

Ramaker clarified for India's benefit that Article XIV (on EIF) did not impinge on a State's sovereign right; nor did paragraph 2, referring to the political conference, mean UN Security Council measures (i.e. sanctions) in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. He clarified for Iran and others, which had objected to Israel's inclusion in the Middle East region, that these groupings were CTBT-specific, defined in geographical terms to underscore that no State Party should be permanently excluded from the Executive Council. He further clarified the purpose of inspections and gave his understanding of safeguards against the potential abuse of NTM: based on 'objective information', limited to the treaty's subject matter, respecting sovereignty of States and in the least intrusive manner possible. The agreement made between China and the US on inspections was presented as a 'slight' modification replacing 'a majority of all' by 'at least 30 affirmative votes of' the Executive Council.

Section VI: National Statements

There then followed 18 national 'statements of position', summarised below in the order in which they were attached.

Egypt: The text offers 'a better balance and an improvement over previous texts' but falls short in some respects. In particular, the preamble 'should have contained clear and unambiguous references to the objective of achieving total nuclear disarmament and to the fact that the treaty is but one step within a phased framework of nuclear disarmament...' Lack of agreement on this 'raises significant doubts about the true commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to these objectives.' The draft is not comprehensive, 'but only another partial test ban treaty which bans only nuclear test explosions.' Egypt argued against the 'green light' OSI process in the treaty (preferring 'red light') but accepted Ramaker's clarifications on NTM and Article XIV. Egypt complained that Africa was not equitably represented and criticised the distribution of seats by six 'unprecedented' regional groups. The statement did not say whether or not Egypt accepts the treaty text as finalised.

Mexico: Noted that the ban was limited to nuclear weapon test explosions and regretted that the preamble did not more explicitly reaffirm 'the commitment of all States to the total elimination of nuclear weapons', arguing that this omission diminished the effectiveness of the treaty's contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament. 'The treaty's most serious shortcoming is the Article on entry into force', with a provision that 'detracts from the viability of the draft as a treaty'. Mexico would have favoured any provision that would have 'enabled the treaty to become fully operative in the foreseeable future.' Notwithstanding these criticisms, Mexico considered that the committee should approve the transmission of the draft to the CD.

India: Reiterated that 'India cannot and does not accept' the revised draft treaty 'as the CTBT we were mandated to negotiate'. India's objections included: the draft 'leaves open the possibilities of non-explosive testing and consequently of the qualitative improvement and upgradation of nuclear weapons...'; it lacks any commitment to a timebound process, including only 'weak preambular references of a non-binding nature' on nuclear disarmament. India opposed the transmission of the draft text because of 'the strongest objection to Article XIV', which created 'obligations for a country without its consent and therefore ...contrary to customary international law'. Since India had 'clearly and repeatedly stated its position not to subscribe to the draft treaty in its present form' Article XIV completely disregarded this position. 'For all those countries who appear so eager to have this text enter into force at an early date, they have ensured, that with the current language, it will never do so.'

Brazil: Accepted the draft, regarding the OSI amendment as an improvement. While preferring other 'adjustments' also, Briazil understood that this could imperil conclusion of the CTBT in the internationally set time-frame. While lack of commitment to specific measures on nuclear disarmament 'is a major shortcoming', Brazil expressed confidence that the ban would 'constrain vertical proliferation and reinforce the trend towards rolling back the nuclear arms race' but raised concerns about the financial burden of its implementation.

China: Referring again to China's commitment to the 'complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-free world', the statement said that China considered that the draft treaty 'represents the outcome of negotiations in the past two and a half years, by and large reflecting objectively the state of the negotiations and therefore is balanced in general' . China would agree to transmission of the treaty draft to the CD as an annex attached to the report of the committee.

Saying that it was not entirely satisfied with the draft because it 'fails to fully reflect the just demand and reasonable proposals put forward by many developing countries, including China', the statement objected to the following: no reference to a no first use agreement in the preamble; equal treatment for IMS and NTM information, 'without drawing the necessary distinctions...' and possible abuse or misuse of OSI; the decision- making procedure, where China would still prefer two-thirds, but had accepted the 30-vote majority option as a last resort to facilitate early conclusion; financial contribution being included as one of the criteria for membership of the Executive Council, which could set a bad precedent; and noble gas monitoring which China viewed as lacking sufficient technical assessment and a technical consensus.

Algeria: Stressed that the absence of a consensus text was not due to the actions of any State in particular but to the inadequacies of the text itself. Despite these, Algeria would not oppose its transmission to the CD. The statement identified several major objections: dissatisfaction with the weak references to nuclear disarmament; concern about inspections, underlining that NTM should not be obtained from human intelligence and should relate only to possible violations of the treaty; Article XIV on entry into force, which could prejudice a State's sovereign rights; and Africa's under-representation on the Executive Council.

Cuba: Criticised the draft for failing to site the issue in the proper contexts of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and for ambiguities and omissions. The treaty in its current from is just another partial test ban treaty. It should have banned all nuclear tests and contained stronger preambular commitments on a timetable for nuclear disarmament and the beneficial impact on the environment of halting nuclear explosions. Cuba also expressed concern about the provisions for NTM, financial contributions as a criterion for EC membership, and entry into force. However, Cuba would not oppose the draft treaty 'chiefly because we think that a ban on nuclear explosions is supremely important and represents a step forward, albeit a modest one...'

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK, USA: Though not 'fully satisfied with the text in CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2,' the 39 signatories on the joint statement were 'prepared to support this text and consider that it should be forwarded to the Conference on Disarmament for consideration and adoption.'

UK, US, Germany, Italy, Spain, France and Belgium (7 Western countries) clarified that in their view none of the national statements had any 'authoritative status at the level of interpretation or otherwise: the text of the Treaty spoke for itself.'

Colombia: Referred to the summit of the NAM (of which it is currently coordinator) in Cartagena in 1995, which 'reaffirmed that, if the CTBT was to have any meaning as a disarmament treaty, it must be considered as a major step towards the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame.' Colombia therefore criticised the preamble as weak and questioned whether the treaty's real purpose was to maintain the nuclear status quo. Calling Article XIV 'interesting', Colombia questioned whether it was 'viable in present circumstances' and 'if we are genuinely interested in having the treaty enter into force at a given time.' Colombia would be ready to sign a CTBT but gave no specific indication of support for this text.

Iran: Noted that there were still 'three or four' issues to be resolved and criticised as 'appalling' the fact that 'negotiations should cease abruptly and be replaced by an accelerated move towards deadlock.' Iran identified several objections: lack of commitment to a phased programme with agreed time frames to eliminate nuclear weapons; NTM; and the Executive Council composition, specifically Israel's inclusion within the Middle East and South Asia regional group. Referring to the programme of action for elimination of nuclear weapons (CD/1419, 7 August 1996, see below), Iran concluded that its proponents 'find the current text failing to fulfil the established objective or a comprehensive test ban', and pushed for negotiations to resolve the remaining issues. Iran said that it could 'go along with nearly all parts' of Ramaker's draft, but 'the remaining issues mentioned above prevent us from lending our support to it.'

Viet Nam: Criticised the preamble as too weak on nuclear disarmament and raised concerns about financial contribution to the treaty regime, but concluded that the 'draft CTBT, in its present form, does provide us [with] several important measures that, if implemented in good faith, would greatly enhance international cooperation for peace and nuclear disarmament.'

Pakistan: Criticised the process of negotiations as lacking transparency and complained that the text was 'not entirely the product of multilateral negotiations' and in some cases did 'not take into account strongly held positions of some States whose participation is vital...' Specific problems included: lack of comprehensiveness of scope; inadequate preambular commitment to nuclear disarmament in a specific time-frame; the EC list (which Pakistan considered unnecessary, while accepting the Chair's statement that this was CTBT-specific). Pakistan's major objections covered NTM and OSI provisions. While raising a series of concerns, Pakistan said it accepted the Chinese-US revision for approval of an OSI request by at least 30 of the 51 EC members, and stated for the record Pakistan's view that 'IMS information will hold primacy in the context of the treaty's verification and that NTM data will not supersede the IMS data.'

Pakistan underlined the 'highest importance' of the EIF provision and said that it would strongly oppose any change to Article XIV. Pakistan underscored its view that 'the signature and ratification by a State of this treaty cannot constitute a legal commitment to its basic obligations until the treaty has entered into force.' Furthermore the conduct of a nuclear explosion could constitute sufficient grounds for Pakistan to withdraw from the treaty on groups of supreme national interests. Pakistan was prepared to accept the draft text as the basis for consensus and agree to its transmission to the CD 'despite its shortcomings', as it would constrain further development of nuclear weapons and contribute to the goal of nuclear disarmament and promote nuclear non- proliferation.

Kenya: Kenya emphasised that it was at the forefront for advocating a CTBT and anxious to see it concluded as soon as possible.

Nigeria: Concluding that 'this nuclear weapon explosion limitation treaty is important' Nigeria appeared to give critical support without indicating its view on transmission or signature. Specifically, Nigeria argued that the financial contributions required of States should be balanced by preambular provisions strong on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, expressing disappointment that the treaty had failed to do this effectively. Nigeria also raised concerns about EIF, preferring a simple numerical formula, and the composition of the EC, complaining that Africa was under-represented and that instead of the six geographical regions the basis should have been the five UN- recognised groupings.

Peru: Despite its 'many deficiencies', Peru would accept the draft treaty, but underlined two major objections: the weakness of the preamble on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and the financial obligations incurred by States Parties which had never acquired or desired nuclear weapons.

Canada: Accepted the text and backed its transmission to the CD for consideration and adoption, but expressed 'serious reservations' about some aspects, namely verification, and the need for 'a more progressive and dynamic reference' to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the preamble. Canada was 'deeply concerned' over the EIF provisions, which 'may result in a prolonged and serious delay in the treaty's entry into force.'

Belgium: While describing the treaty as 'far from being perfect', Belgium wanted it to be sent to and endorsed by the UNGA. In particular, Belgium would have preferred a stronger preamble on nuclear disarmament, a simpler OSI procedure, and a more flexible EIF provision.

Section VII: Conclusions and Recommendations

After long hours of deliberation, the following language was finalised, acknowledging the basic support for the treaty but lack of full agreement: 'As this report indicates, despite the assessments of CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2 contained in section VI above [the national statements] and support for a proposal to transmit it to the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration, no consensus could be reached either on the text or on the action proposed. The ad hoc Committee refers this report to the Conference on Disarmament.'

Statements to the CD Plenary

Several of the statements which formed part of the NTB Committee's report and are summarised above were based on plenary speeches, which will not therefore be detailed again. See also Documents and Sources.

1 August

The 743rd plenary of the CD, chaired by Ambassador Jose Urrutia of Peru, was addressed by John Holum, deputy Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and by the representatives of China, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, Colombia, Iran, Sri Lanka and Brazil. While most statements concentrated on the CTBT negotiations, New Zealand announced that it had become the 58th country to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), while Iran raised concern that this important treaty could enter into force without 'the two declared possessors of chemical weapons', Russia and the United States.

For the United States, Holum echoed President Clinton's call for the Chair's CTBT text to be forwarded without change to the United Nations, arguing that 'the likelihood of a better outcome through further negotiation is nil'. Responding to complaints that the treaty had been 'pre-cooked', Holum pointed out that many positions favoured by the US had been rejected, but congratulated Ramaker for producing from the disparate views of CD members a draft treaty 'that none of us, despite our disappointments, can claim is unrepresentative or unfair'.

Ambassador Sha Zukang itemised the compromises China had made to facilitate early conclusion of the treaty, but argued that China could not support the Chair's draft unless the trigger basis and decisionmaking procedure for OSIs were renegotiated. China called for further clarification of which NTM would be admissible and offered two alternative proposals on OSI. Sha did not refer to China's test, although New Zealand, Australia, Japan and Switzerland expressed regret that it had taken place, while welcoming Beijing's announcement of a moratorium on further tests.

Ambassador Munir Akram reiterated that Pakistan was not satisfied with the negotiations, saying that the process had lacked transparency and that 'texts relating to vital parts of the treaty have descended from heaven and elsewhere'. In particular he raised concern that the treaty would not be universal or fully comprehensive, and repeated Pakistan's positions on NTM and OSI. He concluded by underlining that Pakistan opposed any change in the entry-into-force provisions of the Chair's text.

Several countries, including Australia, Belgium, Japan and Switzerland, urged acceptance of the Chair's text as is, while acknowledging its 'imperfections'. Summing up this position, Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan considered that 'in view of the limited time available for us, the Chairman's text seems to be the only proposal which enables us to have a treaty.' Brazil said it would be prepared to accept the Chair's draft treaty, considering that it 'offers the best prospect' for a CTBT, but noted the 'inescapable fact' that 'several important participants...still have major difficulties' with the text, urging for all avenues to be explored to conclude a 'generally acceptable treaty'.

Pakistan, Colombia and Sri Lanka raised continuing concern that the treaty 'will ban only nuclear explosions and not all nuclear tests', thereby possibly allowing some qualitative development of nuclear weapons. Colombia also regretted the lack of a 'time-bound commitment' to secure nuclear disarmament and questioned the viability of Article XIV on entry into force. In Sri Lanka's view, this, 'as presently drafted, will not permit the treaty to come into force - at all.' Sri Lanka also raised concerns about funding and the composition of the Executive Council, concluding with the hope that negotiations will continue on the basis of the Chair's text in order to resolve the remaining issues.

8 August

The 744th plenary, chaired by Urrutia, was addressed by Ukraine, Ireland, Morocco, Egypt, Mexico, South Africa and India.

Speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated countries, Ambassador Anne Anderson of Ireland (holders of the EU Presidency) acknowledged that because it 'attempts to balance competing requirements, [the 28 June draft text] does not and cannot reflect all the aspirations of all participants in the negotiations'. However, upholding Ramaker's judgment that it represented 'the maximum common ground', the EU urged all participating countries to accept and adopt the treaty text. The draft treaty was also endorsed by Ukraine, who warned that 'further procrastination in the process of negotiations would seriously jeopardize the chances for the successful completion of our common work on the CTBT...'

Morocco said it was 'not opposed in principle' to the Chair's text, but raised concerns that the entry-into-force provision should not compromise any State's sovereignty.

Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India told the CD that since the 28 June draft 'does not meet India's basic concerns', her country would not sign the treaty in that form. She read a statement dated 31 July from the Minister of External Affairs of India, I K Gujral, calling for a 'genuinely comprehensive CTBT' and condemning 'ongoing testing programmes, whether at test sites or in laboratories'. Arguing that Article XIV on entry into force 'seeks to enforce our signature by means unprecedented in treaty- negotiating practice in that it creates obligations for a country without its consent', Ghose proposed an amendment, whereby the treaty would enter into force after ratification by 65 States. Furthermore, she warned that if Article XIV was retained in its inflexible form, requiring India's signature, India would oppose efforts to adopt the text.

Recalling previous decisions by the G-21, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt presented a 'programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons' on behalf of 28 of the 30 current members. This programme outlined three stages from 1996 to 2020, recommending 'concrete measures' to be carried out by the ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. Zahran called for the CD to 'carefully study the programme and start work immediately for the earliest realization of the objective of attaining a world free from all nuclear weapons'.

Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, who had been a prime mover in developing the programme of action, immediately spoke in support, saying the the CD should begin negotiations on 'a phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a definite time- frame' as soon as it had completed the CTBT. Arguing that there has been 'no fundamental change in the military doctrines of security based on these doomsday weapons', de Icaza said that it was 'essential to give the negotiations on disarmament a direction and specific goals' but underlined that the purpose was not to impose 'preconceived patterns' but to initiate a 'joint exercise in thinking'. Noting concern from some CD delegations that the CTBT did not prohibit all nuclear tests or close the test sites, Mexico suggested that this could be remedied by future action rather than by attempting to renegotiate the CTBT.

Ambassador J S Selebi of South Africa read from a joint 'Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control' signed on 8 August by President Nelson Mandela and James Bolger, Prime Minister of New Zealand. This reaffirmed the necessity for early signing of the CTBT, referred to the ICJ judgement and highlighted the NPT enhanced review process, as providing a means for promoting the full implementation of the Treaty. Endorsing the Pelindaba and Rarotonga treaties, both countries reaffirmed their objective of achieving a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons, pledging support for the CWC and verification provisions to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and calling for greater focus on conventional arms in all disarmament fora.

Following this, Selebi said that South Africa had not been able to co-sponsor the programme of action presented by Egypt because of linkage represented by the demand for immediate 'and concurrent' negotiations on several measures including a fissile materials production ban, conventions on non-use and negative security assurances and a nuclear weapons convention, which from experience, he said, was more likely 'to block progress on all fronts'. Although De Icaza denied that any linkage was intended, saying that Mexico also opposed such linkage, it is understood that the word 'concurrent' was included at the insistence of India, which is now opposing a fissban unless it goes together with a commitment on complete nuclear disarmamament.

15 August

The 745th plenary, chaired by Urrutia, was addressed by Chile, Cuba, Bangladesh, Seychelles, Iran, Turkey and Australia. The edited statements of Iran and Cuba were attached to the NTB Committee report, summarised above.

Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile spoke in favour of the treaty and its transmission, but called for more action on nuclear disarmament, citing the Canberra Commission report and the Stimson Center report on 'An evolving US Nuclear Posture', as well as the G-21 programme of action proposed by Egypt (although Chile was not a co-sponsor). This prompted Australia to give a brief introduction to the Canberra Commission report, published on 14 August.

Ambassador Anwar Hashim of Bangladesh spoke critically on the CTBT, objecting especially to the EIF provision as 'superfluous' and creating unacceptable pressures on the 44 listed countries (Bangladesh included). Pointing out that Bangladesh was already an NPT Party with no ambitions for nuclear weapons, he said that, as one of the poorest nations in the world, its decision on ratification would have to be based on 'budgetary arithmetic'.

The Seychelles' maiden speech in the CD expressed commitment to disarmament.

Turkey's representative read out a statement from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 August) which supported the Chair's text and called for signature by UNGA 51.

20 August

The 746th plenary, chaired by Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, adopted the NTB Committee report (CD/1425), but deferred taking action on it until 22 August. Presenting the report, the Committee Chair, Jaap Ramaker, thanked everyone for their work and said that ' the report traces the steps that have led us to the draft text of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the outcome of a long and difficult negotiating process.' He regretted that consensus had not been reached, but said that with the latest version of the draft text, 'the ad hoc committee reached the very limits of what it could negotiate'. Pointing out that 'a great many countries' accepted the treaty 'as it stands now', Ramaker recommended that the CD adopt the report and transmit it to the General Assembly.

Ambassador Arundhati Ghose again gave India's reasons for refusing to let the CD transmit the treaty text to the UNGA. Referring to the 'attempted duress' embodied in the entry into force provision, she said that the CD 'has no text of a CTBT to recommend to the GA at this time'. Going over the ways in which India had tried to remove the 'shortcomings' of the treaty, especially by regarding advances in nuclear technology and the need for nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework, she said that the Indian objective was a 'truly comprehensive test ban treaty rather than merely a nuclear test explosion ban treaty' and that underground explosions now had the same relevance to halting development of nuclear weapons as banning atmospheric tests did in 1963. Ghose reiterated India's objections to Article XIV, declaring that 'the procedure adopted despite India's declared dissociation with the draft text has been perceived very negatively in our capital.'

Ambassador Munir Akram gave a very hard hitting statement providing Pakistan's 'nuclear history of South Asia' and attacking India's nuclear ambitions and 'hypocrisy'. Criticising those who sought to appease India by conveying 'assurances that one country can "stay out" of the Treaty as long as it does not block transmission' he warned against 'double standards', threatening that 'any step of nuclear escalation by our neighbour will find a matching response to preserve our national security.' Pointing out that when India had co-sponsored the UNGA resolution on a CTBT in 1993, proposing the mandate for negotiations, it had not insisted on the link with timebound nuclear disarmament, Akram suggested that India had not expected that negotiations would go so far.

Noting that India had in the past refused regional disarmament initiatives on the grounds that only global measures including the P-5 were acceptable, Akram castigated India for now refusing the global CTBT. Pointing out that Pakistan also supports timebound nuclear disarmament and had sponsored the programme of action with 27 others, he said that 'to insist that the nuclear powers give a prior commitment to such a programme as a precondition for the entry into force of a CTBT is obviously unrealistic and unreasonable...a transparent device to avoid a commitment to a nuclear test ban treaty, to veto a vital disarmament measure which has virtually universal support.' Reiterating that any change to Article XIV would destroy consensus, Akram said that Pakistan endorsed this treaty draft, despite its shortcomings, and backed its transmission to the UNGA for adoption.

Ambassador Sirous Nasseri of Iran criticised the way in which doors were 'slammed shut' on further negotiations, causing a 'hasty non-consensus'. Iran 'would not disagree' with the adoption of the NTB Committee's report but urged the CD to take a fresh look and explore every possibility to improve the treaty text.

22 August

The 747th plenary, chaired by Dembinski, failed to agree on sending the NTB Committee report - even without the treaty text attached - to the the UNGA 50th session. With both the Western and Eastern European groups advocating transmission, supported by many G-21 States, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, Peru, Morocco and Chile, consensus was defeated only by a series of last ditch procedural blocks put up by Iran and India. They said they would not object to its transmission in a 'regular report' and with deliberate disingenuity questioned the 'hurry' of sending it to UNGA 50, even invoking CD rules of procedure that have never been applied before when adopting its committees' reports. Proposals by Pakistan and Egypt to simplify the decision to send the report to UNGA 50 were likewise blocked. The NTB Committee report will thus become part of the annual report of the CD's 1996 session which will be transmitted to UNGA 51 after the CD closes on 13 September.

Belgium requested that the draft treaty text contained in CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2 should be issued as a publicly available CD document, a normal procedure for documents which any CD member wishes to place officially on the record.

After all attempts to get CD consensus for sending the text or the report to the UNGA had failed, Australia made public its intention to take the CTBT to New York with a group of 'Friends of the Treaty' in fulfilment of the undertaking in UNGA resolution 50/65.

Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States individually gave what was clearly a coordinated statement supporting the text, indicating their own willingness to sign it, and warning against attempts to re-open or amend any part of it. Israel made a similar statement, while Germany, Sweden, Romania, Japan, Austria, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland (on behalf of the EU) made individual statements supporting the treaty text, as a 'balanced compromise', though not containing 'all our preferred national positions'.

Agreeing with Ramaker's assessment that the NTB Committee had 'reached the very limits of what it could negotiate' Ambassador Wade Armstrong of New Zealand supported Australia's announcement, posing the question whether the CD should leave the treaty text and pronounce failure or 'allow the international community, which this body serves, to consider for itself the merits of the text'?

Reminding delegates that the treaty had been 'negotiated over years and with the expectations of decades...' Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia crystallised the frustration among many CD members, pointing out that the NTB Committee report they were all arguing about was 'a report shorn of a text...despite an overwhelming majority willing to accept the text, despite perceptions of [its] imperfections'. Accordingly, 'no matter how long or successful your efforts, the CD will not be able to transmit the text of the treaty...'

While acknowledging reservations on the substance of the treaty text, including the EIF provisions, Starr said that it was inaccurate to suggest [as India has] that this is either illegal or coercive, and argued that the treaty did meet the requirements of the mandate. On the positive side, 'the treaty will impose, for the first time, constraints on the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and bring the nuclear arms race to a definitive end. It will make a key contribution to the program of action on non-proliferation and disarmament agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. It is a crucial step in the process towards complete nuclear disarmament. A concluded Treaty will make it possible to tackle authoritatively the next important step toward this goal.' Most importantly, he said, it is a 'workable treaty - and we have a commitment by the five Nuclear-weapon States to endorse and sign it...we have worked for this...for years...we cannot give up.' 'The opportunity is here,' he concluded: 'It will not last. We must grasp it or lose it and with it the whole critical step forward towards nuclear disarmament.'

Although the gist of the statements made by the P-5 was the same, Russia's was longer and more substantive, identifying the treaty's positive features. Ambassador Grigori Berdennikov declared that 'the treaty frees humanity forever from nuclear explosions, whatever the environment in which they are conducted...will make an effective contribution to the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime...[and] represents the implementation, by the Parties to the NPT, of the decision by the NPT Review and Extension Conference which... called for the completion of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996.' He affirmed that 'the comprehensive and threshold-less ban on any nuclear explosions will undoubtedly serve as an effective brake for the qualitative improvement of nuclear charges,' preventing new types of nuclear devices. He concluded that the CTBT would hamper the spread of nuclear weapons even further. China added that if negotiations were reopened it could destroy the fragile balance and that the situation could be 'mishandled' or affected by international developments, pushing the CTBT even further away.

Ambassador Yosef Lamdan's statement for Israel gave support to the treaty text 'despite imperfections', especially on OSI. He said it was the 'best attainable' compromise and warned against any reopening. He underlined that the Executive Council provisions were of 'cardinal importance' to Israel, a 'main consideration' for Israel's support of the text.

Syria's representative complained that the geographical distribution for seats on the Executive Council ran 'contrary to UN customs and practices' and said that if the treaty text came up for discussion in any international forum, Syria woud seek to have Israel removed from the Middle East and South Asia regional list.

A summary of the draft Treaty

Negotiations on a CTBT opened in the CD in January 1994, chaired by Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico, who bequeathed an initial rolling text of 93 pages. Ludwik Dembinski of Poland took over the chair in January 1995, in a year which saw substantial progress on verification but little movement on the central political issues until August, when the US and France dramatically pledged themselves to zero yield. When Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands took over in January 1996, he inherited a revised rolling text, with more than 1200 brackets around disputed text or options.

In February, Iran and Australia submitted draft or 'model' treaty texts, which demonstrated areas of agreement and showed how the mass of brackets could be pared away. While differing in the detail of their solutions, the Iranian and Australian texts approached many of the outstanding problems in similar ways. They thus hacked a path to enable Ramaker to put down a Chair's text. Because of strong opposition to any 'premature' attempt to circumvent the rolling text, expressed by India, Pakistan, China and Russia, Ramaker chose to pull the text together in two stages. At the end of March he therefore tabled an 'Outline of a draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty' (CD/NTB/WP.321), consisting of a preamble and 17 articles, including considerable sections of the rolling text in brackets.

On 28 May, Ramaker presented a complete 'Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty', consisting of a preamble and 17 articles with no brackets (CD/NTB/WP.330). To this were attached various annexes and protocols covering the treaty's verification. On 28 June, the last day of the second part of the 1996 session, Ramaker tabled a revised draft treaty (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.1). Many CD delegations considered that they had been mandated by the 50th UN General Assembly (in consensus resolution UNGA 50/65) to bring it the finalised text of the CTBT for endorsement before it closed on 16 September 1996, so that the treaty could be signed 'at the outset' of the 51st UN Session.

In view of this deadline and support for the draft treaty text from four of the nuclear-weapon States, Ramaker refused to re-open negotiations in the NTB Committee when it reconvened on 29 July. However, the text was modified with minor text clarifications and one substantive amendment, following agreement by the US and China on OSI decisionmaking. On 14 August Ramaker published his final text (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2), which is summarised below.

Preamble

Failing to obtain fuller commitments on nuclear disarmament and preventing qualitative development of nuclear weapons, many non- nuclear-weapon States have expressed disappointment in the preamble, leading to fears that this may be subject to amendments when the treaty is considered in New York.

Rejecting any mention of curbing nuclear weapon development as an objective or aspiration of the treaty, the P-5 were prepared to allow the preamble to refer to 'constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons' as a consequence of the treaty. They would also accept a preambular paragraph recognising a CTBT as 'a meaningful step in the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.' Watering down Cuba's proposal for acknowledging damage to the environment from nuclear testing, the preamble merely notes 'the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment.'

Elsewhere the preamble welcomes recent arms reduction measures and underlines the importance of their implementation and of further measures towards nuclear disarmament. Utilising language agreed in the decisions on Principles and Objectives at the NPT Conference in May 1995, the preamble stresses the need for 'continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'. It reiterates the NTB Committee's mandate for a 'universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty' and affirms its 'purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security'.

Scope

The basic obligations in Article I of the CTBT are taken from the most widely supported option in the rolling text, originally proposed by Australia in March 1995:

'1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.'

This incorporates the 'zero yield' understanding that this prohibits low yield explosive testing and hydronuclear experiments. As far as the nuclear weapon States are concerned, it does not apply to sub-critical tests and laboratory experiments that do not involve a release of fission energy. This is disputed by many non-aligned and non-nuclear weapon countries who argue that the prohibition should cover all nuclear tests, whether explosive or not. So-called 'peaceful nuclear explosions', advocated by China, are banned unless the treaty is amended, following a complicated procedure requiring consensus at both a Review Conference and an Amendment Conference.

The CTBT Organization (CTBTO)

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) would be established in Vienna, comprising a Conference of States Parties, expected to meet annually, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General. The CTBTO would be an independent body, but could share expertise and facilities with other international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Executive Council would consist of 51 members, elected from six geographically determined regions, thus: 10 from Africa, 7 from Eastern Europe, 9 from Latin America, 7 from the Middle East and South Asia, 10 from North America and Western Europe, and 8 from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. One third of the seats are to be filled taking into account particular criteria, one seat per region allocated by alphabetic rotation (to ensure that no-one is excluded), and the rest designated from among the States Parties in each region by rotation or election. In the section to be filled according to certain criteria, political and security interests are to be taken into account, alongside IMS facilities, expertise and experience in monitoring, 'nuclear capabilities relevant to the treaty as determined by international data', and States Parties' budgetary contribution to the CTBTO.

This formula was designed to provide equitable regional participation, ensure that no State is permanently excluded, and give States which regard themselves as major players the assurance of continuous seats on the Council, while avoiding the political overtones of providing 'permanent' seats to the nuclear-weapon States or others. Several countries, including Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Iran and Syria have objected to this formula. Some argue that the treaty should not set a new precedent, but should rely on groupings already established in bodies such as the UN or the IAEA, while others have complained that Africa was under- represented. Iran and Syria have objected to the presence of Israel in the Middle East and South Asia region, arguing that Israel should be among the Western European and North American countries instead.

Ramaker stated for the record that the composition of the six regions was CTBT-specific and that States were listed in geographical terms in order to 'underscore the consensus principe that no State Party should be permanently excluded from a seat on the Executive Council.' This was intended to allay concerns that this treaty might set a precedent, but Iran and Syria have continued to call for this provision to be changed and may seek to amend this provision in New York. However, they are in a minority. Others refuse to have Israel singled out, claiming that the geographical principal is consistently applied, since other countries which appear as part of the Western group in UN bodies, such as Japan or Australia, are listed in the Pacific region.

While the Conference of States Parties is the principal body, the Executive Council will have the greatest political role in decisionmaking. With the exceptions of permitting or preventing an on-site inspection from being launched, the Executive Council would take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of its 51 members, and matters of procedure by a simple majority. Following bilateral negotiations between the US and China, and presented as a 'modification' by Ramaker on 9 August, an on-site inspection request would have to receive 'at least 30 affirmative votes' of the Executive Council.

Verification

The verification regime would consist of an international monitoring system (IMS) of four basic technologies, non-mandatory consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. There is agreement on the number and location of stations providing global networks of seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitors. Despite India's withdrawal of a primary and auxiliary seismic station and a radionuclide monitoring station, Ramaker has kept the IMS numbers the same, with India's replacement 'to be determined' if New Delhi continues to boycott the treaty.

The IMS would comprise 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations, a network of 11 hydroacoustic monitors, 60 infrasound stations and a network of 80 stations for measuring radionuclides in the atmosphere. The IMS also designates 40 of the 80 radionuclide stations to monitor for the presence of relevant noble gases as well as for radioactive particles. While omitting electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and satellites, which China wanted, there are provisions for 'improvement of the verification regime', allowing EMP, satellites or other technology to be incorporated in the IMS subject to the consensus of the Executive Council. In this manner, technologies can be either added or deleted from the IMS without requiring the full process of an Amendment Conference. It would also be possible, under separately established 'cooperative arrangements' for any State Party to make available supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the IMS, although it appears that this only applies to the IMS- type technologies.

The International Data Centre (IDC), attached to the Technical Secretariat, would be responsible for processing the mass of raw data from the IMS stations and sending it to States Parties in a variety of forms. In particular, the IDC would screen data in accordance with internationally standardised criteria established by the CTBTO, filter it according to nationally requested criteria, and provide some additional technical assistance to States Parties.

On IMS funding, Ramaker has decided that unless the responsible State is willing to provide funding, the CTBTO would pay for establishing new facilities identified as necessary for the primary networks, upgrading existing primary or auxiliary facilities to the international standards, operating and maintaining primary IMS facilities, transmitting IMS data, both processed and raw, analysing samples and authenticating data from auxiliary stations. Providing a modified version of the US proposal for 'contribution credits', the Chair's text allows a State Party to offset its costs on establishing and operating its stations against its assessed financial contribution, up to half its annual financial liability. Overall, the costs of the CTBTO will be met by all States Parties in accordance with the UN scale of assessments adjusted to take account of the difference in membership of the two organisations.

Confidence-building measures relate to voluntary notification of chemical explosions and calibration of the IMS stations, but do not encompass any transparency or measures relating to the existing test sites. Consultation and clarification, identified by Ramaker as an essential component of the verification regime, has been made voluntary, not mandatory, but should be sought immediately if any request for an on-site inspection is received. Although time-lines are provided so that results of this exchange of information can inform the OSI decision process, conclusion of the clarification process is not obligatory.

On-Site Inspections (OSI)

This is the only provision to be substantially amended in the 14 August draft (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2).

The draft treaty allows any relevant kind of information, including national technical means, but 'consistent with generally recognised principles of international law', understood to exclude espionage. Countries like Pakistan, Iran and China had raised repeated concerns about the admissibility of NTM. Without changing the draft treaty, Ramaker's report emphasised for the record that the text contains several safeguards against abuse, including the requirements that verification - including any OSI request - must be based on objective information relevant to the treaty's subject, namely to clarify whether a nuclear test or explosion had been carried out, and emphasising that the sovereignty of States would be respected.

Following strong negotiating tactics by China, which favoured a two-thirds majority decision for OSI, the US agreed on a majority of 30 of the 51 Executive Council members. It was understood that Britain, France and Russia had indicated their willingness to go along with this compromise formula during P-5 discussions in late June, but that the US caved in only after intensive bilateral negotiations in the first weeks of August, during which China made it clear that without this concession it would be unable to sign the treaty.

While continuing to advocate a two-thirds majority, China proposed two alternatives on 1 August: the fixed 30 affirmative votes for any OSI request, regardless of the type of information on which it was based; or a more complicated procedure whereby a simple majority decision would suffice for an OSI request based solely on IMS data, a two-thirds majority would be necessary for a request based solely on NTM data, while a request based on a combination of NTM and IMS information would be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes from the whole Executive Council. In the event, the simpler procedure was agreed by the US and adopted by the Chair, who presented it to the Committee on 9 August as a 'modification' (to avoid further attempts to renegotiate the text).

To avoid the decisionmaking procedure being used as a delay mechanism, the draft treaty provides a practical but strict time- line of one week for the various stages between an OSI request and arrival at the site to be inspected. Once an inspection is initiated, it can only be halted by a majority decision of the Council, or by recommendation of the inspection team (unless countermanded by the Council). However, if drilling is to be conducted, a further decision of the Council must be sought.

The treaty also includes penalties if the Executive Council deems a request to have been 'frivolous or abusive'. This may be financial (requiring the requesting State Party to bear the costs incurred) or any of the measures in Article V, which covers the redressing of a situation, compliance and sanctions. Accordingly, failure to comply with treaty obligations or abuse of the treaty's provisions can result in penalties ranging from suspension of membership rights, collective measures in conformity with international law, and the taking of cases of 'particular gravity' to the United Nations.

Review of the Treaty

A Review Conference could be held ten years after the treaty takes legal effect, to enable States Parties to review whether 'the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized'. The review would take into account any new scientific and technological developments and could also consider PNEs, if any State Party so requested. If the Review Conference decided by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it would have to draft an appropriate amendment to the CTBT, 'that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions'. This amendment would then have to be considered and agreed by consensus at an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII.

Entry into Force (EIF)

Despite the carrying out of India's threat to block consensus on the treaty if listed, Ramaker retained the Article XIV provision by which the CTBT cannot become fully legally binding without the signature and ratification of 44 countries which were participating members of the CD on 18 June 1996 and are also listed by the IAEA's 1995 and 1996 schedules of nuclear research and nuclear power reactors in the world respectively. As listed in Annex 2, these countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, DPRK, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, USA, Viet Nam, Zaire. This list was intentionally conceived to prevent ambiguity by clearly omitting Yugoslavia (still on the roll as a CD member but barred from participation) and Iraq.

This provision was strongly supported by Britain, Russia, China, Egypt and Pakistan, but disliked by the majority of States, including the US and France, who feared that it could result in a treaty that never takes effect. Attempting to deal with this concern, Ramaker included an Austrian/Canadian mechanism for a 'political conference', which could be held three years after opening the treaty for signature and annually thereafter until entry into force. This conference 'shall consider a