Stephen G. Rademaker Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Statement to the Conference on Disarmament Geneva, Switzerland May 18, 2006

Rising to the Challenge of Effective Multilateralism

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to appear again in this chamber before the Conference on Disarmament. When I last spoke to this body three years ago, I chose as my theme "The Commitment of the United States to Effective Multilateralism." I explained how, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction having become the preeminent threat of the post-Cold War era, the United States is convinced that multilateralism is today more important than ever. Because of the crucial importance of effective multilateralism in confronting today's threats, I underscored the determination of my government to provide the international leadership necessary to ensure that multilateralism does not fail in those cases of vital importance to our security. Finally, I cautioned against confusing leadership designed to ensure that multilateralism succeeds in such cases with so-called "unilateralism".

Regrettably, the challenges to international peace and security today are no less great than when I spoke here three years ago. In a moment I will address some of those challenges, but first I want emphasize an important aspect of multilateralism that is overlooked in many discussions of the subject.

Sovereign Responsibility

Mr. President, in the view of the United States, effective multilateralism begins at home. In confronting the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, the fundamental building block of success is national efforts to control the dangers of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the delivery systems for such weapons. Multilateral institutions and multilateral instruments cannot by themselves substitute for the exercise by sovereign governments of their responsibility to prevent the proliferation of these weapons. Multilateral institutions and multilateral instruments can establish norms, provide assistance and encouragement to those requesting help complying with the norms, and impose consequences for violations of the norms. But sovereign states also have the responsibility and, in most cases, the capability to stem WMD proliferation. Blind deference to multilateralism should not be considered an acceptable excuse for the failure of governments to do everything within their power at home to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

For these reasons, a hallmark of the Bush Administration's approach to proliferation issues across the board has been to promote exercise of the sovereign responsibility of states to act against WMD proliferation. A clear example of this approach is the work program adopted with U.S. support at the conclusion of the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in 2002. Rather than adopting a new multilateral instrument or establishing a new multilateral institution, the States Parties to the BWC agreed in 2002 to focus from 2003 to 2005 on steps that individual governments could take to better exercise their sovereign responsibility to prevent the development or spread of biological weapons. Those steps included such things as criminalizing the development or use of biological weapons by their nationals or on their territory, improving security measures applied to dangerous pathogens, and strengthening codes of conduct for scientists.

This approach also is reflected in our vigorous support for the development and adoption of a Plan of Action to promote national measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in 2004, was an even more direct effort to promote the exercise of sovereign responsibility to prevent proliferation. By requiring all states to criminalize WMD proliferation and to adopt and enforce controls on exports of sensitive WMD-related technologies, Resolution 1540 ended once and for all the debate about the propriety of such controls. Today it is clear that effective export controls are not just good policy, they are legally required of all members of the United Nations.