'Illicit Spread of Nuclear Weapons Threat to All, Official Say', US Department of State, Washington File, March 27, 2005.

Meeting Nonproliferation Challenges: UNSCR 1540 and the 2005 NPT Review Conference

Mark Fitzpatrick, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary

Remarks at the Meeting of the Organization of American States Committee on Hemispheric Security

Washington, D.C.
March 17, 2005

Today's Nonproliferation Challenges

This month marks the 35th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT. At its inception, the NPT reflected the understanding that the spread of nuclear weapons to more states was contrary to the promotion of international peace and security. Today, that norm and the Treaty embodying it are nearly universal. With the Treaty as a cornerstone, states committed to stemming proliferation have constructed the nuclear nonproliferation regime, a mutually reinforcing network of national actions, multilateral arrangements, and international treaty obligations, aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to more states. As the threat posed by nuclear proliferation has evolved, parties to the regime have responded by strengthening the nonproliferation framework and adding to the tools available to combat this threat in all its dimensions.

Our experience of the past five years shows that the danger of nuclear proliferation will continue to grow and evolve. If we underestimate proliferators and fail to address this threat vigilantly and creatively, not only nonproliferation, but international peace and security will suffer. September 11th, 2001 made abundantly clear that the terrorist desire to cause death and destruction knows no limit. Subsequent investigation has shown terrorist interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, to achieve these aims. This realization was made all the more grave by the discovery of A.Q. Khan's clandestine nuclear trafficking network. The network exemplified the potential for non-state actor involvement in proliferation and non-state actor access to nuclear equipment and technology once thought only to be within the interest and reach of national actors.

The challenge, however, comes not only from non-state actors. A.Q. Khan's list of customers and contacts plus evidence uncovered by the International Atomic Energy Agency make clear that there are states that continue to pursue nuclear weapons despite pledges to the contrary. These states work, not solely through diversion from peaceful nuclear programs, but also through the construction of parallel, clandestine nuclear weapons programs. The exposure of the Khan network led to the exposure of Libya's nuclear weapons program: a program Libya has since verifiably dismantled as part of its strategic decision to return to full compliance with the nonproliferation regime.

But two other states that have pursued nuclear weapons, North Korea and Iran, have failed to follow Libya's example in renouncing them. For the past two years, Iran has responded with denial, deception, and delay to the international community's calls to comply with its obligations. North Korea went so far as to eject International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from its territory, to withdraw from the NPT, and to announce that it has developed nuclear weapons.

Terrorism, illicit nuclear trafficking, and noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations threaten all of us. The impact of terrorism, a world-wide scourge, is not confined to the targeted state. Like terrorism, illicit nuclear trafficking seeks opportunities where they are to be found, regardless of a state's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, all of our security is diminished, especially the security of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, when NPT parties fail to honor their nonproliferation obligations and other parties fail to hold them accountable.